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FOREWORD 
The recovery continues, but it has weak-ened. In advanced economies, growth is now too low to make a substantial dent in unemployment. And in major emerg-
ing market economies, growth that had been strong 
earlier has also decreased. Relative to our April 2012 
forecasts, our forecasts for 2013 growth have been 
revised from 2.0 percent down to 1.5 percent for 
advanced economies, and from 6.0 percent down 
to 5.6 percent for emerging market and developing 
economies.
The forces at work are, for the most part, 
familiar.
Those forces pulling growth down in advanced 
economies are fiscal consolidation and a still-weak 
financial system. In most countries, fiscal consoli-
dation is proceeding according to plan. While this 
consolidation is needed, there is no question that it 
is weighing on demand, and the evidence increas-
ingly suggests that, in the current environment, the 
fiscal multipliers are large. The financial system is 
still not functioning efficiently. In many countries, 
banks are still weak, and their positions are made 
worse by low growth. As a result, many borrowers 
still face tight borrowing conditions. 
The main force pulling growth up is accommoda-
tive monetary policy. Central banks continue not 
only to maintain very low policy rates, but also to 
experiment with programs aimed at decreasing rates 
in particular markets, at helping particular catego-
ries of borrowers, or at helping financial intermedia-
tion in general. 
More seems to be at work, however, than these 
mechanical forces—namely, a general feeling of 
uncertainty. Assessing the precise nature and effects 
of this uncertainty is essential, but it is not easy. 
Essential: If uncertainty could be decreased, the 
recovery could well turn out to be stronger than 
currently forecast. But not easy: Explicit indexes of 
uncertainty, such as the VIX in the United States or 
the VStoxx in Europe, remain at fairly low levels.1 
Uncertainty appears more diffuse, more Knightian 
in nature. Worries about the ability of European 
policymakers to control the euro crisis and worries 
about the failure to date of U.S. policymakers to 
agree on a fiscal plan surely play an important role, 
but one that is hard to nail down.   
Low growth and uncertainty in advanced econo-
mies are affecting emerging market and develop-
ing economies, through both trade and financial 
channels, adding to homegrown weaknesses. As 
was the case in 2009, trade channels are surpris-
ingly strong, with, for example, lower exports 
accounting for most of the decrease in growth in 
China. Alternative risk-off and risk-on episodes, 
triggered by progress and regress on policy action, 
especially in the euro area, are triggering volatile 
capital flows.   
Turning to policy action, the main focus contin-
ues to be the euro area. Here, there has been a clear 
change in attitudes, and a new architecture is being 
put in place. The lessons of the past few years are 
now clear. Euro area countries can be hit by strong, 
country-specific, adverse shocks. Weak banks can 
considerably amplify the adverse effects of such 
shocks. And, if it looks like the sovereign itself 
might be in trouble, sovereign-bank interactions can 
further worsen the outcome.  
Therefore a new architecture must aim at reduc-
ing the amplitude of the shocks in the first place—
at putting in place a system of transfers to soften 
the effects of the shocks. That architecture must aim 
at moving the supervision, the resolution, and the 
recapitalization processes for banks to the euro area 
level. It must decrease the probability of default by  
sovereigns, and were default nevertheless to occur, 
it must decrease the effects on creditors and on the 
1VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility 
Index; VStoxx = Bloomberg’s Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index.
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financial system. It is good to see these issues being 
seriously explored and to see some of these mecha-
nisms being slowly put together.  
In the short term, however, more immediate 
measures are needed. Spain and Italy must follow 
through with adjustment plans that reestablish 
competitiveness and fiscal balance and maintain 
growth. To do so, they must be able to recapital-
ize their banks without adding to their sovereign 
debt. And they must be able to borrow at reason-
able rates. Most of these pieces are falling into 
place, and if the complex puzzle can be rapidly 
completed, one can reasonably hope that the worst 
might be behind us.  
If uncertainty is indeed behind the current 
slowdown, and if the adoption and implementa-
tion of these measures decrease uncertainty, things 
may turn out better than our forecasts, not only 
in Europe, but also in the rest of the world. I, for 
once, would be happy if our baseline forecasts turn 
out to be inaccurate—in this case, too pessimistic.   
Olivier Blanchard
Economic Counsellor
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ExECUTIvE SUMMARY
The recovery has suffered new setbacks, and uncertainty weighs heavily on the outlook. A key reason is that policies in the major advanced economies have 
not rebuilt confidence in medium-term prospects. 
Tail risks, such as those relating to the viability 
of the euro area or major U.S. fiscal policy mis-
takes, continue to preoccupy investors. The World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) forecast thus sees only a 
gradual strengthening of activity from the relatively 
disappointing pace of early 2012. Projected global 
growth, at 3.3 and 3.6 percent in 2012 and 2013, 
respectively, is weaker than in the July 2012 WEO 
Update, which was in turn lower than in the April 
2012 WEO (Chapter 1). Output is expected to 
remain sluggish in advanced economies but still 
relatively solid in many emerging market and 
developing economies. Unemployment is likely 
to stay elevated in many parts of the world. And 
financial conditions will remain fragile, according to 
the October 2012 Global Financial Stability Report 
(GFSR). Chapter 2 discusses regional developments 
in detail.
The WEO forecast rests on two crucial policy 
assumptions. The first is that European policy-
makers––consistent with the GFSR’s baseline 
scenario––will adopt policies that gradually ease 
financial conditions further in periphery economies. 
In this regard, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
has recently done its part. It is now up to national 
policymakers to move and activate the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), while articulating a 
credible path and beginning to implement mea-
sures to achieve a banking union and greater fiscal 
integration. The second assumption is that U.S. 
policymakers will prevent the drastic automatic tax 
increases and spending cutbacks (the “fiscal cliff”) 
implied by existing budget law, raise the U.S. fed-
eral debt ceiling in a timely manner, and make good 
progress toward a comprehensive plan to restore 
fiscal sustainability. The WEO forecast could once 
again be disappointed on both accounts. 
More generally, downside risks have increased 
and are considerable. The IMF staff’s fan chart, 
which uses financial and commodity market data 
and analyst forecasts to gauge risks––suggests that 
there is now a 1 in 6 chance of global growth falling 
below 2 percent, which would be consistent with a 
recession in advanced economies and low growth in 
emerging market and developing economies. Ulti-
mately, however, the WEO forecast rests on critical 
policy action in the euro area and the United States, 
and it is very difficult to estimate the probability 
that this action will materialize. 
This juncture presents major difficulties for 
policymakers. In many advanced economies, injec-
tions of liquidity are having a positive impact on 
financial stability and output and employment, 
but the impact may be diminishing. Many govern-
ments have started in earnest to reduce excessive 
deficits, but because uncertainty is high, confidence 
is low, and financial sectors are weak, the signifi-
cant fiscal achievements have been accompanied 
by disappointing growth or recessions. In emerging 
market and developing economies, policymakers are 
conscious of the need to rebuild fiscal and monetary 
policy space but are wondering how to calibrate 
policies in the face of major external downside risks. 
An effective policy response in the major 
advanced economies is the key to improving 
prospects and inspiring more confidence about the 
future. In the short term, the main tasks are to rule 
out the tail risk scenarios and adopt concrete plans 
to bring down public debt over the medium term. 
The crisis in the euro area remains the most 
obvious threat to the global outlook. The ECB has 
put in place a mechanism to improve the transmis-
sion of low policy rates to borrowing costs in the 
periphery, where investors’ fears about the viability 
of the euro have pushed market rates to very high 
levels. The periphery economies need to continue 
to adjust. Governments must meet their commit-
ment to make the euro area firewall more flexible. 
Specifically, the ESM must intervene in banking 
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systems and provide support to sovereigns, while 
national leaders must work toward true economic 
and monetary union. This requires establishing a 
banking union with a unified financial stability 
framework and implementing measures toward fis-
cal integration, on the principle that more area-wide 
insurance must come with more area-wide control. 
Unless more action is taken soon, recent improve-
ments in financial markets could prove fleeting. 
The WEO forecast may then be disappointed once 
again, and the euro area could slide into the Octo-
ber 2012 GFSR weak policies scenario. If, however, 
policy actions were to exceed WEO assumptions––
for example, if euro area policymakers were to 
deliver a major down payment on the road to more 
integration, such as an area-wide bank resolution 
mechanism with a common fiscal backstop––real 
GDP growth could well be higher than projected, 
consistent with the October 2012 GFSR complete 
policies scenario.
Reducing the risks to the medium-term out-
look presaged by the public debt overhang in the 
major advanced economies will require support-
ive monetary policies and appropriate structural 
reforms (Chapter 3), as well as careful fiscal policy. 
Good progress has already been made and planned 
fiscal consolidation is sizable for the near term, as 
discussed in the October 2012 Fiscal Monitor. U.S. 
legislators must soon remove the threat of the fiscal 
cliff and raise the debt ceiling––if they fail to do 
so, the U.S. economy could fall back into reces-
sion, with deleterious spillovers to the rest of the 
world. Furthermore, policymakers in the United 
States urgently need to specify strong medium-term 
fiscal plans. Those in Japan need to persevere with 
planned adjustments and specify new measures to 
halt and soon reverse the increase in the public-
debt-to-GDP ratio. 
More generally, policymakers need to specify real-
istic fiscal objectives and develop plans for contin-
gencies. This means adopting structural or cyclically 
adjusted targets, or anchoring plans on measures 
and their estimated yields, rather than on nominal 
targets. Automatic stabilizers should be allowed to 
play freely. Also, should growth fall significantly 
short of WEO projections, countries with room to 
maneuver should smooth their planned adjustment 
over 2013 and beyond. At the same time, declin-
ing inflation rates, growing slack, and sizable fiscal 
adjustment in the advanced economies argue for 
maintaining very accommodative monetary condi-
tions, including unconventional measures because 
interest rates are near the zero lower bound.
So far, policymakers’ record in meeting structural 
challenges has been mixed; therefore, further efforts 
are needed. Programs to relieve chronic household 
debt burdens, where these have been tried, have not 
been commensurate with the scale of the problem. 
Efforts to strengthen the regulatory framework for 
financial institutions and markets have been patchy, 
according to Chapter 3 of the October 2012 GFSR, 
with some success in rebuilding capital but less in 
lowering reliance on wholesale funding and contain-
ing incentives for excessive risk taking and regula-
tory arbitrage. In addition, in the euro area, the 
restructuring or resolution of weak financial institu-
tions has advanced slowly and only in response to 
major market pressure––a more proactive, area-wide 
approach is urgently needed. Increases in statutory 
retirement ages have reduced the long-term path 
of pension outlays, but as health care spending 
continues to increase quickly, more measures will 
be needed to contain the growth of entitlements 
to a sustainable rate. Some countries, notably the 
economies of the euro area periphery, have intro-
duced reforms to make labor markets more flexible. 
However, many economies need to take stronger 
action to help the long-term unemployed, including 
through improvements to job-search support and 
training.
In emerging market and developing economies, 
activity has been slowed by policy tightening in 
response to capacity constraints, weaker demand from 
advanced economies, and country-specific factors. 
Policy improvements have raised their resilience to 
shocks (Chapter 4). Since the crisis erupted in 2008, 
expansionary policies have buffered the negative 
impact of the weakness in advanced economy markets: 
fiscal deficits have typically been above precrisis levels, 
whereas real interest rates have been lower. Domestic 
credit has grown rapidly. Over the medium term, 
policymakers will need to ensure that they retain the 
ability to respond flexibly to shocks by maintaining 
a sound fiscal position and by keeping inflation and 
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credit growth at moderate rates. In this respect, the 
policy tightening during 2011 was appropriate. Given 
the growing downside risks to external demand, cen-
tral banks have appropriately paused or reversed some 
of the monetary policy tightening. Many have scope 
to do more to support demand if external downside 
risks threaten to materialize. 
Global imbalances, and the associated vulner-
abilities, have diminished, but there is still a need 
for more decisive policy action to address them. 
Within the euro area, current account imbalances––
the large surpluses in Germany and the Netherlands 
and the deficits in most periphery economies––need 
to adjust further. At the global level, the current 
account positions of the United States, the euro area 
as a whole, and Japan are weaker than they would 
be with more sustainable fiscal policies—and the 
real effective exchange rates of the dollar, euro, and 
yen are stronger. In contrast, the current account 
positions of many Asian economies are undesirably 
strong and their exchange rates undesirably weak. 
In part, this reflects distortions that hold back con-
sumption. But it also reflects the effect of large-scale 
official accumulation of foreign exchange. 
In general, the policies required to lower cur-
rent account imbalances and related vulnerabilities 
suit the interests of the economies concerned. 
More adjustment in external-deficit economies 
and more internal demand in external-surplus 
economies would contribute not only to a safer 
global economy but also to stronger growth for 
all. Many external-deficit economies need further 
fiscal adjustment and strengthened financial sector 
supervision and regulation. These efforts need to be 
complemented with structural measures, the details 
of which differ widely across the external-deficit 
advanced and emerging market economies but 
include labor and product market reform, improve-
ments to governance and the business environment, 
and measures to boost private saving for retirement. 
The structural measures needed in external-surplus 
economies with undervalued exchange rates also 
vary by country but include boosting investment 
in Germany, reforming the social safety net in 
China to encourage consumption, and reducing the 
accumulation of official reserves in many emerging 
market economies, which would also help rein in 
high credit and asset price growth.
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Th e global economy has deteriorated further 
since the release of the July 2012 WEO Update, and 
growth projections have been marked down (Table 
1.1). Downside risks are now judged to be more 
elevated than in the April 2012 and September 2011 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) reports. A key issue 
is whether the global economy is just hitting another 
bout of turbulence in what was always expected 
to be a slow and bumpy recovery or whether the 
current slowdown has a more lasting component. 
Th e answer depends on whether European and 
U.S. policymakers deal proactively with their major 
short-term economic challenges. Th e WEO forecast 
assumes that they do, and thus global activity is pro-
jected to reaccelerate in the course of 2012; if they 
do not, the forecast will likely be disappointed once 
again. For the medium term, important questions 
remain about how the global economy will operate 
in a world of high government debt and whether 
emerging market economies can maintain their 
strong expansion while shifting further from external 
to domestic sources of growth. Th e problem of 
high public debt existed before the Great Recession, 
because of population aging and growth in entitle-
ment spending, but the crisis brought the need to 
address it forward from the long to the medium 
term.
recent Developments
Indicators of activity and unemployment show 
increasing and broad-based economic sluggishness 
in the fi rst half of 2012 and no signifi cant improve-
ment in the third quarter (Figure 1.1). Global 
manufacturing has slowed sharply. Th e euro area 
periphery has seen a marked decline in activity 
(Figure 1.2, panel 1), driven by fi nancial diffi  culties 
evident in a sharp increase in sovereign rate spreads 
(Figure 1.2, panel 2). Activity has disappointed in 
other economies too, notably the United States 
and United Kingdom. Spillovers from advanced 
economies and homegrown diffi  culties have held 
back activity in emerging market and developing 
economies. Th ese spillovers have lowered commodity 
prices and weighed on activity in many commodity 
exporters (see the Special Feature).
Th e result of these developments is that growth 
has once again been weaker than projected, in 
signifi cant part because the intensity of the euro area 
crisis has not abated as assumed in previous WEO 
projections. Other causes of disappointing growth 
include weak fi nancial institutions and inadequate 
policies in key advanced economies. Furthermore, 
a signifi cant part of the lower growth in emerg-
ing market and developing economies is related to 
domestic factors, notably constraints on the sustain-
ability of the high pace of growth in these economies 
and building fi nancial imbalances. In addition, IMF 
staff  research suggests that fi scal cutbacks had larger-
than-expected negative short-term multiplier eff ects 
on output, which may explain part of the growth 
shortfalls (Box 1.1).
the crisis in the euro area Intensifi ed
Notwithstanding policy action aimed at resolv-
ing it, the euro area crisis has deepened and new 
interventions have been necessary to prevent mat-
ters from deteriorating rapidly. As discussed in the 
October 2012 Global Financial Stability Report 
(GFSR), banks, insurers, and fi rms have swept spare 
liquidity from the periphery to the core of the euro 
area, causing Spanish sovereign spreads to hit record 
highs and Italian spreads to move up sharply too 
(Figure 1.2, panel 2). Th is was triggered by contin-
ued doubts about the capacity of countries in the 
periphery to deliver the required fi scal and struc-
tural adjustments, questions about the readiness of 
national institutions to implement euro-area-wide 
policies adequate to combat the crisis, and concerns 
about the readiness of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the European Financial Stability Facility/
European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) to 
respond if worst-case scenarios materialize. 
GLOBaL prOSpectS aND pOLIcIeS
Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections
(Percent change unless noted otherwise)
Year over Year
Difference from July 
2012 WEO Update
Q4 over Q4
Projections Estimates Projections
2010 2011 2012 2013 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
World Output1 5.1 3.8 3.3 3.6  –0.2 –0.3  3.2 3.0 4.0
Advanced Economies 3.0 1.6 1.3 1.5  –0.1 –0.3  1.3 1.1 2.1
United States 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.1  0.1 –0.1  2.0 1.7 2.5
Euro Area 2.0 1.4 –0.4 0.2  –0.1 –0.5  0.7 –0.5 0.8
Germany 4.0 3.1 0.9 0.9  0.0 –0.5  1.9 0.9 1.4
France 1.7 1.7 0.1 0.4  –0.2 –0.5  1.2 0.0 0.8
Italy 1.8 0.4 –2.3 –0.7  –0.4 –0.4  –0.5 –2.3 0.0
Spain –0.3 0.4 –1.5 –1.3  –0.1 –0.7  0.0 –2.3 0.2
Japan 4.5 –0.8 2.2 1.2  –0.2 –0.3  –0.6 1.6 2.1
United Kingdom 1.8 0.8 –0.4 1.1  –0.6 –0.3  0.6 0.0 1.2
Canada 3.2 2.4 1.9 2.0  –0.2 –0.2  2.2 1.7 2.2
Other Advanced Economies2 5.9 3.2 2.1 3.0  –0.4 –0.4  2.4 2.3 3.6
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 8.5 4.0 2.1 3.6  –0.6 –0.6  3.0 3.2 3.5
Emerging Market and Developing Economies3 7.4 6.2 5.3 5.6  –0.3 –0.2  5.7 5.5 6.2
Central and Eastern Europe 4.6 5.3 2.0 2.6  0.1 –0.2  3.6 1.9 3.3
Commonwealth of Independent States 4.8 4.9 4.0 4.1  –0.1 0.0  4.3 2.9 4.8
Russia 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.8  –0.3 –0.1  4.6 2.5 4.8
Excluding Russia 6.0 6.2 4.7 4.8  0.2 0.2  . . .  . . . . . . 
Developing Asia 9.5 7.8 6.7 7.2  –0.4 –0.3  6.9 7.2 7.4
China 10.4 9.2 7.8 8.2  –0.2 –0.2  8.9 7.9 8.1
India 10.1 6.8 4.9 6.0  –1.3 –0.6  5.0 5.5 5.9
ASEAN-54 7.0 4.5 5.4 5.8  0.0 –0.3  2.8 7.2 6.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 6.2 4.5 3.2 3.9  –0.2 –0.3  3.7 3.0 4.6
Brazil 7.5 2.7 1.5 4.0  –1.0 –0.7  1.4 2.9 3.8
Mexico 5.6 3.9 3.8 3.5  –0.1 –0.2  3.9 3.2 4.1
Middle East and North Africa 5.0 3.3 5.3 3.6  –0.2 0.0  . . . . . . . . . 
Sub-Saharan Africa5 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.7  –0.1 0.0  . . . . . . . . . 
South Africa 2.9 3.1 2.6 3.0  0.0 –0.3  2.6 2.7 3.3
Memorandum           
European Union 2.1 1.6 –0.2 0.5  –0.2 –0.5  0.8 –0.2 1.2
World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates 4.1 2.8 2.6 2.9  –0.1 –0.3  2.3 2.2 3.3
World Trade Volume (goods and services) 12.6 5.8 3.2 4.5  –0.6 –0.7  . . . . . . . . .
Imports
Advanced Economies 11.4 4.4 1.7 3.3  –0.2 –0.9 . . . . . . . . .
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 14.9 8.8 7.0 6.6  –0.8 –0.4 . . . . . . . . .
Exports
Advanced Economies 12.0 5.3 2.2 3.6  –0.1 –0.7 . . . . . . . . .
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 13.7 6.5 4.0 5.7  –1.7 –0.5 . . . . . . . . .
Commodity Prices (U.S. dollars)
Oil6 27.9 31.6 2.1 –1.0  4.2 6.5 20.8 3.7 –3.3
Nonfuel (average based on world commodity 
export weights) 26.3 17.8 –9.5 –2.9  2.6 1.4 –6.4 1.9 –5.4
Consumer Prices
Advanced Economies 1.5 2.7 1.9 1.6  –0.1 0.0  2.8 1.7 1.7
Emerging Market and Developing Economies3 6.1 7.2 6.1 5.8  –0.2 0.2  6.5 5.6 5.3
London Interbank Offered Rate (percent)7
On U.S. Dollar Deposits 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6  –0.1 –0.2 . . . . . . . . .
On Euro Deposits 0.8 1.4 0.6 0.2  –0.1 –0.3 . . . . . . . . .
On Japanese Yen Deposits 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3  0.0 –0.1 . . . . . . . . .
Note: Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels prevailing during July 30–August 27, 2012. When economies are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on 
the basis of economic size. The aggregated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.
1The quarterly estimates and projections account for 90 percent of the world purchasing-power-parity weights.
2Excludes the G7 economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries.
3The quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 80 percent of the emerging market and developing economies.
4Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
5The current WEO projections include South Sudan. However, for sub-Saharan Africa, the forecast comparison with the July 2012 WEO Update does not include South Sudan because South 
Sudan was not included in the July projections. The World and Emerging Market and Developing Economies aggregates also are not directly comparable with the July 2012 WEO Update for the 
same reason, but South Sudan’s weight in these aggregates is very small.
6Simple average of prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil. The average price of oil in U.S. dollars a barrel was $104.01 in 2011; the assumed price based on futures 
markets is $106.18 in 2012 and $105.10 in 2013.
7Six-month rate for the United States and Japan. Three-month rate for the euro area.
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These concerns culminated in questions about the 
viability of the euro area and prompted a variety of 
actions from euro area policymakers. At the June 
29, 2012, summit, euro area leaders committed to 
reconsidering the issue of the seniority of the ESM 
with respect to lending to Spain. In response to 
escalating problems, Spain subsequently agreed on a 
program with its European partners to support the 
restructuring of its banking sector, with financing of 
up to €100 billion. Also, leaders launched work on a 
banking union, which was followed up recently with 
a proposal by the European Commission to establish 
a single supervisory mechanism. Leaders agreed that, 
once established, such a mechanism would open 
the possibility for the ESM to take direct equity 
stakes in banks. This is critical because it will help 
break the adverse feedback loops between sovereigns 
and banks. Moreover, in early September, the ECB 
announced that it will consider (without ex ante 
limits) Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) 
under a macroeconomic adjustment or precaution-
ary program with the EFSF/ESM. The transactions 
will cover government securities purchases, focused 
on the shorter part of the yield curve. Importantly, 
the ECB will accept the same treatment as private 
or other creditors with respect to bonds purchased 
through the OMT program. 
The anticipation of these initiatives and their sub-
sequent deployment set off a relief rally in financial 
markets, and the euro appreciated against the U.S. 
dollar and other major currencies. However, recent 
activity indicators have continued to languish, sug-
gesting that weakness is spreading from the periph-
ery to the whole of the euro area (Figure 1.3, panel 
2). Even Germany has not been immune.
Output and employment Weakened again in the 
United States 
The U.S. economy also has slowed. Revised 
national accounts data suggest that it came into 2012 
with more momentum than initially estimated. How-
ever, real GDP growth then slowed to 1.7 percent 
in the second quarter, below the April WEO and 
July WEO Update projections. The labor market and 
consumption have failed to garner much strength. 
The persistent weakness has prompted another round 
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Figure 1.1.  Global Indicators 
The global manufacturing cycle has turned down again. Industrial production has slowed sharply in 
advanced and emerging market and developing economies and so has world trade. The 
deterioration is broad based. Unemployment in advanced economies remains appreciably above 
precrisis levels and is elevated in eastern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. 
1. Industrial Production and World Trade
(annualized percent change of three-month moving average over 
previous three-month moving average)
Advanced economies1
Emerging
market economies2
CPB trade 
volume index
0
3
6
9
12
15
US EA Japan MENA DA CIS EE LAC
2. Unemployment3
2007
2011
2013
Above trend and moderating
Jun.
2008
Jan.
09
Jan.
10
Jan.
11
Jul.
12
Above trend and rising
Below trend and rising
Below trend and moderating
Contracting at a moderating rate
Contracting at an increasing rate
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: US = United States; EA = euro area; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; DA = 
developing Asia; EE = emerging Europe; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle 
East and North Africa.
1Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, euro area, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Japan, Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United Kingdom, 
and United States.
2Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania 
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.
3Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is omitted due to data limitations.
4The Growth Tracker is described in Matheson (2011). Within regions, countries are listed by 
economic size.
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of policy stimulus by the Federal Reserve. Because 
of ongoing political gridlock, the fiscal cliff will not 
be addressed before the November elections. On the 
positive side, the housing market may be stabiliz-
ing, albeit at depressed levels, and private credit has 
continued to expand despite retrenchment in the U.S. 
market by EU banks.
Domestic Demand continued to Lose Momentum in 
Key emerging Market economies 
Policy tightening in response to capacity con-
straints and concerns about the potential for 
deteriorating bank loan portfolios, weaker demand 
from advanced economies, and country-specific 
factors slowed GDP growth in emerging market and 
developing economies from about 9 percent in late 
2009 to about 5¼ percent recently. Indicators of 
manufacturing activity have been retreating for some 
time (Figure 1.3, panel 1). The IMF staff’s Global 
Projection Model suggests that more than half of the 
downward revisions to real GDP growth in 2012 are 
rooted in domestic developments.
 • Growth is estimated to have weakened apprecia-
bly in developing Asia, to less than 7 percent in 
the first half of 2012, as activity in China slowed 
sharply, owing to a tightening in credit conditions 
(in response to threats of a real estate bubble), 
a return to a more sustainable pace of public 
investment, and weaker external demand. India’s 
activity suffered from waning business confidence 
amid slow approvals for new projects, sluggish 
structural reforms, policy rate hikes designed to 
rein in inflation, and flagging external demand. 
 • Real GDP growth also decelerated in Latin Amer-
ica to about 3 percent in the first half of 2012, 
largely due to Brazil. This reflects the impact of 
past policy tightening to contain inflation pres-
sure and steps to moderate credit growth in some 
market segments—with increased drag recently 
from global factors. 
 • Emerging European economies, following a strong 
rebound from their credit crisis, have now been 
hit hard by slowing exports to the euro area, 
with real GDP growth coming close to a halt. In 
Turkey, the slowdown has been driven by domes-
tic demand, on the heels of policy tightening and 
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Figure 1.2.  Euro Area Developments
The crisis in the euro area has deepened. Activity is contracting, mainly due to deep cutbacks 
in production in the periphery economies, because financial and fiscal conditions are very 
tight. Sovereign issuers and banks in the periphery are struggling to attract foreign investors. 
Their sovereign debt spreads have risen appreciably, and their banks rely increasingly on the 
European Central Bank (ECB) for funding. As a result, they have cut back domestic credit.
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a decline in confidence. Unlike in 2008, however, 
generalized risk aversion toward the region is no 
longer a factor. Activity in Russia, which has ben-
efited various economies in the region, has also 
lost some momentum recently.
prospects are for Sluggish and Bumpy Growth
Looking ahead, no significant improvement 
appears in the offing. The WEO forecast includes 
only a modest reacceleration of activity, which would 
be helped along by some reduction in uncertainty 
related to assumed policy reactions in the euro area 
and the United States, continued monetary accom-
modation, and gradually easier financial conditions. 
Healthy nonfinancial corporate balance sheets 
and steady or slowing deleveraging by banks and 
households will encourage the rebuilding of the 
capital stock and a gradual strengthening of durables 
consumption. In emerging market and developing 
economies, monetary and fiscal policy easing will 
strengthen output growth. However, if either of two 
critical assumptions about policy reactions fails to 
hold, global activity could deteriorate very sharply. 
 • The first assumption is that, consistent with the 
October 2012 GFSR baseline scenario, European 
policymakers take additional action to advance 
adjustment at national levels and integration at 
the euro area level (including timely establishment 
of a single supervisory mechanism). As a result, 
policy credibility and confidence improve gradually 
while strains remain from elevated funding costs 
and capital flight from the periphery to the core 
countries. If these policy actions are not taken, the 
WEO forecast may be disappointed once again and 
the area could slide into the GFSR’s weak policies 
scenario, which is described in further detail below.
 • The second assumption is that U.S. policymak-
ers avoid the fiscal cliff and raise the debt ceiling, 
while making good progress toward a comprehen-
sive plan to restore fiscal sustainability. 
Fiscal adjustment Will continue but Not in Many 
emerging Market economies 
Fiscal adjustment has been detracting from activ-
ity in various parts of the world and will continue 
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Figure 1.3.  Current and Forward-Looking Growth Indicators
Purchasing managers’ indices for the manufacturing sector do not yet point to a significant 
reacceleration of activity—they remain below the level of 50, indicating falling output. The 
deterioration is particularly pronounced in the periphery of the euro area. Investment in 
machinery and equipment has also weakened, especially in the euro area. Furthermore, the 
pace of stock building has moved into a lower gear. Consumption has shown greater 
resilience, especially in emerging market and developing economies. Somewhat lower oil 
prices may support consumption in the advanced economies. However, higher food prices 
will harm many households, especially in emerging market and developing economies.
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to do so over the forecast horizon in the advanced 
economies but not in the emerging market and 
developing economies. The October 2012 Fiscal 
Monitor discusses the trends. 
In major advanced economies, general govern-
ment structural balances are on course to tighten by 
about ¾ percent of GDP in 2012, which is about 
the same as in 2011 and in line with the April 2012 
WEO projections (Figure 1.4, panel 1). In 2013, 
the tightening is projected to increase modestly 
to about 1 percent of GDP, but its composition 
across countries will be different (see Table A8 in 
the Statistical Appendix). In the euro area, much 
adjustment has already been implemented and the 
pace of tightening will diminish somewhat. In the 
United States, the budget outlook for 2013 is highly 
uncertain, given the large number of expiring tax 
provisions and the threat of automatic spending cuts 
and in the context of highly polarized politics. The 
fiscal cliff implies a tightening of more than 4 per-
cent of GDP, but the WEO projection assumes that 
the outcome would be only a 1¼ percent of GDP 
reduction in the structural deficit, which is slightly 
more than in 2012, mainly on account of expiring 
stimulus measures, such as the payroll tax cut, and a 
decline in war-related spending. The budget outlook 
has also become uncertain in Japan, where a political 
impasse has delayed approval of budget funding for 
the remainder of the fiscal year ending in March 
2013. Earthquake-related spending has lent support 
to growth in 2012 but will decline sharply in 2013. 
As a result, there will be a fiscal withdrawal of about 
½ percent of GDP. This withdrawal could be much 
larger if the political impasse is not resolved soon.
In emerging market and developing economies, 
no significant fiscal consolidation is on tap for 
2012–13, following a 1 percent of GDP improve-
ment in structural balances during 2011 (Figure 1.4, 
panel 1). The general government deficit in these 
economies is expected to remain below 1½ percent 
of GDP, and public debt levels are expected to 
decline as a share of GDP, toward 30 percent. Fiscal 
prospects, however, vary across economies. Policy 
will be broadly neutral in China, India, and Turkey 
in 2012 and 2013. In Brazil, policy will be broadly 
neutral in 2012 and tighten somewhat in 2013. In 
Mexico, there will be a roughly 1 percent of GDP 
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Figure 1.4.  Fiscal Policies
In 2012, fiscal policy became more contractionary in the advanced economies. It became 
much less contractionary in the emerging market and developing economies, where the fiscal 
deficit is expected to be about 1½ percent of GDP—much lower than the 6 percent of GDP level 
projected for the advanced economies. However, before the crisis, emerging market and 
developing economies were running surpluses. Over the medium term, many should 
strengthen their fiscal positions to rebuild room for policy maneuvering. The main challenges 
with respect to deficit reduction lie, however, in the advanced economies, where public debt is 
in excess of 100 percent of GDP and rising.
2. Fiscal Balance
(percent of GDP)
3. Public Debt
(percent of GDP)
1. Fiscal Impulse
(change in structural balance as percent of GDP)
Emerging market
and developing 
economies
Advanced 
economies
World
1950
Emerging market and 
developing economies
G71
Advanced 
economies
World
2009
Advanced economies
Emerging market and developing economies
10 11 12 13
April 2012 WEO
c h a p t e r 1  G lo b a l P r o s P e c ts a n d P o l i c i e s
 International Monetary Fund | october 2012 7
fiscal tightening in 2012, followed by a modest 
further fiscal withdrawal in 2013. Russia is loosen-
ing noticeably in 2012, but its stance is projected to 
become broadly neutral in 2013. 
Monetary policy Is expected to Support activity
Monetary policy has been easing and will 
remain very accommodative, according to mar-
ket expectations (Figure 1.5, panel 1). The ECB 
recently launched its OMT program (see above) 
and broadened collateral requirements. The Federal 
Reserve recently announced that it would purchase 
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 bil-
lion a month, consider additional asset purchases, 
and employ its other policy tools until economic 
conditions improve. It also extended its low-interest-
rate guidance from late 2014 to mid-2015. Earlier, 
the Bank of England had expanded its quantita-
tive easing program. Various advanced economies 
recently cut policy rates (Australia, Czech Republic, 
Israel, Korea) or postponed rate hikes. The Bank of 
Japan expects a roughly 5 percent of GDP monetary 
expansion during the coming year on account of 
its Asset Purchase Program and estimates that this 
would suffice to push inflation up to its 1 percent 
goal. It recently eased its monetary policy further 
by expanding its asset purchase program ceiling for 
government bonds.
The Bank of England launched some innovative 
measures. Under its Funding for Lending Scheme 
(FLS), banks and building societies will be able to 
borrow U.K. Treasury bills in exchange for less liq-
uid collateral. Banks may borrow bills in an amount 
equal to 5 percent of their June 2012 stock of loans 
to the U.K. nonfinancial sector, plus any expansion 
of lending from that date until the end of 2013. 
Swap fees will be lower for banks that maintain or 
expand rather than cut their lending. These measures 
should encourage bank lending and ease access to 
wholesale credit by improving the quality of assets 
held by banks. 
Emerging market and developing economies 
launched a variety of easing measures in response 
to softening activity and inflation. Many postponed 
anticipated tightening, and some cut policy rates, 
including Brazil, China, Colombia, Hungary, the 
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Figure 1.5.  Monetary Policies
Expectations are for very accommodative monetary policies in the major advanced  
economies. Real interest rates are also low in many emerging market and developing 
economies, and several economies have cut their policy rates in the past six months.
However, only a few economies implemented large cuts. Over the medium term, policy 
rates will have to be raised, but considering the downside risks to the outlook, many central
banks can afford to hold steady now or ease further. In advanced economies, central bank 
balance sheets have expanded appreciably, but their size is not unusual compared with 
those of various emerging market economies. 
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Philippines, and South Africa (Figure 1.5, panel 2). 
However, only Brazil cut aggressively, also easing 
 macroprudential measures to further encourage 
lending. On the whole, real interest rates in many 
emerging market and developing economies are still 
relatively low and credit growth is high. For these rea-
sons, many central banks have chosen to hold steady.
Financial conditions Will remain Very Fragile
Despite the summer 2012 market rally, financial 
vulnerabilities are higher than in the spring, accord-
ing to the October 2012 GFSR. Confidence in the 
global financial system remains exceptionally fragile. 
Bank lending has remained sluggish across advanced 
economies (Figure 1.6, panels 2 and 3). U.S. credit 
standards have been easing modestly for some time, 
although not yet for residential real estate. In the 
euro area, by contrast, lending surveys point to 
a further tightening of standards and falling loan 
demand. Bank credit has contracted sharply in the 
periphery, and credit growth slowed to a crawl in 
the core economies amid large increases in periphery 
credit spreads. 
Increased risk aversion has dampened capital flows 
to emerging markets (Figure 1.7, panel 1), although 
local-currency debt has continued to attract inflows 
throughout the euro area crisis. Concerns center on 
slowing domestic growth and heightened financial 
vulnerabilities. Sovereign and corporate spreads 
edged up (Figure 1.7, panel 2). Emerging market 
banks have been tightening lending standards in the 
face of rising nonperforming loans and worsening 
funding conditions (Figure 1.7, panel 4). Survey 
responses suggest that tightness in global funding 
markets played a major role in this regard. Indicators 
for loan demand are still expansionary in all major 
regions (Figure 1.7, panel 5). Credit growth itself fell 
off its very high pace but remains elevated in many 
economies. 
Financial conditions are likely to remain very 
fragile over the near term because implementing a 
solution to the euro area crisis will take time and the 
U.S. debt ceiling and fiscal cliff raise concerns about 
the U.S. recovery. Bank lending in the advanced 
economies is expected to stay sluggish—much 
more so in the euro area, where the periphery will 
Figure 1.6.  Recent Financial Market Developments
Equity markets recently registered large losses and have been very volatile. Policy 
pronouncements have had large effects. Bank lending conditions are gradually easing from 
very tight levels in the United States but are continuing to tighten in the euro area. U.S. credit 
to households and nonfinancial firms is growing again; euro area credit remains in the 
doldrums, amid cutbacks in the periphery.
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suffer further reductions in lending. Most emerg-
ing markets will likely experience volatile capital 
flows. In economies where credit growth has already 
slowed appreciably, such as China, credit is likely to 
rebound further as project approvals are fast-tracked; 
elsewhere, growth rates are likely to move sideways 
or decline. External funding conditions are likely 
to have a larger impact on credit developments in 
emerging Europe than in other emerging market 
economies. 
activity Is Forecast to remain tepid in Many 
economies 
The recovery is forecast to limp along in the 
major advanced economies, with growth remaining 
at a fairly healthy level in many emerging market 
and developing economies. Leading indicators do 
not point to a significant acceleration of activity, 
but financial conditions have recently improved in 
response to euro area policymakers’ actions and eas-
ing by the Federal Reserve.  
 • In the euro area, real GDP is projected to decline 
by about ¾ percent (on an annualized basis) dur-
ing the second half of 2012 (Figure 1.8, panel 2). 
With diminishing fiscal withdrawal and domestic 
and euro-area-wide policies supporting a further 
improvement in financial conditions later in 
2013, real GDP is projected to stay flat in the 
first half of 2013 and expand by about 1 per-
cent in the second half. The core economies are 
expected to see low but positive growth through-
out 2012–13. Most periphery economies are likely 
to suffer a sharp contraction in 2012, constrained 
by tight fiscal policies and financial conditions, 
and to begin to recover only in 2013. 
 • In the United States, real GDP is projected to 
expand by about 1½ percent during the second 
half of 2012, rising to 2¾ percent later in 2013 
(Figure 1.8, panel 1). Weak household balance 
sheets and confidence, relatively tight financial 
conditions, and continued fiscal consolidation 
stand in the way of stronger growth. In the very 
short term, the drought will also detract from 
output. 
 • In Japan, the pace of growth will diminish notice-
ably as post-earthquake reconstruction winds down. 
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Emerging markets suffered capital outflows until recently, their equity markets declined, and 
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Real GDP is forecast to stagnate in the second half 
of 2012 and grow by about 1 percent in the first 
half of 2013. Thereafter, growth is expected to 
accelerate further (Figure 1.8, panel 1). 
Fundamentals remain strong in many economies 
that have not suffered a financial crisis, notably in 
many emerging market and developing economies. 
In these economies, high employment growth and 
solid consumption (Figure 1.3, panel 3) should con-
tinue to propel demand and, together with macro-
economic policy easing, support healthy investment 
and growth. However, growth rates are not projected 
to return to precrisis levels. 
 • In developing Asia, real GDP is forecast to 
accelerate to a 7¼ percent pace in the second 
half of 2012 (Figure 1.8, panel 3). The main 
driver will be China, where activity is expected 
to receive a boost from accelerated approval of 
public infrastructure projects. The outlook for 
India is unusually uncertain: For 2012, with 
weak growth in the first half and a continued 
investment slowdown, real GDP growth is 
projected to be 5 percent, but improvements in 
external conditions and confidence––helped by a 
variety of reforms announced very recently––are 
projected to raise real GDP growth to about 6 
percent in 2013.
 • In Latin America, real GDP growth is projected 
to be about 3¼ percent for the second half of 
2012. It is then expected to accelerate to 4¾ 
percent in the course of the second half of 2013 
(Figure 1.8, panel 4). The projected accelera-
tion is strong for Brazil because of targeted fiscal 
measures aimed at boosting demand in the near 
term and monetary policy easing, including policy 
rate cuts equivalent to 500 basis points since 
August 2011. The pace of activity elsewhere is not 
forecast to pick up appreciably. 
 • In the central and eastern European (CEE) 
economies, improving financial conditions in the 
crisis-hit economies, somewhat stronger demand 
from the euro area, and the end of a boom-bust 
cycle in Turkey are expected to raise growth back 
to 4 percent later in 2013. 
 • Growth is projected to stay above 5 percent in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and above 4 percent in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (see 
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Figure 1.8.  GDP Growth
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Real GDP growth is projected to move sideways or accelerate modestly in 2012. Activity 
is expected to continue to contract during 2013 in the periphery economies of the euro 
area. In emerging Asia and Latin America, the projected acceleration is mainly driven  
by China and Brazil, which have been easing their macroeconomic policies in response 
to weakening activity.
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Table 1.1). In both regions, still-high commodity 
prices and related projects are helping. 
 • In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
activity in the oil importers will likely be held 
back by continued uncertainty associated with 
political and economic transition in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring and weak terms of trade—real 
GDP growth is likely to slow to about 1¼ percent 
in 2012 and rebound moderately in 2013. Due 
largely to the recovery in Libya, the pace of overall 
growth among oil exporters will rise sharply in 
2012, to above 6½ percent, and then return to 
about 3¾ percent in 2013.
cyclical Indicators point to Slack in advanced 
economies
Cyclical indicators point to ample slack in many 
advanced economies but to capacity constraints in a 
number of emerging market economies (Figure 1.9). 
WEO output gaps in the major advanced econo-
mies are large, varying from about 2½ percent of 
GDP in the euro area and Japan to 4 percent in the 
United States for 2012 (see Table A8 in the Statisti-
cal Appendix). These gaps are consistent with weak 
demand due to tight financial conditions and fiscal 
consolidation. By contrast, most emerging market 
and developing economies that were not hit by the 
crisis continue to operate above precrisis trends. 
However, their potential growth rates in recent 
years are judged to have been higher than indicated 
by the 1996–2006 precrisis average, and therefore 
WEO output gap estimates do not signal much 
overheating. 
Amid sharply differing developments across 
advanced and emerging market and developing 
economies, the world unemployment rate is esti-
mated to remain flat during 2012–13, near 6¼ per-
cent (Figure 1.1, panel 2). Unemployment rates have 
on average declined below precrisis levels in emerg-
ing market and developing economies, but they 
remain elevated in advanced economies and are not 
expected to fall significantly during 2012–13. 
 • In the United States, the unemployment rate 
dropped from close to 10 percent in 2010 to 
about 8 percent lately, where it is expected to 
remain through 2013. However, a large part of 
the decline is due to sluggish labor force expan-
sion through 2011. In addition, more than 40 
percent of those unemployed have been out of 
work for more than six months. In Europe, more 
than 1 in 10 labor force participants are projected 
to be unemployed through 2013; in Greece and 
Spain the ratio is 1 in 4 workers. More generally, 
almost half of all young labor force participants 
are without jobs in the periphery of the euro area. 
As in the United States, the number of long-term 
unemployed has also risen starkly, increasing the 
risk of hysteresis and skills atrophy.
 • In emerging market and developing economies, 
the unemployment record varies widely. Rates 
are very high in economies that were hit by the 
crisis, such as in many of the CEE and a few CIS 
economies, but relatively low in most parts of 
developing Asia and Latin America. Unemploy-
ment rates are projected to remain high in the 
MENA region, mainly among the oil importers. 
These economies face a number of challenges, 
ranging from major political changes, to social 
needs related to rapidly expanding populations, to 
decreased revenues from tourism—all of which are 
weighing on employment prospects in the short 
term. 
The slowdown in global activity and ample slack 
in many advanced economies have meant that 
inflation has fallen (Figure 1.10, panels 1 and 2). 
In advanced economies, lower commodity prices 
reduced headline inflation to about 1½ percent as 
of July 2012, down from more than 3 percent in 
late 2011. Core inflation has been steady at about 
1½ percent. In emerging market and developing 
economies, headline inflation has declined by almost 
2 percentage points, to slightly under 5½ percent, 
in the second quarter of 2012; core inflation too has 
declined, although to a lesser extent. The forecast 
is for further easing of inflation pressure in the 
advanced economies, with headline inflation moving 
to about 1¾ percent in 2013; in emerging market 
and developing economies, headline inflation is 
projected to move broadly sideways. 
This inflation forecast assumes broadly unchanged 
commodity prices, but sharply rising food prices raise 
increasing concern (see the Special Feature and Box 
1.5). Thus far, price pressures do not encompass all 
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Figure 1.9.  Overheating Indicators for the G20 Economies
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Emerging Market and 
Developing Economies
Financial
Domestic overheating indicators point to ample slack in the advanced economies—most indicators flash blue. By contrast, a number of yellow and red indicators for the emerging market and developing 
economies point to capacity constraints. External overheating indicators flash yellow or red for Japan and China—rather thanraising concerns, these are symptoms of an internal demand rebalancing 
process that has helped bring down global current account imbalances. However, in China, the rebalancing is overly reliant oninvestment. In Germany, which is the world’s other major surplus economy, the 
rebalancing process is lagging. The red indicators for Turkey point to external vulnerabilities.Credit indicators point to excesses in many emerging market and developingeconomies. Other financial 
indicators are mostly reassuring about overheating, except for Brazil.
Sources: Australia Bureau of Statistics; Bank for International Settlements; CEIC China Database; Global Property Guide; Haver Analytics; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Database; IMF, International 
Financial Statistics Database; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: For each indicator, except as noted below, economies are assigned colors based on projected 2012values relative to theirprecrisis (1997–2006) average. Each indicator is scored as red = 2, yellow= 
1, and blue = 0; summary scores are calculated as the sum of selected component scores divided by the maximum possible sum of those scores. Summary blocks are assigned red if thesummaryscore is 
greater than or equal to 0.66, yellow if greater than or equal to 0.33 but less than 0.66, and blue if less than 0.33. When data are missing, no color is assigned. Arrows up (down) indicate hotter (colder) 
conditions compared with the April 2012 WEO predicted values for 2012.
1Output more than 2.5 percent above the precrisis trend is indicated by red. Output less than 2.5percent below the trend is indicated by blue. Output within ±2.5 percent from the precrisis trend is 
indicated by yellow.
2For the following inflation-targeting economies, the target inflation rate was used instead of the 1997–2006 average in the calculation of the inflation indicator: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom. For the non-inflation-targeting economies, red was assigned if inflation is approximately 10 percent or higher, yellow if inflation is approximately 5 to 9 
percent, and blue if inflation is less than 5 percent. 
3The indicators for credit growth, house price growth, and share price growth refer to the latest2012 values relative to the 1997–2006 average of output growth.
4Arrows in the fiscal balance column represent the forecast change in the structural balance as apercent of GDP over the period 2011–12. An improvement of more than 0.5 percent of GDP is indicatedby 
an up arrow; a deterioration of more than 0.5 percent of GDP is indicated by a down arrow.
5Real policy interest rates below zero are identified by a down arrow; real interest rates above 3 percent are identified by an up arrow. Real policy interest rates are deflated by two-year-ahead inflation 
projections.
6Calculations are based on Argentina’s official GDP data. The IMF has called on Argentina to adopt remedial measures to address the quality of the official GDP data. The IMF staff is also using alternative 
measures of GDP growth for macroeconomic surveillance, including data produced by private analysts, which have shown significantly lower real GDP growth than the official datasince 2008. The IMF 
staff’s estimate of average provincial inflation is used as a measure of inflation and to deflate nominal variables.
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major food crops, unlike in 2007–08. As discussed 
further below, monetary policy should not react to 
food-price-driven increases in headline inflation unless 
there are significant risks for second-round effects on 
wages. Governments may need to scale up targeted 
social safety net measures and implement other fiscal 
measures (such as reducing food taxes) where there is 
fiscal space to do so. Also, countries should avoid any 
restrictions on exports, which would exacerbate price 
increases and supply disruptions. Over the longer 
term, broader policy reforms are necessary to reduce 
global food price volatility.
the Outlook has Become More Uncertain 
Risks to the WEO forecast have risen appreciably 
and now appear more elevated than in the April 
2012 and September 2011 WEO reports, whose 
policy assumptions and hence growth projections 
for advanced economies proved overly optimis-
tic. Although standard risk metrics suggest that 
downside risks are much higher now than only a 
few months ago, upside risks appear higher too, 
although to a lesser extent. This may be a reflection 
of the fact that many market participants have a 
bimodal view of global prospects: the recovery could 
be set back if European and U.S. policymakers fail 
to live up to expectations, but it could also be stron-
ger if they deliver on their commitments. The most 
pertinent near-term risks––escalation of the euro 
area crisis and fiscal policy failures in the United 
States––are quantified and discussed with the help of 
scenarios. In addition, this section considers a variety 
of medium- and long-term risks and scenarios.   
risks for a Serious Global Slowdown are alarmingly 
high
The WEO’s standard fan chart suggests that 
uncertainty about the outlook has increased mark-
edly (Figure 1.11, panel 1).1 The WEO growth 
forecast is now 3.3 and 3.6 percent for 2012 and 
2013, respectively, which is somewhat lower than in 
1For details about the construction of the fan chart, including a 
discussion of the role of the risk factors, see Elekdag and Kannan 
(2009).
Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
1Boom-bust countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States.
2Upward pressure countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, China, Hong 
Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Israel, Malaysia, Norway, Philippines, Switzerland, Singapore, 
Serbia, Sweden, Uruguay.
Figure 1.10.  Global Inflation
Headline inflation has declined everywhere, helped by lower commodity prices. In the 
emerging market and developing economies, core inflation has declined too. In advanced 
economies, it has remained stable around 1½ percent. House price developments 
increasingly diverge across economies. In various smaller advanced and a number of 
emerging market and developing economies, upward pressure remains, notwithstanding 
already high prices.
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April 2012. The probability of global growth falling 
below 2 percent in 2013––which would be consis-
tent with recession in advanced economies and a 
serious slowdown in emerging market and develop-
ing economies––has risen to about 17 percent, up 
from about 4 percent in April 2012 and 10 percent 
(for the one-year-ahead forecast) during the very 
uncertain setting of the September 2011 WEO. 
The IMF staff’s Global Projection Model (GPM) 
uses an entirely different methodology to gauge risk 
but confirms that risks for recession in advanced 
economies (entailing a serious slowdown in emerg-
ing market and developing economies) are alarm-
ingly high (Figure 1.12, panel 1). For 2013, the 
GPM estimates suggest that recession probabilities 
are about 15 percent in the United States, above 25 
percent in Japan, and above 80 percent in the euro 
area. 
risk Scenarios for the Short term
As emphasized, immediate risks relate to the 
assumptions about the sovereign debt crisis in the 
euro area and about the U.S. budget, both of which 
could negatively affect growth prospects. Further-
more, oil prices could again provide a shock.
A further deepening of the euro area crisis
The euro area crisis could reintensify again. The 
OMT program will reduce risks from self-fulfilling 
market doubts related to the viability of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) most effectively if it is 
implemented decisively. However, serious risks remain 
outside this safety net—posed, for example, by rising 
social tensions and adjustment fatigue that raise doubts 
about adjustment in the periphery or by doubts about 
the commitment of others to more integration. 
The downside scenario developed here uses the 
IMF staff’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal 
Model (GIMF) to consider the implications of an 
intensification of euro area sovereign and bank-
ing stress. Unlike in the WEO forecast and GFSR 
baseline scenario, European policymakers in this 
scenario do not strengthen their policies, as dis-
cussed in further detail in the weak policies scenario 
in the October 2012 GFSR. In this scenario, the 
forces of financial fragmentation increase and 
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Figure 1.11.  Risks to the Global Outlook
Risks around the WEO projections have risen, consistent with market indicators, and remain 
tilted to the downside. The oil price and inflation indicators point to downside risks to growth, 
while S&P 500 options prices and the term spread suggest some upside risk.
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Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Chicago Board Options Exchange; Consensus 
Economics; and IMF staff estimates. 
1The fan chart shows the uncertainty around the WEO central forecast with 50, 70, and 90 
percent confidence intervals. As shown, the 70 percent confidence interval includes the 50 
percent interval, and the 90 percent confidence interval includes the 50 and 70 percent 
intervals. See Appendix 1.2 in the April 2009 World Economic Outlook for details.
2The values for inflation and oil price risks enter with the opposite sign, because they 
represent downside risks to growth. 
3GDP measures the dispersion of GDP forecasts for the G7 economies (Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States), Brazil, China, India, and Mexico. VIX = 
Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 500 Implied Volatility Index. Term spread measures 
the dispersion of term spreads implicit in interest rate forecasts for Germany, Japan, United 
Kingdom, and United States. Oil measures the dispersion of one-year-ahead oil price 
forecasts for West Texas Intermediate. Forecasts are from Consensus Economics surveys. 
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become entrenched, capital holes in banking systems 
expand, and the intra-euro-area capital account crisis 
increasingly spills outward. Within the GIMF, this 
scenario features the following shocks relative to the 
WEO forecast (Figure 1.13): lower credit, mainly in 
the periphery; higher sovereign risk premiums for 
the periphery; modestly lower premiums for the core 
sovereigns, which benefit from a flight to safety; an 
even larger fiscal consolidation in the periphery; and 
increases in corporate risk premiums for all (includ-
ing non-European) advanced and emerging market 
economies. Capital flight from the euro area and 
emerging markets is assumed to benefit the United 
States, and its sovereign risk premium falls. Mon-
etary policy is constrained at the zero interest rate 
floor in the advanced economies, and the assump-
tion is that they do not proceed with additional 
unconventional easing. Emerging market economies, 
by contrast, are assumed to ease as growth and infla-
tion fall, which considerably reduces the impact of 
the external shock on their economies. 
In this scenario, output in the euro area core 
would fall by about 1¾ percent relative to the WEO 
projections within one year; in the periphery, the 
decline would be about 6 percent. Output losses in 
non-European economies would be about 1 to 1½ 
percent. Chapter 2 provides further details for the 
various regions.
Stronger-than-expected euro area policies 
This second GIMF scenario assumes that national 
policymakers follow up the latest ECB actions with a 
more proactive approach toward domestic adjustment 
and EMU reforms. The details are discussed in the 
complete policies scenario in the October 2012 GFSR. 
This scenario requires regaining credibility through 
an unflinching commitment to implementing already 
agreed plans. Policymakers need to build political 
support for the necessary pooling of sovereignty that 
a more complete currency union entails. It envisages 
that they quickly introduce a road map for bank-
ing union and fiscal integration and deliver a major 
down payment. Examples of possible action include 
implementation of a bank resolution mechanism 
with common backstops or a pan-European deposit 
insurance guarantee plan (for both, concrete propos-
als still need to be spelled out) and concrete measures 
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Figure 1.12.  Recessions and Deflation Risks
Risks for a prolonged recession and for sustained deflation are elevated in the euro area, 
notably in periphery economies. The risk of deflation continues to be a problem in Japan. 
In other areas, the risks are minimal.
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toward fiscal integration. Under this scenario (Figure 
1.13), the euro area begins to reintegrate as policy 
credibility is restored and capital flight reverses. 
Relative to the WEO forecast and the GFSR baseline 
scenario, credit expands by roughly €225 billion and 
sovereign spreads decline by about 200 basis points 
in 2013 in the periphery of the euro area. Economic 
growth resumes in the periphery and picks up in 
the core. In other advanced economies, corporate 
spreads fall by 50 basis points; in emerging market 
economies, by 100 basis points. Output would then 
be roughly ½ to 1 percent higher within one year in 
most other parts of the world.
The U.S. debt ceiling and fiscal cliff 
The U.S. fiscal cliff could entail significantly more 
fiscal tightening (by about 3 percent of GDP) than 
assumed in the WEO projections. A recent Spillover 
Report (IMF, 2012e) finds that if this risk material-
izes and the sharp fiscal contraction is sustained, the 
U.S. economy could fall into a full-fledged recession. 
The global spillovers would be amplified through 
negative confidence effects, including, for example, 
a global drop in stock prices. The impact of hitting 
the debt ceiling is more difficult to model. Politi-
cal delays before the previous deadline, in summer 
2011, led credit rating agencies to downgrade the 
United States, and major market turmoil ensued. 
At this stage, markets appear to consider the fiscal 
cliff a tail risk, given that Congress has in the past 
eventually reached a compromise to resolve similar 
high-stakes situations. However, this implies that, 
should this risk actually materialize, there would be 
a great shock to confidence that would quickly spill 
over to financial markets in the rest of the world. 
Notice that risks for a sudden fiscal withdrawal are 
also present in Japan: however, if they materialize, 
they will probably have spillovers that are not as 
large as those from the U.S. fiscal cliff.
A renewed spike in oil prices
If either the euro area or U.S. downside sce-
nario were to materialize, oil prices would likely fall 
substantially. But there is also an important risk that 
intensified geopolitical tensions could boost oil prices. 
The April 2012 WEO included a scenario featuring 
oil supply disruptions that showed that a 50 percent 
The Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) is used to consider a scenario in 
which policy is initially unable to prevent the intensification of euro area sovereign and 
banking stress as well as a scenario in which policy action quickly alleviates the current 
level of stress. The model contains two blocks of euro area countries, those with acute fiscal 
sustainability issues (referred to as “periphery”) and those with less acute fiscal 
sustainability issues (referred to as “core”). 
The intensification-of-stress scenario (red bars) assumes that policymakers delay taking 
sufficient action to prevent a sharp intensification of financial stress. Consequently, 
deleveraging by euro area banks leads to a sharp credit contraction in periphery countries 
but milder contraction elsewhere. Credit in periphery countries falls €475 billion below the 
WEO baseline in 2013, while that in the core countries falls by €50 billion. Concerns about 
fiscal sustainability raise periphery sovereign spreads 350 basis points in 2013; however, 
subsequent policy action results in spreads falling thereafter and returning fully to baseline 
by 2016. The core countries’ sovereign risk premium is assumed to decline by 50 basis 
points in 2013 as a flight to quality within the euro area occurs. Sovereigns in the periphery 
are forced into more front-loaded fiscal consolidation, averaging an additional 2 percentage 
points of GDP in 2013. Risk concerns are also assumed to spill over to all other regions, with 
corporate risk premiums rising by 50 basis points in advanced economies and 150 basis 
points in emerging market and developing economies in 2013. The capital flight is assumed 
to benefit the U.S. sovereign, with the risk premium falling by 50 basis points in 2013. 
Monetary policy is constrained at the zero interest rate floor in the G3 countries (euro area, 
Japan, United States), whereas elsewhere monetary policy eases to help offset the impact 
on market interest rates of rising risk premiums.   
In the scenario in which policy is able to alleviate the stress (blue bars), credit in the euro 
area expands relative to the baseline and sovereign spreads decline. In the periphery 
countries, credit expands by roughly €225 billion relative to the baseline, and sovereign 
spreads decline by roughly 200 basis points in 2013. In other advanced economies, 
corporate spreads fall by 50 basis points in 2013, and in emerging markets, the decline is 
100 basis points. 
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Figure 1.13. Upside and Downside Scenarios
(Percent or percentage point deviation from WEO baseline)
1. Change in GDP after One Year
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increase in oil prices due to less supply would lead to 
a 1 to 1½ percent decline in output in many parts of 
the world. The latest distribution of options prices for 
oil––which is skewed to the upside, implying a down-
side skew for the distribution of global growth––sug-
gests that this scenario remains relevant for the global 
economy (Figure 1.11, panel 2).
risk Scenarios for the Medium term
A large number of risks and scenarios can be 
envisaged for the medium term. This section focuses 
on two specific risk scenarios and one general risk 
scenario that appear pertinent for policymakers at 
this juncture. The specific risk scenarios relate to 
large central bank balance sheets and high public 
debt––they are directly relevant for monetary and 
fiscal policy in the advanced economies. The general 
risk scenario is for globally lower growth over the 
medium term. This is akin to the experience follow-
ing the shocks of the 1970s, but this time rooted 
in other shocks and policy failures—and, for the 
advanced economies, similar to the experience of 
Japan after the mid-1990s.
Risks related to swollen central bank balance 
sheets
The concern is that the vast acquisition of assets 
by central banks will ultimately mean a rise in the 
money supply and thus inflation (Figure 1.5, panel 
3). However, as discussed in previous WEO reports, 
no technical reason indicates this would be inevitable. 
Central banks have more than enough tools to absorb 
the liquidity they create, including selling the assets 
they have bought, reverting to traditionally short 
maturities for refinancing, raising their deposit rates, 
and selling their own paper. Furthermore, in prin-
ciple, central bank losses do not matter: their creditors 
are currency holders and reserve-holding banks; nei-
ther can demand to be paid with some other form of 
money.2 The reality, however, may well be different. A 
national legislature may see such losses as a symptom 
that the central bank is operating outside its mandate, 
2Central bank capital is, in many ways, an arbitrary number, as 
is well illustrated by the large balance sheets of central banks that 
intervene in foreign exchange markets (Figure 1.5, panel 4).
which could be of concern if it led to efforts to limit 
the central bank’s operational independence. A related 
concern is that economic agents may begin to doubt 
the capacity of central banks to fight inflation. Two 
scenarios come to mind: 
 • Public deficits and debt may run out of control, 
causing governments to lean on central banks to 
pursue more expansionary policies with a view to 
eroding the real value of the debt via inflation. 
Similarly, losses on holdings of euro area, Japa-
nese, and U.S. (G3) government securities may 
cause emerging market economies’ central banks 
or sovereign wealth funds to buy fewer G3 gov-
ernment assets, investing instead in better oppor-
tunities at home and triggering large depreciations 
of G3 currencies.
 • Policymakers may falsely perceive central bank bal-
ance sheet losses to be damaging to their economies. 
Such perceptions may make central banks more hesi-
tant to raise interest rates, because doing so would 
decrease the market value of their asset holdings. The 
mere appearance of such hesitation may lead private 
agents to expect an increase in inflation.
Risks related to high public debt levels
Public debt has reached very high levels, and 
if past experience is any guide, it will take many 
years to appreciably reduce it (see Chapter 3). Risks 
related to public debt have several aspects. First, 
when global output is at or above potential, high 
public debt may raise global real interest rates, 
crowding out capital and lowering output in the 
long term.3 Second, the cost of debt service may lead 
to tax increases or cutbacks in infrastructure invest-
ment that lower supply. Third, high public debt in 
individual countries may raise their sovereign risk 
premiums, with a variety of consequences—from 
limited scope for countercyclical fiscal policies (as 
evidenced by the current problems in the euro area 
periphery) to high inflation or outright default in 
the case of very large increases in risk premiums. 
Simulations with the GIMF suggest that an 
increase in public debt in the G3 economies of 
3See, for example, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) for a review 
of the literature and Kumar and Woo (2010) for some recent 
evidence.
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about 40 percentage points of GDP raises real inter-
est rates almost 40 basis points in the long term 
(Box 1.2). This simulation and discussion necessarily 
abstracts from the potential long-term benefits of 
fiscal stimulus. The 2009 stimulus, for example, was 
likely instrumental in averting a potential deflation-
ary spiral and protracted period of exceedingly high 
unemployment, macroeconomic conditions that 
general equilibrium models such as the GIMF are 
not well suited to capture. Bearing this in mind, the 
simulation suggests that in the long term the higher 
debt lowers real GDP by about ¾ percent relative to 
a baseline without any increase in public debt. This 
is because of the direct effect of higher interest rates 
on investment and the indirect effect via higher taxes 
or lower government investment. The GIMF simula-
tions indicate that within the G3 the negative effects 
would be larger, with output 1 percent below base-
line projections. The loss of output over the medium 
term would be even larger if, for example, savings 
were to drop more than expected because of aging 
populations in the advanced economies or if the 
consumption patterns of emerging market econo-
mies with very high saving rates align more quickly 
than expected with those of advanced economies.
Scenarios that involve very high levels of debt and 
high real interest rates may not only result in lower 
growth but may also involve a higher risk of default 
when fiscal dynamics are perceived to be unstable. This 
combination of high debt and high real interest rates 
can lead to bad equilibriums, when doubt about the 
sustainability of fiscal positions drives interest rates to 
unsustainable levels.
Disappointing potential output and growing risk 
aversion
Looking beyond the near term, a concern is that 
output growth may disappoint in both advanced and 
emerging market economies, albeit for different rea-
sons, and will precipitate a general flight to safety. As 
noted, growth outcomes have already disappointed 
repeatedly, including relative to the September 2011 
and April 2012 WEO projections. These disap-
pointments could be symptomatic of medium-term 
problems. 
 • In advanced economies that suffered from the 
financial crisis, prospects for employment remain 
dim, and many workers may ultimately drop out 
of the labor force. Banks are in the middle of an 
arduous process of lowering their leverage and 
strengthening their funding models. High public 
debt and, for some economies, external liabilities 
could mean new bouts of instability and gener-
ally low growth. Projections for these economies 
already incorporate marked-down estimates for 
potential output relative to precrisis trends, typi-
cally by 10 percent or more (Figure 1.14, panel 1).  
However, output could be lower still over the 
medium term.
 • In response to forecast errors and policy changes, 
estimates for the medium-term output levels of 
emerging market economies have been marked 
down (relative to September 2011 estimates)—by 
about 3 percent for Brazil, 5 percent for China, 
and 10 percent for India, for example—and there 
may be more to come (Figure 1.14, panel 4). The 
April 2012 WEO already featured a downside 
scenario with weaker potential output in emerg-
ing Asian economies. Given recent disappoint-
ments elsewhere, this scenario is broadened to 
other emerging market economies. In fact, many 
emerging Asian and Latin American economies 
have seen growth above the 10-year precrisis 
average, and the IMF staff sees further scope for 
such high growth, as evidenced by WEO output 
gap estimates that point to slack (Figure 1.14, 
panel 1). The findings of Chapter 4 justify this 
optimism to some extent: there are indications of 
growing resilience on the part of emerging market 
and developing economies, mainly reflecting 
stronger policies. However, the chapter’s findings 
suggest that less frequent adverse funding and 
terms-of-trade shocks have also played a role in 
these economies’ recent strong performance, and 
the frequency of such shocks could increase again. 
Moreover, strong credit growth, which likely sup-
ported demand, cannot continue at the present 
pace without raising concerns about financial 
stability in many of these economies (Figure 1.14, 
panels 2 and 3). In short, there may be less cycli-
cal slack and scope to grow over the medium term 
than suggested by IMF staff projections.
The scenario used to model lower potential 
output and the global macroeconomic implications 
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is the IMF staff’s Global Economy Model. Figure 
1.15 shows the impact of downward revisions to 
medium-term output growth by about ½ percent in 
the United States, the euro area, and Latin America 
and by about 1 percent in Asia. Along the transition 
path to lower equilibrium output is a flight into the 
most liquid and safest assets—mainly cash—because 
of growing concern about prospects, and private 
and public risk premiums increase temporarily. In 
this scenario, global growth for 2013–16 is only 
about 2 to 3 percent, or 1½ to 2 percentage points 
below the baseline WEO forecast. The euro area and 
Japan would experience several years of stagnation or 
recession, whereas the United States would see posi-
tive but very modest growth. Eventually, advanced 
economies have some scope to ease monetary policy 
as the zero bound no longer binds, which helps 
support growth toward the very end of the WEO 
horizon and bring inflation back toward the base-
line. Growth in emerging Asia would be closer to 
5 to 6 percent, rather than 7 to 8 percent; in Latin 
America, it would be about 2½ percent rather than 
4 percent as weaker global growth translates into 
significantly weaker demand for commodities. The 
price of oil falls by roughly 30 percent after three 
years, with prices for non-oil commodities falling 
by roughly 20 percent. These drops, in turn, lower 
growth in Africa and the Middle East. Develop-
ments in the real world could easily be much worse 
than the model suggests. The reason is that the 
model does not consider the social and political 
ramifications of rising unemployment; nor can it do 
justice to the adverse feedback loops between activ-
ity, banks, and sovereigns that can be triggered by 
unusually large shocks. 
policy requirements
Five years after the onset of the Great Reces-
sion, the recovery remains tepid and bumpy, and 
prospects remain very uncertain. Unemployment 
is unacceptably high in most advanced economies, 
and workers in emerging market and developing 
economies face a chronic struggle to find formal 
employment. Aside from the legacies of the crisis, 
uncertainty itself is likely to weigh on output (Box 
1.3). 
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Output in emerging market and developing economies in Asia and Latin America is above 
precrisis trends, but WEO output gap estimates still see some slack. Amid disappointment 
relative to output projections, estimates for medium-term output have been lowered. For 
China and India, the reduction amounts to 5 to 10 percentage points by 2016; for all emerging 
market and developing economies, the reduction amounts to about 3½ percentage points. 
Buoyant activity in many emerging market and developing economies has been driven partly 
by better policies and partly by high credit growth and favorable terms-of-trade shocks. In 
many economies, the high credit growth will be difficult to sustain at present rates without 
weakening bank balance sheets. Also, future improvements in the terms of trade may be 
more limited. Thus, there are risks that medium-term output could surprise further on the 
downside.
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: AE = advanced economies; AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CEE = central and eastern 
Europe; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; CN = China; CO = Colombia; DA = 
developing Asia; EM = emerging market economies; HK = Hong Kong SAR; ID = Indonesia;  
IN = India;  LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MY = Malaysia; SSA = sub-Saharan 
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1Precrisis trend is defined as the geometric average of real GDP level growth between 1996 
and 2006.
2Nominal credit is deflated using the IMF staff’s estimate of average provincial inflation.
3Relative to September 2011 WEO. 
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A basic challenge for policymakers is thus to move 
away from an incremental approach to policymaking 
and address the many downside risks to global activ-
ity with strong medium-term fiscal and structural 
reform programs in order to rebuild confidence. 
In the euro area, action is also needed to address 
the current crisis and, over the medium term, to 
complete the EMU. Only after substantial progress 
is made on these various fronts will confidence and 
demand strengthen durably in the major advanced 
economies. Investors will be reassured that public 
debt is a safe investment and that advanced economy 
central banks have scope to use monetary policy to 
maintain low inflation and forestall renewed bouts 
of financial instability. Policymakers in emerging 
market and developing economies will need to bal-
ance two priorities: rebuilding policy buffers so as to 
maintain hard-won increases in the resilience of their 
economies to shocks and supporting domestic activ-
ity in response to growing downside risks to external 
demand. 
addressing the euro area crisis
Despite policy progress, the euro area crisis has 
deepened. Unless recent ECB actions are followed 
up with more proactive policies by others, the 
WEO forecast and GFSR baseline scenario may 
once again prove overly optimistic and the euro 
area could slide into the weak policies scenario,  
with deleterious consequences for the rest of  
the world.
Ensuring market confidence in the viability of the 
EMU will require robust action on multiple fronts. 
Sovereigns under stress must continue to adjust, and 
support for these countries and their banks needs to 
be provided via the EFSF and the ESM to relieve 
funding pressures and break the adverse feedback 
loops between sovereigns and banks. Meanwhile, the 
ECB’s commitment to act on secondary markets via 
the OMT program is very important to address ele-
vated risk premiums due to convertibility concerns, 
and monetary policy should be very accommoda-
tive to support demand. Anticrisis measures must 
be anchored by the vision of—as well as reasonably 
fast and tangible progress toward—a more complete 
monetary union. 
Figure 1.15.  Lower Global Growth Scenario 
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This scenario uses the IMF’s Global Economy Model to trace the global macroeconomic 
implications of slower potential growth and temporarily higher risk premiums. For the 
United States and the euro area, this scenario assumes that annual potential output growth 
is ½ percentage point below baseline over the WEO horizon, whereas for Japan, growth is ¼ 
percentage point below baseline. In emerging Asia, potential growth is assumed to be 1 
percentage point lower than baseline. For Latin American and all remaining countries,it is 
assumed that potential growth is ½ percentage point below baseline. It takes until mid-2015 
before it becomes clear that potential growth will be lower until end-2017. For advanced 
economies, this raises debt-sustainability concerns, and sovereign risk premiums rise by 
50 basis points by 2016 before gradually returning to baseline. As sovereign risk premiums 
rise, advanced economies gradually tighten fiscal policy. The fiscal balance improves by 1 
percent of GDP by 2016, and then gradually returns to baseline once the debt-to-GDP ratio 
declines and risk premiums moderate. In emerging market and developing economies, 
lower growth prospects raise concerns about the viability of some private investment, and 
corporate risk premiums rise, particularly in the tradable sector. In this sector, corporate 
risk premiums peak roughly 200 basis points above baseline in 2016 in emerging Asia and 
about 150 basis points above baseline in Latin America. In the G3 (euro area, Japan, United 
States), monetary policy is constrained by the zero bound on nominal policy interest rates. 
For the first few years, interest rates cannot ease at all relative to the baseline, and beyond 
that, there is only limited scope for easing. 
GDP growth in all regions is well below the WEO baseline between 2013 and 2016,with 
global growth roughly 2 percentage points lower in 2015. Eventually, advanced economies 
have scope to ease monetary policy, which helps support growth toward the end of the WEO 
horizon and bring inflation back toward the baseline. Lower global growth translates into 
weaker demand for commodities, and the price of oil falls by roughly 30 percent after three 
years, with non-oil commodities falling by roughly 20 percent.
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 • EU partners should support countries making 
adequate adjustment efforts but still subject to 
market pressure. While economies in the periph-
ery must continue to adjust their fiscal balances at 
a pace they can bear, it is essential to ensure their 
access to funding at reasonable cost. Common 
resources can be channeled via the EFSF or the 
ESM—and countries in need should request those 
resources, with the goal of preserving or regaining 
market access. 
 • Direct equity injections into banks are key to 
cutting bank-sovereign loops in the near term. 
For this to happen, the ESM needs to be made 
operational as soon as possible, and a single 
supervisory mechanism—a precondition for the 
ESM to take a stake in banks—should be estab-
lished quickly, following up on the European 
Commission’s proposals to that effect. Viable 
banks should be recapitalized, but those that are 
nonviable should be resolved, in part to mini-
mize fiscal costs.
 • An integrated regulatory and supervisory struc-
ture—a banking union—is indispensable for 
the smooth functioning of integrated financial 
markets in the EMU. Such a union should rest 
on four pillars: common supervision, harmonized 
regulation, a pan-European deposit guarantee 
scheme, and a pan-European resolution mecha-
nism with common backstops. The last two build-
ing blocks are critical, and proposals for them still 
need to be spelled out.
Fiscal integration would provide critical tools to 
support a banking union, improve fiscal discipline, 
and enhance adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks 
while preventing them from becoming systemic. 
The immediate priority is to establish a common 
fiscal backstop for a banking union anchored on a 
single supervisory mechanism. More generally, fiscal 
risk sharing is an integral component of common 
currency areas. However, mutual support needs to 
be complemented by stricter and more robustly 
enforced rules and greater coordination of national 
policies—including through swift approval and sen-
sible implementation of the Fiscal Compact (at the 
country level). There are different ways to achieve ex 
ante risk sharing, but all approaches would benefit 
from a clear road map. 
rebuilding room for Fiscal policy Maneuvering
Fiscal adjustment has become necessary in many 
cases to strengthen confidence in sovereign balance 
sheets and in many other cases because the prospects 
for future potential output—and hence revenue 
growth—are substantially less promising than they 
were before 2008. Unless governments spell out 
how they intend to effect the necessary adjustment 
over the medium term, a cloud of uncertainty will 
continue to hang over the international economy, 
with downside risks for output and employment in 
the short term.
Fiscal adjustment should be gradual and sus-
tained, where possible, supported by structural 
changes, as, inevitably, it weighs on weak demand. 
Developments suggest that short-term fiscal mul-
tipliers may have been larger than expected at the 
time of fiscal planning (Box 1.1). Research reported 
in previous issues of the WEO finds that fiscal 
multipliers have been close to 1 in a world in which 
many countries adjust together; the analysis here 
suggests that multipliers may recently have been 
larger than 1 (Box 1.1).4 There are other reasons 
for avoiding abrupt adjustments: fiscal problems 
can be rooted in structural problems that take time 
to address, and sharp expenditure cutbacks or tax 
increases can set off vicious cycles of falling activity 
and rising debt ratios, ultimately undercutting politi-
cal support for adjustment. The historical record 
for public debt reduction suggests that a gradual, 
sustained approach supported by structural changes 
offers the best chance for success within today’s 
constraints (Chapter 3).
To build credibility, governments should commit 
to measures and medium-term targets that are actu-
ally under their control. They must clearly explain 
how they will react to such setbacks as unexpected 
slowdowns in activity or increases in funding costs. 
Except in economies facing acute financing con-
straints, automatic stabilizers should be allowed to 
operate freely. Budget forecasts must be based on 
realistic assumptions about the negative short-term 
impact of adjustment on output and employment. 
Similarly, projections for the evolution of debt 
4See for example, chapter 3 of the October 2010 World Eco-
nomic Outlook.
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ratios should be based on realistic, not optimistic, 
assumptions about the growth of potential output 
and interest rates. In short, fiscal policy must be 
transparent, realistic, and predictable, and although 
geared toward medium-term objectives, it should 
be a stabilizing factor against short-term downturns 
or booms. Clear analogies can be drawn with the 
practice of successful monetary policy.
Among the advanced economies, planned fiscal 
adjustment is sizable over the near term. The main 
policy shortfalls, discussed in more detail in the 
October 2012 Fiscal Monitor, relate to the need for 
stronger commitment to a sound fiscal framework: 
 • To anchor market expectations, policymakers need 
to specify adequately detailed medium-term plans 
for lowering debt ratios, which must be backed by 
binding legislation or fiscal frameworks. Among 
large advanced economies, the United States lacks 
such a plan, and Japan’s medium-term plan needs 
to be strengthened, notwithstanding the welcome 
legislative passage of the doubling of the con-
sumption tax. U.S. authorities must now urgently 
deal with the debt ceiling and the fiscal cliff, 
which would severely affect growth in the short 
term; the Japanese authorities also need to quickly 
approve funding for this year’s budget.
 • Countries should go much further in reducing the 
growth of aging-related expenditures—an issue that 
they cannot avoid forever—because such reductions 
can greatly improve debt dynamics without detract-
ing severely from demand in the short term. 
 • More countries need to define targets in structural 
or cyclically adjusted terms and prepare contin-
gency plans for coping with shocks. The first 
line of defense against shocks should be auto-
matic stabilizers and monetary policy, including 
unconventional support and measures to improve 
the transmission of already low policy rates to 
demand. But these efforts might not suffice. 
Should growth fall significantly short of WEO 
projections, countries with room to maneuver 
should smooth their planned adjustment over 
2013 and beyond. 
 • Emerging market and developing economies 
typically have much lower public debt than do 
advanced economies and therefore less urgent 
need for fiscal adjustment, but they still should 
rebuild room for policy maneuvering. Deficits 
are appreciably larger than before 2008, even in 
countries that were not hit by the crisis. These 
countries have typically experienced a relatively 
quick recovery and are operating above precrisis 
trends. Therefore, now is an appropriate time for 
them to adopt fiscal consolidation to fully restore 
their flexibility to deal with unexpected adverse 
contingencies. They should leave the task of 
supporting demand in response to greater-than-
expected external weakness to monetary policy. 
Among the major emerging market economies, 
more effort is needed in India, Russia, and, over the 
medium term, Turkey. China, also slowing, is differ-
ent for two reasons: first, the authorities are trying 
to rebalance economic growth toward consump-
tion, which will require expanding social support 
programs, and second, less scope is available for 
credit growth because the economy is still digesting 
a large expansion of credit released in response to the 
Great Recession. Similarly, the major oil exporters 
are also increasing spending to address social chal-
lenges, which is helping to rebalance global demand. 
Over the medium term, however, these economies 
will need to bring spending growth down to more 
sustainable levels. 
Supporting adjustment with Liquidity
In many advanced economies, ample liquidity 
provision continues to be essential given the weak-
ness of demand and the very protracted implemen-
tation periods for fiscal, financial, and structural 
adjustment. Prudential authorities must ensure that 
they control the risks that may be created by the 
extended period of low yields and exceptionally easy 
access to central bank funding. Easy credit provides 
incentives for excessive risk taking and also gives 
banks easy options for postponing desirable restruc-
turing. Over time, very low interest rates may distort 
the efficient investment of savings, which is an 
underlying function of the financial system. Cred-
ible medium-term fiscal adjustment programs and 
banking system restructuring are extremely valuable 
supports to the monetary policy objective of keeping 
inflation expectations firmly anchored at a low rate 
while maintaining financial stability. 
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A widespread concern is that monetary stimulus is 
not reaching all markets evenly. Households and small 
companies struggle to obtain bank loans, whereas 
large corporations are paying record low rates in bond 
markets. In the euro area, bank lending is slumping in 
the periphery but still growing in Germany. Changes 
in borrower risk premiums in response to changes in 
economic conditions and tighter bank lending policies 
in response to strained capital and funding are playing 
important roles. However, large differences in financ-
ing conditions do not mean that monetary policy is 
not working. The actions taken by central banks have 
forestalled worse outcomes. In some euro area econo-
mies, such as France and Italy, credit has thus far 
fared better during the current recovery than during 
the post-1993 recovery, despite a much larger drop in 
output (Figure 1.16, panels 3–6). The same holds in 
comparison with U.S. credit after 1989 (Figure 1.16, 
panels 1 and 2). More generally, liquidity provision 
has prevented a collapse of the banking systems in the 
periphery economies.
Specific monetary policy requirements vary across 
economies. In many advanced economies, the stance 
should remain very accommodative, given that infla-
tion expectations are well anchored, headline and 
core inflation are receding, and activity is typically 
well below potential. Policymakers should continue 
to help reduce risk premiums and improve the 
transmission of monetary policy to the real econ-
omy, with direct interventions in key asset markets 
or with measures to strengthen banks’ incentives 
to lend, such as the Bank of England’s FLS. The 
specific policy requirements for the major economies 
are the following: 
 • The Federal Reserve has recently adopted strong 
measures to ease monetary and financial condi-
tions, consistent with high unemployment and 
headline inflation that is projected to drop below 
2 percent. The traction of these and previ-
ous unconventional measures would be greatly 
enhanced if more progress were made in mortgage 
debt relief for overly burdened households and in 
the reform of the housing market. 
 • In the euro area, underlying inflation pressure 
is low––core inflation has been running about 
1½ percent for some time, with tax and admin-
istrative price hikes contributing about ¼ to ½ 
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Figure 1.16.  Crisis Comparisons
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Credit appears to be doing better after the Great Recession than after previous recessions 
associated with credit crises. For example, domestic credit in the United States has held up 
better than after 1989, notwithstanding a much sharper drop in output. The same holds for  
credit in France and Italy when compared with the European exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) crisis, although real credit is now falling in Italy. In Spain, credit is doing less well, 
consistent with a larger drop in output. Overall, these output and credit developments 
suggest that low policy rates and unconventional measures have, thus far, helped 
avert a much deeper credit crunch. However, more action is needed to sustain and 
improve credit, especially in the euro area periphery.  
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percentage point. Headline inflation is forecast to 
decline to about 1½ percent during the course of 
2013, and risks from domestic wages and profits 
are to the downside––the IMF staff ’s Global 
Projection Model suggests that the probability of 
falling prices is unusually high, reaching almost 
25 percent (Figure 1.12, panel 2). This projec-
tion gives the ECB ample justification for keeping 
policy rates very low or cutting them further. 
 • In Japan, inflation is forecast to remain near zero 
in 2012 and 2013. The easing of monetary policy 
announced in September is welcome and should 
help support economic growth and an exit from 
deflation. However, further easing of monetary 
policy may be needed to accelerate achievement 
of the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ’s) inflation goal of 1 
percent, supported by enhanced communication 
of the policy stance and framework. Any further 
easing by the BoJ could include purchasing Japa-
nese government bonds with longer maturities, as 
well as selected private paper.
Among emerging market and developing econo-
mies, policy requirements differ, but many can afford 
to wait and see or to ease policy further because of 
downside risks to activity. Headline and core inflation 
are generally declining. The main reason for caution is 
that although credit growth rates have recently come 
down, they remain at fairly elevated levels (Figure 
1.14, panels 2 and 3). Supervisory and macropru-
dential measures should be employed to counter any 
emerging credit bubbles, such as in real estate. 
 • In emerging Asia, headline and core inflation rates 
have been low or declining. In many economies, 
inflation is forecast to be close to 3 percent over 
the medium term. Credit has expanded rapidly 
in a number of these economies (China, India) 
and is still expanding quickly in some (Indonesia 
and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia); several have 
also seen booming real estate prices. Various 
economies’ currencies are undervalued relative to 
medium-term fundamentals (China, Malaysia, 
Thailand). Considering this credit and exchange 
rate picture, these countries should wait and see 
or consider modest further easing of monetary 
policy stances and rely mainly on fiscal policy 
to support demand. Those with less fiscal space 
could proceed to more monetary easing, provided 
macroprudential measures keep credit growth in 
check. Those with high inflation (India, Vietnam) 
cannot afford to loosen monetary policy unless 
they slow down domestic demand with more fis-
cal adjustment.
 • In Latin America, many economies are forecast 
to operate with inflation near or below 5 percent 
in 2013, which is appreciably less than in 2011. 
High credit growth rates bear watching. Con-
sidering the downside risks to the global growth 
outlook, many central banks can afford to hold 
steady; if these risks materialize, they can reduce 
policy rates. High or rising real estate prices or 
growing household debt burdens, notably in 
Brazil, call for continued vigilence by policymak-
ers. Central banks in economies with relatively 
high inflation (Argentina, Venezuela) will need to 
tighten further. 
 • Inflation rates are low or forecast to decline 
noticeably in many emerging European econo-
mies, typically to about 3 percent. There is 
therefore room for easing in various economies 
in response to very high unemployment rates and 
sluggish activity. Much higher and more volatile 
inflation in the CIS stands in the way of lower 
policy rates. The same holds for a number of 
economies in the MENA region and SSA.
Sharp increases in food prices present significant 
challenges for policymakers on many fronts (see the 
Special Feature). Regarding monetary policy, the 
concern is that the heavy weight of food in the con-
sumption baskets of poorer households could trigger 
a push for higher wages and thus second-round 
effects on inflation. In this setting, monetary policy-
makers need to communicate that they will tighten 
policy if threats of second-round effects build. Until 
they do, however, central banks should not react 
to food prices, which would destabilize output and 
inflation over the medium term.5
advancing Global Demand rebalancing
The slowdown in global trade and activity has 
been accompanied by a marked narrowing of global 
5For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 3 of the September 
2011 World Economic Outlook.
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imbalances, and this is projected to persist (Figure 
1.17, panel 1).6 As discussed in the April 2012 
WEO and a recent IMF Pilot External Sector Report 
(IMF, 2012d), most of this narrowing reflects weaker 
domestic demand from crisis-stricken, external-
deficit economies rather than stronger demand from 
external-surplus economies. But healthier adjust-
ments have taken place—improvements in fiscal 
balances in external-deficit economies, resilient 
domestic demand in China, and more social spend-
ing by oil exporters—which are bringing down their 
large surpluses. 
In the euro area, imbalances have narrowed but 
mainly because of lower demand in the deficit econ-
omies of the periphery; labor costs have adjusted 
relative to the core but this process has much further 
to go (Figure 1.18, panels 1–3). Adjustments in 
surplus economies toward stronger, domestic-
demand-driven growth are at an early stage. External 
indicators for Germany, the main surplus country, 
suggest that its internal demand rebalancing process 
is less advanced than that of Japan or China (see 
Figure 1.9). Furthermore, major adjustment is still 
needed in the deficit economies, notably Greece and 
Portugal, to reduce their net foreign liabilities to 35 
percent of GDP, the indicative guideline under the 
European Commission’s Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure (Figure 1.18, panel 4).
Despite recent improvements, global imbalances 
and the associated vulnerabilities are likely to remain 
well above desirable levels unless governments take 
additional, decisive action (IMF, 2012d). The current 
account positions of the G3 economies are all esti-
mated to be weaker and their real effective exchange 
rates stronger than desirable because of unduly large 
fiscal deficits (Figure 1.17, panel 3). By contrast, in 
many Asian economies, including China, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, current account 
positions are stronger and currencies weaker than they 
would be with a more desirable set of policies. Several 
of these economies have accumulated very high 
levels of official reserves or have internal distortions 
that hold back consumption (Figure 1.17, panel 4). 
Among the large economies of the euro area, policies 
6Imbalances are current accounts that differ from those war-
ranted by fundamentals and desirable policies.
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Global current account balances narrowed sharply during the Great Recession and are not 
projected to widen again, except for the contribution of emerging Asia. Exchange rate 
developments since the onset of the crisis have been consistent with global demand 
rebalancing. However, the appreciation of external surplus currencies has stopped during the 
past eight months. IMF staff assessments suggest that current account balances remain 
larger than desirable in emerging Asia and weaker elsewhere. Sustained accumulation of 
international reserves in these economies is contributing to global current account 
imbalances and associated vulnerabilities that are larger than desirable.
2. Real Effective Exchange 
Rates in Emerging
Market Economies
(percent change from
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wo r l d e co n o m i c o u t lo o k : co P i n G w i t h h i G h d e bt a n d s lu G G i s h G r ow t h
26 International Monetary Fund | october 2012
that would result in stronger domestic demand for 
Germany and stronger competitiveness for France, 
Italy, and Spain would be beneficial.
It must be emphasized that the policies that 
would most effectively lower global imbalances and 
related vulnerabilities serve the self-interests of the 
countries concerned, even when considered purely 
from a domestic viewpoint (Figure 1.18, panel 
5). Many external-deficit economies need strong 
medium-term fiscal adjustment programs––the need 
is urgent for the United States. In the euro area, 
much of the planned adjustment in the periphery 
economies would be warranted regardless of their 
external positions, and such fiscal efforts must be 
complemented with structural reforms to labor and 
product markets that help rebuild competitiveness. 
The requirements for emerging market economies 
with external surpluses and undervalued curren-
cies are to cut back official reserve accumulation, 
adopt more market-determined exchange systems, 
and implement structural reforms, for example, to 
broaden the social safety net. 
Improving Growth prospects with Structural policies
Structural problems shape much of the legacy of 
the Great Recession. They also contribute to wide 
global current account imbalances, which have 
exacerbated the crisis in the euro area. The impact 
on growth of reforms to alleviate these structural 
problems can be significant. In an upside policy sce-
nario produced by the IMF staff for the G20 Mutual 
Assessment Process, most of the 2½ percent increase 
in global output is generated by reforms to labor 
and product markets and the beneficial spillovers via 
international trade (IMF, 2012e). Through confi-
dence and wealth effects and by facilitating relative 
price adjustments, structural reforms can promote 
aggregate demand, particularly investment, over 
time. But these benefits are unlikely to accrue unless 
such reforms are supported with macroeconomic 
policies that lower uncertainty and improve confi-
dence among investors. 
Structural policies in crisis-hit economies 
Household debt and bank restructuring: Although 
only a few countries have adopted effective house-
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Figure 1.18.  Euro Area Imbalances
Current account imbalances have also narrowed within the euro area, reflecting mainly a 
collapse of demand in the deficit economies in the periphery rather than stronger demand in 
surplus economies, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Since the onset of the crisis, unit 
labor costs have grown less in the deficit economies than in the surplus economies, but 
more adjustment will be needed. Reducing global and euro area current account imbalances 
will also require further policy changes. In external-deficit economies, these include reducing 
large fiscal deficits, slowing entitlement spending, and, within the euro area, reforming labor 
and product markets. In external-surplus economies, policies should improve social 
protection and remove a variety of distortions.  
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3Classifications based on the IMF Staff's Pilot External Sector Report (2012d), which covers 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, euro area, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, 
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percent and that the nominal GDP growth rate stays at the level projected for 2017.
6Germany, Netherlands.
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hold debt restructuring programs, others should 
consider following their lead. Programs in the 
United States got off to a sluggish start, but the 
recent expansion of the modification and refinancing 
programs is welcome. Further steps would help sup-
port a recovery of the housing market. These could 
include participation by government-sponsored 
enterprises in the principal reduction program, 
implementation of the administration’s proposal to 
further expand refinancing, timely expansion of the 
program aimed at fostering conversion of foreclosed 
properties into rental units, and permitting mort-
gages to be modified in bankruptcy courts. Other 
economies suffering from housing market slumps 
may also benefit from policies to directly alleviate 
household debt.7 
Progress in financial sector reform, which is 
critical to building a safer global economy, has 
been patchy. Chapter 3 of the October 2012 GFSR 
observes that a host of regulatory reforms are under 
way but that the structure of financial intermedia-
tion remains largely unchanged and vulnerable. 
Areas that require further attention from policymak-
ers include a global-level discussion of the pros and 
cons of direct restrictions on business models, moni-
toring and a set of prudential standards for non-
bank financial institutions that pose systemic risks, 
incentives for the use of simpler financial products, 
further progress on recovery and resolution planning 
for large institutions, and cross-border resolution. 
Crucially, none of the current or prospective reforms 
will be effective in the absence of enhanced supervi-
sion, incentives for the private sector to follow the 
reforms, and the political will to deliver progress.
Bank restructuring has advanced on a broader 
front. Many countries have adopted programs to 
strengthen bank balance sheets and to tide banks 
over during temporary liquidity difficulties. Capital 
bases have been strengthened: between 2008 and 
2011, for example, large European and U.S. banks 
raised common-equity-to-asset ratios by about one-
fifth and one-third, respectively. They also reduced 
their reliance on wholesale funding, although such 
7For a more in-depth discussion of issues related to house-
hold debt restructuring, see Chapter 3 of the April 2012 World 
Economic Outlook.
funding remains extensive in Europe. However, the 
worsening euro area crisis and weak global economy 
are posing increasingly severe banking difficulties. 
Prudential authorities must continue to push balance 
sheet repair and, where necessary, impose losses on 
bank stakeholders and force recapitalization. This 
may require the injection of public funds or the 
winding-up of weak institutions. In the periphery 
economies of the euro area, external support in the 
form of equity injections is critical to breaking the 
vicious feedback loops between deteriorating sover-
eigns and weakening banks. 
Labor and product market reform: Progress has 
been uneven. A number of countries, especially 
in the euro area, are beginning to take action to 
improve the functioning of their labor markets, but 
there has been less action to tackle stubborn long-
term unemployment or to reform the markets for 
products and, especially, for services. 
Labor market reforms can boost employment in 
various ways. Reforms can lower hiring and firing 
costs or reduce minimum wages when they are high 
enough to undercut employment of the young or 
the less skilled. Such reforms are under way in Italy 
and Spain. Trilateral agreements between unions, 
employers, and their governments can be an impor-
tant element of reform efforts by helping coordinate 
relative labor cost adjustment, which is essential 
for realigning competitiveness between deficit and 
surplus economies in the euro area. Unions and 
employers can also develop more flexible collec-
tive wage bargaining agreements, as they have done 
with much success in Germany. To the extent that 
large-scale wage cuts occur in deficit economies, 
households may need help to cope with their debt 
burdens, underscoring the significance of effec-
tive household debt restructuring programs. Active 
labor market policies can have very positive effects 
on employment by promoting better job matching 
and supporting education and vocational training 
for workers displaced by sector-specific shocks, such 
as the collapse of construction activity in Spain and 
the United States. Labor force participation can be 
buoyed by subsidies for jobs filled by the long-term 
unemployed or jobs created by small and medium-
size firms, many of which are finding it hard to 
obtain credit.
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In various economies, especially in Europe, reform 
of the services sector should be accelerated, not least 
to help generate more employment over the medium 
term. Stronger competition and lower barriers to 
entry would help ensure that lower wages result 
in more job creation rather than higher profits for 
firms. The business environment in various euro area 
economies also needs to be improved by reducing 
procedures and costs that weigh on entrepreneur-
ship and by streamlining bankruptcy proceedings to 
better defend property rights and facilitate exit of 
inefficient firms (Barkbu and others, 2012). 
Structural reforms to facilitate global demand 
rebalancing
Structural reforms will be important in boosting 
growth and fostering global demand rebalancing while 
reducing associated vulnerabilities. In surplus coun-
tries such as China and Germany, reforms are needed 
to boost domestic demand; in deficit countries such as 
Brazil and India, they are needed to improve supply.
 • In Germany, structural reforms will be needed to 
boost the relatively low level of investment and, 
more generally, increase potential growth from 
domestic sources. In the near term, the underly-
ing strength in the labor market should foster a 
pickup in wages, inflation, and asset prices, and 
this should be seen as part of a natural rebalanc-
ing process within a currency union. By way of 
example, inflation in Germany and the Nether-
lands, the other major surplus economy in the 
euro area, would have to be about 3 to 4 percent 
to keep euro area inflation close to the ECB’s 
target of “below but close to 2 percent,” if infla-
tion in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
were kept around zero to 1 percent and inflation 
elsewhere remained in line with the ECB target. 
This underscores the importance of wage and 
spending adjustments in the surplus economies 
for the proper functioning of the EMU.
 • Previous reports for China have stressed the need 
for better pension and health care support to 
lower precautionary saving and boost consump-
tion. Progress is being made on these fronts, but 
the measures will take time to exert their effects 
on demand. Meanwhile, support for demand con-
tinues to come mainly from measures that sup-
port more investment. An obvious risk is that the 
quality of bank lending could be further lowered, 
adding to already ample capacity in the export 
sector or boosting already-high real estate prices.
 • In India, there is an urgent need to reaccelerate 
infrastructure investment, especially in the energy 
sector, and to launch a new set of structural 
reforms, with a view to boosting business invest-
ment and removing supply bottlenecks. Structural 
reform also includes tax and spending reforms, in 
particular, reducing or eliminating subsidies, while 
protecting the poor. In this regard, the recent 
announcements with respect to easing restrictions 
on foreign direct investment in some sectors, 
privatizations, and lowering fuel subsidies are very 
welcome. 
 • Brazil’s consumption boom has been a large 
component of its strong growth performance, and 
domestic saving and investment remain relatively 
low. Reforms could usefully focus on further 
developing the defined-contribution pillar of the 
pension system, streamlining the tax system, and 
developing long-term financial instruments. 
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The first section of this special feature discusses 
developments in commodity prices, and the second 
confirms that fluctuations in demand have played a 
key role in the drop in prices during the second quarter 
of 2012. The important complementary role of supply 
developments is discussed for energy markets in the 
third section and for food markets in the fourth, as these 
contributed to sharp price increases during the third 
quarter of 2012. The special feature concludes with the 
outlook for commodity markets. 
price Developments during 2012
Broad developments
After a robust recovery during 2009–10, the 
IMF’s Primary Commodities Price Index (PCPI) 
stayed essentially flat during 2011 and then fell 
during the second quarter of 2012, only to stage a 
comeback in the third quarter (Figure 1.SF.1). The 
PCPI is a weighted average of prices for 51 primary 
commodities, grouped into three main clusters—
energy, industrial inputs (mainly base metals), and 
edibles (of which food is the main component—
Table 1.SF.1). Among the three clusters, energy and 
base metal prices declined during the second quarter 
by nearly 30 and 20 percent, respectively, from 
their first quarter peaks. Although metal prices have 
leveled off during the third quarter, energy prices 
increased sharply once again, by about 13 percent 
(through August). Food prices remained broadly flat 
until mid-June, but have increased since then, by 
about 10 percent. 
Energy prices
The prices of petroleum, natural gas, and coal 
together have a weight of nearly two-thirds in the 
PCPI; petroleum alone accounts for more than half of 
the index. The average petroleum spot price (APSP)—
a simple average of the Brent, Dubai, and West Texas 
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50
100
150
200
250
2007 08 09 10 11 Aug. 
12
Source: IMF, Primary Commodity Price System.
Figure 1.SF.1.  IMF Commodity Price Index
(2005 = 100)
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Table 1.Sf.1.  Indices of Market Prices for Nonfuel and fuel Commodities, 2009–12
(2005 = 100, in U.S. dollar terms)1
Commodities Weights 2009 2010 2011 2011:Q3 2011:Q4 2012:Q1 2012:Q2
Nonfuel Commodities 36.9 127.4 161.0 189.6 190.7 168.0 172.8 170.2
Food 16.7 134.0 149.4 178.8 179.1 163.8 168.8 171.0
Cereals  3.6 162.4 166.5 231.2 236.2 216.6 216.6 215.7
Wheat  1.7 146.6 146.7 207.4 207.0 183.5 182.9 176.4
Maize  1.0 168.2 189.0 296.5 307.3 273.5 282.2 274.4
Rice  0.6 204.8 180.9 191.7 201.4 207.6 192.9 209.0
Barley  0.3 135.0 166.6 217.9 221.8 221.7 226.7 247.1
Vegetable Oils and Protein Meals  4.4 154.0 170.4 209.1 209.6 189.7 202.5 216.7
Soybeans  1.2 169.7 172.5 217.0 223.2 193.4 209.1 234.9
Soybean Meal  0.8 174.6 161.0 184.1 188.7 161.6 181.0 221.0
Soybean Oil  0.4 158.8 186.6 245.2 247.9 225.1 235.2 233.0
Palm Oil  0.7 175.2 233.9 292.8 278.9 260.1 287.7 282.5
Fish Meal  0.2 168.7 233.7 204.1 191.3 184.7 176.0 204.6
Sunflower Oil  0.2  91.0 103.6 141.7 146.1 135.6 129.2 125.9
Olive Oil  0.3  63.6  57.5  55.6  55.6  54.4  52.5  51.8
Groundnuts  0.2 129.3 161.1 224.2 231.5 240.3 240.6 238.3
Rapeseed Oil  0.3 118.8 140.3 189.6 187.8 175.4 177.5 172.1
Meat  3.7  98.0 117.2 134.5 136.4 134.2 136.2 133.4
Beef  1.4 100.8 128.4 154.3 150.1 154.7 162.7 158.1
Lamb  0.3  91.3  90.5  92.7  94.0  88.0  77.7  62.0
Pork  1.1  82.4 110.0 131.6 142.1 129.1 125.7 123.5
Poultry  0.9 115.9 116.2 118.2 119.3 120.9 123.7 127.1
Seafood  3.2 113.7 135.9 132.8 119.6 102.9 109.8 111.8
Fish  2.5 121.2 151.3 145.5 128.4 107.3 116.4 119.2
Shrimp  0.7  84.7  75.9  83.4  85.4  85.9  83.9  82.9
Sugar  0.9 151.8 172.0 210.8 225.4 200.3 192.5 172.7
Free Markets  0.6 180.2 207.5 260.5 281.3 245.7 235.8 208.0
United States  0.1 115.5 147.4 178.3 184.8 178.6 162.7 144.3
European Union  0.2  86.0  85.0  88.1  88.4  86.5  86.3  87.0
Bananas  0.4 147.0 152.8 169.2 165.9 165.4 181.4 170.0
Oranges  0.5 107.9 122.1 105.8 123.3  97.9  91.5 100.2
Beverages  1.8 154.4 176.2 205.5 207.9 184.6 175.2 162.7
Coffee  0.9 131.5 165.4 231.0 231.1 212.3 200.0 179.7
Other Milds  0.5 123.8 170.0 239.0 238.6 216.1 194.8 160.2
Robusta  0.3 144.5 157.6 217.3 218.3 205.9 208.8 213.0
Cocoa Beans  0.7 187.4 202.7 192.8 196.5 159.9 151.6 143.4
Tea  0.3 145.1 146.4 160.0 165.8 160.5 157.0 157.6
Agricultural Raw Materials 2  7.7  94.1 125.4 153.8 153.2 135.1 135.8 136.9
Timber2  3.4 101.5 101.6 111.4 116.4 111.4 105.4 109.6
Hardwood  1.2 128.9 132.7 159.1 169.9 158.9 150.5 148.7
Logs2  0.4 141.4 137.6 193.2 220.0 202.3 184.6 178.6
Sawed2  0.8 123.5 130.6 144.5 148.5 140.2 135.8 135.9
Softwood  2.2  86.4  84.5  85.0  86.8  85.2  80.4  88.0
Logs2  0.4  75.3  77.9  82.6  80.9  79.2  79.8  77.6
Sawed2  1.8  88.6  85.8  85.5  88.0  86.4  80.5  90.1
Cotton  0.7 113.7 187.7 280.2 229.6 187.8 182.1 163.6
Wool  0.5 115.1 152.9 234.2 243.2 212.9 240.5 218.7
Fine  0.2 114.9 151.0 241.7 247.7 213.2 226.5 200.0
Coarse  0.3 115.2 154.6 227.9 239.4 212.6 252.2 234.3
Rubber  0.5 128.0 243.3 320.8 309.9 240.1 256.5 239.1
Hides  2.6  68.4 109.6 125.0 130.8 115.1 117.8 128.0
Metals 10.7 136.5 202.3 229.7 233.1 195.4 205.4 194.2
Copper  2.8 140.5 205.0 240.0 244.3 204.3 226.4 214.1
Aluminum  3.9  87.8 114.3 126.3 126.3 110.2 114.8 104.1
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Intermediate (WTI) crude oil varieties—increased 
from a low of $35 a barrel in late 2008 to a high of 
$120 a barrel in March 2012. Since then, oil prices 
declined during the second quarter only to climb back 
during the third, albeit with some volatility. Implied 
volatility remained moderate when compared with the 
spikes after the Libyan revolution in 2011 but picked 
up during the summer months (Figure 1.SF.2). 
Metal and food prices
These two components comprise the remaining 
third of the PCPI, each receiving a similar weight. 
After a strong rally earlier in 2012, base metal prices 
declined in tandem with petroleum prices—albeit less 
sharply—during the second quarter and have leveled 
off somewhat during the third quarter (Figure 1.SF.3). 
After remaining broadly flat for much of the year, 
food prices started to pick up strongly in mid-June. 
Grain and soybean prices rose, offsetting the weakness 
in seafood, sugar, and vegetable oil prices. Implied 
volatility also rose significantly (Figure 1.SF.4). 
economic activity and commodity prices
A tight link with demand
Fluctuations in economic activity and in the 
outlook are the primary determinants of short-term 
commodity price movements, with some caveats.
Table 1.Sf.1.  (concluded)
Commodities Weights 2009 2010 2011 2011:Q3 2011:Q4 2012:Q1 2012:Q2
Iron Ore  1.3 284.6 521.9 596.9 625.7 500.9 504.5 496.3
Tin  0.2 184.2 275.8 352.7 333.9 282.3 310.6 278.3
Nickel  1.1  99.3 147.6 155.0 149.1 124.4 133.0 116.1
Zinc  0.6 120.1 156.5 159.0 161.1 138.1 146.9 139.7
Lead  0.2 176.5 220.5 246.4 251.8 204.5 214.8 202.7
Uranium  0.5 167.1 164.6 201.3 185.5 188.2 185.8 183.8
Energy 63.1 116.8 147.1 193.8 193.6 193.9 208.3 192.3
Spot Crude3 53.6 116.2 148.5 195.9 194.3 194.4 211.9 193.9
Natural Gas  6.9 109.6 113.3 154.3 165.4 172.6 170.9 178.0
Russian in Germany  3.2 149.7 139.0 179.1 188.3 204.2 208.8 212.5
Indonesian in Japan  1.9 106.5 133.4 221.2 245.4 253.8 249.3 271.5
U.S., Domestic Market  1.9  44.5  49.5  45.1  46.5  37.6  27.7  25.7
Coal  2.6 148.8 206.0 253.7 253.3 238.2 233.8 198.3
Australian, Export Markets  2.1 151.0 207.8 254.0 253.3 239.7 235.3 197.2
South African, Export Markets  0.5 140.2 198.5 252.5 253.4 232.0 228.0 202.9
Source: IMF, Primary Commodity Price System.
1Weights are based on 2002–04 average world export earnings.
2Provisional.
3Average petroleum spot price.  Average of U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate, equally weighted.
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2007 08 09 10 11 Sep. 
12
Figure 1.SF.2.  Oil Prices and Volatility
1. Daily Crude Oil Spot Prices
(U.S. dollars a barrel)
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2. CBOE Oil Volatility Index (OVX)2
Sources: Bloomberg, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: As of September 11, 2012.
1Average petroleum spot price (APSP) is a simple average of Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot prices.
2CBOE = Chicago Board Options Exchange.
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First, on occasion, causality goes the other way: 
supply disruptions can sometimes lead to price 
spikes and declines in economic activity (Hamilton, 
2008). Second, developments on the supply side 
or concerns about supply depletion can be impor-
tant enough to break the tight connection between 
economic activity and commodity prices even if 
they are not significant enough to derail economic 
activity (see Benes and others, 2012, for the case of 
oil prices). Third, concerns that speculative com-
modity trading has decoupled price movements from 
economic activity have been a constant refrain dur-
ing the past few years despite the lack of conclusive 
supporting evidence.1 
These caveats notwithstanding, a tight link 
between economic activity and commodity price 
fluctuations is evident in the data, and this appears 
to be the leading factor behind the broad commod-
ity price declines during the second quarter. Com-
modity markets rallied somewhat in early 2012 on 
the back of recovering market confidence in response 
to the European Central Bank’s longer-term refi-
nancing operations as well as better-than-expected 
global growth in the first quarter. However, with 
renewed setbacks to the global recovery in the 
beginning of the second quarter, leading indicators 
pointed to a synchronized slowing in the momen-
tum of global activity. In particular, growth in a 
number of major emerging market economies, 
notably China, has slowed significantly. These com-
mon macroeconomic factors affect commodity prices 
through changes in current and prospective demand 
and the cost of carrying inventories. 
Principal components analysis
The influence of common macroeconomic fac-
tors on commodity markets can be examined using 
principal component analysis, which extracts key 
factors that account for most of the variance in the 
observed variables. Individual commodity prices are 
affected by both commodity-wide and commodity-
specific factors. The first principal component of 
commodity prices captures price movements driven 
by commodity-wide factors. The strong correla-
1See Box 1.4 of the September 2011 World Economic Outlook 
for a detailed discussion.
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Figure 1.SF.3.  Base Metal Spot Prices
(Indices; January 1, 2007 = 100)
Aluminum Copper Nickel
Sources: Bloomberg, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: As of September 11, 2012.
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Sources: Bloomberg, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: As of September 11, 2012.
1ATM = at the money.
Figure 1.SF.4.  Food Prices and Volatility
1. Prices of Major Crops
(indices; January 1, 2007 = 100)
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2. Food Price Implied Volatility
(index; January 1, 2006 = 100; ATM; 60-day)1
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tion between this first principal component and 
actual commodity prices across the board—more 
than 0.85 for all major commodity groups, includ-
ing crude oil, food, and base metals—implies that 
individual commodity prices have been significantly 
affected by commodity-wide factors (Figure 1.SF.5, 
panel 1). Similarly, the first principal component 
from industrial production indices (IPs), purchas-
ing managers’ indices (PMIs), and equity returns 
(using MSCI)—which are good proxies for global 
economic activity, economic sentiment, and broad 
asset market performance, respectively—capture the 
underlying common macroeconomic factors (Figure 
1.SF.5, panel 2). 
The strong correlations between the first principal 
components for commodity prices and aggregate 
economic activity suggest that commodity-wide 
factors have mainly reflected common macroeco-
nomic developments. Especially during the second 
quarter, the first principal component of commodity 
prices has shown a declining trend in line with the 
first principal component of IPs, PMIs, and equity 
returns, implying that the recent declines in com-
modity prices over this period were largely driven by 
global economic conditions (Figure 1.SF.6).
Metal prices and Chinese activity
The link between prices and activity is also 
apparent for base metal prices. The slow recovery of 
advanced economies continued to exert a drag on 
base metal consumption, but it was the significant 
slowdown in major emerging market economies, 
notably China, that led to a sharp decline in global 
base metal consumption. In China, growth has 
been steadily moderating as the authorities have 
pursued policies aimed at slowing the economy to 
a more sustainable pace. Reflecting these policies, 
growth in industrial production fell to single digits 
after April for the first time since mid-2009, and 
real estate investment also slowed in recent months. 
China’s base metal consumption, which has been 
steadily increasing and now accounts for more than 
40 percent of global consumption (Figure 1.SF.7, 
panel 1), slowed sharply in the second quarter. As a 
result, growth in global consumption of base metals 
slowed significantly in the second quarter (Figure 
1.SF.7, panel 2). In line with this trend, base metal 
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Figure 1.SF.5.  Influence of Common Factors: Pairwise 
Correlations with First Principal Components
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Figure 1.SF.6.  Commodity Prices and Economic Activity: First 
Principal Components
Commodity prices Economic activity
wo r l d e co n o m i c o u t lo o k : co P i n G w i t h h i G h d e bt a n d s lu G G i s h G r ow t h
34 International Monetary Fund | october 2012 SPECIAL fEATURE
prices declined the most among major commodities, 
despite some supply response to lower prices.
Demand factors play a critical role by driving 
commodity-wide movements in prices, but the role 
of commodity-specific factors—which generally 
reflect specific developments on the supply side—is 
important as well. In petroleum markets, production 
decisions by producers, supply disruptions, and geo-
political concerns are often decisive in determining 
the course of prices, particularly when inventories 
are low. For food prices, weather is the predominant 
commodity-specific factor. The next two sections 
discuss the supply-demand balance in oil and food 
markets, respectively. 
Supply-Demand Balance in Oil Markets
Supply surge
Oil supply expanded at an annual rate of 3.2 
percent during the first half of 2012—on average by 
2.4 million barrels a day (mbd)—more than double 
the growth rate during 2011 (Table 1.SF.2). Since 
then, supply has moderated. 
 • Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC): As of the end of June, increased sup-
ply reflected an eight-month ramp-up in OPEC 
production (an increase of 2.1 mbd), well above 
the cartel’s production quota ceiling of 30 mbd 
for crude oil. The OPEC crude oil production 
quota is only a guideline, however, and actual 
production was considerably higher (by 1.9 mbd) 
during the first half of 2012 (Figure 1.SF.8, panel 
1), largely attributed to the recovery in Libyan 
production and increased Saudi output. While 
still above quota, OPEC production moderated 
(by 0.5 mbd) during the third quarter.2
2Before the full effects of the sanctions and oil embargo kicked 
in, Iranian crude oil during the second quarter was at half of 
peak production (in 1974, at more than 6 mbd), hovering at an 
average of 3.2 to 3.3 mbd between April and June 2012, only to 
fall to below 2.9 mbd in August (according to the International 
Energy Agency, IEA). Given the use of flagging out and floating 
storage, the IEA suggests caution when interpreting the data, 
especially pre-July data. The EU oil embargo also barred European 
insurance companies from insuring Iranian oil-related transac-
tions. As the insurance market for Iranian oil disappeared, Japan 
decided to provide its own insurance and Iran offered to provide 
insurance coverage to tankers carrying Iranian oil.
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Figure 1.SF.7.  Demand for Base Metals
1. China’s Share in Base Metal Demand
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 • Non-OPEC: Non-OPEC production growth was 
centered in the Americas—namely, Canada and the 
United States, which added on average 1 mbd. This 
increase was largely attributable to the development 
of unconventional oil production in the United 
States with hydraulic fracturing technology (Box 
1.4).The increase in the Americas offsets non-OPEC 
declines elsewhere—for example, in Sudan, Syria, 
and Yemen—and trend declines in other Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) country supplies (United Kingdom), 
resulting in a net non-OPEC supply increase of 0.4 
Table 1.Sf.2.  Global Oil Supply and Demand by Region
(Million barrels a day)
2010 2011
2012
Proj.
2011
H2
2012
H1
Year-over-Year Percent Change
2005–07
Avg. 2008 2009 2010 2011
2012
Proj.
2011
H2
2012
H1
World Production 87.3 88.4 89.8 88.9 90.8  0.9  1.2  –1.5  2.1   1.3  1.5   1.2   3.2
OPEC (current composition)1,2 34.6 35.7 36.6 35.9 37.6  1.7  3.3  –5.9  1.8   3.0  2.6   2.8   6.3
Of Which:
Saudi Arabia  9.7 10.8 . . . 11.1 11.4 –0.2  4.9  –9.5  2.2  11.6 . . .  13.2   8.7
Iran  4.2  4.2 . . .  4.1  3.8  1.7 –1.5  –1.9 –0.0  –1.7 . . .  –2.5 –10.2
Nigeria  2.5  2.6 . . .  2.6  2.6 –1.9 –7.6  –0.4 15.7   3.9 . . .  –0.3  –1.7
Venezuela  2.7  2.7 . . .  2.6  2.7  1.8  0.8  –3.6 –4.6  –1.2 . . .  –4.0  –2.7
Iraq  2.4  2.7 . . .  2.7  2.9  2.0 14.3   2.7 –2.0  12.9 . . .  12.3   5.4
Libya  1.7  0.5 . . .  0.3  1.4  4.3  0.8  –9.7  0.0 –70.8 . . . –81.1 116.2
Kuwait  2.2  2.4 . . .  2.6  2.7  1.9  8.0 –11.3  1.6   9.8 . . .  15.3  14.8
Non-OPEC2 52.6 52.8 53.2 53.0 53.2  0.4 –0.2   1.5  2.4   0.3  0.8   0.1   1.1
Of Which:
North America 14.1 14.6 15.7 14.9 15.6 –1.2 –3.4   1.8  3.6   3.5  7.8   4.5   8.8
United States  7.8  8.1  8.9  8.3  8.9 –1.8 –1.2   6.5  4.7   4.6 10.0   5.6  11.5
Canada  3.4  3.5  3.9  3.6  3.8  2.6 –2.2  –0.8  4.8   4.5 10.5   6.5  11.4
North Sea  3.8  3.4  3.1  3.3  3.3 –7.0 –4.7  –5.3 –8.6  –9.8 –8.0  –8.8  –5.8
Russia 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.6 10.7  2.5 –0.7   2.0  2.4   1.4  1.0   1.4   1.4
Other Former Soviet Union3  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.9  3.0  9.8  3.1   8.7  0.6  –3.0 –1.5  –5.6  –2.4
Other Non-OPEC 21.3 21.2 20.7 21.3 20.6  1.4  3.0   1.6  4.0  –0.2 –2.3  –1.1  –2.6
Of Which:  
Brazil  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  6.2  3.4   6.8  5.6   2.6  0.7   2.6   0.6
World Demand 88.1 88.9 89.8 89.7 89.1  1.5 –0.7  –1.2  3.1   1.0  0.9   0.5   1.0
Advanced Economies 45.9 45.4 45.0 45.6 44.7 –0.1 –3.6  –3.9  1.8  –1.2 –0.8  –1.7  –0.9
Of Which:
United States 19.5 19.3 19.1 19.3 18.9 –0.1 –5.9  –3.7  2.2  –0.9 –0.9  –1.7  –2.1
Euro Area 10.5 10.2  9.9 10.3  9.8 –0.4 –0.4  –5.6 –0.3  –3.3 –3.1  –4.3  –3.8
Japan  4.4  4.5  4.6  4.6  4.8 –1.8 –4.8  –8.1  0.7   0.6  4.0   2.8   9.6
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies  5.0  4.9  4.9  4.9  4.8  2.4 –2.6   3.5  5.5  –2.4 –0.0  –1.8  –0.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 42.1 43.6 44.7 44.0 44.4  3.8  3.0   2.1  4.5   3.4  2.7   2.9   3.0
Of Which:
Commonwealth of Independent States  4.2  4.4  4.6  4.6  4.5  2.2  6.1  –4.7  3.2   6.7  3.6   7.4   4.1
Developing Asia 25.1 26.0 26.9 25.9 27.0  3.7  1.6   3.8  7.2   3.9  3.2   2.8   3.0
China  8.8  9.2  9.5  9.2  9.4  5.5  1.9   3.3 10.7   5.0  2.6   2.2   1.8
India  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.4  3.7  4.9  4.0   1.1  7.1   4.1  3.8   4.7   3.7
Middle East and North Africa  9.1  9.0  9.2  9.2  9.1  4.5  5.2   5.7  2.5  –1.3  2.8  –0.9   3.0
Western Hemisphere  5.9  6.2  6.4  6.3  6.3  3.6  6.4   0.5  4.9   4.4  2.4   4.3   3.1
Net Demand4  0.8  0.5 . . .  0.8 –1.7  0.4 –0.4   0.0  0.9   0.6 . . .   0.9  –1.9
Sources: International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, September 2012; and IMF staff calculations.
1OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Includes Angola (subject to quotas since January 2007) and Ecuador, which rejoined OPEC in November 2007 after suspending its membership 
from December 1992 to October 2007.  
2Totals refer to a total of crude oil, condensates, natural gas liquids, and oil from unconventional sources. Individual OPEC country production is for crude oil only.
3Other Former Soviet Union includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
4Difference between demand and production. In the percent change columns, the figures are in percent of world demand.
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mbd during the first half of the year (Table 1.SF.2). 
Unplanned outages in Norway and those related to 
Hurricane Isaac in the United States, among others, 
led to some moderation (by about 1 mbd) in non-
OPEC production during the third quarter.
Anemic demand
Demand growth was flat during the first half of 
2012 relative to the 2011 average, at 89.1 mbd, thus 
contributing to the easing in crude oil prices, par-
ticularly toward the end of the second quarter. Year-
over-year demand was up during the second quarter 
of 2012 (by about 1.2 mbd), but largely from Asia 
and the Pacific—namely, China, India, and Japan—
and the Middle East; there was a slowdown rela-
tive to the last quarter of 2011 in other advanced 
economies (Figure 1.SF.8, panel 2; Table 1.SF.2). 
This slowdown is a continuation of the trend decline 
in OECD demand (except in Japan) owing to lower 
oil intensity. Much of China’s demand increase was 
reportedly to add to the country’s strategic petro-
leum reserve and, to a lesser extent, to support the 
still-expanding vehicle usage and growth in petro-
chemical demand. India’s strong demand intensified 
initially from irrigation needs given a weak monsoon 
and then from electricity blackouts and power short-
ages during the third quarter. Increased Japanese 
demand reflects the use of oil for power generation 
after nuclear production was halted in the wake of 
the Fukushima disaster. Japanese demand is expected 
to remain high despite the restart of two nuclear 
plants during July 2012, given the country’s recent 
decision to phase out nuclear power by 2040. 
Reflecting these supply and demand developments, 
there was a replenishment of inventories among 
OECD countries. Inventory levels were close to their 
five-year averages in July 2012, while spare capacity in 
OPEC countries hovered at 2.5 mbd (Figure 1.SF.9).3 
3Reliable data on inventory accumulation from non-OECD 
economies are scarce. However, industry analysts report some 
buildup in forward demand (particularly in Asia), but this 
remains well below the OECD average (55 days) for many large 
emerging market economies (for example, India and Indonesia).   
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Figure 1.SF.8.  Oil Supply and Demand
1. OPEC Crude Oil Production and Quotas1
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Supply concerns in Food Markets
Supply setbacks
The prices of major crops—corn, soybeans, and 
wheat—have risen strongly amid concern about 
weather-related supply disruptions worldwide. Earlier 
in the year, the La Niña weather pattern contributed 
to drought in South America, which significantly 
hurt corn and soybean crops in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay. Since mid-June, other supply concerns have 
emerged as hot and dry weather in the U.S. Midwest 
lowered corn and soybean yields. At the same time, 
wheat crop estimates have been downgraded in the 
Black Sea region (Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine) and in 
China because of adverse weather conditions. 
Robust demand
Food demand remained robust in 2012 despite 
the slowdown in global economic activity. Most of 
the demand growth for major crops—corn, wheat, 
soybeans, and rice—is expected to come from 
emerging market and developing economies this 
year, with China being the single largest contribu-
tor. Among individual food commodities, wheat 
accounts for more than half the global consumption 
growth for major crops. 
Declining stocks
Global food markets are vulnerable to supply 
setbacks because of low buffers. Stock-to-use ratios 
remain below their long-term historical average levels 
for corn and rice and have been declining for wheat 
and soybeans. Compared with the 2007–08 food 
crisis, global stock-to-use ratios have improved signifi-
cantly for rice and wheat but deteriorated most nota-
bly for soybeans and to a lesser extent for corn and 
other grains and oilseeds. (Figure 1.SF.10, panel 1). In 
the absence of adequate food reserves, threats of pro-
duction shortages caused an immediate price response 
in grains, which has significant spillovers to other 
food commodities.  Rising corn prices in particular 
have important spillover effects in meat and ethanol 
markets. The share of the U.S. corn crop going to fuel 
use declined noticeably with the expiration of govern-
ment support for the ethanol industry through tariffs 
and tax credits to gasoline refiners. This year, all the 
growth in U.S. corn consumption is expected to come 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
–100 –50 0 50 100 150
July 12
June 12
May 12Apr. 12
Mar. 12
Feb. 12
Jan. 12
OECD inventories—deviations from five-year average (mbd)
Sources: International Energy Agency; U.S. Energy Information Administration; and IMF staff 
calculations.
Note: mbd = million barrels a day; OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development; OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Figure 1.SF.9.  Oil Inventories and Spare Capacity
1. Oil Market Buffers
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from its use as animal feed (Figure 1.SF.10, panel 2). 
Although other grains can be substituted for corn in 
animal feedstock, corn remains the primary feed grain 
in the United States. Another key grain, rice, posted 
only a marginal price change since mid-June because 
markets are well supplied, despite some concern 
about the Indian harvest from a weaker monsoon 
season, but global rice output is projected to reach 
record levels next year. Substitution on the supply and 
demand sides between rice and other grains is also less 
prevalent, and the rice market is more segmented. 
Macroeconomic impact
The current food price shock is less severe than 
the shock in 2007–08 because it has not affected all 
key crops uniformly and has not been aggravated by 
trade restrictions and high energy input costs (Box 
1.5). However rising food prices could have a number 
of macroeconomic implications. First, rising prices 
translate into higher headline inflation, which erodes 
consumers’ buying power. This erosion is felt particu-
larly sharply in low- and middle-income countries, 
where the share of food in the consumption basket 
is higher and the pass-through from international to 
domestic prices is larger than in advanced economies. 
Second, they erode the fiscal balance through higher 
government subsidies and safety net measures for 
affected households. And finally, rising food prices 
have a negative effect on the trade balances of food-
importing countries. Rising food prices also have 
political economy dimensions: they contribute to 
widespread discontent, thus destabilizing fragile post-
conflict political systems. Therefore, countries should 
avoid protective trade policies such as export bans and 
export taxes and quotas, which further drive up food 
prices and volatility, and instead should adopt appro-
priate policies to maintain macroeconomic stability 
while protecting the poor.4 
In the near term, countries should expect rising 
inflation and balance of payments pressures. During 
the 2007–08 food price surge, low- and middle-
income countries bore the brunt of the inflationary 
impact, because volatile items such as food and fuel 
4So far this year, there is no evidence of widespread export 
restrictions on food commodities or panic buying by importers, as 
seen during 2007–08.
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Figure 1.SF.10.  Inventory Buffers for Food
1. Global Food Stock-to-Use Ratios
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account for a large share in the consumption basket. 
Recent IMF research suggests that, despite a variety 
of appropriate monetary policy tools to combat ris-
ing inflation across countries, commodity importers 
are better off targeting underlying inflation rather 
than headline inflation, which includes volatile food 
and fuel, thus improving central bank credibility 
by stabilizing both output and inflation volatility.5 
In this context, near-term macroeconomic policies 
should also include scaling up well-targeted social 
safety nets and other fiscal transfers where space is 
available, allowing the real exchange rate to move 
flexibly for net importers, and accessing multilateral 
finance to support balance of payments needs.
Outlook for commodity Markets
For all their faults, futures prices remain the most 
favored way to gauge the outlook for spot prices 
(Chinn and Coibion, 2009). The predictions by 
futures markets for the main commodities are shown 
in Figure 1.SF.11, and market assessments of the bal-
ance of risks from the prices of futures options are 
shown in Figure 1.SF.12.6 
 • Oil: With the decline in inventory buffers and their 
return in May to five-year averages, futures curves 
for the Brent crude oil variety—the predominant 
price benchmark outside the North American 
market—continue to exhibit backwardation, 
implying a gradual decline in oil prices to less than 
$100 in the medium term. However, reflecting 
physical market (for example, North Sea) disrup-
tions, ongoing geopolitical risks and concern 
about associated potential supply disruptions, and 
expectations of stimulus in China, the United 
States, and Europe, the risk to oil prices is tilted 
to the upside. In contrast, futures curves for WTI 
are still sloping upward at the front end, reflecting 
localized pockets of excess supply in the landlocked 
5See Chapter 3 of the September 2011 World Economic Outlook 
for a detailed discussion.
6The time duration of the fan chart depends on the depth of 
available futures options. Options for many commodities are 
either unavailable or, as for aluminum, are not liquid enough to 
construct a fan chart.
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Figure 1.SF.11.  Futures Prices
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areas of the North American oil supply system.7 
 However, because still-limited transportation capac-
ity constrains the scope for arbitrage to reduce price 
differentials, and given that these constraints are 
expected to persist, current futures prices imply 
that markets expect WTI to be priced at a discount 
to Brent through 2015. Overall, risks around 
the APSP baseline are more balanced than at the 
time of the April 2012 World Economic Outlook, 
although upside risks are wide and thus cannot be 
easily dismissed (see Figure 1.SF.12). 
 • Food: Although short-term supply constraints are 
likely to keep food prices elevated, in the medium 
term the current food price spike should subside 
in the absence of major additional disruptions to 
supply and resulting trade restrictions. Futures 
price curves indicate that markets expect the 
prices of key food crops to moderate by the end 
of 2013.
 • Metals: Markets are expecting some rebound after 
the sharp price declines in recent quarters. This 
could reflect anticipation of a pickup in economic 
activity beginning in the fourth quarter of 2012 and 
the impact of possible stimulus measures in China.
7With above-average temperatures in the United States during 
June and July coinciding with the summer driving season, oil spot 
prices rose in response to strong refinery runs, reduced imports, 
and falling stocks. The upward-sloping WTI futures curve at 
the front end, however, reflects still-large stocks in the mid-
continent—from increased light tight oil in the United States and 
heavy crude oil from Canada—and a lack of pipeline capacity to 
ship crude oil to Gulf Coast refineries. The buildup in landlocked 
crude oil has driven the price of WTI below that of Brent, in part 
as a reflection of the higher cost of moving surplus crude oil to 
market by rail, barge, and truck. The ahead-of-schedule reversal 
of the direction of the Seaway pipeline, which now delivers heavy 
crude oil from Cushing, Oklahoma, to Gulf Coast refineries, 
helped alleviate at the margin some congestion this spring at 
Cushing—where stockpiles had been at an all-time high—but 
not enough to remove the surplus. The WTI-Brent spread is 
likely to persist until new pipelines to the Gulf Coast are built, 
existing pipelines expanded, and new refining capacity comes 
online to handle the increase in heavy crude: the first large-scale 
refining facility is scheduled to open in Indiana in mid-2013. The 
expected narrowing of the WTI-Brent spread is reflected in the 
middle and back end of both futures curves: both slope down-
ward, reflecting expectations of future lower prices. 
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Figure 1.SF.12.  Price Prospects for Selected Commodities
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With many economies in fiscal consolidation 
mode, a debate has been raging about the size of 
fiscal multipliers. The smaller the multipliers, the 
less costly the fiscal consolidation. At the same time, 
activity has disappointed in a number of economies 
undertaking fiscal consolidation. So a natural ques-
tion is whether the negative short-term effects of fis-
cal cutbacks have been larger than expected because 
fiscal multipliers were underestimated. 
This box sheds light on these issues using interna-
tional evidence. The main finding, based on data for 
28 economies, is that the multipliers used in generat-
ing growth forecasts have been systematically too low 
since the start of the Great Recession, by 0.4 to 1.2, 
depending on the forecast source and the specifics of 
the estimation approach. Informal evidence suggests 
that the multipliers implicitly used to generate these 
forecasts are about 0.5. So actual multipliers may be 
higher, in the range of 0.9 to 1.7.
Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers 
Our basic approach is the following: focusing on the 
recent episode of widespread fiscal consolidation, we 
regress the forecast error for real GDP growth dur-
ing 2010–11 on forecasts of fiscal consolidation for 
2010–11 that were made in early 2010. Under rational 
expectations, and assuming that the correct forecast 
model has been used, the coefficient on planned fiscal 
consolidation should be zero. The equation estimated is
forecast error of growth = α + β forecast of fiscal 
consolidation + ε. (1.1.1)
The forecast error of growth is equal to actual 
cumulative real GDP growth during 2010–11 minus 
the forecast of growth in the April 2010 World 
Economic Outlook. The forecast of fiscal consolida-
tion is the forecast of the change in the structural 
fiscal balance as a percentage of potential GDP 
during 2010–11 as of the April 2010 WEO. We also 
investigate forecasts other than the WEO. If the fiscal 
multipliers used for forecasting are accurate, the slope 
coefficient, β, should be zero. Our baseline sample 
consists of 28 economies: the major advanced econo-
mies included in the G20 and the member countries 
of the EU for which forecasts are available.  
What Do the Data Show?
We find the coefficient on planned fiscal con-
solidation to be large, negative, and significant. 
The baseline estimate suggests that a planned fiscal 
consolidation of 1 percent of GDP is associated with 
a growth forecast error of about 1 percentage point 
(Table 1.1.1 and Figure 1.1.1, panel 1). This result 
indicates that the multipliers underlying growth pro-
jections have been too low by about 1. The systematic 
relationship between fiscal consolidation and growth 
holds up to a battery of robustness tests. Overall, 
depending on the forecast source and the specifica-
tion, our estimation results for the unexpected output 
loss associated with a 1 percent of GDP fiscal con-
solidation are in the range of 0.4 to 1.2 percentage 
points. First, we establish that the baseline result is 
not driven by crisis economies––those that had IMF 
programs—or other outliers (Table 1.1.1).1
Next, we check whether the results are robust to 
controlling for additional variables that could plausi-
bly have triggered both planned fiscal consolidation 
and lower-than-expected growth. The omission of 
such variables could bias the analysis toward finding 
that fiscal multipliers were larger than assumed. We 
consider two groups of variables: those that were 
known when the growth forecasts were made and 
those that were not (Table 1.1.1).
 • Variables known at the time the forecasts were 
made: We start by considering the role of sover-
eign debt problems. Are the baseline results pick- 
ing up greater-than-expected effects of sovereign 
debt problems rather than the effects of fiscal  
consolidation? Reassuringly, the results are robust  
to controlling for the initial (end-2009) 
 government-debt-to-GDP ratio and for initial 
sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads. 
Controlling for the possible role of banking 
crises—based on the data set of systemic banking 
crises of Laeven and Valencia (2012)—yields 
similar results. The baseline finding also holds up 
to controlling for the fiscal consolidation of trad-
ing partners. To the extent that fiscal consolida-
tions were synchronized, fiscal consolidation by 
1Similarly, the results are unchanged when other (non-EU) 
advanced economies are included (Iceland, Israel, Norway, 
Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China). 
Box 1.1. are We Underestimating Short-term Fiscal Multipliers?
The authors of this box are Olivier Blanchard and Daniel 
Leigh.
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others may be driving the results. However, when 
we control for trade-weighted fiscal consolidation 
of other countries (scaled by the share of exports 
in GDP), the results are virtually unchanged. 
Finally, to investigate the role of precrisis external 
imbalances that may have triggered both fiscal 
consolidation and larger-than-expected headwinds 
to growth, we try controlling for the precrisis 
(2007) current-account-deficit-to-GDP ratio and 
find similar results.2
 • Variables not known at the time the forecasts were 
made:3 We consider the role of the sharp increase 
in sovereign and financial market stress during 
2010–11, measured by the change in the sover-
eign CDS spreads. Controlling for these develop-
ments again yields similar results. We also address 
the possibility that, even if the assumed multipli-
ers were correct, countries with more ambitious 
consolidation programs may have implemented 
more fiscal consolidation than originally planned. 
2The baseline results also hold up to additional robust-
ness checks, including controlling for the initial forecast for 
2010–11 growth and for initial trade openness and its interac-
tion with planned fiscal consolidation.
3It is possible that developments that occurred after the 
forecasts were made could be partly the result of lower-than-
expected growth rather than the cause of lower growth. 
As Table 1.1.1 reports, including unexpected fis-
cal consolidation does not significantly affect the 
results, suggesting that the baseline specification 
is appropriate.4 In line with this result, we find 
that there was no systematic tendency for econo-
mies with larger initial fiscal consolidation plans 
to implement larger additional consolidation. 
GDP Components, Unemployment, and Different 
Forecasters 
When we decompose GDP, we find the largest 
coefficient for forecasts of investment and the most 
statistically significant coefficient for forecasts of 
consumption (Figure 1.1.1, panel 2). The coefficient 
associated with forecasts of the unemployment rate 
is also large and significant. 
We also consider four different sets of forecasts: 
those of the WEO, the European Commission 
(EC), the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), and the Econo-
4Unexpected consolidation is defined as the actual (ex post) 
change in the structural fiscal balance minus the forecast—
that is, the forecast error of fiscal consolidation. The results 
also hold up to additional robustness checks, including 
controlling for the revision to the initial (end-2009) debt-to-
GDP ratio, defined as the actual debt ratio in 2009 minus the 
estimate of the debt ratio published in the April 2010 WEO.
Box 1.1. (continued)
Table 1.1.1. Growth forecast Errors and fiscal Consolidation
(Forecast error of growth = a + b forecast of fiscal consolidation + yX + ´)
Additional Control β γ Obs R2
Baseline –1.164*** (0.244) 28 0.506
Excluding Possible Outliers
Exluding IMF Programs –0.918*** (0.279) 24 0.256
Excluding CEE –1.054*** (0.267) 22 0.480
Excluding Largest Adjustment –0.974*** (0.314) 27 0.325
Excluding Cook’s D Outliers –1.058*** (0.240) 23 0.506
Additional Controls in Forecasters’ Information Set
Initial Government Debt –1.165*** (0.249)  0.000 (0.007) 28 0.506
Initial Sovereign CDS –0.971*** (0.250) –0.669 (0.509) 27 0.533
Systemic Banking Crisis –1.172*** (0.247)  0.192 (0.705) 28 0.508
Initial Growth Forecast –1.194*** (0.264) –0.068 (0.113) 28 0.511
Partner Fiscal Consolidation –1.183*** (0.264) –0.794 (1.289) 28 0.513
Additional Controls not in Forecasters’ Information Set
Change in Sovereign CDS –0.938*** (0.315) –0.092 (0.055) 27 0.540
Revision to Initial Debt –1.171*** (0.284)  0.820 (10.7) 28 0.507
Unexpected Fiscal Consolidation –1.146*** (0.230) –0.142 (0.190) 28 0.513
Sources: Bloomberg, L.P.; Laeven and Valencia (2012); and IMF staff calculations.
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Obs denotes the number of observations. A constant term (α) 
is included in the specification but is not reported in the table. Unexpected fiscal consolidation is actual fiscal consolidation minus forecast. Estimation results for the 
constant term are not reported. IMF Programs denotes Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Romania. CEE denotes Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
and Slovak Republic. Initial CDS denotes credit default swap spread at end-2009. Change in CDS is from end-2009 to end-2011. 
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mist Intelligence Unit (EIU—Figure 1.1.1, panel 
3).5 The largest estimated coefficient is associated 
with the WEO forecasts and the smallest with the 
OECD forecasts. The coefficient is statistically 
significant in all cases. 
What Does This Say about Actual Fiscal 
Multipliers?
These results suggest that actual fiscal multipliers 
were larger than forecasters assumed. But what did 
forecasters assume about fiscal multipliers? Answer-
ing this question is complicated by the fact that not 
all forecasters make these assumptions explicit. Nev-
ertheless, a number of policy documents, including 
IMF staff reports, suggest that fiscal multipliers used 
in the forecasting process are about 0.5. In line with 
these assumptions, earlier analysis by the IMF staff 
suggests that, on average, fiscal multipliers were near 
0.5 in advanced economies during the three decades 
leading up to 2009.6
If the multipliers underlying the growth forecasts 
were about 0.5, as this informal evidence suggests, 
our results indicate that multipliers have actu-
ally been in the 0.9 to 1.7 range since the Great 
Recession. This finding is consistent with research 
suggesting that in today’s environment of substantial 
economic slack, monetary policy constrained by the 
zero lower bound, and synchronized fiscal adjust-
ment across numerous economies, multipliers may 
be well above 1 (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 
2012; Batini, Callegari, and Melina, 2012; IMF, 
2012b; Woodford, 2011; and others). More work 
on how fiscal multipliers depend on time and eco-
nomic conditions is warranted.
5Data for EC forecasts are from the May 2010 European 
Economic Forecast. Data for OECD forecasts are from the June 
2010 Economic Outlook. Data for EIU forecasts of real GDP 
are from the April 2010 Country Forecast, and the forecasts of 
fiscal consolidation are from the April 2010 WEO. (The EIU 
does not publish forecasts of the structural fiscal balance.)
6See Chapter 3 of the October 2010 World Economic 
Outlook. 
Box 1.1. (continued)
Activity over the past few years has disappointed more in 
economies with more aggressive fiscal consolidation plans, 
suggesting that fiscal multipliers used in making growth forecasts 
have been systematically too low. This relationship holds for 
different components of GDP, the unemployment rate, and 
forecasts made by different institutions.
1. Fiscal Consolidation Plans and Growth Forecast Errors 1
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The analysis presented in this box examines 
the potential long-term macroeconomic impli-
cations of advanced economies’ accumulation 
of large quantities of public debt, as currently 
forecast in the World Economic Outlook baseline 
scenario. Two models are used to illustrate the 
implications. The first is the Global Integrated 
Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF),1 and the 
second is a small stochastic macroeconomic 
model that emphasizes uncertainty in fiscal 
dynamics (FiscalMod). The GIMF is used to 
illustrate the implications for the baseline of an 
accumulation of large stocks of debt by advanced 
economies, while the FiscalMod is used to 
illustrate the distribution of outcomes around 
possible baselines in an uncertain world with 
macroeconomic surprises.
Some Stylized GIMF Simulations 
A stylized simulation that incorporates some 
aspects of recent economic experience in the G3 
(euro area, Japan, United States) is used to illus-
trate the long-term implications for the baseline 
of higher public debt. In recent years G3 coun-
tries’ fiscal positions have deteriorated, resulting 
in a sharp increase in public debt levels. This was 
driven largely by the financial crisis: public spend-
ing was increased to address financial institution 
problems and help maintain output in the face 
of diminished private demand. In addition, weak 
private demand has also led to lower public rev-
enue. The GIMF simulation, represented by the 
blue line in Figure 1.2.1, replicates this develop-
ment and shows a rise in G3 debt-to-GDP ratios 
over roughly a 10-year period by the amounts 
forecast in the WEO baseline between 2007 and 
2017. In the simulation, the weakness in private 
demand also initially results in low real interest 
rates. However, once private demand normalizes 
and public debt converges to a new higher level, 
the increased demand for savings from G3 econo-
mies raises the global real interest rate, which over 
The main authors of this box are Ali Alichi, Derek Ander-
son, Ben Hunt, and Douglas Laxton.
1See Kumhof and others (2010) and Anderson and others 
(forthcoming).
the long term rises almost 40 basis points above 
the baseline. Although the following discussions 
focus largely on the macroeconomic implications 
of these higher real interest rates, this simulation 
analysis necessarily abstracts from the potential 
long-term benefits of the stimulus. The stimulus 
was likely instrumental in averting a potential 
deflationary spiral and protracted period of 
exceedingly high unemployment, macroeconomic 
conditions that general equilibrium models such 
as the GIMF are not well suited to capture.   
Higher real interest rates have two important 
implications for the subsequent level of economic 
activity. First, higher real interest rates raise the 
servicing cost of outstanding public debt. To 
finance those increased debt-service costs, fiscal 
policy adjustments must occur. 
It is assumed that higher labor income taxes 
and consumption taxes each account for 30 per-
cent of the required funding, with an additional 
10 percent coming from higher taxes on capital 
income and the final 30 percent coming from a 
reduction in transfers to households. Higher labor 
and capital income taxes reduce the amount of 
labor and capital used in production, and hence 
output, and lower transfers; and higher consump-
tion taxes reduce household demand. The effects 
jointly lead to a lower level of sustainable output.2 
Second, higher real interest rates raise the cost of 
capital, further reducing the level of capital stock, 
firms’ labor demand, and ultimately sustainable 
output. Together these two effects lead to GDP 
converging to a new long-term level roughly 1 
percent below the previous baseline (as shown by 
the blue line in Figure 1.2.1). (This analysis does 
not consider the possibility of a simultaneous rise 
in the sovereign risk premium in these economies 
with higher public debt. Should that occur, the 
new long-term level of output would be even 
lower than simulated here.) 
Although the run-up in public debt in G3 
economies represents a significant decrease in 
2Relying on a different mix of fiscal instruments to gener-
ate the improvement in the primary fiscal balance necessary 
to cover increased debt-service costs would lead to slightly 
different outcomes for long-term sustainable GDP.
Box 1.2. the Implications of high public Debt in advanced economies
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public saving, another worry is that private saving 
rates could also decline. In emerging markets, 
notably emerging Asia, private saving rates have 
been very high and are likely to moderate in the 
future. In G3 economies, aging is likely to have 
a negative impact on private saving rates. The 
red line in Figure 1.2.1 represents the macro 
implications if, in addition to the reduction in 
public saving, private saving rates also decline. A 
reduction in the private saving rate as a share of 
GDP in emerging market economies of roughly 
2 percentage points is considered in this analysis. 
For the G3 economies, the decline in the saving 
rate is estimated using the United Nations’ low-
Box 1.2. (continued)
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working-age population projections. For every 1 
percent decline in the working-age population, it 
is assumed that saving declines by 0.7 percent.3 
The first point to note is that this implies that 
the real interest rate must rise by an additional 
120 basis points. Higher real interest rates then 
lead to more of the behavior noted above. Tighter 
fiscal policy to finance increased debt-service costs 
further reduces the incentive to work, invest, 
and consume. Higher real interest rates further 
increase the cost of capital, adding to a decline in 
the incentive to invest. The net result is that GDP 
falls even further below the baseline if private sav-
ing rates decline along with the projected decline 
in public saving rates in the G3.
Focusing on relative impacts, Japan becomes 
worse off compared with the United States and 
the euro area because it had the highest debt level 
in the initial control and the largest increase in 
3We abstract from the direct impact on output from the 
decline in the labor force itself and focus purely on the 
implications for saving. Implicitly, this assumes that the 
impact of the decline in the labor force on output and all the 
fiscal implications, such as pension and health care expendi-
tures, are built into the baseline.   
the initial scenario. The rising real interest rate 
adds to debt-service costs in Japan, so the fiscal 
adjustment to pay those costs is larger, as is the 
resulting impact on the incentive to work, invest, 
and consume. 
Moreover, higher public debt in advanced 
economies does not reduce only their potential 
baseline GDP outcomes: all countries suffer 
because higher global real interest rates affect 
everyone. Figure 1.2.2 shows the outcomes for 
global GDP, GDP in the aggregate of the G3, 
and GDP in the aggregate of all other countries. 
Even though the G3 suffer the worst outcomes, all 
countries are worse off. 
The simulated impact on real interest rates 
and thus on real GDP of higher debt and lower 
private saving in advanced economies is highly 
dependent on the rate at which households 
are willing to substitute consumption at some 
point in the future for consumption today—the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The 
simulations presented in Table 1.2.1 assume an 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5, 
roughly in the middle of the range of the empiri-
cal estimates. However, given the uncertainty 
Figure 1.2.2.  Implications of Higher Debt Levels for the Global Economy
(Percent or percentage point deviation from control)
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about this key parameter, Table 1.2.1 compares 
the long-term impact on global GDP and real 
interest rates under three values for the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution. 
Stochastic Analysis
GIMF simulations are a useful way to trace 
potential long-term trend outcomes for GDP 
when G3 countries have high public debt, but 
in an uncertain world, the distributions around 
those trend outcomes must be considered, given 
the potential range of future macroeconomic 
surprises. To compute the distributions for the 
outcomes for GDP, public debt, and real interest 
rates, a small empirical model, FiscalMod, is used. 
This model is semistructural, with a maturity 
structure of government debt and a yield curve. 
The model includes stochastic shocks to output, 
potential output, deficits, inflation, and interest 
rate term premiums and is simulated around an 
extended WEO baseline for a typical advanced 
economy. Illustrative base-case distributions 
(showing 90 percent confidence intervals) for the 
outcomes for GDP, the output gap, public debt, 
inflation, and real interest rates are presented in 
Figure 1.2.3. 
To illustrate the risks associated with allow-
ing debt to drift upward, Figure 1.2.3 presents a 
scenario that makes the following two assump-
tions. First, reduced world private saving rates 
(for example, due to aging) drive up the world 
real interest rate. Second, after the WEO horizon 
(2017) the baseline (median) value of net debt 
is allowed to increase to more than 100 percent 
of GDP. The distributions around this baseline 
are based on a fiscal policy rule allowing it to be 
easier to increase government deficits during bad 
economic times than it is to cut deficits during 
good economic times—that is, it is assumed that 
there is a bias toward higher debt ratios even if 
the macroeconomic shocks are symmetric. Because 
of this assumption, outcomes around the baseline 
are asymmetrical: the upward drift in debt, com-
bined with the assumption that high debt leads to 
higher risk and term premiums, results in positive 
skewness in real interest rates. Given the negative 
relationship between real interest rates and GDP, 
the result is negative skewness in GDP.4 
Scenarios that involve very high levels of debt 
and real interest rates not only result in lower 
growth, but they imply a higher risk of default 
when fiscal dynamics are perceived to be unstable. 
In the model these scenarios would result in 
explosive dynamics and simulation failures. To 
illustrate the importance of these disaster scenar-
ios, Figure 1.2.3, panel 6, shows the probability of 
net debt rising to more than 100 percent of GDP 
and the proportion of scenarios that fail because 
of unstable debt dynamics. As the distribution of 
debt drifts up, the proportion of scenarios with 
unstable debt dynamics rises because of a larger 
gap between an economy’s real interest rate and 
real growth rate. 
This analysis shows the importance of prudent 
fiscal policy frameworks that gradually reduce 
debt over time and prevent debt from drifting 
up too high. Still, it is important to consider the 
speed at which debt is reduced, given advanced 
economies’ weakness and constraints on mon-
4The asymmetry in the distributions also reflects nonlin-
earity in which incremental increases in real interest rates 
caused by increases in debt become larger when the baseline 
value of debt is higher. For empirical evidence on the link 
between government debt and real interest rates, see Engen 
and Hubbard (2004); Gale and Orszag (2004); and Laubach 
(2009).
Table 1.2.1. Importance of the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
0.25 0.5 1.0
Higher Debt
Plus Lower 
Savings Higher Debt
Plus Lower 
Savings Higher Debt
Plus Lower 
Savings
Global Real GDP –1.75 –7.25 –1.0 –3.50 –0.07 –1.75
Global Real Interest Rate  0.80  3.30  0.40  1.20  0.20  0.80
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Box 1.2. (continued)
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etary policy to offset the contractionary effects 
of fiscal consolidation. As shown in Figure 1.2.3, 
the WEO baseline assumes a gradual closing of 
the output gap and little risk of a deflationary 
spiral (negative inflation and larger output gaps). 
Although it is not illustrated with an alternative 
scenario, the same model suggests that an exces-
sively rapid reduction in debt would risk reducing 
growth and pushing the advanced economies into 
a deflationary spiral.  
Box 1.2. (continued)
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Bouts of elevated uncertainty have been one of 
the defining features of the sluggish recovery from 
the global financial crisis. In recent quarters, high 
uncertainty has once again coincided with weak-
ness in the global recovery. Many commentators 
argue that uncertainty is a major cause of escalat-
ing financial stress and recession in the euro area, 
stalling labor markets in the United States, and 
slowing growth in emerging market and developing 
economies.
This box explores the role of uncertainty in 
driving macroeconomic outcomes. Specifically, it 
addresses three major questions: How is uncertainty 
measured? How does it evolve over the business 
cycle? And what is the impact of uncertainty on 
growth and business cycles? To address these ques-
tions, the box briefly analyzes the main features of 
various measures of uncertainty and their associa-
tion with growth and business cycles in advanced 
economies, and it interprets the evidence in light of 
findings from recent research.
Uncertainty is shown to have a harmful impact 
on economic activity. First, the adverse effects 
are transmitted through multiple channels, with 
financial market imperfections and institutional 
constraints often magnifying them, so the effects 
of uncertainty are likely to vary across sectors and 
countries. Second, as experienced acutely since 
the global financial crisis, uncertainty is highly 
countercyclical. Third, cross-country evidence indi-
cates that high uncertainty is often associated with 
deeper recessions and weaker recoveries. 
How Is Uncertainty Measured?
Economic uncertainty frequently refers to an 
environment in which little or nothing is known 
about the future state of the economy. Shocks 
that lead to economic uncertainty can stem from 
a variety of sources, including changes in eco-
nomic and financial policies, dispersion in future 
growth prospects, productivity movements, wars, 
acts of terrorism, and natural disasters (Bloom, 
2009). Although uncertainty is difficult to quantify 
because of its latent nature, it can be measured 
indirectly in a number of ways. These measures 
emphasize distinct aspects of uncertainty facing an 
economy over time. Some of the measures focus on 
macroeconomic uncertainty, including the volatility 
of stock returns, variation in aggregate productiv-
ity, dispersion in unemployment forecasts, and the 
prevalence of terms such as “economic uncertainty” 
in the media. Others consider uncertainty at the 
microeconomic level, which is often measured 
by various indicators of dispersion across sectoral 
output, firm sales, and stock returns.
Because we are concerned primarily with macro-
economic uncertainty, we concentrate on four mea-
sures based on the volatility of stock returns and 
economic policy. The first is the monthly standard 
deviation of daily stock returns in each advanced 
economy in our sample.
The second is the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (VXO), which is an 
indicator of the implied volatility of equity prices 
calculated from S&P 100 options. The third refers 
to uncertainty surrounding economic policies.1 The 
fourth, which represents uncertainty at the global 
level, is the estimated dynamic common factor of 
the first measure using the series of the six major 
advanced economies with the longest available data.
How Does Uncertainty Evolve? 
Both macroeconomic and policy measures of 
uncertainty tend to rise during global recessions 
(Figure 1.3.1). Policy uncertainty in the United 
States and the euro area has remained high since 
the global financial crisis and the recent sovereign 
debt problems in the euro area. Moreover, during 
the lethargic global recovery, uncertainty has been 
unusually high and volatile. This contrasts with the 
recoveries following the other three global reces-
1The economic policy uncertainty measure employed here 
is from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012), who use a weighted 
average of the following three indicators: the frequency with 
which terms like “economic policy” and “uncertainty” appear 
together in the media, the number of tax provisions that 
will expire in coming years, and the dispersion of forecasts 
of future government outlays and inflation. Because most of 
this information refers to outcomes it does not distinguish 
between uncertainty about policy goals and uncertainty 
about policy instruments.   
Box 1.3. how Does Uncertainty affect economic performance? 
The authors of this box are M. Ayhan Kose and Marco E. 
Terrones, with research support from Ezgi O. Ozturk.
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sions shown in Figure 1.3.1, which were accompa-
nied by steady declines in uncertainty.
Uncertainty is highly countercyclical. Macroeco-
nomic uncertainty varies over different phases of 
the business cycle: during expansions in advanced 
economies uncertainty is, on average, much lower 
than during recessions, regardless of the measure 
(Table 1.3.1). Microeconomic uncertainty, mea-
sured by the volatility of movements in plant-level 
productivity in the United States, also behaves 
countercyclically and reached a post-1970 high 
during the Great Recession (Bloom and others, 
2012).
Causality between uncertainty and the business 
cycle is difficult to establish—does uncertainty 
drive recessions or do recessions lead to uncer-
tainty? Empirical findings on this question are 
mixed.2 However, economic theory, as discussed 
next, points to clear channels through which 
uncertainty can have a negative impact on growth. 
Some uncertainty is likely to be an intrinsic feature 
of the business cycle: firms and households will 
learn only over time which sectors of the economy 
will do better and which will do worse—and for 
how long—in response to the shocks that cause 
recessions.
What Is the Impact of Uncertainty on Growth 
and Business Cycles? 
Economic theory suggests that macroeconomic 
uncertainty can have an adverse impact on output 
through a variety of channels. On the demand side, 
for example, when faced with high uncertainty, 
firms reduce investment demand and delay their 
projects as they gather new information, because 
investment is often costly to reverse (Bernanke, 
1983; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Households’ 
response to high uncertainty is similar to that of 
2Bachmann and Moscarini (2011) find that the direction 
of causality runs from recessions to uncertainty. In contrast, 
Baker and Bloom (2011) offer evidence, using disaster data 
as instruments, that the causality runs from uncertainty to 
recessions, and Bloom and others (2012) report that growth 
does not cause uncertainty. Predictions of theory and find-
ings from empirical studies collectively indicate that uncer-
tainty can play a dual role over the business cycle: it can be 
an impulse as well as a propagation mechanism.
Box 1.3. (continued)
0
50
100
150
200
250
1985:Q1 95:
Q1
2005:
Q1
12:
Q2
US Policy Uncertainty Index
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
–5
0
5
10
15
20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1960 70 80 90 2000 11:
Q4
Figure 1.3.1.  Evolution of Uncertainty
(Indices)
1. Macroeconomic Uncertainty
2. Economic Policy Uncertainty
3. Uncertainty during Global Recoveries
(number of quarters from three quarters after peak
in uncertainty on x-axis)
Uncertainty in the U.S. (right scale)
Global uncertainty (left scale)
European Policy Uncertainty Index
1975 1982
1991 2009
Sources: IMF staff calculations; and Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2012). 
Note: In panels 1 and 2, shaded areas denote the periods of global 
recession. These global recessions (1975, 1982, 1991, 2009) are 
identified following Kose, Loungani, and Terrones (2009). In panel 
2, economic policy uncertainty in the United States and the euro 
area is from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012). Since these 
indicators are based on different measures, their levels are not 
strictly comparable. In panel 3, each line presents the evolution of 
uncertainty in the United States starting three quarters after 
uncertainty reached its peak during the respective global 
recession. 
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firms: they reduce their consumption of durable 
goods as they wait for less uncertain times. On the 
supply side, firms’ hiring plans are also negatively 
affected by higher uncertainty, reflecting costly 
adjustment of personnel (Bentolila and Bertola, 
1990). 
Financial market imperfections can amplify 
the negative impact of uncertainty on growth. In 
theory, uncertainty leads to a decline in expected 
returns on projects financed with debt and makes it 
harder to assess the value of collateral. Thus, credi-
tors charge higher interest rates and limit lending 
during uncertain times, which reduces firms’ ability 
to borrow. The decline in borrowing causes invest-
ment to contract, especially for credit-constrained 
firms, and results in slower productivity growth 
because of reduced spending on research and devel-
opment. These factors together can translate into a 
significant reduction in output growth (Gilchrist, 
Sim, and Zakrajsek, 2010). 
The impact of uncertainty differs across sectors 
and countries. The sectors that produce durable 
goods—including machinery and equipment, auto-
mobiles, houses, and furniture—are often the most 
affected by increases in uncertainty. The impact 
of an uncertainty shock on consumption and 
investment is larger in emerging market economies 
than in advanced economies, probably because the 
former group tends to have less developed financial 
markets and institutions (Carrière-Swallow and 
Céspedes, 2011). 
Empirical evidence suggests that uncertainty 
tends to be detrimental to economic growth. The 
growth rate of output is negatively correlated with 
macroeconomic uncertainty (Table 1.3.2). A 1 stan- 
dard deviation increase in uncertainty is associated 
with a decline in output growth of between 0.4 and 
1.25 percentage points depending on the measure 
of macroeconomic uncertainty. There were indeed 
multiple episodes during which uncertainty rose 
by 1 standard deviation or more, including at the 
onset of the Great Recession and during the recent 
debt crisis in the euro area. High uncertainty tends 
to be associated with a larger drop in investment 
than in output and consumption growth. These 
findings lend support to the validity of different 
theoretical channels through which uncertainty 
adversely affects economic activity. They are also 
consistent with recent studies documenting a nega-
tive relationship between growth and uncertainty.3 
3Empirical evidence based on vector autoregression (VAR) 
models points to a significant negative impact of uncertainty 
shocks on output and employment (Bloom, 2009; Hirata 
and others, 2012). These results also echo the findings in a 
broader area of research on the negative impact of macroeco-
nomic and policy volatility on economic growth (Ramey and 
Box 1.3. (continued)
Table 1.3.1.  Uncertainty over the Business Cycle
Country-Specific 
Uncertainty
Uncertainty in the 
United States
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty Global Uncertainty
Recession 1.29***
(0.08)
24.12***
(0.50)
134.59***
(2.78)
1.61***
(0.18)
Expansion 0.93***
(0.03)
19.03***
(0.06)
100.56***
(0.51)
–0.24**
(0.02)
Number of Observations 3,138 4,158 2,268 4,347
Number of Economies 21 21 21 21
R2 Adjusted 0.77 0.89 0.92 0.07
Test (p Values)
h0: Recession Coefficient = Expansion Coefficient 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: The dependent variable is the level of uncertainty. Recessions and expansions in regressions refer to dummy variables taking the values of 1 and zero when the 
economy is in recession and expansion, respectively. The periods of recession and expansion are defined following Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2012). Country-
specific uncertainty refers to the monthly standard deviation of daily stock returns in each country. Daily returns are calculated using each country’s stock price index. 
Data series cover the period 1960–2011, but coverage varies across economies. Uncertainty in the United States refers to the Chicago Board Options Exchange VXO 
index, which is calculated from S&P 100 options. Prior to 1986, this series has been extended following Bloom (2009). The policy uncertainty measure is an index of 
economic policy uncertainty for the United States from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012). It refers to the weighted average of three indicators, including the frequency 
of the appearance of terms like “economic policy” and “uncertainty” in the media, the number of tax provisions that will expire in coming years, and the dispersion of 
forecasts of future government outlays and inflation. Global uncertainty is the estimated dynamic common factor of the first measure using the series of France, Italy, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (These countries have the longest series of stock market indices.)  *** denotes that the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Policy-induced uncertainty is also negatively 
associated with growth. The adverse impact of 
policy uncertainty on economic growth works 
mainly through two channels. First, it directly 
affects the behavior of households and firms as they 
postpone investment and consumption decisions 
when uncertainty about future policies is elevated. 
Second, it breeds macroeconomic uncertainty, 
which in turn reduces growth. As noted, policy 
Ramey, 1995; Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2006; Fatas and 
Mihov, forthcoming).
uncertainty has increased to record levels since the 
Great Recession. Specifically, the increase in policy 
uncertainty between 2006 and 2011 was about 5 
standard deviations. This sharp increase in policy 
uncertainty may have stymied growth in advanced 
economies by 2½ percentage points during this 
period.4
4This finding is consistent with results from a recent study 
by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012). They employ a VAR 
model and report that a jump in policy uncertainty, such 
as the one observed between 2006 and 2011 in the United 
Box 1.3. (continued)
Table 1.3.2.  Uncertainty and Growth
Output Consumption Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Country-Specific Uncertainty –0.65*
(0.37)
–0.23
(0.38)
–1.18
(0.99)
Uncertainty in the U.S. –0.18***
(0.01)
–0.12***
(0.01)
–0.41***
(0.06)
Economic Policy Uncertainty –0.01***
(0.00)
–0.01
(0.00)
–0.02**
(0.01)
Global Uncertainty –0.46***
(0.03)
–0.31***
(0.04)
–0.87***
(0.164)
Number of Observations 3,117 4,157 2,267 4,283 3,115 4,155 2,265 4,281 3,111 4,041 2,265 4,123
Number of Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
R 2 Adjusted 0.42 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.31 0.25 0.35 0.25
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Dependent variable is the year-over-year growth of the respective macroeconomic aggregate. All specifications include country fixed and time effects. See notes 
to Table 1.3.1 for explanations of uncertainty measures. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.
Table 1.3.3. Uncertainty and Business Cycles
Recessions Recoveries
With High Uncertainty Others With High Uncertainty Others
Output
 Duration 4.00 3.89 4.81 4.54
 Amplitude –3.66** –1.85 2.31* 3.06
 Slope –0.78* –0.49 0.66* 0.77
 Cumulative Loss –5.81* –2.99 . . . . . .
Consumption –0.46 –0.37 1.53 2.21
Investment –9.44 –5.22 –0.48** 3.28
Number of Episodes 28 83 28 82
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: A recession is associated with high uncertainty if the level of uncertainty at its trough falls in the top quartile of uncertainty 
measured at the troughs of all recessions. A recovery is associated with high uncertainty if the average uncertainty during the 
recovery is in the top quartile of  average uncertainty of all recovery episodes. The periods of recession and recovery are defined 
following Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2012). All statistics except “Duration” correspond to sample median. For duration, 
means are shown. For recessions, duration is the number of quarters between peak and trough. Duration for recoveries is the time 
it takes to attain the level at the previous peak after the trough. The amplitude for recessions is calculated based on the decline in 
output during the recession and expressed in percent. The amplitude for the recoveries is calculated based on the one-year change 
in output after the trough and expressed in percent. The slope of the recessions is the amplitude from peak to trough divided by 
the duration. The slope of recoveries is the amplitude from the trough to the period where output has reached the level at its last 
peak divided by the duration. Cumulative loss combines information about duration and amplitude to measure the overall cost 
of a recession and is expressed in percent.** and * denote that features of recessions (recoveries) with high uncertainty differ 
significantly from those of other recessions (recoveries) at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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The degree of economic uncertainty also appears 
to be related to the depth of recessions and strength 
of recoveries. In particular, recessions accompa-
nied by high uncertainty are often deeper, longer, 
and more severe than other recessions. Moreover, 
recessions in highly uncertain environments are 
associated with cumulative output losses roughly 
two times larger than those during other recessions 
(Table 1.3.3). Similarly, recoveries coinciding with 
periods of elevated uncertainty are weaker and 
slower than other recoveries.5 Both consumption 
States, is associated with about a 3 percent decline in real 
GDP and a 16 percent contraction in private investment. 
5The unusually high levels of uncertainty the global 
economy experienced since the 2007–09 financial crisis and 
the associated episodes of deep recessions and weak recoveries 
play an important role in explaining these findings. Uncer-
tainty shocks account for about one-third of business cycle 
variation in advanced economies and up to half of cyclical 
volatility in emerging market and developing economies, 
implying that these shocks play a sizable role in driving the 
dynamics of recessions and expansions (Bloom and others, 
and investment tend to grow at a slower pace dur-
ing recoveries associated with high uncertainty. 
Global Recovery in Times of Manifold 
Uncertainty
Elevated uncertainty historically coincides with 
periods of lower growth, and the recent pickup 
in uncertainty raises the specter of another global 
recession. Policymakers can do little to alleviate the 
intrinsic uncertainty economies typically face over 
the business cycle. However, policy uncertainty 
is unusually high, and it contributes significantly 
to macroeconomic uncertainty. By implementing 
bold and timely measures, policymakers can reduce 
policy-induced uncertainty and help kick-start eco-
nomic growth. What precisely policymakers need 
to do is discussed in the main text of Chapter 1.
2012; Baker and Bloom, 2011). Other relevant research con-
cludes that shocks associated with uncertainty and financial 
disruptions were the primary factors that led to the Great 
Recession (Stock and Watson, forthcoming). 
Box 1.3. (continued)
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U.S. natural gas and oil production has 
increased in recent years, driven largely by the 
commercialization of horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) technology from 
shale rock.1,2 The “unconventional energy revolu-
tion” began in the natural gas sector during the 
past decade, and gas production rose 28 percent 
between 2005 and 2011, and continued to climb 
in 2012 albeit at diminishing rates.3 The rise in 
unconventional gas contributed to the plunge 
in natural gas prices, and producers have since 
focused on liquids-rich gas plays or have migrated 
to pure oil (or tight oil) plays. 
Since 2005, application of this technology has 
put an end to the trend decline in U.S. oil output 
by increasing oil production from unconventional 
formations—first by maintaining total U.S. oil 
production at about 7 million barrels a day (mbd) 
until 2008 (8 percent of daily global produc-
tion). More recently, from 2009 to the first half of 
2012, oil output rose by about 2 mbd to about 9 
mbd (10 percent of daily global oil production). 
This more recent rise stems largely from tapping 
unconventional shale deposits in North Dakota 
and Texas for “tight” oil and other liquid by-
products (that is, natural gas liquids) through the 
use of techniques similar to those pioneered to tap 
unconventional shale gas (see Table 1.SF.2).
The authors of this box are Samya Beidas-Strom and Akito 
Matsumoto.
1Hydraulic fracturing involves pumping a mix of water, 
sand, and chemicals into wells at high pressure, thereby 
cracking the rock containing the liquids. Horizontal drilling 
enables greater access to pockets of liquids, allowing more 
to be pumped to the surface. Application of this technique 
to hydrocarbon liquids (oil) was previously considered too 
challenging or uneconomic and has raised environmental 
concerns—notably about possible contamination of aquifers.
2“Oil” in this box refers to crude (conventional) oil, con-
densates, natural gas liquids, and unconventional oil.
3Unconventional natural gas is found in locations requir-
ing special extraction technologies such as horizontal drilling 
and fracking. It includes shale gas, tight gas, and coal-bed 
methane; this gas is similar to conventional natural gas, 
with the only difference being that their extraction requires 
unconventional methods. Unconventional oil, such as shale 
oil (or tight oil), is recovered from shale using the same 
unconventional technologies as for shale gas but is conven-
tional oil, similar in quality to light crude oil.
The boom in unconventional energy affects 
other energy markets as well. The downturn in 
natural gas prices has led to displacement of coal 
in the U.S. electric power sector and decoupling 
of U.S. natural gas from crude oil prices. The 
displacement of coal is largely attributed to the 
shift from coal to natural gas by U.S. electric 
power companies in response to lower natural gas 
prices. On the one hand, coal displacement in 
the United States has been beneficial to Europe, 
where demand has increased because of substi-
tution away from higher-priced fuels—notably 
(non-U.S.) natural gas, whose price is still linked 
to that of oil—and from a phaseout of nuclear 
power. On the other hand, rising unconventional 
natural gas production has also led to a decou-
pling of U.S. natural gas prices from crude oil 
prices; gas prices have fallen to their lowest level 
in a decade.4 Rising unconventional oil produc-
tion has also contributed to the stock buildup in 
the mid-continent, which led to a large discount 
in the price of U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude 
oil compared with internationally traded crude oil 
varieties—for example, Brent and Dubai Fateh.
The future of unconventional extraction is 
uncertain given its relative cost: crude oil prices 
would have to range between $50 and $90 a 
barrel to guarantee commercial viability (break-
even). Hence a drop in crude oil prices to levels 
seen during the 2008 slump could set back U.S. 
unconventional oil production. Despite uncer-
tainty, industry analysts suggest that U.S. pro-
duction could increase by 1 mbd annually until 
2015, and possibly beyond. Moreover, because 
there are large tight oil reserves in other regions 
of the world, if commercially viable, extraction 
could offset declining production in maturing 
conventional fields, thus alleviating concern about 
oil scarcity. Finally, abundant unconventional 
energy might not keep oil prices from rising in 
the short term, but it could have that effect in the 
4Until the early 1990s, natural gas prices were heavily 
regulated, with regulators using oil prices as a reference for 
gas prices. Deregulation and restructuring of the pipeline 
sector led to a competitive market with direct gas-on-gas 
competition.
Box 1.4. Unconventional energy in the United States
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long term—because higher energy prices would 
stimulate unconventional oil development if oil 
prices remain above $80 a barrel. At the same 
time, energy substitutability depends on a number 
of factors: electric power companies switched from 
coal to natural gas as did the petrochemical sector, 
but a shift from oil to natural gas in transporta-
tion has proved to be much slower.5
5See Chapter 3 of the April 2011 World Economic Outlook 
for a detailed discussion.
Box 1.4. (continued)
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Food prices are increasing worldwide, raising 
fears of another food crisis like that in 2007–08. 
How is 2012 different? Which regions are most 
vulnerable to the current food price surge?1 The 
current food price shock is less severe than that of 
2007–08 because it has not affected all key crops 
uniformly and has not been aggravated by trade 
restrictions and high energy input costs. However, 
when focusing on vulnerability, there are signifi-
cant variations across regions: the African, Central 
American, Caribbean, and Middle Eastern regions 
appear to be the most exposed to rising food prices 
amid low inventory buffers and high dependence 
on the global market for their food supplies.
The 2007–08 food crisis was exacerbated by various 
forms of export restrictions by major food exporters;2 
in contrast, no such policies have been implemented by 
major food exporters during 2012. Since the last food 
crisis, supply has responded to robust demand and rela-
tively high prices through higher acreage and yields as 
well as productivity gains. As a result, global inventory 
buffers, measured by stock-to-use ratios, have improved 
significantly, especially for rice and wheat.
Spillovers from energy markets are much more 
limited in 2012. Energy prices feed into global 
food prices through two main channels: cost push 
and demand pull. First, energy-intensive inputs 
such as ammonia-based nitrogen fertilizers and 
power provide a transmission mechanism from 
energy prices into food prices. Second, the diver-
sion of crops from food to fuel production has 
become an important factor in recent years—corn 
and sugar have been increasingly used for ethanol 
production and soybeans and other oilseeds for 
biodiesel production. Energy prices surged along-
side food prices during the 2007–08 food crisis, 
intensifying the spillover through both channels, 
but energy prices have recently declined, limit-
ing the spillover to food prices. The expiration of 
government subsidies to the U.S. ethanol industry 
in 2011 also helped reduce the use of food crops 
for energy production. Therefore, the pass-through 
from energy prices to food prices plays a less 
important role than in 2007–08.  
Nevertheless, countries in Africa, Central 
America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East are 
vulnerable to rising food prices. Despite significant 
heterogeneity, regions with low inventory buffers, 
high dependence on the global market for their 
food supply, and a high share of food in final con-
sumption seem to be the most vulnerable to recent 
food price hikes (Table 1.5.1, Figure 1.5.1).3
Table 1.5.1.  Regional food Vulnerability
Low Food Inventories (that is, low 
stock-to-use ratios)
High Dependence on Global Food 
Imports
High Share of Food in Final 
Consumption
Caribbean * * *
Central America *
East Asia
European Union
Former Soviet Union * *
Middle East * * *
North Africa * *
North America *
Oceania
Other Europe
South America * *
South Asia *
Southeast Asia *
Sub-Saharan Africa * * *
Sources: U.S. Department of Agriculture; World Trade Organization; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
Box 1.5. Food Supply crunch—Who Is Most Vulnerable?
The author of this box is Marina Rousset.
1Regional composition is as defined by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture. Note that North America includes Mexico, and 
Oceania includes Australia and New Zealand. Pacific island 
nations, which are vulnerable to food price shocks, could not be 
disaggregated from Oceania due to data limitations.
2A survey by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization 
prepared in 2008 showed that of the 77 surveyed countries, 
roughly one-quarter imposed some form of export restric-
tions during the food crisis.
3Compared with 2007–08, the extent of regional 
exposure to global food price fluctuations has not changed 
significantly.
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Box 1.5. (continued)
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Figure 1.5.1.  Regional Food Vulnerabilities
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 • Naturally, regions that are not self-sustaining in 
agricultural production, and therefore dependent 
on the global food market, are the most exposed 
to the effects of global price instability. These 
regions include Caribbean and Central American 
nations, which import three-quarters and one-
half of their corn demand, respectively, and have 
lower inventory buffers than in 2007–08. 
 • Countries in the Middle East and sub-Saharan 
Africa, which import more than half of their 
wheat consumption and whose stock-to-use 
ratios for wheat and rice are below historical 
averages, could also be heavily affected if global 
wheat prices rise further because of lower inven-
tory buffers. 
 • North Africa, where about 40 percent of final 
consumption is food, is also vulnerable to high 
food prices given significant reliance on food 
imports.   
Exposure to global food price volatility for other 
regions is crop specific. The former Soviet Union 
region has a high share of imports and household 
consumption dedicated to food, but, because of 
interregional trade, its exposure to global mar-
kets for wheat—its main consumption and trade 
crop—is fairly limited. East Asia, in particular 
China, depends on the global market to satisfy 
a large portion of its domestic soybean demand 
but has accumulated substantial inventory buffers. 
Although inventory buffers in North America, 
which is a net exporter of major crops, have 
deteriorated significantly, especially for corn, food 
expenditures in North America account for a lower 
share of imports and household income than in 
other regions, making North America less vulner-
able to food price increases. 
On the global level, the current stock-to-use 
ratios for corn and soybeans are lower than they 
were during 2007–08, but are higher for rice and 
wheat. Many regions have undertaken self-suffi-
ciency initiatives to reduce their dependence on 
global food markets, and some regions increased 
their precautionary demand for key grains to miti-
gate food price increases while others initiated food 
and fertilizer subsidies and farm lending programs. 
However, alleviating the burden of global food 
price volatility calls for broader policy reforms, 
including to address agricultural infrastructure 
improvement, effective safety nets for the poor, and 
climate change, as well as to encourage additional 
agricultural food production (and eliminate policies 
that discourage it).
Box 1.5. (continued)
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2chapter
Global growth slowed again during the second 
quarter of 2012 after rebounding during the first. 
The slowing has been observed in all regions. This 
synchronicity suggests an important role for com-
mon factors, many of which reflected wide-ranging 
spillovers from large country-specific or regional 
shocks. A first shock was the ratcheting up of finan-
cial stress in the euro area periphery in the second 
quarter. Second, domestic demand in many econo-
mies in Asia and Latin America (notably Brazil, 
China, and India, but also others) slowed, owing 
not just to weaker external demand from Europe but 
also to domestic factors. Growth also decelerated in 
the United States. 
The theme of spillovers runs throughout this 
chapter, because spillovers are important to both the 
baseline projections and the risks to the outlook. 
With respect to the former, near-term growth pro-
jections across most regions have been revised down 
relative to the April 2012 World Economic Outlook 
(Figure 2.1). Activity is projected to gradually gather 
speed beginning in late 2012, later than had been 
expected in April, led by a pickup in emerging 
market economies owing to recent policy easing. The 
relatively small revisions to global growth under the 
baseline are predicated on the assumption that there 
will be sufficient policy action for financial condi-
tions in the euro area periphery to gradually ease 
and that the fiscal cliff will be avoided in the United 
States. 
Downside risks have increased relative to the April 
2012 WEO and also have important global spillover 
potential.1 The most immediate downside risk—that 
delayed or insufficient policy action will further 
escalate the euro area crisis—remains in place. Other 
short-term risks are the looming U.S. “fiscal cliff” 
and delays in raising the U.S. debt ceiling.
1The 2012 Spillover Report (IMF, 2012b) discusses policy-
related spillover risks emanating from the five largest systemically 
important economies (China, euro area, Japan, United Kingdom, 
United States).
country and regional perspectives
Figure 2.1.  Revisions to WEO Growth Projections for 2012 and 
2013
(Percentage point difference from April 2012 WEO projections)
Revisions to the outlook have generally been downward but to varying degrees. The largest 
revisions apply to Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
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A medium-term risk is the possibility of lower-
than-expected growth in many major economies and 
regions, including China, because of lower medium-
term growth potential and temporarily higher global 
risk aversion. As illustrated by the corresponding 
scenario analysis in Chapter 1, if this risk material-
izes, sharply lower growth will be experienced in all 
regions—including regions with no or only minor 
declines in potential growth, which underscores the 
large spillovers (Figure 2.2).
The Spillover Feature in this chapter assesses the 
potential transmission of financial stress in advanced 
economies via capital flows, sovereign yields, and 
equity prices. The analysis highlights the strong 
response of global capital flows and asset prices to 
increased financial stress in advanced economies 
during several recent episodes, pointing to important 
differences across episodes depending on the source 
of stress (Figure 2.3). It also shows that stress related 
to downswings in China’s real activity has become a 
source of financial market contagion, particularly for 
commodity-exporting emerging market and develop-
ing economies. Because capital flows and asset prices 
affect domestic financial conditions and business 
and household confidence, the real effects can be 
important. 
europe: in the orbit of the euro area crisis 
Financial stress in the euro area periphery has 
ratcheted up. The recession in most of the periphery is 
increasingly spilling into other economies in the region. 
The measures agreed to at the June 29, 2012, Euro-
pean Union (EU) summit and the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB’s) establishment of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program were steps in the right 
direction and have improved financial conditions, 
which nevertheless remain fragile. The baseline outlook 
for the region, weaker now than expected in the April 
2012 WEO (Figure 2.4), is for further anemic growth 
or contraction in 2012 and a moderate pickup in 
growth in 2013. The possibility that the euro area crisis 
Very strong (< –2.5)
Strong (between –2.5 and –2.0)
Moderate (between –2.0 and –1.5)
Limited (between –1.5 and 0.0)
Insufficient data
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Peak deviation of real GDP growth from the WEO baseline, under the “disappointing potential output and growing risk aversion” scenario described in Chapter 1. 
Simulations were conducted using the IMF’s Global Economic Model, a six-region model (supplemented with satellite models) that does not explicitly model individual 
countries (except the United States and Japan).
(Peak deviation of real GDP growth from WEO baseline; percentage points)
Figure 2.2.  The Effects of Lower Potential Growth
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will escalate remains a major downside risk to growth 
and financial sector stability until the underlying issues 
are resolved. 
Activity in Europe contracted by about ¼ percent 
during the first half of 2012. The main new develop-
ment was a further escalation of financial stress during 
the second quarter in the euro area periphery, which, 
despite some easing, did not fully reverse in the third 
quarter through mid-September. The impact is most 
direct in these economies themselves, and all except 
Ireland are in recession now. But spillovers are increas-
ingly reaching other economies in the region, given 
strong trade and financial linkages (Figure 2.5). Rising 
uncertainty about the viability of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) has been another drag on 
the region. Tellingly, there has been no contribution 
to growth from investment, in sharp contrast to other 
advanced economies and major emerging market 
economies. Finally, precrisis legacy issues, including 
high household debt following housing booms, have 
constrained private consumption, notably in Spain, but 
also in Denmark and the United Kingdom.
Another factor has been the diminishing offset 
from trade with faster-growing emerging market 
and advanced economies. Economies in the region 
with higher growth, including in the euro area core,2 
have benefited from stronger trade linkages with 
faster-growing economies outside the region. Still, 
robust growth in Russia has provided some offset to 
the weaker euro area external demand in emerging 
Europe. On the financial side, capital outflows from 
the periphery to perceived safe haven economies 
in the region (Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavian 
countries) have continued. These flows contributed 
to declining yields on government bonds and have 
fostered expanded domestic lending in recipient 
economies, including for housing. 
Monetary policy remains accommodative across the 
region. But with increasing financial market segmen-
tation due to country risk premiums in the euro area, 
the transmission of conventional monetary policy 
impulses to the periphery is impaired. The fiscal pol-
icy stance has been contractionary overall, especially 
in the euro area periphery, where the structural fiscal 
2Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
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Figure 2.3.  Weekly Equity and Bond Fund Flows during Financial 
Stress in Advanced Economies
(Percent of 2011 weekly GDP, two weeks before and after stress)
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Financial stress in advanced economies tends to be associated with swings in global capital 
flows. Flows are lower during the weeks following stress than during the weeks before.
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deficit as a share of GDP is expected to decline by 
about 2½ percentage points in 2012, compared with 
a decline of about ½ percentage point in 2011. 
Near-term prospects for Europe are weaker now 
than they were at the time of the April 2012 WEO. 
The forecast assumes that policymakers in the euro 
area succeed in containing the crisis through a com-
bination of continued crisis management (including 
implementation of reforms agreed to at the June sum-
mit), supportive demand management, and further 
advancement of measures to deepen fiscal integration 
and create a full-fledged banking union. Still, uncer-
tainty will constrain confidence and activity for some 
time, and downside risks loom large. 
The baseline projects that economic activity will 
pick up gradually, primarily in 2013 (Table 2.1). This 
increasing activity reflects a number of factors, includ-
ing improving external demand due to the pickup in 
growth in some major emerging market economies, 
a moderating pace of fiscal consolidation throughout 
much of the region—Spain is an exception given that 
consolidation must accelerate to meet deficit targets 
in 2012–13—and a gradual further easing of financial 
stress in the euro area periphery as fiscal adjustment 
advances, policy support increases, and policy credibil-
ity and confidence improve. There are broad differ-
ences among European economies. 
 • In the euro area, real GDP is projected to contract 
at a rate of ½ percent in 2012 and to increase by  
¼ percent in 2013. In the core economies, growth 
will broadly stall in 2012, except in the Nether-
lands, where intensified fiscal consolidation is 
expected to contribute to contraction. Except for 
Ireland, which is in a bumpy recovery, the recessions 
in the economies of the euro area periphery have 
been deeper, and recovery is generally expected to 
begin only in 2013, once adjustment moderates. 
 • Growth in other advanced economies in Europe is 
projected to moderate to ¼ percent in 2012 before 
picking up in 2013. Domestic demand has gener-
ally remained stronger in many economies, reflect-
ing lower precrisis imbalances and balance sheet 
pressure, which, together with declining yields 
from safe haven inflows, have helped cushion the 
spillovers from the euro area crisis. One exception 
is the United Kingdom, where the financial sector 
Figure 2.4.  Europe: Revisions to 2013 GDP Growth Forecasts
(Change in percentage points from April 2012 WEO projections)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Greater than –1.0
Between –1.0 and –0.5
Between –0.5 and 0.0
Between 0.0 and 0.5
Between 0.5 and 1.0
Greater than or equal to 1.0
Insufficient data
Covered in a different map
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was hit hard by the global financial crisis and where 
ongoing repair of overstretched private and public 
balance sheets weighs on domestic demand. 
 • Emerging Europe was significantly affected by 
the euro area crisis during the past year, includ-
ing through the deleveraging of western European 
banks and declining capital inflows (see Chapter 
2 of the October 2012 Global Financial Stability 
Report). Credit growth, in turn, decreased signifi-
cantly. Trade with the euro area also decelerated 
rapidly, and growth slowed sharply from late 2011. 
Nevertheless, unlike in 2008, risk contagion from 
the euro area crisis has remained limited, and credit 
default swap spreads for most countries in the 
region remain well below those for the economies 
of the euro area periphery. Growth is projected to 
strengthen from 2 percent in 2012 to about 2½ 
percent in 2013, largely owing to improving condi-
tions elsewhere in Europe.
Headline inflation generally moderated in 2012 
and is projected to decline further in the remainder 
of 2012–13. In fact, where inflation either increased 
or remained above target recently, the causes were 
primarily one-time factors such as increases in energy 
prices and indirect taxes. Although core inflation 
has remained relatively stable over the past year, it is 
expected to decrease as well, given the slowdown in 
activity and large output gaps. With large downside 
risks to the near-term growth outlook, there is a risk 
of core inflation undershooting targets, especially in 
other advanced Europe. 
Downside risks predominate in Europe’s near-
term growth prospects. The most immediate risk 
remains that delayed or insufficient policy action 
will lead to further escalation of the euro area crisis. 
Until the crisis is resolved, the situation remains pre-
carious, and the broad interconnections among most 
economies in the region point to larger spillovers in 
Europe than in other regions. 
The growth implications and spillovers from any 
further escalation of the crisis will depend on the 
scale and reach of the deterioration in confidence 
and the response of capital flows.3 If the deterio-
3Chapter 2 of the April 2012 World Economic Outlook provides 
an in-depth analysis of these linkages. It highlights the important 
role of adverse feedback loops between rising funding pressure in 
the banking system, increasing fiscal vulnerability, and slowing 
aggregate demand and growth. 
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Activity has slowed throughout Europe, with recession in the euro area periphery and the 
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Table 2.1. Selected European Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance,  
and Unemployment
(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Europe 2.0 0.1 0.8 3.3 2.8 2.1 0.4 0.8 1.0 . . . . . . . . .
Advanced Europe 1.4 –0.3 0.4 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.7 9.4 10.2 10.4
Euro Area4,5 1.4 –0.4 0.2 2.7 2.3 1.6 0.0 1.1 1.3 10.2 11.2 11.5
Germany 3.1 0.9 0.9 2.5 2.2 1.9 5.7 5.4 4.7 6.0 5.2 5.3
France 1.7 0.1 0.4 2.1 1.9 1.0 –1.9 –1.7 –1.7 9.6 10.1 10.5
Italy 0.4 –2.3 –0.7 2.9 3.0 1.8 –3.3 –1.5 –1.4 8.4 10.6 11.1
Spain 0.4 –1.5 –1.3 3.1 2.4 2.4 –3.5 –2.0 –0.1 21.7 24.9 25.1
Netherlands 1.1 –0.5 0.4 2.5 2.2 1.8 8.5 8.2 8.2 4.4 5.2 5.7
Belgium 1.8 0.0 0.3 3.5 2.8 1.9 –1.0 –0.1 0.3 7.2 7.4 7.9
Austria 2.7 0.9 1.1 3.6 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 4.2 4.3 4.5
Greece –6.9 –6.0 –4.0 3.3 0.9 –1.1 –9.8 –5.8 –2.9 17.3 23.8 25.4
Portugal –1.7 –3.0 –1.0 3.6 2.8 0.7 –6.4 –2.9 –1.7 12.7 15.5 16.0
Finland 2.7 0.2 1.3 3.3 2.9 2.3 –1.2 –1.6 –1.7 7.8 7.6 7.8
Ireland 1.4 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.8 2.7 14.4 14.8 14.4
Slovak Republic 3.3 2.6 2.8 4.1 3.6 2.3 0.1 0.8 0.3 13.5 13.7 13.5
Slovenia 0.6 –2.2 –0.4 1.8 2.2 1.5 0.0 1.1 1.0 8.2 8.8 9.0
Luxembourg 1.6 0.2 0.7 3.7 2.5 2.3 7.1 7.3 7.1 5.7 6.2 6.1
Estonia 7.6 2.4 3.5 5.1 4.4 3.2 2.1 0.7 –0.1 12.5 10.1 9.1
Cyprus 0.5 –2.3 –1.0 3.5 3.1 2.2 –10.4 –3.5 –2.0 7.8 11.7 12.5
Malta 2.1 1.2 2.0 2.5 3.5 2.2 –1.3 –1.5 –1.6 6.5 6.0 5.8
United Kingdom5 0.8 –0.4 1.1 4.5 2.7 1.9 –1.9 –3.3 –2.7 8.0 8.1 8.1
Sweden 4.0 1.2 2.2 3.0 1.4 2.0 6.9 7.2 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.7
Switzerland 1.9 0.8 1.4 0.2 –0.5 0.5 10.5 10.1 10.0 2.8 3.4 3.6
Czech Republic 1.7 –1.0 0.8 1.9 3.4 2.1 –3.0 –2.4 –2.2 6.7 7.0 8.0
Norway 1.5 3.1 2.3 1.3 1.0 2.2 14.5 15.2 15.6 3.3 3.1 3.1
Denmark 0.8 0.5 1.2 2.8 2.6 2.0 6.7 5.0 4.6 6.1 5.6 5.3
Iceland 3.1 2.9 2.6 4.0 5.6 4.4 –6.2 –2.7 –2.1 7.4 6.1 5.7
San Marino –2.6 –2.6 0.5 2.0 3.0 2.1 . . . . . . . . . 5.5 6.6 6.1
Emerging Europe6 5.3 2.0 2.6 5.3 5.6 4.4 –6.1 –5.0 –4.9 . . . . . . . . .
Turkey 8.5 3.0 3.5 6.5 8.7 6.5 –10.0 –7.5 –7.1 9.8 9.4 9.9
Poland 4.3 2.4 2.1 4.3 3.9 2.7 –4.3 –3.7 –3.8 9.6 10.0 10.2
Romania 2.5 0.9 2.5 5.8 2.9 3.2 –4.4 –3.7 –3.8 7.4 7.2 7.0
Hungary 1.7 –1.0 0.8 3.9 5.6 3.5 1.4 2.6 2.7 11.0 10.9 10.5
Bulgaria 1.7 1.0 1.5 3.4 1.9 2.3 0.9 –0.3 –1.5 11.3 11.5 11.0
Serbia 1.6 –0.5 2.0 11.1 5.9 7.5 –9.5 –11.5 –12.6 24.4 25.6 25.6
Croatia 0.0 –1.1 1.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 –1.0 –1.2 –1.3 13.7 14.2 13.3
Lithuania 5.9 2.7 3.0 4.1 3.2 2.4 –1.5 –1.1 –1.4 15.4 13.5 12.5
Latvia 5.5 4.5 3.5 4.2 2.4 2.2 –1.2 –1.6 –2.8 16.2 15.3 13.9
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Current account position corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.
5Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.
6Also includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, and Montenegro.
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ration is confined to the periphery economies—
broadly mirroring developments during the past two 
years—private capital outflows from crisis to core 
economies will increase. The direct negative impact 
on the periphery through external current accounts 
and domestic demand would remain limited, how-
ever, because the euro system provides for automatic, 
offsetting inflows. Still, financial conditions would 
tighten as prospective bank losses increase; banks 
in the periphery and, to a lesser extent, in the core 
economies (largely because of cross-border asset 
holdings in the periphery) would increase provisions 
and precautionary cash holdings; and lending rates 
would rise. 
In contrast, if the euro area core economies were 
hit by contagion—for example, resulting from 
rapidly intensifying concerns about the integrity of 
the EMU and its ability to manage the crisis—the 
loss of investor confidence would also hit the core. 
Sovereign risk premiums and yields would increase 
in the periphery and the core, requiring additional 
fiscal adjustment everywhere. Increased capital 
outflows from the euro area as a whole would cause 
depreciation of the euro by more than in the case of 
limited contagion. Current accounts throughout the 
euro area would adjust. Obviously, the output losses 
in Europe and also outside the region would be 
larger under this scenario. 
The highest policy priority in Europe is to resolve 
the crisis in the euro area. All other economies in the 
region need a policy mix that supports their recover-
ies in a weak global growth environment, and many 
also need to address fiscal sustainability challenges 
and financial sector vulnerabilities. 
Resolving the euro area crisis requires progress 
toward banking and fiscal union in combination 
with short-term demand support and crisis manage-
ment at the euro area level.4 
 • The agreements reached at the June 29, 2012, EU 
summit, if fully implemented, will create a bank-
ing union and help break the adverse feedback 
loops between sovereigns and banks—once an 
effective single supervisory mechanism for euro 
area banks is established, the ESM, which will be 
operational beginning in October 2012, could be 
4See also the discussion in Chapter 1 and in IMF (2012c). 
able to recapitalize banks directly. But implemen-
tation hurdles are a concern, and additional steps 
are needed. Banking union also requires a pan-
European deposit insurance guarantee program 
and a bank resolution mechanism with common 
backstops. 
 • Regarding demand support, the ECB should keep 
its policy rate low for the foreseeable future or 
reduce it even further. OMTs, which the ECB will 
consider for countries under a macroeconomic 
adjustment or precautionary program with the 
European Financial Stability Facility and its suc-
cessor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
should help ensure that low policy rates transmit 
to borrowing costs in countries in the periphery 
with a program. The ECB should also continue to 
provide ample liquidity to banks. 
 • The viability of the EMU must be supported by 
wide-ranging structural reforms throughout the 
euro area to raise growth and competitiveness, 
thereby helping the resolution of intra-euro-area 
current account imbalances. 
 • Fiscal consolidation plans in the euro area must 
be implemented. In general, attention should be 
paid to meeting structural fiscal targets, rather 
than nominal targets that will likely be affected by 
economic conditions. Automatic stabilizers should 
thus be allowed to operate fully in economies not 
subject to market pressure. Considering the large 
downside risks, economies with limited fiscal vul-
nerability should stand ready to implement fiscal 
contingency measures if such risks materialize. 
In other advanced economies in the region, 
monetary policy needs to respond effectively to 
a much weaker near-term environment that will 
dampen price pressures, including through the use 
of further unconventional measures. In the United 
Kingdom, further monetary easing through uncon-
ventional measures may be necessary, depending 
on the effects of the easing measures implemented 
recently. With the prospect of somewhat weaker 
global growth, automatic stabilizers should be 
allowed to operate fully, and economies with 
limited fiscal vulnerability (see the October 2012 
Fiscal Monitor) should stand ready to implement 
fiscal contingency measures if large downside risks 
materialize. 
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In emerging Europe, the need for fiscal consoli-
dation varies widely; economies with a high public 
debt burden and exposed to market volatility must 
continue with steady consolidation (Hungary). 
Inflation pressure is set to decline rapidly in many 
countries, giving central banks new room for easing. 
the united states and canada: growth 
continues, but slack remains 
In the United States, a modest recovery with weak 
job creation continues amid a weak global environ-
ment, although the housing market is stabilizing. In 
Canada, the recovery has been more robust, reflect-
ing partly the effects of favorable financing conditions 
with less pressure for balance sheet adjustment and 
the commodity boom. The expansion is expected to 
remain modest throughout 2012–13 (Figure 2.6). Both 
external and domestic downside risks to the outlook 
remain elevated. In the United States, it is imperative 
to avoid excessive fiscal consolidation (the fiscal cliff) in 
2013, to raise the debt ceiling promptly, and to agree 
on a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plan. In 
Canada, a priority is to limit risks related to elevated 
house prices and household debt levels.
Output in the United States rose above the 
precrisis peak in the second half of 2011, sooner 
than in many other advanced economies (Figure 
2.7, panels 1 and 2). Still, compared with earlier 
recoveries, growth remains sluggish, consistent with 
the broad evidence of significant legacy effects of 
financial crises and housing busts. Job creation, 
which accelerated in the second half of 2011, slowed 
again in 2012. Weaker external conditions and 
the confluence of global spillovers discussed above 
explain much of the slowing, with a payback from 
the unusually warm winter weather also temporar-
ily weighing on growth in the second quarter. On 
the demand side, growth in business investment lost 
some momentum, in part due to the partial expira-
tion of bonus depreciation allowances, although 
uncertainty related to the fiscal and economic 
outlook may have also played a role. Private con-
sumption has also moderated since early 2012. The 
Figure 2.6.  United States and Canada: Revisions to 2013 GDP Growth Forecasts
(Change in percentage points from April 2012 WEO projections)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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housing market is showing signs of stabilizing after a 
sharp correction (Figure 2.7, panels 3 and 4). 
In Canada, growth has been constrained by the 
sluggish expansion in the United States—a result 
of the two economies’ deep economic and financial 
linkages—and the ongoing fiscal consolidation. Still, 
activity has recovered at a faster pace than in the 
United States. Domestic demand—both business 
investment and private consumption—has been 
supported by exceptionally favorable financing 
conditions, including low interest rates and credit 
availability. These factors, along with the commod-
ity boom, have also boosted the housing sector, 
especially in provinces with strong mining activity. 
However, housing-related credit and household 
leverage have risen markedly since the Great Reces-
sion, despite measures to limit mortgage growth 
(Figure 2.7, panels 4 and 5). 
The U.S. and Canadian economies are both pro-
jected to grow at about 2 percent during 2012–13 
under the baseline, with uncertainty and weaker 
external demand weighing on aggregate demand 
(Table 2.2). U.S. inflation will stay subdued, given 
lower commodity prices and persistent economic 
slack, averaging 2 percent this year and declining to 
1¾ percent in 2013. 
The near-term growth outlook is subject to large 
downside risks from both external and domestic 
factors. The main external risk pertains to a further 
escalation of the euro area crisis. Although safe 
haven capital flows into the United States could help 
to lower bond yields, supporting interest-sensitive 
components of aggregate demand, they also have 
been associated with real appreciation pressures, 
which dampen exports. As noted above, U.S. growth 
will also fall sharply if potential output in the United 
States and its major trading partners disappoints and 
risk aversion increases (Figure 2.2). 
A major U.S. domestic risk is the potential 
for much sharper fiscal contraction (Figure 2.7, 
panel 6) if policymakers fail to reach agreement to 
prevent large automatic tax increases and spend-
ing cuts scheduled to take effect at the beginning 
of 2013. At the extreme, the fiscal cliff could result 
in a fiscal withdrawal of more than 4 percent of 
GDP in 2013—about 3 percentage points of GDP 
larger than the fiscal adjustment assumed under the 
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baseline. Growth would stall in 2013 with the full 
materialization of the cliff and, as detailed in the 
2012 Spillover Report (IMF, 2012b), would inflict 
large spillovers on major U.S. trading partners and 
also on commodity exporters (because of declines in 
commodity prices). 
Another fiscal risk, although relatively more 
medium term, relates to a potential jump in the 
risk premium on U.S. Treasury bonds, reflecting 
investor concerns about the sustainability of U.S. 
debt levels in the absence of a credible plan for 
medium-term consolidation. The rise in long-
term interest rates would lead to lower aggregate 
demand and growth, particularly in the United 
States but also elsewhere through asset price and 
trade spillovers (see IMF, 2012b). More generally, 
a deterioration in economic conditions in the U.S. 
economy that hurts investor confidence and raises 
risk aversion at the global level could induce sharp 
swings in global capital flows and asset prices (see 
the Spillover Feature).
Given its strong economic and financial ties with 
the U.S. economy, Canada is equally exposed to 
the risks facing its trading partner. In addition, an 
important domestic vulnerability in Canada relates 
to the housing market. A sharp or sustained decline 
in house prices could seriously set back the leveraged 
household sector and domestic demand.
The urgent policy priorities in the United States 
are to avoid excessive fiscal contraction in the short 
term, promptly raise the debt ceiling, and agree on a 
credible fiscal consolidation plan—centered around 
entitlement and tax reforms—that places government 
debt on a sustainable path in the medium term. The 
latter would also contribute to global demand rebal-
ancing, given that the U.S. current account position is 
estimated to be weaker and the real effective exchange 
rate stronger than they would be if a more desirable 
path for fiscal deficits over the medium term were in 
place (IMF, 2012a). Notwithstanding recent steps and 
nascent signs of stabilization in the housing market, 
more must be done to reduce the rate of foreclosures 
and remove impediments to the transmission of low 
long-term policy rates to mortgage rates.5 In this 
regard, the recent measures by the Federal Reserve 
on additional quantitative easing and the extension 
of its low-interest-rate guidance until mid-2015 were 
timely in limiting downside risks. Monetary policy 
needs to remain accommodative while the govern-
ment and household sectors continue to consolidate 
5Key measures include increasing the participation of 
government-sponsored enterprises in the principal reduction 
program, supporting refinancing on a larger scale, and converting 
foreclosed property into rental property to limit the downward 
price pressure. See IMF (2012c) and Chapter 3 of the April 2012 
World Economic Outlook. 
Table 2.2. Selected Advanced Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Advanced Economies 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.7 1.9 1.6 –0.2 –0.4 –0.3 7.9 8.0 8.1
United States 1.8 2.2 2.1 3.1 2.0 1.8 –3.1 –3.1 –3.1 9.0 8.2 8.1
Euro Area4,5 1.4 –0.4 0.2 2.7 2.3 1.6 0.0 1.1 1.3 10.2 11.2 11.5
Japan –0.8 2.2 1.2 –0.3 0.0 –0.2 2.0 1.6 2.3 4.6 4.5 4.4
United Kingdom4 0.8 –0.4 1.1 4.5 2.7 1.9 –1.9 –3.3 –2.7 8.0 8.1 8.1
Canada 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.9 1.8 2.0 –2.8 –3.4 –3.7 7.5 7.3 7.3
Other Advanced Economies6 3.2 2.1 3.0 3.1 2.2 2.4 4.7 3.7 3.3 4.5 4.5 4.6
Memorandum
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 4.0 2.1 3.6 3.6 2.7 2.7 6.6 5.6 5.5 3.6 3.5 3.5
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Table A6 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ.
4Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.
5Current account position corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.
6Excludes the G7 economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries.
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their balance sheet positions. These and other priori-
ties—including financial regulatory, labor market, and 
structural reforms—are discussed in detail in Chapter 
1 and in previous WEO reports. 
In Canada, the key priority is to ensure that risks 
from the housing sector and increases in household 
debt remain well contained and do not create finan-
cial sector vulnerabilities. Thus far, mortgage credit 
growth has slightly decelerated in response to the 
measures taken by the authorities, including tighter 
mortgage insurance standards. If household leverage 
continues to rise, additional measures may need to 
be considered. 
asia: calibrating a soft landing
Growth in Asia has moderated further with weaker 
external demand and the soft landing of domestic 
demand in China. The outlook is for a modest pickup 
in growth on the back of recent policy easing. Limited 
direct financial spillovers and some room for policy easing 
should be helpful in minimizing external downside risks. 
Balancing external and internal risks will be important, 
however, given that output gaps are still positive in some 
economies in the region while credit growth remains 
strong and that lower-than-expected potential output 
growth and domestic imbalances are still risks. 
Growth continued to moderate in much of 
Asia during the first half of 2012. Slower growth 
in import demand in most advanced economies 
corresponded with weaker export growth in Asia. 
Growth in China slowed further in the second 
quarter of 2012, as the economy continued to adjust 
to the policy tightening undertaken in 2010–11. 
The tightening of monetary and credit policies has 
been partly reversed in 2012, as price pressures 
have eased and the residential real estate market has 
cooled. This easing, however, has not yet gained the 
traction expected earlier in the year. Slowing growth 
in China has affected activity in the rest of Asia, a 
consequence of the deepening of linkages through-
out the region in the past decade. 
In other parts of Asia, activity was boosted by 
recovery from natural disasters and reconstruction, 
notably in Japan and Thailand, but also in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. In Australia, continued 
strong mining activity and related investment have 
also supported growth. In India, growth weakened 
more than expected in the first half of 2012, an 
outcome of stalled investment caused by governance 
issues and red tape, and a deterioration in business 
sentiment against the backdrop of a rising current 
account deficit and the recent rupee depreciation. 
Compared with the region’s growth performance 
in recent years, the near- and medium-term outlooks 
are less buoyant. This view reflects weaker anticipated 
external demand resulting from the tepid growth pros-
pects in major advanced economies and a downshift 
in China’s and India’s growth prospects, with a return 
to double-digit growth in China unlikely given the 
policy objectives laid out in the 12th Five-Year Plan. 
The main impetus for a moderate pickup in growth 
from late 2012 will come from recent policy easing 
in China and elsewhere. Specifically, growth in the 
region is projected to average 5½ percent this year and 
rise to 5¾ percent in 2013 (Table 2.3), downward 
revisions of more than ½ percentage point for both 
years relative to the April 2012 WEO (Figure 2.8). 
 • Growth in China is projected to be about 7¾ 
percent this year and then to strengthen to 8¼ 
percent in 2013 as domestic demand growth, 
especially investment growth, picks up with the 
policy easing now under way. 
 • Growth in India is projected to average 5 to 6 
percent in 2012–13, more than 1 percentage 
point lower than in the April 2012 WEO. The 
downgrade reflects both an expectation that cur-
rent drags on business sentiment and investment 
will persist and a weaker external environment.
 • In Japan, growth is expected to reach almost 2¼ 
percent in 2012. Much of the recent strength is 
attributable to reconstruction activity and some 
rebound in manufacturing activity in the first half 
of the year following the supply shocks associated 
with the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami 
and the Thai floods in October 2011. The effects 
of these factors will fade, however, and growth is 
projected to moderate to 1¼ percent in 2013. 
 • Weaker external demand is the main factor under-
pinning generally modestly weaker growth in the 
ASEAN-56 economies in 2012 (Figure 2.9, panels 
6The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 10 
members; the ASEAN-5 are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.
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1 and 2). The main exception is Thailand, where 
growth has bounced back sharply, led by reconstruc-
tion and investment after the devastating floods in 
October 2011. Overall, growth in the ASEAN-5 
is projected to accelerate slightly to 5¾ percent in 
2013, up from about 5½ percent in 2012. 
 • In Korea, growth is projected to moderate to 2¾ 
percent this year but to pick up to about 3½ 
percent in 2013 because of a rebound in exports 
and private investment, which is geared toward 
the tradables sector.
Inflation in the region is projected to decline 
from 5 percent in 2011 to about 4 percent during 
2012–13. This is due, in part, to the recent decline 
in commodity prices but also to the lagged effect of 
the policy tightening during 2010–11 put in place 
to relieve overheating pressure. 
The balance of risks to the near-term growth 
outlook is tilted to the downside, reflecting external 
and, to a lesser extent in the near term, internal risks 
to the region. In the short term, a further escala-
tion of the euro area crisis and failure to address the 
U.S. fiscal cliff are the main external risks for the 
region. If these risks were to materialize, Asia’s open, 
trade-oriented economies would be faced with lower 
external demand and other spillovers (for example, 
on confidence), and growth could be substantially 
lower.
Much of the discussion of spillovers from 
advanced economies to economies in emerging 
Asia has focused on spillovers through trade and 
confidence channels. However, as discussed in the 
Spillover Feature, emerging Asia, like other emerging 
markets, has become more integrated with global 
Table 2.3. Selected Asian Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Asia 5.8 5.4 5.8 5.0 3.9 3.8 1.9 1.2 1.3 . . . . . . . . .
Advanced Asia 1.3 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.2 1.2 2.3 1.5 1.6 4.3 4.3 4.2
Japan –0.8 2.2 1.2 –0.3 0.0 –0.2 2.0 1.6 2.3 4.6 4.5 4.4
Australia 2.1 3.3 3.0 3.4 2.0 2.6 –2.3 –4.1 –5.5 5.1 5.2 5.3
New Zealand 1.3 2.2 3.1 4.0 1.9 2.4 –4.2 –5.4 –5.9 6.5 6.6 5.7
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 4.0 2.1 3.6 3.6 2.7 2.7 6.6 5.6 5.5 3.6 3.5 3.5
Korea 3.6 2.7 3.6 4.0 2.2 2.7 2.4 1.9 1.7 3.4 3.3 3.3
Taiwan Province of China 4.0 1.3 3.9 1.4 2.5 2.0 8.9 6.9 7.3 4.4 4.5 4.3
Hong Kong SAR 5.0 1.8 3.5 5.3 3.8 3.0 5.3 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.3
Singapore 4.9 2.1 2.9 5.2 4.5 4.3 21.9 21.0 20.7 2.0 2.1 2.1
Developing Asia 7.8 6.7 7.2 6.5 5.0 4.9 1.6 0.9 1.1 . . . . . . . . .
China 9.2 7.8 8.2 5.4 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.5 4.1 4.1 4.1
India 6.8 4.9 6.0 8.9 10.2 9.6 –3.4 –3.8 –3.3 . . . . . . . . .
ASEAN-5 4.5 5.4 5.8 5.9 4.0 4.3 2.9 0.6 0.2 . . . . . . . . .
Indonesia 6.5 6.0 6.3 5.4 4.4 5.1 0.2 –2.1 –2.4 6.6 6.2 6.1
Thailand 0.1 5.6 6.0 3.8 3.2 3.3 3.4 –0.2 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7
Malaysia 5.1 4.4 4.7 3.2 2.0 2.4 11.0 7.5 6.9 3.1 3.1 3.0
Philippines 3.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 3.5 4.5 3.1 3.0 2.6 7.0 7.0 7.0
Vietnam 5.9 5.1 5.9 18.7 8.1 6.2 0.2 0.3 –0.9 4.5 4.5 4.5
Other Developing Asia4 5.0 5.1 4.9 10.6 8.9 8.2 –0.6 –1.5 –1.5 . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
Emerging Asia5 7.3 6.1 6.7 6.1 4.7 4.6 2.4 1.6 1.7 . . . . . . . . .
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Other Developing Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Lao P.D.R., Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
5Emerging Asia comprises all economies in Developing Asia and Newly Industrialized Asian Economies.
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financial markets (Figure 2.9, panels 3 and 4). With 
the resulting higher exposure to financial shocks, 
increases in financial stress in advanced economies 
during the past few years have indeed been associ-
ated with lower capital flows and asset price declines 
in the region. Overall, though, private capital flows 
to the region have remained sizable and credit 
growth strong (Figure 2.9, panel 5). With increased 
exposure, volatility in global capital markets also 
can have larger effects, including through effects on 
exchange rates (as illustrated by safe haven effects 
and the recent yen appreciation). 
Among internal risks to the region, lower-than-
expected potential growth in emerging Asia in the 
medium term is a key risk. As noted in Chapter 1, 
the housing boom and similar temporary factors in 
the major advanced economies may have contrib-
uted to the recent strong growth performance in the 
region. China experienced residential real estate and 
investment booms of its own, which accelerated dur-
ing 2009–10 subsequent to macroeconomic policy 
stimulus actions taken in response to the global 
financial crisis. Strong credit growth has supported 
demand across emerging market economies more 
broadly, including in Asia, but cannot continue at its 
recent pace without creating large financial stability 
risks. In the event of simultaneous lower potential 
growth in emerging Asia and in other regions, the 
impact on growth would be sizable in Asia, as would 
be the outward spillovers on commodity  exporters 
Figure 2.8.  Asia: Revisions to 2013 GDP Growth Forecasts
(Change in percentage points from April 2012 WEO projections)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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Between –1.0 and –0.5
Between –0.5 and 0.0
Between 0.0 and 0.5
Between 0.5 and 1.0
Greater than or equal to 1.0
Insufficient data
Covered in a different map
wo r l d e co n o m i c o u t lo o k : co p i n g w i t h h i g h d e bt a n d S lu g g i S h g r ow t h
74 International Monetary Fund | October 2012
(see Figure 2.2). A related risk is that the recent surge 
in investment in China could be reversed and result 
in a sharper-than-expected investment slowdown 
in the future. Such a shock would strongly affect 
economies in the highly interlinked Asian supply 
chain—for example, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan Prov-
ince of China, and Thailand—including indirectly 
through the large effects on other major manufactur-
ing exporters, especially Germany and Japan.7 
Policies must strike the right balance between 
managing external and internal risks and orchestrat-
ing a soft landing. External risks have been more 
pressing, and the recent shift toward monetary 
easing across much of the region seems appropriate 
for most economies, given decelerating inflation in 
both advanced and emerging Asia. Even so, recent 
rate cuts have used some of the available space in 
emerging Asia—output gaps are still positive and 
real policy rates remain well below their precrisis 
averages. In India, where inflation is still high, mon-
etary policy should stay on hold until a sustained 
decrease in inflation materializes. In Japan, the 
easing of monetary policy announced in September 
should help support economic growth and exit from 
deflation. Further easing of monetary policy may, 
however, be needed for inflation accelerating toward 
the Bank of Japan’s goal of 1 percent.
Should downside risks materialize, some econo-
mies (ASEAN-5, China, Korea) still have the fiscal 
space to allow automatic stabilizers to operate fully, 
if appropriate, or to use discretionary fiscal stimulus 
(Figure 2.9, panel 6). In a number of economies, 
however, addressing debt sustainability through cred-
ible fiscal consolidation remains a priority (India, 
Japan, Vietnam). In Japan, the recent approval of a 
gradual doubling of the consumption tax rate to 10 
percent by 2015 is an important step toward put-
ting public debt on a sustainable trajectory, although 
further consolidation measures are needed to achieve 
this goal. Structural fiscal policy reform is needed in a 
number of economies in the region, including China, 
to address social spending and protection as well as 
infrastructure needs. By reducing distortions that hold 
back private consumption, such reforms would lower 
7IMF (2012b) presents a more detailed analysis of spillovers 
from investment shocks in China. 
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Figure 2.9.  Asia: Activity Decelerates
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risks of a buildup in domestic imbalances and are part 
of the set of desirable policies that would help rebal-
ance global demand. Indeed, in a number of Asian 
economies—including China, Korea, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore, and Thailand—current account positions are 
stronger and currencies are weaker than they would 
be with a more desirable set of policies.8 
Against the risks of deteriorating credit quality 
while growth is slowing, policymakers in many Asian 
economies also need to guard against financial stabil-
ity risks arising from recent rapid credit growth, 
including by closely monitoring balance sheet health 
and funding conditions in the banking and shadow 
banking systems. In the event of global or local 
liquidity shortages, central banks should stand ready 
to backstop liquidity. 
latin america and the caribbean: losing 
some Buoyancy
With slowing growth, overheating pressures and 
inflation in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
have declined. Private capital flows remain strong and 
financing conditions favorable. The outlook has dete-
riorated compared with the April 2012 WEO (Figure 
2.10). Growth is expected to pick up later this year, as 
recent policy easing gains traction. Risks to the near-
term growth outlook are to the downside, as elsewhere. 
With continued rapid credit growth and inflation above 
the midpoint of the target band in many economies in 
the region, however, the priority is to rebuild macroeco-
nomic policy space unless downside risks materialize. 
Growth in the LAC region decelerated further 
in the first half of 2012. Activity outside the region 
moderated more than expected, including in emerging 
Asia, which weakened external demand for LAC goods 
and services. Together with weaker near-term global 
prospects, this slump in activity also led to lower prices 
for most commodities and terms-of-trade losses for 
commodity exporters, which account for three-quar-
ters of the region’s output. Domestic demand growth, 
especially investment, cooled on the back of past pol-
icy tightening. The pickup in growth was lower than 
expected in Brazil—an important cause of the weaker 
regional growth performance—an acknowledgment of 
8See also IMF (2012a). 
both poorer external conditions and slower transmis-
sion of the monetary policy easing since August 2011 
as a result of an increase in nonperforming loans after 
several years of rapid credit growth. 
The LAC region has been exposed to financial spill-
overs from the euro area crisis and concerns about global 
growth prospects, but their effects have been contained. 
These spillovers contributed to increased risk aversion 
and temporarily reduced capital flows to the region but 
have not caused a reversal of flows (Figure 2.11). Foreign 
currency debt spreads have increased, as in other emerg-
ing markets, but they remain well below recent highs. 
At the same time, most of the region’s currencies have 
appreciated, with the notable exception of the Brazilian 
real (Figure 2.11, panels 1 and 2).
Spillovers from the region’s exposure to the opera-
tions of European banks, predominantly Spanish 
banks, have also been contained, primarily because 
the LAC operations of these banks are largely con-
ducted by subsidiaries and funded by local depos-
its. Credit growth throughout the region has thus 
remained robust, notwithstanding slowing activity. 
Growth in the region is projected to moderate to 
3¼ percent in 2012, before strengthening to about 4 
percent in 2013 (Table 2.4). Among the commodity 
exporters, recent monetary policy easing is expected 
to spur stronger growth in Brazil from late 2012, led 
by domestic demand. Employment growth is also 
expected to remain robust, primarily in the domestic 
services sectors. In most other commodity exporters, 
growth is expected to remain close to potential for 
the remainder of 2012 and in 2013, after moderat-
ing gradually during the past year or so. In Mexico, 
growth has remained strong in 2012 but is expected 
to moderate with the weaker near-term U.S. growth 
prospects. Overall, growth is forecast to average 3¾ 
percent in 2012–13, somewhat above potential. In 
Central America, where the outlook is closely tied 
to developments in the United States, growth is 
expected to moderate by ½ percentage point from 
2011 to 4¼ percent in 2012–13. In the Caribbean, 
high public debt and weak tourism and remittance 
flows continue to constrain the outlook, and growth 
is expected to remain lackluster at about 2¾ to 3½ 
percent.
Risks to the growth outlook are to the downside, 
and the main risks are broadly aligned with those 
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affecting the global economy. The main near-term 
risks relate to an escalation of the euro area crisis 
and the U.S. fiscal cliff. The euro area risk scenario 
analysis in Chapter 1 suggests that the peak decline 
in regional output could amount to about ½ percent 
relative to the baseline. This is modest compared 
with other regions and reflects the LAC region’s 
relatively low level of trade with Europe (only about 
10 percent of goods exports) and limited financial 
linkages. If global growth slowed sharply because 
the United States failed to avoid the fiscal cliff, the 
impact on the LAC region would be relatively larger 
because of stronger linkages with the U.S. economy. 
In both cases, countercyclical policy responses in the 
region could help dampen the spillover effects on 
domestic output. 
In view of the region’s dependence on commodity 
market developments, particularly in the Southern 
Cone, the medium-term risks that have the greatest 
impact on commodity prices are of particular con-
cern. The Chapter 1 risk scenario of lower potential 
growth in systemically important economies and 
temporarily higher global risk aversion illustrates 
this concern. Even if potential growth in the LAC 
region were only ½ percentage point lower, the 
short-term growth impact would be considerably 
larger because a commodity price bust would fol-
low the large output declines in emerging Asia and 
the advanced economies. A sharper-than-expected 
investment slowdown in China is another important 
medium-term risk that could affect the LAC region. 
China’s economic boom of the past decade has been 
Figure 2.10.  Latin America and the Caribbean: Revisions to 2013 GDP Growth Forecasts
(Change in percentage points from April 2012 WEO projections)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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commodity intensive, boosting its market share in 
global commodity markets, especially in industrial 
base metals and raw materials, and leading to much 
greater trade linkages with the LAC region. Among 
the commodity exporters, the largest spillover effects 
of an investment shock in China would be on undi-
versified exporters specializing in metal extraction 
and trade; diversified exporters such as Brazil would 
be relatively less affected (see IMF, 2012b). 
Lower potential growth also is a risk from an 
intraregional perspective because growth in the 
region has been above historical trends during the 
past decade or so, supported in part by financial 
deepening and rapid credit growth. This success may 
well have generated overly optimistic expectations 
about potential growth in the medium term. There 
are related risks of domestic financial instability after 
years of rapid credit growth. 
Against this backdrop, policymakers in the region 
must be alert to spillovers from weaker prospects in 
advanced economies and major emerging markets 
outside the region, volatile capital flows, and emerg-
ing domestic financial risks. Nevertheless, policy-
makers must carefully balance these downside risks 
with the remnants of recent overheating and reduced 
policy space. Despite recent declines, inflation is still 
above the midpoint of target bands, and output gaps 
are close to zero or still positive. Concerns about 
upside risks to inflation are particularly acute in 
Venezuela and Argentina, where policies have not 
been tightened noticeably and inflation continues 
at high levels. Still, monetary policy should be the 
first line of defense if global growth slows more than 
expected, especially in economies with established 
and tested inflation-targeting frameworks. As for 
risks related to capital flows and financial stability, 
policies must build on a strong foundation of pru-
dential measures and further enhance risk-based pru-
dential regulation and supervision. At the same time, 
liquidity provision may also be needed if a change in 
global risk sentiment leads to acute funding pressure 
in the region’s banking systems. 
Fiscal policy should continue to rebuild room 
for maneuvering unless large downside risks mate-
rialize. New fiscal space is particularly important 
for commodity exporters to buffer the downside 
risks to global growth and commodity prices. 
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More  generally, the move to countercyclical mac-
roeconomic policies has been an important factor 
underpinning greater resilience in emerging market 
economies (see Chapter 4). With output gaps close 
to zero or still positive in many economies in the 
region, a countercyclical policy stance would indicate 
that fiscal policy needs to remain tight. Many econo-
mies in the region should also include structural 
reforms aimed at boosting medium-term growth. In 
Brazil, for example, infrastructure bottlenecks are a 
constraint on growth. Recent steps to grant private 
concessions to develop critical road and railway 
infrastructure are a welcome step forward, but 
increased public investment is also needed. Greater 
resolve is required to reduce debt overhang in the 
Caribbean while addressing weak competitiveness.
commonwealth of independent states: 
growth is still robust 
Growth in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) is expected to moderate slightly in line with 
the projected small decline in commodity prices and 
a weaker external environment. The region remains 
Table 2.4. Selected Western Hemisphere Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance,  
and Unemployment
(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
North America 2.0 2.3 2.2 3.1 2.1 1.9 –2.9 –3.0 –3.0 . . . . . . . . .
United States 1.8 2.2 2.1 3.1 2.0 1.8 –3.1 –3.1 –3.1 9.0 8.2 8.1
Canada 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.9 1.8 2.0 –2.8 –3.4 –3.7 7.5 7.3 7.3
Mexico 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.4 4.0 3.5 –1.0 –0.9 –1.1 5.2 4.8 4.8
South America4 4.8 2.9 4.0 7.8 6.8 6.9 –1.0 –1.5 –1.7 . . . . . . . . .
Brazil 2.7 1.5 4.0 6.6 5.2 4.9 –2.1 –2.6 –2.8 6.0 6.0 6.5
Argentina5 8.9 2.6 3.1 9.8 9.9 9.7 –0.1 0.3 –0.1 7.2 7.2 7.2
Colombia 5.9 4.3 4.4 3.4 3.2 2.8 –3.0 –2.9 –2.9 10.8 11.0 10.5
Venezuela 4.2 5.7 3.3 26.1 23.2 28.8 8.6 6.7 5.6 8.1 8.0 8.1
Peru 6.9 6.0 5.8 3.4 3.7 2.5 –1.9 –3.0 –3.0 7.7 7.5 7.5
Chile 5.9 5.0 4.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 –1.3 –3.2 –3.0 7.1 6.6 6.9
Ecuador 7.8 4.0 4.1 4.5 5.1 4.3 –0.3 –0.3 3.0 6.0 5.8 6.2
Uruguay 5.7 3.5 4.0 8.1 7.9 7.6 –3.1 –3.0 –1.9 6.0 6.7 7.0
Bolivia 5.2 5.0 5.0 9.9 4.8 4.7 2.2 1.8 1.1 . . . . . . . . .
Paraguay 4.3 –1.5 11.0 6.6 5.0 5.0 –1.0 –1.1 –0.4 5.6 5.8 5.4
Central America6 4.7 4.3 4.1 5.6 5.0 4.9 –6.9 –7.2 –6.9 . . . . . . . . .
Caribbean7 2.7 2.8 3.5 7.2 5.5 5.3 –6.3 –5.9 –5.8 . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
Latin America and the Caribbean8 4.5 3.2 3.9 6.6 6.0 5.9 –1.3 –1.7 –1.9 . . . . . . . . .
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union9 –1.1 0.7 1.3 3.5 3.3 2.6 –20.3 –20.5 –19.8 . . . . . . . . .
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Also includes Guyana and Suriname.
5Figures are based on Argentina’s official GDP and consumer price index (CPI-GBA) data. The IMF has called on Argentina to adopt remedial measures to address the quality of the official 
GDP and CPI-GBA data. The IMF staff is also using alternative measures of GDP growth and inflation for macroeconomic surveillance, including data produced by private analysts, which 
have shown significantly lower real GDP growth than the official data since 2008, and data produced by provincial statistical offices and private analysts, which have shown considerably 
higher inflation figures than the official data since 2007.
6Central America comprises Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
7The Caribbean comprises Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.
8Latin America and the Caribbean comprises Mexico and economies from the Caribbean, Central America, and South America.
9Eastern Caribbean Currency Union comprises Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines as well as Anguilla and Montser-
rat, which are not IMF members.
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vulnerable to stress from advanced economies, given 
the CIS’s deeper economic and financial linkages with 
the euro area. The region should take advantage of the 
still-favorable current economic conditions to rebuild 
policy space. 
Growth remained robust in the CIS through the 
beginning of 2012, supported by high prices for key 
commodities, good harvests in 2011, and strong 
remittance flows. However, financial conditions 
in the three largest CIS economies (Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Ukraine) have been significantly affected by 
increased financial stress in the euro area periphery 
and higher global risk aversion: sovereign spreads 
have widened; stock prices have fallen; and capital 
outflows have risen. Investment growth has weak-
ened, but expansionary fiscal policies and strong 
credit growth in Russia and other energy exporters 
have dampened the overall growth impact. 
Regional growth is expected to average 4 percent 
during 2012–13 compared with close to 5 percent in 
2011, in response to a weaker external environment 
and terms-of-trade losses from the slight decline 
in commodity prices (Table 2.5; Figures 2.12 and 
2.13). 
 • Russia’s growth is projected at about 3¾ percent 
during 2012–13, led by domestic demand, which 
is supported by an expansionary fiscal stance and 
a rebound in credit growth. Growth is projected 
to moderate in the region’s other energy-exporting 
economies, mainly owing to weaker growth in the 
energy sector, although strong public spending 
should help sustain activity in other sectors.
 • The global growth slowdown is projected to have 
a larger impact on some of the region’s energy-
importing economies. Growth in Ukraine will 
slow to 3 percent in 2012 compared with more 
than 5 percent in 2011, driven by weaker export 
and domestic demand growth. In Belarus, lower 
domestic demand after the 2011 currency crisis 
will weigh on growth. In the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan, activity is supported by strong 
remittances and import demand from Russia 
Table 2.5. Commonwealth of Independent States: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance,  
and Unemployment
(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)4 4.9 4.0 4.1 10.1 6.8 7.7 4.6 4.2 2.9 . . . . . . . . .
Net Energy Exporters 4.7 4.0 4.1 8.5 5.3 6.7 6.1 5.6 4.2 . . . . . . . . .
Russia 4.3 3.7 3.8 8.4 5.1 6.6 5.3 5.2 3.8 6.5 6.0 6.0
Kazakhstan 7.5 5.5 5.7 8.3 5.0 6.6 7.6 6.2 4.5 5.4 5.4 5.3
Uzbekistan 8.3 7.4 6.5 12.8 12.9 10.7 5.8 4.7 3.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Azerbaijan 0.1 3.9 2.7 7.9 3.0 6.0 26.5 20.4 16.1 6.0 6.0 6.0
Turkmenistan 14.7 8.0 7.7 5.3 4.3 6.0 2.0 –1.5 –1.6 . . . . . . . . .
Net Energy Importers 5.7 3.8 4.2 18.2 14.7 12.7 –7.9 –6.8 –6.9 . . . . . . . . .
Ukraine 5.2 3.0 3.5 8.0 2.0 7.4 –5.5 –5.6 –6.6 7.9 7.8 7.7
Belarus 5.3 4.3 3.4 53.2 60.2 30.6 –10.5 –3.6 –5.8 0.6 0.6 0.6
Georgia 7.0 6.5 5.5 8.5 0.2 5.5 –11.8 –12.6 –11.2 15.1 14.2 13.8
Armenia 4.6 3.9 4.0 7.7 2.8 4.2 –10.9 –9.8 –9.3 19.0 19.0 18.5
Tajikistan 7.4 6.8 6.0 12.4 6.0 8.1 0.6 –0.4 –1.5 . . . . . . . . .
Mongolia 17.5 12.7 15.7 7.7 14.1 11.7 –31.8 –31.4 –10.1 7.7 6.8 6.1
Kyrgyz Republic 5.7 1.0 8.5 16.6 2.9 9.4 –6.3 –12.8 –6.2 7.9 7.7 7.6
Moldova 6.4 3.0 5.0 7.6 5.1 5.0 –11.5 –11.4 –10.7 6.7 5.8 6.4
Memorandum
Low-Income CIS Countries5 7.3 6.1 6.1 11.6 8.2 8.6 –1.5 –2.3 –2.3 . . . . . . . . .
Net Energy Exporters Excluding Russia 6.8 5.8 5.5 8.9 6.3 7.3 10.6 8.1 6.0 . . . . . . . . .
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Table A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure.
5Low-income CIS economies comprise Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
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(deferred gold production increases planned for 
2012 will temporarily lower growth in the Kyrgyz 
Republic). 
Inflation is projected to moderate during 2012–
13 compared with 2011, reflecting favorable harvests 
in many economies of the region, monetary policy 
tightening in some, and a slight retreat in commod-
ity prices. The recent surge in global food prices, 
however, could push prices up temporarily, and 
demand pressures remain strong in energy exporters. 
As in other regions, the balance of risks to the 
near-term outlook is tilted to the downside. In view 
of the region’s strong dependence on commodity 
exports, most major risks to global growth discussed 
in Chapter 1 would be of concern to the CIS region 
because they would involve large commodity price 
declines. For the energy importers in the region, 
direct trade spillovers from a further escalation of 
the euro area crisis would also be sizable given that 
Europe is the most important trading partner out-
side the region. 
If downside risks materialize, external balances 
would deteriorate, which would tend to exacerbate 
capital outflows and put pressure on currencies, 
especially in energy importers with large external 
financing needs (Ukraine). More flexible exchange 
rates and a reduction in balance sheet mismatches 
(Kazakhstan, Russia) would help cushion the growth 
impact compared with the 2009 downturn. The 
impact on Russia, should any of the downside risks 
materialize, would be critical for the region as a 
whole, given the tight linkages between Russia and 
Figure 2.12.  Commonwealth of Independent States: Revisions to 2013 GDP Growth Forecasts
(Change in percentage points from April 2012 WEO projections)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Includes Georgia and Mongolia.
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other CIS economies via trade, foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), and remittances.
Against this backdrop, the major CIS economies 
should take advantage of the current, still-robust 
economic conditions to rebuild fiscal policy buf-
fers. In Russia, the non-oil fiscal deficit is more 
than three times larger than it was before the 
Great Recession. In energy importers, the fiscal 
adjustment should aim to put public debt on a 
downward trajectory (Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan), 
which would also lower external vulnerabilities by 
reducing large current account deficits (Armenia, 
Georgia). 
Consolidation efforts should be accompanied 
by structural reforms, a strengthening of fiscal 
frameworks, and improvements in the quality and 
efficiency of public spending.
In some economies, further monetary policy 
tightening is needed to rein in inflation expectations 
(Belarus, Mongolia, Uzbekistan). If downside risks 
materialize, however, monetary and fiscal poli-
cies may need to be eased, maintaining a balance 
between immediate stabilization needs and medium-
term objectives. 
Global risks also call for speeding up financial 
system repair and improving the region’s resilience to 
negative external spillovers of financial stress (see the 
Spillover Feature). Although progress has been made 
to strengthen the banking system, bank balance 
sheets are still impaired in a number of economies 
faced with a significant share of nonperforming 
loans (Ukraine) and poor capital adequacy (Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan). 
Middle east and north africa: a two-speed 
region 
Differences in the economic performance of oil export-
ers and oil importers have widened. Higher government 
spending in most oil exporters has supported robust 
growth. Elsewhere, uncertainties from political and 
economic change after the Arab Spring, slowing growth 
in major trading partners, and, in some cases, internal 
conflict have led to a marked weakening in activity. For 
oil importers, the policy priority will be preserving or 
rebuilding macroeconomic stability while defining and 
implementing a reform agenda to accelerate growth. For 
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2. Real Private Credit Growth
(year-over-year percent change)
5. Stock Market Performance
during Stress in Advanced
Economies2 
4. Net Financial Flows
(percent of regional GDP)
3. Terms of Trade
(index; 2004 = 100)
6. General Government Fiscal 
Balance
(percent of GDP)
1. Output Gap
(percent of potential GDP)
Growth in the CIS has remained robust, supported by high prices for key commodities and 
good harvests in 2011, although indicators suggest some moderation of activity in recent 
months. Financial conditions in the three largest CIS economies (Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Ukraine) have deteriorated with increased financial stress in the euro area periphery and 
higher global risk aversion. Given downside risks, the priority is to strengthen policies by 
improving fiscal balances, accelerating financial system reform, and tightening the monetary 
stance where inflation risks are high.
Net energy 
exporters excl. 
Russia
Russia
CIS
Net energy 
importers
2007
2012
2013
Armenia 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan
Moldova 
Mongolia
Russia 
Ukraine
FDI1
Portfolio equity 
Portfolio debt 
Derivative flows 
Other flows 
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Euro area crisis
Global financial crisis
Net energy 
exporters excl. 
Russia
Russia
Net energy 
importers
CIS
–35
–30
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
Sources:  Haver Analytics; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics database; IMF, International 
Financial Statistics database; Thomson Reuters Datastream; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Net energy exporters: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan (KAZ), Russia (RUS), Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan. Net energy importers: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Tajikistan, Ukraine (UKR). 
1FDI = foreign direct investment.
2Percent change in average level of index five days after and five days before stress in 
advanced economies. The periods for euro area crisis and global financial crisis are 
respectively: January 2010–June 2012 and January 2007–December 2009. See the Spillover 
Feature for details. 
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oil exporters, the priority is to take advantage of current 
high oil prices to diversify their economies. 
Growth in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region was relatively subdued at 3¼ per-
cent in 2011, but is projected to strengthen to 5¼ 
percent in 2012 on account of oil exporters (Table 
2.6).9 Growth in oil exporters is expected to acceler-
ate from about 4 percent in 2011 to 6½ percent 
in 2012, largely as a result of a strong rebound of 
activity in Libya since late 2011. In most other 
oil exporters, non-oil GDP growth is expected to 
remain robust in 2012, supported by ratcheted-up 
9Syria has been excluded from regional aggregates, including 
projections, because of the ongoing civil war. Regional aggregates 
do include Libya, where activity has been strongly affected by its 
civil war, with a collapse in output in 2011 and a sharp rebound 
in 2012.
government spending as oil prices remain at histori-
cally high levels, while oil sector growth is forecast to 
moderate somewhat after a strong increase in 2011 
(Figure 2.14). The boost from Libya will moderate 
in 2013, when growth in the oil exporters of the 
region is projected to be 3¾ percent. 
In contrast, growth in oil importers has been about 
1¼ percent during 2011–12, reflecting the effects of 
social unrest and political uncertainty, weak external 
demand, and high oil prices. Uncertainty and unrest 
have led to a pullback from the region, evidenced most 
dramatically in steep declines in tourism and FDI (Fig-
ure 2.15). At the same time, the contraction of activity 
in advanced Europe—a major trading partner for most 
economies in the group—has been a drag on growth. 
Looking forward, uncertainty is expected to decrease 
as political transitions stabilize, while external demand 
Table 2.6. Selected Middle East and North African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account 
Balance, and Unemployment 
(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Middle East and North Africa 3.3 5.3 3.6 9.7 10.4 9.1 14.2 12.2 10.6 . . . . . . . . .
Oil Exporters4 3.9 6.6 3.8 10.1 11.1 9.4 18.7 16.4 14.2 . . . . . . . . .
Iran 2.0 –0.9 0.8 21.5 25.2 21.8 12.5 3.4 1.3 12.3 14.1 15.6
Saudi Arabia 7.1 6.0 4.2 5.0 4.9 4.6 26.5 26.1 22.7 . . . . . . . . .
Algeria 2.4 2.6 3.4 4.5 8.4 5.0 10.0 6.2 6.1 10.0 9.7 9.3
United Arab Emirates 5.2 4.0 2.6 0.9 0.7 1.6 9.7 9.3 10.1 . . . . . . . . .
Qatar 14.1 6.3 4.9 1.9 2.0 3.0 30.2 29.6 26.8 . . . . . . . . .
Kuwait 8.2 6.3 1.9 4.7 4.3 4.1 44.0 44.1 39.2 2.1 2.1 2.1
Iraq 8.9 10.2 14.7 5.6 6.0 5.5 8.3 0.3 6.1 . . . . . . . . .
Oil Importers5 1.4 1.2 3.3 8.5 8.3 8.3 –5.2 –6.9 –5.8 . . . . . . . . .
Egypt 1.8 2.0 3.0 11.1 8.6 10.7 –2.6 –3.4 –3.3 12.1 12.7 13.5
Morocco 4.9 2.9 5.5 0.9 2.2 2.5 –8.0 –7.9 –5.4 8.9 8.8 8.7
Tunisia –1.8 2.7 3.3 3.5 5.0 4.0 –7.3 –7.9 –7.7 18.9 17.0 16.0
Sudan6 –4.5 –11.2 0.0 18.3 28.6 17.0 –0.5 –7.8 –6.6 12.0 10.8 9.6
Lebanon 1.5 2.0 2.5 5.0 6.5 5.7 –14.0 –16.2 –15.6 . . . . . . . . .
Jordan 2.6 3.0 3.5 4.4 4.5 3.9 –12.0 –14.1 –9.9 12.9 12.9 12.9
Memorandum
Israel 4.6 2.9 3.2 3.4 1.7 2.1 0.8 –2.1 –1.3 7.1 7.0 7.0
Maghreb7 –1.9 19.0 6.0 4.0 6.4 3.6 2.2 4.4 2.9 . . . . . . . . .
Mashreq8 1.8 2.0 3.0 10.0 8.2 9.8 –4.9 –6.0 –5.4 . . . . . . . . .
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Also includes Bahrain, Libya, Oman, and Yemen. 
5Also includes Djibouti, Mauritania, and Syria. Excludes Syria for 2011 onward.
6Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan.
7The Maghreb comprises Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
8The Mashreq comprises Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Excludes Syria for 2011 onward.
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picks up, and growth in oil importers is projected to 
recover to 3¼ percent in 2013. 
Risks to the near-term outlook for oil exporters 
revolve primarily around oil prices and global growth, 
given that all major risks to global growth discussed in 
Chapter 1 involve lower oil prices. For oil exporters, 
government expenditures have risen to such a degree 
that substantial declines in the price of oil could 
undermine fiscal positions. Despite significant accrued 
financial buffers, such declines could put at risk ongo-
ing infrastructure investment and growth. On the 
upside, Iran-related and other geopolitical risks could 
lead to higher oil prices. 
Oil importers face both external and internal 
risks. On the external side, they are vulnerable to 
trade spillovers if downside risks to growth in major 
economies materialize.10 Another concern is risks 
to internal and external balances from upside risks 
10 The November 2012 Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East 
and Central Asia provides a detailed analysis of spillovers from the 
economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council  to other MENA 
economies.
to food and fuel prices (see the Special Feature in 
Chapter 1). Because of extensive food and fuel 
subsidies in most economies, the immediate concern 
with spikes in commodity prices is not the effect 
on inflation and disposable income, but rather the 
strain on budgets and foreign exchange reserves. 
More broadly, meeting social demands when growth 
has slowed and political uncertainty has increased 
has resulted in higher budget deficits and declines in 
foreign exchange reserves in non-oil importers. 
A general policy priority in the MENA region is 
to secure economic and social stability through more 
inclusive medium-term growth. Achieving this goal 
will require institutional and regulatory reform to 
stimulate private sector activity and ensure greater 
and more equal access to economic opportunities 
and measures to address chronically high unemploy-
ment, particularly among the young.
Maintaining macroeconomic stability while support-
ing strong, inclusive medium-term growth will be an 
important policy challenge. Increased spending on food 
and fuel subsidies, along with pressure to raise civil ser-
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Figure 2.14.  Middle East and North Africa: Revisions to 2013 GDP Growth Forecasts
(Change in percentage points from April 2012 WEO projections)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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vice wages and pensions, risks straining public finances. 
In oil exporters, it will be critical to contain increases 
in spending on entitlements that are hard to reverse. 
Instead, the focus should be on productivity-enhancing 
spending on human capital and infrastructure invest-
ment, which could also support diversification of their 
economies. In oil importers, policy buffers have been 
diminished, creating pressures for fiscal consolidation. 
Structural fiscal reforms aimed at reorienting govern-
ment spending toward poverty reduction and the 
promotion of productive investment will be crucial to 
improving the budget outlook. Improved targeting of 
subsidies, especially through fuel subsidy reforms, will 
be an important step in this respect. 
sub-saharan africa: a continued Favorable 
outlook
Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to continue growing 
strongly in the near term, with regional differences in 
prospects reflecting in part economies’ varying exposure 
to external shocks (Figure 2.16). As elsewhere, external 
risks remain elevated. Policymakers in the region should 
use the window provided by strong growth to rebuild 
budgetary space and normalize monetary conditions to 
be better prepared for downside risks. 
Economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has 
expanded by more than 5 percent in each of the past 
three years—continuing a decade-long run of strong 
performance that was only briefly interrupted by the 
global downturn in 2009 (Figure 2.17, panels 1 and 
2). Most SSA economies are participating in this 
solid expansion, with the notable exception of South 
Africa, which has been hampered by its strong link-
ages with Europe, as well as some countries in western 
Africa affected by drought and civil conflict. More 
recently, some food importers in the region have also 
been hit by the sharp increase in global food prices for 
a few major crops—leading to higher headline infla-
tion and widening trade imbalances—although so far 
with less severe effects than during the 2007–08 food 
price shocks (see Chapter 1, Box 1.5). 
The region’s recent growth has occurred against a  
backdrop of difficult external conditions, including  
the escalation of the euro area crisis. But apart from 
South Africa, financial spillovers from Europe to the  
region have been modest (Figure 2.17, panel 3). 
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Figure 2.15.  Middle East and North Africa: An Uneven Recovery
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Continued high oil prices, increased oil production, and increased government spending have 
supported robust activity in oil exporters. Internal conflicts and their aftermath remain a 
source of uncertainty, and tourism has not yet recovered. The increases in government 
expenditure in oil exporters in the region have raised the break-even oil price (the price at 
which oil revenue covers the non-oil budget deficit), implying that significant oil price 
declines could undermine fiscal positions. 
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Oil prices
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Private portfolio flows
Private other flows
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4. MENA Financial Flows
(percent of GDP)
Total flows
Current oil 
price3
Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Haver Analytics; IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: 
Middle East and Central Asia, November 2012; and IMF staff estimates.
1Index of tourism is calculated based on the simple average of tourism receipts of Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. Morocco’s figures are based on nonresident entries 
instead of tourist arrivals because of a lack of data.
2DZA = Algeria; BHR = Bahrain; IRN = Iran; IRQ = Iraq; KWT = Kuwait, LBY = Libya; 
OMN = Oman; QAT = Qatar; SAU = Saudi Arabia; UAE = United Arab Emirates.
3Current oil price as of August 2012.
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Export diversification has reduced exposure to weak 
demand from advanced economies, and high com-
modity prices have supported the region’s commod-
ity exporters and boosted investment in resource 
extraction. However, as documented in Chapter 4, 
improved policy frameworks and judicious use of 
policy space in response to adverse shocks have been 
important elements in these economies’ improved 
performance during the past decade. 
In the baseline scenario, under which strains 
in the euro area remain contained and the global 
economy expands by 3¼ to 3½ percent this year 
and next, growth in SSA will continue above 5 per-
cent during 2012–13 (Table 2.7). 
 • Growth in the oil-exporting economies is pro-
jected to remain high, near 6 percent in 2012; 
increased oil production in Angola will expand its 
GDP by close to 6¾ percent this year. In Nige-
ria, non-oil GDP growth will moderate with the 
softer external environment and tighter macroeco-
nomic policies, but a slight rebound in oil output 
will keep overall GDP growth at 7 percent. 
 • Among the middle-income countries, growth 
in South Africa is projected to be 2½ percent 
in 2012—below most estimates of potential 
growth—largely because of strong linkages with 
Europe. Growth is expected to rebound to 3 
percent next year under the relatively favor-
able external conditions of the WEO baseline. 
Output growth in Cameroon is expected to 
strengthen this year and next, with the non-oil 
sector being supported by major public invest-
ment projects and measures to boost agricultural 
productivity. 
 • The region’s low-income economies face vary-
ing outlooks. In Ethiopia, growth is projected to 
decelerate moderately this year and next, reflecting 
weaker external demand and an increasingly con-
strained environment for private sector activity. 
In Kenya, tight monetary conditions have slowed 
consumption, but construction activity and 
corporate investment remain buoyant and will 
support an acceleration of growth to 5 percent 
this year and 5½ percent in 2013. 
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Figure 2.16.  Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to 2013 GDP Growth Forecasts
(Change in percentage points from April 2012 WEO projections)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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Risks to the outlook remain high, primarily 
because of global uncertainties. If the euro area crisis 
escalates further and global growth slows further, 
SSA’s prospects will be less favorable. The primary 
channel for spillovers is trade. South Africa, strongly 
linked to Europe, would be particularly affected, 
with possible repercussions for some economies in 
southern Africa, and softer commodity prices would 
adversely affect the region’s natural resource export-
ers.11 Another key risk relates to the possible further 
elevation of global food prices, which would under-
mine the external and fiscal balances of the food 
importers in the region. For the medium term, a 
potential sharp slowdown in China would also affect 
the region adversely, not only because of the region’s 
deepening trade linkages with China in the past sev-
eral years (see Figure 2.SF.7) or through the effect on 
global commodity prices (see IMF, 2012b), but also 
because of China’s increasingly important contribu-
tion to the region’s FDI and official financing.12 
The priority in much of the region is to continue to 
strengthen policy buffers and prepare contingency plans 
if downside risks materialize. Macroeconomic policies 
have remained generally accommodative, although 
a surge in inflation during 2011 prompted a sharp 
tightening of monetary policy in several east African 
economies. In several countries, some fiscal consolida-
tion is also under way. If downside risks to the global 
economy materialize, economies without significant 
financing constraints should stand ready to ease policies 
in response. But countries that are in the process of 
reducing elevated inflation will need to maintain tight 
monetary policies. The situation is different in South 
Africa, where four years of macroeconomic stimulus 
have significantly diminished the policy space avail-
able to deal with an adverse shock. This constraint is 
particularly acute on the fiscal side, where fiscal space 
will shrink further in a global slowdown; under such a 
scenario the authorities may need to rely more heavily 
on countercyclical monetary policy to cushion the 
economy against adverse spillovers.
11See Chapter 2 of the October 2012 Regional Economic 
Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa for a detailed analysis of spillover 
channels from the region’s two largest economies, South Africa 
and Nigeria, to the rest of the region.
12See Chapter 3 of the October 2011 Regional Economic Out-
look: Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Figure 2.17.  Sub-Saharan Africa: A Strong Expansion
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Economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa has been expanding by 5 percent or more a year 
throughout the past decade, except during the global downturn in 2008–09. High commodity 
prices have supported the region’s commodity exporters and boosted investment in resource 
extraction. Better policy frameworks and judicious use of policy space in responding to 
adverse shocks have also contributed to this improved performance. But with 
macroeconomic policies still accommodative in much of the region, rebuilding policy buffers 
is a priority. 
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Table 2.7. Selected Sub-Saharan African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance,  
and Unemployment
(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.1 5.0 5.7 9.7 9.1 7.1 –1.7 –3.2 –3.3 . . . . . . . . .
Oil Exporters4 6.2 6.0 7.5 11.2 10.8 8.9 5.5 3.8 3.4 . . . . . . . . .
Nigeria 7.4 7.1 6.7 10.8 11.4 9.5 3.6 3.5 3.1 23.9 . . . . . .
Angola 3.9 6.8 5.5 13.5 10.8 8.6 9.6 8.5 6.6 . . . . . . . . .
Equatorial Guinea 7.8 5.7 6.1 6.3 5.4 7.0 –6.0 –7.7 –7.7 . . . . . . . . .
Gabon 6.6 6.1 2.0 1.3 2.3 2.6 10.6 9.1 4.1 . . . . . . . . .
Republic of Congo 3.4 4.9 5.3 1.8 5.1 4.5 0.8 –0.6 –0.4 . . . . . . . . .
Middle-Income5 4.1 3.7 4.0 5.4 5.7 5.5 –3.4 –5.3 –5.3 . . . . . . . . .
South Africa 3.1 2.6 3.0 5.0 5.6 5.2 –3.3 –5.5 –5.8 23.9 24.4 24.7
Ghana 14.4 8.2 7.8 8.7 9.8 10.9 –9.2 –9.1 –7.0 . . . . . . . . .
Cameroon 4.2 4.7 5.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 –4.1 –4.1 –3.8 . . . . . . . . .
Côte d’Ivoire –4.7 8.1 7.0 4.9 2.0 2.5 6.7 –3.1 –1.6 . . . . . . . . .
Botswana 5.1 3.8 4.1 8.5 7.5 6.2 1.6 3.9 3.4 . . . . . . . . .
Senegal 2.6 3.7 4.3 3.4 2.3 2.1 –6.4 –8.5 –6.9 . . . . . . . . .
Low-Income6 5.6 5.9 6.1 15.1 12.5 7.6 –10.9 –11.1 –11.2 . . . . . . . . .
Ethiopia 7.5 7.0 6.5 33.1 22.9 10.2 0.6 –6.1 –7.7 . . . . . . . . .
Kenya 4.4 5.1 5.6 14.0 10.0 5.8 –10.6 –8.5 –8.6 . . . . . . . . .
Tanzania 6.4 6.5 6.8 12.7 15.6 9.8 –13.7 –15.4 –13.4 . . . . . . . . .
Uganda 5.1 4.2 5.7 18.7 14.6 6.1 –11.4 –11.0 –11.7 . . . . . . . . .
Democratic Republic of the Congo 6.9 7.1 8.2 15.5 10.4 9.5 –11.5 –12.5 –14.3 . . . . . . . . .
Mozambique 7.3 7.5 8.4 10.4 3.0 8.6 –12.8 –11.6 –12.4 . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
Sub-Saharan Africa Excluding 
South Sudan 5.2 5.3 5.3 9.3 8.9 7.0 –2.0 –3.1 –3.5 . . . . . . . . .
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Table A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP. 
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Also includes Chad and South Sudan.
5Also includes Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, and Zambia.
6Also includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zimbabwe.
spillover Feature: the Financial transmission of stress in the global economy
The findings confirm that global financial condi-
tions are vulnerable to stress in major economies. 
Global capital flows and asset prices tend to be 
weaker in the period after stress compared with the 
period before. However, the magnitudes of the spill-
overs are generally smaller now than they were dur-
ing the global financial crisis. Stress related to sharp 
economic downswings in China has also become a 
source of financial contagion, although more so for 
emerging market and developing economies than 
for advanced economies. For many emerging market 
and developing economy regions, stress during the 
euro area crisis has been transmitted more quickly to 
equity than to bond flows, whereas in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis, both bond and equity 
flows were similarly affected by stress. The greater 
persistence of bond flows may be indicative of 
increased investor confidence about these economies, 
but could also be the result of a search for yield in a 
time of low global interest rates. 
The consequences of stress vary by region, likely 
reflecting differences in underlying vulnerabilities 
and in exposures to the various types of stress. The 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
emerging Europe—which have deeper economic and 
financial ties with the euro area—have experienced 
somewhat larger swings in financial conditions than 
others during the euro area crisis. Spillovers for other 
regions are relatively smaller. Stress emanating from 
China coincides with sharper declines in financial 
conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) than elsewhere—
possibly because of these regions’ ties with China 
for oil and other commodity exports. These findings 
resonate with recent studies highlighting the role of 
spillovers.3 
3Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub (2012) analyze the spillover 
consequences of unconventional monetary policy announcements 
by the Federal Reserve. Bayoumi and Bui (2011) document the 
consequences of U.S. fiscal, financial, and monetary policies on 
asset prices for a number of systemically important economies. 
IMF (2011a, 2012b) consider other scenarios to analyze the 
potential global effects of a further intensification of the crisis 
Four years after the global financial crisis, the 
world economy is still struggling to achieve sustained 
expansion amid major downside risks. This Spillover 
Feature sheds light on a number of concerns relating 
to the weak recovery: Could a major intensifica-
tion of the euro area crisis or renewed U.S. financial 
stress induce contagion effects? Have such spillovers 
increased over time? Can a sharp economic slow-
down in China affect financial conditions elsewhere? 
Financial markets react differently to stress 
depending on the strength of offsetting factors. 
Capital may flow out of economies under stress to 
regions in which perceived economic prospects and 
financial returns are higher. However, if banks in the 
economies under stress are forced to reduce lever-
age by unwinding their cross-border exposures, this 
would cause capital outflows from across the world.1 
Stress could also dampen risk appetite more gener-
ally and precipitate a flight to safety out of all risky 
assets, depressing asset prices and financing condi-
tions more broadly.
We assess the nature of global contagion dur-
ing episodes of financial stress in the United States 
and the euro area as well as the contagion of shocks 
to real activity specific to China. We gauge this 
contagion by tracking developments in weekly bond 
and equity flows to advanced and emerging market 
economy funds and daily equity prices and sovereign 
yields in the immediate aftermath of these stress 
episodes. However, the spillovers evident in the 
analysis should be interpreted as associations rather 
than drivers of stress because we do not identify the 
factors underlying the stress nor control for common 
factors that may be affecting global financial markets 
concurrently.2 
The main author of this feature is Rupa Duttagupta with sup-
port from Gavin Asdorian, Sinem Kilic Celik, Nadia Lepeshko, 
and Bennet Voorhees.
1The potential global consequences of bank deleveraging in the 
euro area, as observed in late 2011, were analyzed in the Spillover 
Feature in Chapter 2 of the April 2012 World Economic Outlook. 
2For instance, IMF (2012b) finds that the spillover con-
sequences of increased volatility in euro area sovereign bond 
markets depend on the level of global risk repricing. 
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defining stress 
To compare the consequence of stress in recent 
years with that during the global financial crisis, we 
distinguish between two sample periods: (1) Janu-
ary 2007 through 2009, which included the U.S. 
subprime mortgage meltdown and culminated in 
the global financial crisis; and (2) January 2010 to 
mid-2012, the period of the euro area crisis. 
Financing conditions for sovereigns in the euro 
area periphery have sharply deteriorated only with the 
escalation of their debt crises.4 The volatility in their 
financing conditions, as measured by the range of 
daily 10-year sovereign spread changes relative to Ger-
man bunds, has also increased (Figure 2.SF.1, panels 1 
and 3). Conversely, U.S. financial market uncertainty, 
as measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Market Volatility Index (VIX), is relatively lower now 
(Figure 2.SF.1, panels 2 and 4). However, the VIX 
has experienced occasional volatility in recent years: 
in May 2010, possibly related to contagion from the 
outbreak of the Greek crisis, and in late 2011 during 
the acrimonious U.S. debt-ceiling debate and the 
escalation of sovereign funding pressure in Italy. 
How were episodes of financial stress in the 
advanced economies chosen? Drawing on Romer 
(2012), episodes of high stress in a euro area periph-
ery economy are defined as days in which the change 
in the daily 10-year sovereign spread was in the 95th 
percentile of its distribution for the given sample 
period (see Figure 2.SF.1). The euro area periphery 
as a whole is considered to have been under stress 
when all periphery economies were under stress as 
defined by the above metric. For the United States, 
stress is defined as days in which the VIX level is 
higher than 30 and the daily VIX increase is in the 
95th percentile of the distribution.5 We filter out 
in the euro area. See also Chapter 4 of the October 2009 World 
Economic Outlook. 
4The euro area periphery economies considered here comprise 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain.
5Although the U.S. 10-year sovereign yield could serve as an 
alternative proxy for tracking U.S. stress, this yield has declined 
in periods of stress in part because of the dollar’s status as a 
safe haven currency and in part because of the Federal Reserve’s 
unconventional measures to lower rates (see IMF, 2012b, for 
the effects of unconventional Federal Reserve measures on U.S. 
sovereign yields). Therefore, the VIX is a better gauge of U.S. 
financial stress.
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Figure 2.SF.1.  Financing Conditions for Euro Area Periphery 
Economies and the United States, 2007–12
(Percentage points for daily spread changes and points for VIX)1
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Financing conditions faced by the euro area periphery economies sharply deteriorated 
during the euro area crisis. In contrast, U.S. financial market stress is somewhat lower now 
than during the global financial crisis.
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consecutive days of stress in a region by restricting 
each stress episode to those that occur at least one 
month after the previous episode. The final number 
of stress episodes is determined by the days during 
which the euro area periphery, the United States, or 
both were under stress. 
Focusing on the euro area crisis period, we 
identify episodes of real activity-related stress from 
China as periods during which China’s manufactur-
ing activity is weaker than can be explained by its 
external trade links. Specifically, we first single out 
residuals from a 12-month rolling regression of the 
Chinese manufacturing purchasing managers’ index 
(PMI) on U.S. and euro area PMIs only when 
they are in the bottom quartile of the distribution. 
Among these, episodes since 2011 that do not 
coincide with the episodes of advanced economy 
stress are considered China-induced stress events.6 
The above criteria identify 15 stress episodes for 
the advanced economies and 2 for China (Figure 
2.SF.2, Table 2.SF.1). As expected, during the 
global financial crisis, stress was experienced mainly 
in the United States, whereas during 2010 through 
mid-2012, stress was experienced by both the 
United States and the euro area periphery, although 
increasingly by only the latter since late 2011. 
transmission of stress
spillovers through cross-Border capital Flows
We use data on portfolio capital flows compiled 
by Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) to 
track capital flow movements at a weekly frequency. 
These data suggest a drying up of capital flows from 
most regions at the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis (Figure 2.SF.3, panels 1 and 2).7 However, 
6Manufacturing PMIs are released on the first working day of 
the month, so the specific China-induced stress date is the first 
working day of the month identified as a stress episode. Even 
so, given the lower frequency for the PMI data, the case for a 
correctly identified shock emanating from China is weaker than 
for the advanced economies, whose stress dates were identified 
using daily data. Thus, the results relating to China-specific stress 
should be treated with caution.  
7These data are not available at daily frequency for most 
regions. Although EPFR funds do not cover all portfolio flows, 
recent studies find a close match between EPFR and balance of 
payments gross portfolio flows (Fratzscher, 2011; Miao and Pant, 
2012).  
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Figure 2.SF.2.  Changes in Stress Indicators, 2007–12
(percentage points for daily sovereign spread and points for VIX)1
Financial stress is proxied by sharp increases in sovereign spreads for the euro area 
periphery economies and in the VIX for the United States.
1. Change in VIX Level 
2. Change in Greece Sovereign Spread
3. Change in Sovereign Spreads 2
Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; and IMF staff calculations. 
1VIX: Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index.
2Data on Irish 10-year bond yields were discontinued after October 11, 2011. Beyond this 
date, stress in the euro area reflects data on Greece, Italy, and Spain.
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Event studies based on the identified stress epi-
sodes confirm that stress in major economies tends 
to be associated with lower global capital flows. The 
exercise compares the level of capital flows to alter-
native regions in the week of and the weeks before 
and after stress, and then averages across all stress 
episodes within each sample period. Lower flows 
in the weeks of and after stress relative to the week 
before suggest that foreign investors’ appetite for 
cross-border investment is lower during stress (Fig-
ure 2.SF.4). The poststress decline in flows during 
the euro area crisis is generally not as sharp as that 
observed during the global financial crisis, although 
there is considerable regional heterogeneity: 
capital flow volatility increased even before the 
crisis—as early as January 2007 for developing Asia 
and late 2007 for LAC economies. Flows picked 
up for most regions from the second half of 2009, 
although volatility has increased again since early 
2011. Since late 2009, there has also been a change 
in the composition of portfolio flows toward bond 
flows for both advanced and emerging market and 
developing economies (Figure 2.SF.3, panel 3). The 
rise in bond flows for the latter marks a shift from 
the steady decline in the share of debt-creating 
inflows in the run-up to the global financial crisis.8 
8See Chapter 4 of the April 2011 World Economic Outlook. 
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Table 2.SF.1. Behavior of Stress Indicators, 2007–12
Stress Dates
Chicago Board 
Options Exchange 
Market Volatility 
Index (VIX)
Daily Changes in 10-year Sovereign Spreads
Stress 
Experienced by
Greece Ireland Italy Spain
VIX 
Level 
Change 
in VIX 
Level
Spread 
Level1
Change 
in 
Spread2
Spread 
Level1
Change 
in 
Spread2
Spread 
Level1
Change 
in  
Spread2
Spread 
Level1
Change 
in 
Spread2
Stress during the Global Financial Crisis  (January 2007—December 2009)
Jan. 22, 2008 31.01  3.83  0.37  0.01 0.22  0.01 0.38  0.01 0.19  0.01 United States
Mar. 14, 2008 31.16  3.87  0.68 –0.00 0.41  0.01 0.63  0.01 0.41  0.11 United States
Sep. 15, 2008 31.70  6.04  0.80  0.07 0.42  0.02 0.72  0.06 0.47  0.06 United States
Oct. 15, 2008 69.25 14.12  0.84 –0.03 0.60 –0.02 0.69 –0.05 0.47 –0.09 United States
Nov. 14, 2008 66.31  6.48  1.39 –0.13 0.78 –0.07 0.95 –0.10 0.46 –0.10 United States
Jan. 07, 2009 43.39  4.83  2.11 –0.04 1.38 –0.01 1.25 –0.06 0.80 –0.04 United States
Feb. 12, 2009 41.25 –3.28  2.64  0.17 2.23  0.20 1.41  0.08 1.17  0.13 Euro area periphery
Mar. 30, 2009 45.54  4.50  2.72  0.15 2.38  0.09 1.40  0.12 1.03  0.07 Both
Oct. 30, 2009 30.69  5.93  1.42  0.04 1.47  0.02 0.84  0.02 0.56  0.01 United States
Stress during the Euro Area Crisis (January 2010—June 2012)3
May 06, 2010 32.80  7.89  8.52  1.21 3.00  0.30 1.49  0.28 1.63  0.31 Both
Jun. 29, 2010 34.13  5.13  7.89 –0.11 2.95 –0.00 1.57  0.03 2.05  0.10 United States
Aug. 4, 2011 31.66  8.28 12.87  0.28 8.10 –0.13 3.90  0.21 3.98  0.13 United States
Sep. 5, 2011 33.92  0.00 17.47  1.19 6.91  0.29 3.71  0.43 3.41  0.30 Both
Oct. 17, 2011 33.39  5.15 21.90  0.17 . . . . . . 3.70  0.10 3.22  0.17 United States
Dec. 8, 2011 30.59  1.92 32.70  0.80 . . . . . . 4.44  0.55 3.80  0.47 Euro area periphery
Apr. 4, 2012 16.44  0.78 20.34  0.86 . . . . . . 3.58  0.23 3.90  0.26 Euro area periphery
May 14, 2012 21.87  1.98 26.13  2.89 . . . . . . 4.24  0.25 4.77  0.28 Euro area periphery
China, Real Activity Stress
PMI4 Change from Previous Month Unexplained PMI5
Feb. 1, 2011 51.7 –2.8 –2.0
Jun. 1, 2011 52.5 –1.5 –2.4
Source: IMF staff calculations. See Table 2.SF.2 for data sources. 
1Daily spread with 10-year bunds.
2Daily spread change.
3Data on Irish 10-year bond yields were discontinued after October 11, 2011. (Stress in the euro area reflects data on Greece, Italy, and Spain only).
4Purchasing Managers’ Index.
5The bottom quartile residuals from a 12-month rolling regression of China’s manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) on the U.S. and euro area manufacturing PMIs. (The 
residuals for months that coincided with months of advanced economy stress are filtered out.)
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Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; 
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; EMDE = emerging market 
and developing economy. See Table 2.SF.2 for the country composition of each group.   
1Equity and bond fund flows, cumulated from January 2006.
Figure 2.SF.3.  Global Weekly Capital Flows
(Billions of U.S. dollars)1
Following a sharp decline during the global financial crisis, capital flows have steadily risen 
in most regions. Emerging market and developing economies have seen a buildup in both 
bond and equity flows, whereas equity flows have largely been negative in advanced 
economies.
1. Advanced Economies
Advanced Asia
Advanced 
Europe
3. Advanced versus Emerging Market and Developing Economies
United States and 
Canada
2. Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Euro area
Developing Asia LAC
Emerging Europe CIS
SSA MENA
Advanced economy equity funds
Advanced economy bond funds
EMDE equity funds (right scale)
EMDE bond funds (right scale)
 • Advanced economies tend to experience greater 
declines in capital flows when their own econo-
mies are under stress compared with periods of 
China-specific stress (Figure 2.SF.4, panels 1–4). 
With the exception of advanced Asia, flows to 
advanced economies do not fall immediately 
after China-related stress and, in fact, increase 
for some.  
 • Although capital flows to emerging market and 
developing economies also dry up after stress, 
the scale varies by region (Figure 2.SF.4, panels 
5–10). For the CIS, poststress capital outflows 
during the euro area crisis are larger than in 
other emerging market and developing econo-
mies and almost as sharp as outflows during 
the global financial crisis, whereas for emerging 
Europe flows continue to be lower even in the 
week after stress. This may reflect in part these 
regions’ ties with the euro area and the effects of 
increased deleveraging by euro area banks, many 
of which have a strong presence in the CIS and 
emerging Europe. 
 • The evidence of contagion from China is 
stronger for emerging market and developing 
economies, particularly in the LAC, MENA, and 
SSA regions, likely reflecting commodity trade 
linkages, but also for emerging Europe.9 
Stress has affected bond and equity flows dif-
ferently over time, suggesting that investors are 
increasingly distinguishing between asset classes 
rather than between economies (Figure 2.SF.5).10 
During the euro area crisis, bond flows—including 
to emerging market and developing economies—
have held up more than equity flows after stress, 
declining in level but not reversing immediately. 
The decline in equity flows is generally sharper. In 
contrast, during the global financial crisis, bond 
flows were generally negative and fell further after 
stress (equity flows behaved in a similar fashion). It 
is possible that investors increasingly consider that 
9IMF (2012b) analyzes the consequences of potentially lower 
Chinese investment growth on growth in commodity exporters 
through direct trade linkages and global commodity prices. 
10The EPFR database does not have data on bond and equity 
fund flow breakdowns for every country. Therefore, total flows 
for a country are included in the regional aggregates only if both 
bond and equity fund flows are available. See Table 2.SF.2 for 
details on the country coverage of the data. 
92  International Monetary Fund | October 2012
wo r l d e co n o m i c o u t lo o k : co p i n g w i t h h i g h d e bt a n d S lu g g i S h g r ow t h
S p i l l o v e r  F e at u r e
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
–2
–1
0
1
2
t + 1tt – 1 t + 1tt – 1
t + 1tt – 1 t + 1tt – 1
t + 1tt – 1 t + 1tt – 1
t + 1tt – 1 t + 1t – 1
t + 1tt – 1 t + 1tt – 1
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
Sources: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research; and IMF staff calculations. 
Note: t  denotes the week of stress, and  t – 1 and t + 1 refer to the weeks before and after 
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Figure 2.SF.4.  Global Fund Flows during Stress 
(Percent of 2011 weekly GDP)
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Global capital flows are generally weaker during the week of and the week after advanced
-economy stress than during the week before stress. For most regions, the swings in flows 
around stress episodes are still somewhat smaller compared with those experienced during 
the global financial crisis. Stress from China also tends to coincide with lower flows but 
more dominantly for emerging market and developing economies that have strong trade-
related ties with China.
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1LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean.
Figure 2.SF.5.  The Composition of Capital Flows during Stress
(Percent of 2011 weekly GDP)
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Bond flows have tended to be relatively more resilient to stress than equity flows during the 
euro area crisis.
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Table 2.SF.2. Data for Spillover Feature
Variable Definition/Description/Source
Sovereign Spreads 
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Spain
Ten-year general government bond index. The spread is calculated as a country’s indexed yield over German 10-year 
bonds. Source: Bloomberg Financial Markets.
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index. Source: Bloomberg Financial Markets.
Total, Bond, and 
Equity Fund Flows
Weekly total, bond, and equity fund flows to 10 regions. Source. Emerging Portfolio Fund Research.
Country Compositions for Each Region:
Total Flows
Euro Area Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain
Advanced Europe Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom
Advanced Asia Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan Province of 
China  
Developing Asia China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela
Emerging Europe Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Turkey
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russia, Ukraine
Sub-Saharan Africa Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Zambia
Middle East and North Africa Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates
United States and Canada Canada, United States
United States United States
Bond Flows: Each region includes the same composition as Total Flows, with additional countries listed below.
Developing Asia Cambodia
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
Emerging Europe Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova
Sub-Saharan Africa Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Liberia, Uganda
Middle East and North Africa Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya
Advanced Economies All countries listed under Euro Area, Advanced Europe, Advanced Asia, and United 
States and Canada
Emerging Market and 
Developing Economies
All countries listed under Developing Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Emerging 
Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Middle East 
and North Africa
Equity Flows: Each region includes the same composition as Total Flows, with additional countries listed below.
Developing Asia Bangladesh, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Turkmenistan
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Table 2.SF.2. (continued)
Variable Definition/Description/Source
Sub-Saharan Africa Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe
Middle East and North Africa Iran, Yemen
Advanced Economies All countries listed under Euro Area, advanced Europe, Advanced Asia, and United 
States and Canada
Emerging Market and 
Developing Economies
All countries listed under Developing Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Emerging 
Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Middle East 
and North Africa
2011 Weekly GDP 2011 annual GDP in U.S. dollars divided by 52. Source: World Economic Outlook database (series NGDPD).
Sovereign Yields1 Ten-year government bond yields for most advanced economies; JPMorgan EMBIG Sovereign Yields for emerging 
market economies. Source: Bloomberg Financial Markets.
Country Compositions for Each Region
Euro Area (core) Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Slovak Republic
Advanced Europe Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Advanced Asia Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore,  
Taiwan Province of China
Developing Asia China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  
El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
Venezuela
Emerging Europe Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia, Turkey
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine
Sub-Saharan Africa Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa
Middle East and North Africa Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia
Equity Prices1 MSCI Equity Indices. Source: Bloomberg Financial Markets.
Country Compositions for Each Region
Euro Area Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain
Advanced Europe Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Advanced Asia Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore,  
Taiwan Province of China
Developing Asia China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela
Emerging Europe Hungary, Poland, Turkey
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine
Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa
Middle East and North Africa Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco
Financial Equity 
Prices1
MSCI Financial Equity Indices. Source: Bloomberg Financial Markets.
Country Compositions for Each Region
Euro Area Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain
Advanced Europe Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
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crisis periods, but more so during the euro area 
crisis. This observation is consistent with the 
greater persistence of bond flows observed for 
emerging market and developing economies over 
time. Yields in most advanced economies also 
tend to be lower after stress, more so during the 
euro area crisis period, reflecting in part a flight 
to quality. 
 • Both equity and financial equity prices are lower 
after stress, with the poststress declines in finan-
cial equity prices slightly larger than those in 
overall equity prices for most regions. During the 
euro area crisis, for most regions, equity prices 
were lower by 1 to 3 percentage points for the 
two days after stress (compared with the average 
two-day prices before stress), while the decline 
was about 4 percentage points for the CIS and 
euro area economies. These declines were larger 
during stress in the global financial crisis. 
 • Sovereign yields do not exhibit any specific pat-
tern during China-specific stress episodes. Equity 
and financial equity prices are generally weaker 
after such stress, particularly for commodity-
exporting regions (LAC, MENA).
these economies issue higher-quality assets given 
the resilience of their expansions. However, it could 
also reflect a greater thirst for yield in an environ-
ment of ultra-low interest rates.
Contagion through Asset Prices
The above results using weekly capital flows are 
complemented by studying the poststress behavior 
of global sovereign yields and equity prices, the 
data for which are available at a daily frequency. 
Global asset prices tend to tighten in periods of 
stress—sovereign yields rise and equity prices fall 
(Figure 2.SF.6)—although the size of spillovers has 
typically varied across regions:
 • During the euro area crisis, for emerging 
Europe, the CIS, and LAC, the average sover-
eign yields in the two days after stress were 8 
to10 basis points higher compared with average 
yields in the two days before stress. During the 
global financial crisis, the rise in yields after 
stress was generally larger, particularly for the 
CIS. For developing Asia, stress has been associ-
ated with a decline in sovereign yields in both 
Table 2.SF.2. (continued)
Variable Definition/Description/Source
Advanced Asia Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore,  
Taiwan Province of China
Developing Asia China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru
Emerging Europe Hungary, Poland, Turkey
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Russia
Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa
Middle East and North Africa Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco
Purchasing 
Managers’ Index 
(manufacturing)
China
Euro Area
United States
Markit Economics Purchasing Managers’ Index for the manufacturing sector (monthly data). Source: Haver Analytics.
1Regional aggregates are computed as a weighted average of the countries within the region, with weights based on 2012 U.S. dollar GDP weights from the April 2012 World Economic 
Outlook. 
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Conclusions 
The analysis confirms that financial or real stress 
in major economies can affect global financial 
conditions either because stress occurs concur-
rently everywhere or because of spillover effects. 
Global capital flows decline, equity prices fall, 
and sovereign yields generally rise following such 
stress. Although spillovers have been smaller in 
recent years than during the global financial crisis, 
economies with greater linkages to advanced econo-
mies—emerging Europe and the CIS region—
remain vulnerable. Swings in financial conditions 
are also experienced around stress from downswings 
in Chinese real economic activity, particularly for 
commodity exporters. The recent shift in finan-
cial markets away from equity to bond flows in 
emerging market and developing economies could 
suggest that bonds issued by the latter are now 
considered safer for investors than before. However, 
it could also reflect a search for yield in the face 
of low global interest rates, which raises concerns 
about a potential increase in the exposure of these 
economies to such debt-creating flows. 
The real implications of stress can be severe 
in the context of strong macrofinancial linkages 
in systemically important economies.11 Growth 
spillovers from these economies can be large given 
the sizable trade linkages of most regions with these 
economies (Figure 2.SF.7). More generally, a sharp 
rise in global risk aversion—the proxy used here 
for U.S. financial strain—is also associated with a 
higher likelihood of the end of economic expan-
sions in emerging market and developing econo-
mies (see Chapter 4). 
Policymakers should focus on limiting the 
potential for such stress in the first place, which 
involves a range of policies, as discussed in Chapter 
1. For economies at the receiving end, it is crucial 
to maintain strong macroeconomic and prudential 
policies that sustain market confidence and increase 
resilience to potential contagion.
11See Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2011); Igan and others 
(2009); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); and IMF (2012b).
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Figure 2.SF.6.  Global Asset Price Performance around Stress 
Episodes
Global sovereign yields tend to rise and equity prices to fall during periods of stress emanating 
from major economies.
1. Difference in average two-day sovereign yields after stress relative to 
average two-day sovereign yields before stress
(percent)
2. Changes in average two-day equity prices after stress relative to average
two-day equity prices before stress
(percent)
Euro area crisis (Jan. 2010–June 2012) Global financial crisis (Jan. 2007–Dec. 2009)
China real activity stress
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3. Changes in average two-day financial equity prices after stress relative to 
average two-day financial equity prices before stress
(percent)
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Figure 2.SF.7.  Global Trade Linkages with Advanced Economies 
and China
Global trade linkages with advanced economies remain sizable, and those with China have 
been increasing in recent years.
1. Exports of Goods to the United States by Region
(percent of each region's GDP)
2. Exports of Goods to the Euro Area by Region
(percent of each region’s GDP)
3. Exports of Goods to China by Region
(percent of each region’s GDP)
Average 2000–07 Average 2010–11
Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Adv. Asia = advanced Asia; Dev. Asia = developing Asia; LAC = Latin America and 
the Caribbean; Em. Europe = emerging Europe; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent 
States; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa. 
See the Statistical Appendix for regional country compositions, except other advanced 
Europe (Other adv. Europe): Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom.
1Excluding China.
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Throughout the past century, numerous advanced 
economies have faced public debt burdens as high, or 
higher, than those prevailing today. They responded 
with a wide variety of policy approaches. We analyze 
these experiences to draw lessons for today and reach 
three main conclusions. First, successful debt reduc-
tion requires fiscal consolidation and a policy mix 
that supports growth. Key elements of this policy mix 
are measures that address structural weaknesses in the 
economy and supportive monetary policy. Second, fiscal 
consolidation must emphasize persistent, structural 
reforms to public finances over temporary or short-lived 
fiscal measures. In this respect, fiscal institutions can 
help lock in any gains. Third, reducing public debt 
takes time, especially in the context of a weak external 
environment.
Public debt in advanced economies has climbed 
to its highest level since World War II. In Japan, 
the United States, and several European countries, 
it now exceeds 100 percent of GDP (Figure 3.1). 
Low growth, persistent budget deficits, and high 
future and contingent liabilities stemming from 
population-aging-related spending pressure and weak 
financial sectors have markedly heightened concerns 
about the sustainability of public finances. These 
concerns have been reflected in ratings downgrades 
and higher sovereign borrowing costs, especially for 
some European countries. Correcting fiscal imbal-
ances and reducing public debt have therefore 
become high priorities. 
There is, however, a widespread and ongo-
ing debate over the most appropriate policy mix 
for achieving a successful adjustment. According 
to some, fiscal austerity is essential to resolve the 
current crisis. Others argue that fiscal austerity is 
self-defeating, given its contractionary effect on 
output, and that reinvigorating growth through fiscal 
The authors of this chapter are John Simon (team leader), 
Andrea Pescatori, and Damiano Sandri with support from Gavin 
Asdorian and Murad Omoev. Paolo Mauro, Cemile Sancak, and 
Ali Abbas provided helpful comments.
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Figure 3.1.  Public Debt in Advanced Economies
1. Historical Debt Levels
(2011 U.S. dollar GDP-weighted average, percent)
2. Debt-to-GDP Ratios for Selected Economies in 2011
(percent of GDP)
Gross public debt as a percent of GDP among advanced economies has reached historical 
highs: Japan, the United States, and many European countries currently have debt-to-GDP 
ratios close to or above 100 percent.
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stimulus is more important.1 Still others point to the 
experience of financial repression after World War II 
and suggest this as a model for resolving the current 
debt overhang.2
This chapter informs the current policy debate 
by reviewing the historical experiences of advanced 
economies that have reached debt-to-GDP ratios as 
high as today’s. The policy responses differed greatly, 
as did the outcomes. The richness of this historical 
experience provides insight into the full spectrum of 
policy options currently under consideration. In par-
ticular, the chapter addresses the following questions:
 • How successful were countries in reducing high 
public debt ratios in the past?
 • Which policy mix proved most effective? What 
were the contributions of fiscal, monetary, and 
financial sector policies?
 • What were the macroeconomic consequences of 
the policies pursued?
 • What does historical experience suggest for coun-
tries dealing with high debt today?
To address these points, we do not focus only on 
large debt reductions, as done in previous stud-
ies, but we review more broadly “what happens 
next?” after debt rises above 100 percent of GDP. 
This allows us to take in the full range of possible 
outcomes rather than just the successes, which might 
paint a distorted picture of debt dynamics. Indeed, 
some of the most instructive episodes are those in 
which public debt increased.3
We focus on six case studies spanning almost 100 
years, from the United Kingdom in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I, through the United States 
after World War II, to Belgium, Canada, Italy, and 
Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. These episodes cover 
1See, for example, Krugman (2012).
2Financial repression occurs “when governments implement 
policies to channel to themselves funds that in a deregulated 
market environment would go elsewhere” (Reinhart, Kirkegaard, 
and Sbrancia, 2011). It commonly involves explicit or indirect 
caps on government debt interest rates, combined with other 
regulations to ensure a market for this debt. See also Reinhart and 
Sbrancia (2011).
3By selecting the sample of episodes on the basis of ex ante 
criteria rather than ex post success, this chapter is similar in spirit 
to, though distinct from and complementary to, the approach of 
Mauro (2011), which looks at large planned fiscal consolidations 
and compares plans against outcomes for the G7 countries and 
EU member countries during the past few decades. 
a full range of policy approaches and economic out-
comes. In-depth analysis allows us to more clearly 
identify the policy mix pursued by each country and 
assess its relative effectiveness. Importantly, we not 
only focus on fiscal policies, but also consider the 
broader macroeconomic environment encompass-
ing the countries’ monetary stance, financial sector 
policies, and external environment. That said, past 
country experiences are not necessarily prescriptions 
for the future, given changes in economic structures 
and in policy and regulatory frameworks. More-
over, we review actual policy strategies and do not 
consider whether other policies would have pro-
duced better outcomes. These caveats must be taken 
into account when drawing implications for today. 
Finally, given the high starting point, even relatively 
successful debt reductions can still leave countries 
with high debt and, thus, a vulnerability to renewed 
setbacks. For example, in Belgium, where debt was 
reduced substantially between 1993 and 2007, debt 
levels are again approaching 100 percent because of 
the setbacks from the Great Recession.
The next section looks at the full historical record, 
focusing on episodes that begin when public debt 
rose above 100 percent of GDP and reviewing 
the macroeconomic environment and outcomes. 
The chapter then discusses how the six cases were 
selected before turning to the in-depth case studies. 
It then synthesizes the findings from the case studies 
and, finally, draws lessons for today.
historical overview
The IMF Fiscal Affairs Department recently com-
piled a comprehensive database on gross government 
debt-to-GDP ratios covering nearly the entire IMF 
membership back to 1875.4 We use these data to 
4See Abbas and others (2010) for a detailed description of the 
database, which is available at www.imf.org/external/datamapper/ 
index.php?db=DEBT. The use of gross debt data reflects the 
difficulty of collecting net debt data on a consistent basis across 
countries and over time. Nonetheless, even gross debt data may 
not be immune to measurement problems (see Dippelsman, 
 Dziobek, and Gutiérrez Mangas, 2012). We also use supple-
mentary data on interest payments and primary deficits for 19 
advanced economies from Abbas and others (2011) as well as real 
GDP data from Maddison (2003) and other data from Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010).
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identify all advanced economy episodes that begin 
when gross public debt rises above 100 percent of 
GDP.5 High-debt episodes of emerging market and 
developing economies are not included in our analy-
sis. This is not because they may not offer interest-
ing insights. Rather, it is because their experiences 
typically differed in two important respects. First, 
their debt was mostly external and denominated in 
foreign currency, which presents different challenges 
from those faced by advanced economies today.6 Sec-
ond, their economic structures and institutions can 
differ substantially from the structures and institu-
tions of advanced economies, especially going back 
in time.7 Finally, narrowing our analysis to advanced 
economies is a simple and transparent criterion for 
selecting the sample.
The 100 percent threshold is used for a number 
of reasons. First, it is most relevant today given the 
number of countries currently close to or above 
that threshold. Second, 100 percent is high rela-
tive to historical experience: only 15 percent of the 
observations in our advanced economy database are 
above 100 percent. Third, our analysis suggests that 
political and economic forces do not tend to exert 
5The starting date of an episode is the first year in which the 
debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 100 percent, conditional on the ratio 
being below 100 percent in the previous year. In a few instances, 
missing data prevent us from identifying the exact year in which 
the debt-to-GDP ratio crossed the 100 percent threshold. In these 
cases, we interpolate the data linearly and date the episode from 
the time the interpolated data show the 100 percent threshold was 
crossed. Furthermore, given our focus on the 15 years after the 
100 percent threshold is crossed, we consider only episodes that 
begin by 1997 and, thus, end by 2012. We have experimented 
with different windows (for example, 10 years and 20 years) and 
the results are essentially unchanged.
6The inability of emerging markets to borrow abroad in their 
own currency has been referred to in the literature as “original 
sin” (Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza, 2005). In particular, a 
debt denominated in foreign currency, especially if issued at short-
term maturities, introduces an exchange rate channel through 
which sharp depreciations of the currency, by increasing the debt 
burden, can fuel additional exchange rate depreciation and trigger 
a vicious cycle. The presence of this channel, then, has various 
ex ante implications—for example, posing a stricter limit on the 
amount of debt that can be issued and constraining the set of 
monetary policy options. 
7Some of the earliest episodes in our sample involve economies 
that share features similar to those of emerging market economies 
(for example, Greece in 1888 or Greece in 1931). For the sake of 
completeness, we retain these episodes in the historical overview 
but do not include them in the case studies or draw important 
conclusions from them.
downward pressure on debt on average until public 
debt reaches this level. 
The 26 identified episodes are shown in Figure 
3.2, which also traces the evolution of the debt-
to-GDP ratio for 15 years after the 100 percent 
threshold was crossed. The chart conveys three key 
insights.
 • Public debt levels above 100 percent of GDP are 
not uncommon. Of the 22 advanced economies 
for which there is good data coverage, more than 
half experienced at least one high-debt episode 
between 1875 and 1997. Furthermore, several 
countries had multiple episodes: three for Belgium 
and Italy and two for Canada, France, Greece, the 
Netherlands, and New Zealand.
 • The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratios are quite 
diverse, with some countries experiencing addi-
tional large increases and others witnessing sharp 
reductions.
 • The episodes are clustered around four major eras: 
the last quarter of the 19th century, the periods 
following the two world wars, and the last quarter 
of the 20th century. The 19th century debt 
buildup was related mainly to nation building 
and the railroad boom. The post–World War II 
episodes are connected with the enormous and 
widespread military effort and subsequent rebuild-
ing, although some start earlier, during the Great 
Depression. The episodes in the last cluster during 
the 1980s and 1990s have their genesis in the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, when 
government policy struggled with social issues and 
the transition to current economic systems. 
Figure 3.3, panel 1, combines the full set of 
episodes to trace the distribution of the debt-to-
GDP ratio for 15 years after debt crosses the 100 
percent threshold. The range of experiences is broad: 
the 10th and 90th percentiles are associated with a 
reduction of 60 percentage points and an increase of 
90 percentage points in debt, respectively. Focusing 
on the median, the debt ratio does tend to fall, but 
only at a moderate pace. After 15 years, the median 
debt-to-GDP ratio is only about 10 percentage 
points lower than in the first year after debt rises 
above 100 percent.
This pattern of falling median debt ratios emerges 
only at high original debt ratios. Panel 2 of Figure 
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3.3 repeats the same exercise shown in panel 1, but 
uses a 60 percent threshold. The interesting dif-
ference is that 15 years after debt rises above 60 
percent, the median debt level shows no tendency to 
decrease, and the average debt level is actually higher 
(which can be inferred from the positively skewed 
distribution). 
To provide a framework for thinking about 
the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratios during these 
episodes, one can think about four key variables that 
affect the stock of debt, bt: the interest rate paid on 
the stock of debt, it; the inflation rate of the GDP 
deflator, pt; the real GDP growth rate, gt; and the 
primary deficit–to-GDP ratio, dt. The relationships 
among these variables are described by the following 
formula:
 1 + itbt = —————— bt–1 + dt + et, (3.1) (1 + pt)(1 + gt)
in which et is a residual that takes into account valu-
ation effects and other accounting adjustments not 
fully captured by changes in the primary deficit.8 As 
a result of compounding over long periods, the dif-
ference between the real interest rate and real GDP 
growth plays a crucial role in determining the stability 
of public debt. While a high difference can set debt 
on an unstable path, the difference is normally close 
to zero. In particular, for the 22 advanced econo-
mies in our database, the average difference is –0.7 
percent.9 Furthermore, primary deficits respond 
slowly to changes in debt—Ostry and others (2010) 
8The residual can be significant and can vary across countries 
depending on, among other things, the accounting rules followed 
by governments (for further details see Appendix 4 of the Septem-
ber 2011 Fiscal Monitor). This residual is particularly pronounced 
in the periods preceding World War II, when accounting stan-
dards were not reliable or uniform.
9A differential of –0.7 percent implies that the term in front of 
bt–1 in the equation for debt dynamics is approximately equal to 
0.99. Or, put another way, the half-life of public debt, abstracting 
from changes in the primary balance or other adjustments related 
to the stock of debt, would be almost 100 years. For additional 
details on the negative interest rate growth differential, see 
Escolano, Shabunina, and Woo (2011).
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Increases in public debt to above 100 percent are reasonably frequent, with very diverse dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratios. These episodes are clustered around four major 
eras: the last quarter of the 19th century, the periods following the two world wars, and the last quarter of the 20th century.
Figure 3.2.  Debt-to-GDP Dynamics after Public Debt Reaches 100 Percent of GDP
(Percent of GDP, advanced economies)
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estimate that the elasticity of the primary balance to 
debt is quite low at about 0.05. Thus, the evolution of 
the stock of debt tends to be quite persistent and to 
undergo large, long swings, as evident in Figures 3.2 
and 3.3.
This framework helps us explore other aspects 
of these countries’ experiences. Panel 1 of Figure 
3.4 shows the average growth rate of real GDP per 
capita and the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
for each high-debt episode. With the exception of 
Greece (1931),10 the United Kingdom (1918) had 
the worst growth performance, with negative growth 
and a considerable increase in its debt burden. At 
the opposite extreme is Ireland (1986), with the 
fastest average growth rate, more than 6 percent, and 
substantial debt reduction. The largest debt reduc-
tions followed the world wars, usually as a result 
of hyperinflation. The United States (1946) stands 
out as an exception, as we discuss below; however, 
inflation was still an important contributor to debt 
reduction during this episode. Finally, there is no 
clear correlation between growth and debt reduction 
in this group of high-debt episodes.
Another way to look at these high-debt episodes 
is by tracking the average primary fiscal balance 
and the average inflation rate over the 15 years after 
public debt reaches 100 percent of GDP. Because 
these are the main targets of fiscal and monetary 
policy, they lay a foundation for examining the vari-
ous policy approaches of the case studies. Figure 3.4, 
panel 2, shows that when these countries reached 
high levels of debt, their fiscal balances and inflation 
rates differed considerably. We see some obvious 
outliers in the United Kingdom (1918) and Japan 
(1997) along with a number of war-related high- 
or hyperinflation episodes, including in France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, and Japan. By and large, 
however, the more modern episodes are much more 
tightly clustered, with modest inflation and modest 
primary surpluses. As is evident in the case studies 
below, the modern episodes differed in ways not 
readily apparent in the aggregate analysis.
Table 3.1 presents a third perspective on these 
episodes, which are separated into two broad 
10The poor economic performance of Greece is explained 
mainly by the deep internal political instability after the 1919–22 
war with Turkey and the foreign occupation during World War II.
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After reaching 100 percent of GDP, the debt-to-GDP ratio tends to decline, even though at a 
very moderate pace. This tendency to reverse is not present at lower levels of debt, for 
example when debt rises above 60 percent of GDP. 
Figure 3.3.  Debt-to-GDP Dynamics
(Percent of GDP, advanced economies)
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groups: those in which debt levels increased and 
those in which debt levels decreased. The primary 
fiscal surplus is, on average, about 2.4 percent of 
GDP during episodes where the debt-to-GDP ratio 
decreases, but it is only 1.2 percent where the debt 
ratio increases. This foreshadows a finding from our 
case studies—debt reduction ultimately requires 
primary surpluses. The relationship between inflation 
and debt reduction is more ambiguous. Although 
hyperinflation is clearly associated with sharp 
debt reduction, when hyperinflation episodes are 
excluded, there is no clear association between the 
average inflation rate and the change in debt. Finally, 
a relatively stronger growth performance is associated 
with debt reduction when hyperinflation episodes 
are excluded.
Among our 26 episodes, only 3 feature default: 
Germany (1918), which suspended war reparations 
in 1932, and Greece (1888, 1931), which defaulted 
in 1894 and 1932, respectively. These episodes have 
little relevance for the challenges faced by advanced 
economies today for at least two reasons. First, they 
involve very peculiar features that set them apart 
from others: the post–World War I political instabil-
ity in Germany, the nation-building effort of Greece 
at the turn of the 19th century and the subsequent 
Greco-Turkish war of 1897, and a period of deep 
internal political instability in Greece after the 
1919–22 war with Turkey. Second, in these defaults 
a large proportion of public debt was denominated 
in foreign currency (or gold), which made debt 
repayment subject to exchange rate fluctuations. 
For example, the Greek episodes are more similar 
to the sovereign debt crises commonly experienced 
by emerging markets, during which a sharp drop in 
the exchange rate leads to a dramatic increase in the 
value of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities.  
public debt and economic Growth
One particular concern with high public debt 
ratios is that they may lower economic growth. 
Several empirical papers document a negative cor-
relation between public debt and GDP growth, with 
some suggesting that a debt-to-GDP ratio of 90 
percent or more may constrain growth (Kumar and 
Woo, 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Cecchetti, 
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After exceeding the 100 percent debt-to-GDP ratio, there is considerable variation in 
economies’ growth, the change in their debt ratio, their primary fiscal balance, and their 
inflation rate.
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Mohanty, and Zampolli, 2011).11 However, high 
debt may itself be the result of sluggish growth, or 
it could reflect a third factor that at the same time 
increases debt and reduces growth (for example, 
a war or a financial crisis). Indeed, Panizza and 
11Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012) find that debt above 
90 percent reduces growth by 1 percent. Kumar and Woo (2010) 
find that when debt is at 90 percent, an additional 10 percent 
increase in the debt ratio reduces future growth by about 1 
percent for advanced economies and that this is not the case 
for some selected lower levels of debt. Cecchetti, Mohanty, and 
Zampolli (2011) obtain a similar result when debt is in a range of 
85 percent of GDP.
Presbitero (2012), who use an instrumental variable 
approach to control for reverse causality, reject the 
hypothesis that high debt causes lower growth. We 
do not address the challenging causality issue here. 
Rather, by focusing on performance after a certain 
debt-to-GDP ratio has been crossed, we highlight 
a few additional and important stylized facts about 
debt and growth. 
Figure 3.5, panel 1, explores whether entering a 
high-debt phase is followed by relatively low growth 
over the subsequent 15 years. Growth rates during each 
of the episodes are compared with those of a control 
Table 3.1. Differentiating Episodes by the Change in the Debt-to-GDP Ratio
1. Episodes with an Overall Reduction in Debt to GDP over 15 Years
Episodes
Change in Debt to 
GDP (percent)
GDP Growth 
(percent)
Inflation  
(percent)
Primary  
Balance  
(percent  
of GDP)Country Start Year
Germany
Japan
Ireland
Italy
United States
Greece
Belgium
Italy
Spain
Israel
Belgium
Canada
Netherlands
France
Italy
1918
1942
1986
1942
1946
1931
1940
1919
1898
1977
1921
1995
1887
1884
1992
–129
 –96
 –74
 –68
 –68
 –57
 –55
 –43
 –27
 –22
 –22
 –18
 –15
 –13
  –2
 1.2
 0.7
 6.1
 2.8
 1.4
–2.8
 2.2
 0.1
 1.1
 2.2
 1.3
 1.7
 0.1
 1.7
 1.3
1.4×1010
91.4
 2.8
41.5
 3.0
90.0
 3.1
 2.7
 0.3
. . .
 4.8
 1.9
–0.2
–0.6
 2.8
. . .
3.8
3.5
. . .
1.7
3.5
0.7
2.0
3.9
. . .
0.8
2.0
1.3
3.3
2.8
Average
Average Excluding Hyperinflation
(>40 percent)
 –47
 –33
 1.4
 1.8
1.0×109
 2.1
2.4
2.2
2. Episodes with an Overall Increase in Debt to GDP over 15 Years
Episodes
Change in Debt to 
GDP (percent)
GDP Growth 
(percent)
Inflation  
(percent)
Primary  
Balance  
(percent  
of GDP)Country Start Year
Italy
Belgium
Greece
New Zealand
Canada
New Zealand
France
Greece
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Japan
1876
1983
1993
1884
1932
1909
1916
1888
1918
1932
1997
   4
   8
  10
  28
  29
  36
  50
  75
  75
 109
 131
 0.6
 2.0
 3.3
 0.6
 4.5
 0.5
 1.4
 1.4
–0.2
 0.0
 0.5
–0.2
 2.5
 4.7
–1.6
 2.1
 3.8
11.0
 2.3
–4.8
 4.7
–0.3
 4.1
 2.1
 0.4
. . .
–3.7
. . .
 4.2
 0.5
 8.2
 0.5
–5.4
Average   51  1.3  2.2  1.2
Source: IMF staff calculations.
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group of all other advanced economies during the same 
periods. If growth rates are unrelated to debt levels, the 
growth of countries with high debt should be, on aver-
age, about the same as those of other countries—that 
is, the points plotted in Figure 3.5, panel 1, should be 
randomly scattered around zero. The scatter plot, how-
ever, shows that countries that crossed the 100 percent 
threshold typically experienced lower GDP growth 
than the advanced economy average. In this respect at 
least, these results are consistent with the findings of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). 
Figure 3.5, panel 2, explores debt levels and 
growth performance in more breadth. This figure 
is also based on the difference between the average 
growth rate during a set of high-debt episodes and 
the average growth rate for all advanced econo-
mies during matching periods. But the threshold 
for selecting episodes varies between 10 percent of 
GDP and 140 percent of GDP, with the threshold 
increasing in 5 percentage point increments. For 
each threshold, the average growth rate during the 
selected episodes is plotted against the advanced 
economy average. Furthermore, in addition to 
episodes where debt is increasing when the threshold 
is crossed, the figure also shows relative growth for 
episodes where debt is decreasing when the threshold 
is crossed. This yields two interesting observations. 
First, it matters whether a country’s debt level is 
increasing or decreasing. Among countries with the 
same debt levels, the growth performance over the 
subsequent 15 years in countries for which debt is 
decreasing when the threshold is crossed is better 
than in countries for which it is increasing. This 
difference is statistically significant across the whole 
sample. It is particularly striking for debt levels 
between 90 and 115 percent of GDP (where average 
growth is 0.5 percentage point higher).12 Second, 
there is no particular threshold that consistently 
precedes subpar growth performance. In fact, Figure 
3.5, panel 2, shows that countries with a debt level 
between 90 and 110 percent outperform the control 
group when debt is on a declining trajectory.
12Countries with very low debt levels (for example, below 25 
percent of GDP) tend to have higher public debt levels after 15 
years. In such cases, whether debt is increasing or decreasing at 
the time they cross the threshold has much less of an effect on the 
level of debt at the end of the episode.
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Figure 3.5.  Debt and Growth Performance
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Countries whose debt-to-GDP ratio rises above 100 percent tend to experience lower GDP 
growth than other advanced economies. However, countries with a debt level between 90 
and 110 percent can actually grow faster than other advanced economies if debt is on a 
declining trajectory. In fact, the growth performance in countries whose debt is decreasing 
when crossing a given threshold is better than that in countries where it is increasing.
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Our analysis is not meant to dispute the notion 
that, all else equal, higher levels of debt may lead to 
higher real interest rates. Rather it highlights that 
there is no simple relationship between debt and 
growth. In fact, our subsequent analysis empha-
sizes that there are many factors that matter for a 
country’s growth and debt performance. Moreover, 
there is no single threshold for debt ratios that can 
delineate the “bad” from the “good.” For this reason, 
we explore public debt dynamics, the macroeco-
nomic environment, and policies in a number of 
case studies. 
case studies
We turn now from the aggregate analysis of the 
26 high-debt episodes to more detailed analyses of 
6 individual cases: the United Kingdom (1918), the 
United States (1946), Belgium (1983), Italy (1992), 
Canada (1995), and Japan (1997) (Figure 3.6). The 
selected cases meet three criteria: the episodes cover 
each of the main eras of high debt; they reflect the 
full range of outcomes; and they cover the full range 
of macroeconomic policy approaches. 
The case studies cover the two postwar eras and 
the most recent era of debt buildup in peacetime. 
High-debt episodes that occurred before World War 
I are excluded because of the lack of detailed data 
and because the structure of economies was substan-
tially different during that era, making comparisons 
with today less meaningful. For the interwar period, 
we consider the United Kingdom (1918) because it 
provides important lessons about fiscal austerity and 
the difficulties created by deflation.13 Among post–
World War II episodes, we analyze the United States 
(1946) because it is representative of the financial 
repression policies adopted after the war and that 
have recently been suggested as a possible solution 
to current debt problems (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 
2011). The more recent cases of Belgium (1983), 
Canada (1995), Italy (1992), and Japan (1997) 
13We did not select Germany because its experience was very 
extreme and that experience is already relatively well known: the 
limited ability to raise taxes combined with large expenditures and 
war-reparation requirements caused serious fiscal imbalances that 
led the Weimar Republic to monetize the fiscal deficits, producing 
bouts of hyperinflation.
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The selected case studies cover the broad range of debt-to-GDP dynamics historically 
experienced by advanced economies.
Figure 3.6.  Debt-to-GDP Dynamics after Crossing the 100 
Percent Threshold
(Percent of GDP, advanced economies)
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capture a wide range of debt-to-GDP dynamics 
and policy approaches.14 Together, the case studies 
capture the full range of debt outcomes for coun-
tries whose public debt rises above 100 percent of 
GDP. The cases are also representative of the range 
of policies pursued to address high public debt (see 
Figure 3.4, panel 2). The United Kingdom (1918) is 
an extreme case of large fiscal surpluses and strong 
deflation. Japan (1997) also endured deflation but 
pursued the opposite fiscal stance, with large and 
persistent fiscal deficits. Finally, the United States 
(1946), Belgium (1983), Italy (1992), and Canada 
(1995) are representative of the fiscal primary sur-
plus and positive inflation policy mix followed by 
the majority of countries since World War II.15
We start with the United Kingdom after World 
War I, whose experience set a clear foundation 
for all subsequent thinking about public debt and 
economic policy. We follow with the United States 
after World War II, where initial circumstances were 
very similar but outcomes were very different. We 
then turn to more modern examples and emphasize 
not the extremes but the more typical experiences 
of Belgium, Canada, and Italy. Nonetheless, to 
reinforce the message that the United Kingdom’s 
experience with deflation after World War I has not 
been consigned to the dustbin of history, we discuss 
Japan since the 1990s. 
the United Kingdom in 1918: deflation
In the aftermath of World War I, the United 
Kingdom’s stock of debt had ballooned to about 140 
percent of GDP and prices were more than double 
14Among the recent episodes of substantial debt reduction, 
Ireland (1986) stands out. Starting from a relatively low level 
of GDP per capita, however, this remarkable decline was driven 
mainly by the very high growth rate resulting from the process 
of catching up with the other European economies. Ireland 
experienced a structural transformation in the late 1980s from an 
agriculture-based economy, which had already occurred earlier in 
many other advanced economies (see Honohan and Walsh, 2002; 
and Perotti, 2012). We therefore have not included this episode in 
our case studies because it does not seem repeatable by countries 
currently dealing with high public debt.
15A number of countries experienced primary deficits and posi-
tive (usually hyper-) inflation, but these were all war related, with 
Germany (1918) the most extreme example. We do not investi-
gate these cases further here because of their limited relevance for 
today.
their prewar level. Policymakers’ priorities were 
twofold. First, return to the gold standard at the 
prewar parity to restore British trade, prosperity, and 
prestige (Pollard, 1992, p. 106). Second, pay off the 
debt to preserve Britain’s proverbial creditworthiness. 
Indeed, by returning to prewar parity, the United 
Kingdom intended to prove its commitment to 
repay its debt in real terms, rather than in devalued 
currency.16
To achieve its objectives the U.K. government 
implemented a policy mix of severe fiscal auster-
ity and tight monetary policy. The primary surplus 
was kept near 7 percent of GDP throughout the 
1920s.17 This was accomplished through large 
expenditure decreases, courtesy of the “Geddes axe,” 
and a continuation of the higher tax levels intro-
duced during the war.18 On the monetary front, the 
Bank of England raised interest rates to 7 percent 
in 1920 to support the return to the prewar parity, 
which—coupled with the ensuing deflation—deliv-
ered extraordinarily high real rates. 
The United Kingdom’s resulting economic perfor-
mance was very poor. Economic growth was weak 
and considerably below the advanced economy aver-
age, unemployment was high, and deflation was the 
order of the day (Figure 3.7). Real output in 1938 
was barely above the level in 1918, and growth aver-
aged about ½ percent a year. This was not merely 
because of the Great Depression—real output in 
1928 was also below that in 1918. The export sector 
was particularly weak as a result of the revaluation 
of the currency—the real exchange rate drifted up 
initially as price and wage reductions failed to keep 
up with the nominal appreciation. Unemployment 
reached 11 percent in 1921. Indeed, the weakness 
16David Lloyd George, prime minister from 1916 to 1922, 
said this about the desire to pay off the debt and return to the 
gold standard: “It was not policy that determined the action 
of the government in Britain. It is just because a Briton has an 
ineradicable habit of paying what he owes and it never occurred 
to him to abandon that habit because he had fought a victorious 
war. Great Britain thought it her duty to uphold her credit, even 
at the highest cost.” Lloyd George (1928)
17The headline balance remained slightly negative given the size 
of the debt and the interest rate on it.
18Sir Eric Geddes was appointed to chair a committee on ways 
to reduce expenditures in August 1921. It was, on its terms, very 
successful. But, as Pollard (1992) puts it, “The Geddes axe became 
a by-word for callous meanness” (p. 106).
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of the labor market was part and parcel of the policy 
to induce large reductions in prices and, perforce, 
wages. A comparison with the other continental 
powers, particularly France and even Germany, 
suggests that the costs of this mix of tight fiscal and 
monetary policies were high. These outcomes led to 
the cynical observation from Keynes (1928, p. 218) 
that “assuredly it does not pay to be good.”
If the policies pursued had successfully reduced 
debt and restored British growth and prosper-
ity, the short-term costs perhaps would have been 
acceptable. Unfortunately, they did not. In fact, the 
policies had the opposite effect: British prosperity 
was hampered by the dual pursuit of prewar parity 
and fiscal austerity. Most European countries were 
enhancing their competitiveness through exchange 
rate devaluation, and British export industries 
suffered accordingly. Furthermore, managing the 
exchange rate forced the Bank of England to main-
tain high interest rates, which increased the burden 
of the national debt and generally constrained eco-
nomic activity—further undermining tax receipts.
The policy of fiscal austerity, pursued to pay down 
the debt, further limited growth. Debt continued to 
rise and was about 170 percent of GDP in 1930 and 
more than 190 percent of GDP in 1933. It was not 
until 1990 that debt approached its pre–World War 
I level. Lloyd George (1928) observed about Britain 
that “her present activity and profit-earning power 
have been sacrificed in large measure to the mainte-
nance of integrity and good faith to all her creditors 
at home and abroad.”
The effects of deflation, economic growth, interest 
rates, and fiscal austerity on the public debt can be seen 
in Figure 3.7, panel 3. This figure calculates the average 
annual contribution to the change in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio over five-year periods from 1919 to 1933 and for 
the period as a whole. The calculation is based on the 
formula for debt dynamics given in equation (3.1). 
Primary surpluses contributed on average about 7 per-
centage points a year, but they were easily overwhelmed 
by deflation and high interest rates, which added 12 
percentage points a year to the stock of debt. Further-
more, there was little to no positive contribution from 
economic growth. Only during 1924–28, when the 
United Kingdom experienced modest growth, did the 
debt level actually decline. 
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After World War I, the United Kingdom experienced strong deflation, anemic growth, and 
high unemployment. Despite large primary surpluses, the debt ratio continued to increase 
due to high nominal interest rates and deflation.
Figure 3.7.  United Kingdom: Deflation in the Aftermath of 
World War I
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The U.K. interwar episode is an important 
reminder of the challenges of pursuing a tight fiscal 
and monetary policy mix, especially when the exter-
nal sector is constrained by a high exchange rate.
the United states in 1946: financial repression and 
surprise inflation
By the end of World War II the U.S. stock of 
debt had swelled to 10 times higher than it was 
before the war, about 120 percent of GDP. The 
U.S. economy was also confronting a rapid rise in 
inflation associated with the removal of wartime 
price controls and the release of pent-up demand. In 
this respect, at least, the U.S. situation was similar 
to that of the United Kingdom after World War I. 
Many feared a similar outcome.19 The success of the 
Keynesian revolution in economic thinking and the 
fear of repeating the mistakes of the interwar period, 
however, led to a very different policy approach and 
to better economic results. 
Between 1946 and 1948, U.S. public finances 
swung quickly from deficit to surplus, as is common 
in postwar periods. The primary balance went from 
a deficit of 5 percent of GDP in 1946 to a surplus 
of 6½ percent of GDP in 1948 before stabilizing 
near 2 percent through most of the 1950s. In this 
respect, U.S. performance was qualitatively, if not 
quantitatively, similar to that of both the United 
States and the United Kingdom after World War I.
The monetary policy situation was, however, very 
different. In fact, unlike after World War I, vari-
ous extraordinary measures used to support war-
time deficits were removed only partially or slowly. 
In particular, the bond-support program, which 
placed a floor under the price of government bonds 
during the war, was continued, and this prevented 
the Federal Reserve from raising interest rates to 
19“As the year 1947 opens America has never been so strong or 
so prosperous. Nor have our prospects ever been brighter. Yet in 
the minds of a great many of us there is a fear of another depres-
sion, the loss of our jobs, our farms, our businesses…The job at 
hand today is to see to it that America is not ravaged by recurring 
depressions and long periods of unemployment, but that instead 
we build an economy so fruitful, so dynamic, so progressive that 
each citizen can count upon opportunity and security for himself 
and his family.” (Truman, 1947)
control inflation.20 Despite proposals to remove this 
restriction on the operation of monetary policy, fear 
of repeating the mistakes of the past and causing 
a repeat of the boom-bust cycle after World War I 
persuaded policymakers to stay the course.21 
The removal of price controls in mid-1946 led to 
a burst of inflation in late 1946 and 1947, which 
was ended by the 1949 recession and the concomi-
tant mild deflation. Notwithstanding the burst of 
inflation, between 1946 and 1948 there was a wide-
spread belief that prices were destined to fall quickly, 
which—coupled with a high government surplus 
and the fear of a major recession—meant that the 
Federal Reserve did not actually have to intervene to 
support government bond prices.22 Serious inflation 
pressure was building nonetheless, and it emerged at 
the outset of the Korean War in 1950. To mitigate 
the rise in inflation without disrupting the bond 
market, consumer credit limits were reintroduced 
and there was a call for voluntary restraints on bank 
credit.23 Nonetheless, between 1950 and 1951 
inflation increased substantially again. This second 
burst of inflation coupled with that during 1946–47 
contributed substantially to lower U.S. public debt, 
which by 1951 was down to 75 percent of GDP. 
The Korean War finally demonstrated that the 
policies being pursued by the government made 
inflation rather than deflation the real danger. This 
20Under the program, the Federal Reserve was responsible for 
intervening in the market to buy bonds if the price fell below par. 
The practical effect was to cap nominal interest rates at various 
maturities, with the Treasury bill rate at 0.375 percent and the 
long-term bond rate at 2½ percent.
21“The financial world should rest easy that the investment 
market will not be subject to the demoralization which swept over 
it in 1920 when the unsupported market for Government bonds 
fell about 20 percent below par” (Truman, 1947, p. 202).
22Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer (2003) provide 
various arguments in support of the thesis that there was a “will-
ingness on the part of the public to hold relatively large amounts 
of money and government securities at fairly low rates of interest” 
as reflected by the relatively small rise in the money stock over 
that period. In their view the “expectation of subsequent contrac-
tion and price decline […] induced [the public] to hold larger 
real money balances than it otherwise would have been willing to. 
In this way it made the postwar rise more moderate.” (Friedman 
and Schwartz, 1963) 
23The Defense Production Act, enacted September 8, 1950, 
in response to the start of the Korean War, sought, among other 
things, to restrain inflation through control of consumer and real 
estate credit.
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realization enabled the Federal Reserve to regain 
some independence in setting interest rates.24 The 
Federal Reserve was formally freed from the obliga-
tion to support the government bond market in 
1951, although this was only the first step in dis-
mantling the bond-support program.25 Still, the idea 
of capping nominal interest rates while limiting the 
quantity of credit (credit controls) permeated U.S. 
economic policy at the time and persisted at least 
until the 1980s.  
Figure 3.8 shows the contributions of the various 
forces to changes in the U.S. public debt level and the 
two distinct phases of the debt reduction. In the early 
years, high rates of surprise inflation combined with 
low nominal interest rates to reduce the debt by almost 
35 percentage points. The rest of the debt reduction is 
attributable to solid growth, which contributed 2 per-
centage points each year; primary surpluses contributed 
an additional 2 percentage points.26 
In summary, financial repression evolved logi-
cally and gradually from the reality of high public 
debt and the fear of what would happen if interest 
rates were raised to fend off postwar inflation. But, 
because direct control of quantities replaced the 
price mechanism, controls had to be in place across 
a wide range of activities. Credit controls and higher 
reserve requirements were imposed on banks. Bank 
competition was limited by various rules such as 
24As noted by Friedman and Schwartz, “World War II was 
widely expected to be followed by severe unemployment. The 
Reserve System girded itself for the possibility and welcomed the 
bond-support program, because the System thought it would be 
consistent with the easy-money policies which would be required 
after the war. In the event, inflation rather than deflation loomed 
as a greater danger and, under the added impetus to inflation 
given by the Korean War, the Federal Reserve was finally led to 
divest itself of the self-imposed chains of the bond-supporting 
program.” (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 700)
25In March 1951 an agreement was reached by President Tru-
man, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve (the 1951 Accord) 
that relieved the Federal Reserve of the responsibility of support-
ing the government securities market. Support for government 
securities, however, continued under the principle of “bills only” 
or “bills preferably,” which facilitated large-scale Treasury refund-
ing operations during times of stringent money market condi-
tions. See Young and Yager (1960).
26Although strong, the U.S. growth rate after World War II was 
below the advanced economy average (see Figure 3.8). This was 
largely because of the high growth rates in Europe, which resulted 
from the reconstruction efforts.
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The United States sharply reduced its debt-to-GDP ratio in the five years following World War 
II thanks to a combination of high negative real interest rates, fiscal surpluses, and strong 
growth.
Figure 3.8.  United States: Debt Dynamics after World War II
(Percent of GDP)
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Regulation Q and limits on branching.27 Some of 
these restrictions (for example, interest ceilings on 
deposits) were eventually circumvented by financial 
innovation (for example, money market funds) 
and thus led to additional intervention in later 
years (for example, the extension of credit controls 
by the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1969). 
More generally, these restrictions only partially suc-
ceeded in stabilizing inflation. In fact, even though 
the U.S. exchange rate policy fixing the gold value 
at $35 an ounce did not destabilize prices,28 infla-
tion remained very volatile throughout the episode 
and beyond.29
Japan 1997: deflation redux
Gross Japanese public debt rose above 100 
percent of GDP in 1997, during the middle of 
Japan’s “lost decade”—an extended period of mild 
deflation and output growth near zero, a growth 
level considerably below that of other advanced 
economies and Japan’s own historical levels (see 
Figure 3.5, panel 1).30 The primary cause of the 
rising debt was a bursting of the stock market and 
real estate bubbles in 1989–90 and the subsequent 
weakness in the financial and real sectors of the 
economy. The initial policy response involved fiscal 
stimulus, with a sharp deterioration of the fiscal 
27From 1933 to 1986 Regulation Q imposed maximum 
interest rates on various types of bank deposits, such as demand 
deposits, savings accounts, and time deposits, which limited 
competition among banks for funding. Interstate branching was 
not allowed until 1994.
28Given widespread concern about competitive devaluations, 
the overriding objective of postwar U.S. exchange rate policy was 
the maintenance of a fixed par value of the dollar as established 
by the Bretton Woods agreement. Moreover, given that there were 
relatively few revaluations or devaluations of foreign currencies 
against gold, the overall system ensured fairly stable exchange 
rates during this high-debt episode.
29Inflation volatility during the episode was more than four 
times higher than U.S. inflation volatility from 1997 to 2012.
30In the case of Japan, the difference between gross and net 
debt is significant. Due to large gross lending and borrowing posi-
tions within the public sector, the net debt-to-GDP ratio in 1997 
was only 34 percent. However, both gross debt and net debt have 
followed a similar trend, with net debt currently exceeding 130 
percent of GDP.
balance, and interest rate cuts (Figure 3.9). The 
sharp reduction of inflation expectations, however, 
was larger than the reduction in interest rates, lead-
ing to a real exchange rate appreciation.31 More-
over, this policy response did not directly address 
the structural weaknesses in Japan’s financial sector. 
There was a moderate recovery that ended in 1997 
when a confluence of events weakened the econ-
omy. Though there was a tightening of fiscal policy 
through a rise in consumption and payroll taxes 
that had been induced by the growing public debt 
and rising social security expenditures, the main 
causes of the economic downturn were as follows. 
First, the Asian financial crisis occurred and the 
exchange rate appreciated substantially. Moreover, 
structural weakness in the banking sector was 
exacerbated by the poor economic performance, 
resulting in the onset of a serious banking crisis. 
The end result was a severe recession that forced 
the government to abandon its fiscal consolidation 
plan and led to continued increases in public debt 
levels.
Monetary policy in this period had limited effect 
in stimulating economic activity. Although interest 
rates were close to zero, no credit or quantitative 
easing policies were implemented. Furthermore, 
and more seriously, structural problems in the 
banking sector remained, and this compromised 
the transmission of monetary policy to lending 
conditions. Finally, a premature increase in interest 
rates in 2000 and repercussions from the bursting 
of the dot-com bubble in the United States exac-
erbated the situation. The economy again fell into 
recession in 2001. 
There was a second and more effective phase 
of policy action beginning in 2001. The govern-
ment turned its attention to fixing the underlying 
structural problems in the economy. The authori-
ties took significantly more resolute steps to resolve 
problems in the financial sector, forcing the write-
down of bad loans and the recapitalization of banks 
with private and public funds. The Bank of Japan 
also began a program of quantitative easing and in 
31The yen’s real trade-weighted exchange rate appreciated by 
about 60 percent in early 1990s, peaking in 1995; after that, it 
depreciated temporarily during the economic recovery, only to 
rise again during the Asian crisis.
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2002 publicly committed to keeping interest rates 
low until stable positive inflation returned. The 
structural reforms to the financial sector and the 
more accommodative monetary policy environment 
reversed the downward trend in inflation and led 
to a relatively strong recovery phase that finally 
allowed for a mild correction of the fiscal imbal-
ance. A weakening exchange rate and very favorable 
external environment also contributed to the posi-
tive outcomes.32 During this period, the debt-to-
GDP ratio stabilized at about 185 percent. Since 
then, the Great Recession pushed Japan back into 
recession, leading to yet another large deterioration 
in the fiscal balance.
The various phases of this episode are summarized 
in Figure 3.9, panel 3, which shows the decomposi-
tion of Japan’s debt dynamics. Growth and infla-
tion made virtually no direct contribution to debt 
dynamics during this period as a whole—although 
the increase in debt slowed between 2002 and 
2007, when the policy response emphasized mon-
etary measures and growth was stronger. The largest 
contribution to debt dynamics, however, comes from 
the primary deficit.
This episode highlights the need to deal with 
banking sector weakness and ensure a supportive 
monetary environment before fiscal consolidation 
can succeed. It also highlights the difficulties that 
can be created by adverse external developments 
when domestic conditions are already stretched. 
When structural weakness in the financial system 
prevents the normal transmission of monetary 
stimulus and when policy rates are constrained 
by the zero lower bound, the risk of anemic and 
fragile growth is high regardless of the fiscal set-
ting. Such a macroeconomic environment clearly 
precluded successful fiscal consolidation: whenever 
such measures were taken the economy dipped into 
recession.
32The real exchange rate devalued by about 20 percent between 
2004 and 2007, thanks, in part, to the more accommodative 
monetary policy stance. 
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After stock market and real estate bubbles burst, Japan’s weak growth and large fiscal 
deficits caused a strong increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The gradual reduction in policy 
rates to the zero bound was not sufficient to prevent deflation.
Figure 3.9.  Japan: Lost Decade
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italy in 1992: european Monetary Union 
Italy’s ratio of public debt to GDP rose 70 per-
centage points in the quarter-century after World 
War II, a period marked by relatively high inflation 
and the subordination of monetary policy to the 
government’s desire for low financing costs. In 1992, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio rose swiftly past 100 percent, 
peaking at about 120 percent between 1994 and 
1996. It subsequently declined moderately, reaching 
a trough of 104 percent in 2004, as a result of Italy’s 
strong political desire to be a founding member of 
the euro area. 
The criteria of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which 
set out the conditions for membership in the euro 
area, however, were a serious challenge to Ital-
ian ambitions because they required a very strong 
monetary and fiscal effort from Italian policymakers. 
Unfortunately, the European exchange rate mecha-
nism (ERM) crisis in September 1992 and the dis-
integration of long-standing Italian political parties 
following widespread corruption scandals appeared 
to further complicate Italian hopes of participating 
in the euro area. In practice, however, the political 
instability reinforced a pro-Europe sentiment at vari-
ous levels of society and opened the door to three 
technocratic governments that were able to imple-
ment a substantial fiscal adjustment and initiate 
unpopular structural reforms.33
On the fiscal front, the consolidation effort 
included structural reforms that affected pension 
payments, health services, local authority finance, 
wage setting, and public employment. An impor-
tant step was breaking the wage-price spiral, which 
was accomplished with the suspension and subse-
quent removal of wage indexation (scala mobile) in 
December 1991 and July 1993.34 This smoothed the 
way for the transition to a low-inflation monetary 
policy regime in line with the Maastricht criteria. In 
1993 the government was granted special power to 
33The technocratic governments were led by Giuliano Amato 
(June 1992–April 1993), Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (April 1993–May 
1994), and Lamberto Dini (January 1995–May 1996) after a 
brief interlude under Silvio Berlusconi.
34The new labor agreement in July 1993 sought greater 
employer and trade union support for policy targets by explicitly 
mentioning the policy goals of reducing inflation, cutting the 
budget deficit, and stabilizing the exchange rate (OECD, 1994).
cut primary spending, thus breaking with the past 
practice of using one-time measures as the main 
vehicle for deficit reduction, and action was taken 
to curb the Parliament’s power to implement new 
spending initiatives. Pension reform was particularly 
important given the rapidly aging population and 
a generous pension provision that gave Italy one of 
highest ratios of pension spending to GDP in the 
world—14 percent in 1994. The reform was a step 
in the right direction, but there were two drawbacks: 
first, it was not enough given the demographic 
trends, and second, the transition phase was particu-
larly long.35 Thus, although necessary, the benefits of 
the reform took a long time to directly affect public 
finances. Despite these promising developments, and 
reflecting the delay in bottom-line results from some 
of them, almost half the consolidation was achieved 
through tax increases.36 
On the monetary front, 1992 was a year of 
market turbulence, with Italy’s exit from the ERM 
and the subsequent devaluation of the lira. The 
currency crisis had two distinct implications for 
public finances. On one hand, it delivered gains 
in competitiveness much needed by Italian export 
industries, thus supporting economic growth. On 
the other hand, the sharp devaluation stoked infla-
tion and, especially, inflation expectations, which led 
the Bank of Italy to raise interest rates significantly. 
The burden of interest payments rose to more than 
11 percent of GDP between 1993 and 1995, and 
this prevented a significant reduction in the overall 
deficit, which remained stuck above 7 percent. 
35The 1995 Dini reform of the public pension system was 
intended to ensure the long-term viability of pension funds by 
instituting sustainable contribution rates (the system shifted from 
linking old-age pensions to earnings, sistema retributivo, to linking 
benefits to lifetime contributions, sistema contributivo); linking 
benefits to residual life expectancy at the time of retirement; 
reviewing pensions for the disabled and survivors; and reviewing 
guaranteed minimum pensions. The 1995 Dini reform would 
have eliminated the possibility of retiring after 35 years of service 
regardless of age (pensioni di anzianità), which constituted one of 
the more generous provisions of the old system, by 2013; start-
ing in 2008, seniority pensions would have required 40 years of 
service. A few years later, the Prodi Agreement tried to shorten 
the very long transition phase.
36The fiscal consolidation amounted to 13.6 percent of GDP 
from 1992 to 1995, of which just over 40 percent was from tax 
increases—the primary balance went from –4 percent in 1987 to 
2.9 percent in 1995 (see Devries and others, 2011).
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In 1996, immediately after taking office, the 
government led by Romano Prodi declared as its 
primary objective Italy’s admission to the euro area 
as a founding member. Prodi’s goal was to break the 
vicious cycle of high expected inflation, high inter-
est rates, high deficits, and again to high expected 
inflation that would have prevented admission. 
He gained support from unions and the public 
to embark on further substantial fiscal consolida-
tion, and this led to implementation of additional 
measures that eventually reduced the overall deficit 
to 2.7 percent in 1997, reaching a record primary 
surplus of 6.1 percent of GDP in 1997.37 This 
consolidation topped a 10-year period during which 
Italy improved its primary balance by slightly more 
than 10 percentage points—an exceptional perfor-
mance by historical standards. 
Furthermore, the credibility of Italy’s commit-
ment to European integration and the feasibility of 
meeting the Maastricht criteria as perceived by the 
markets led to a dramatic drop in interest rates in 
early 1996.This effectively broke the previous vicious 
cycle and replaced it with a virtuous one. Given the 
tight timetable, however, some of the deficit reduc-
tion inevitably consisted of one-time measures. This 
is exemplified by the 0.6 percent of GDP “tax for 
Europe” and by the fact that part of the debt reduc-
tion was achieved with substantial proceeds from 
privatization.38 
Joining the euro area lowered borrowing costs for 
the Italian Treasury and made it possible to extend 
the average maturity of its debt (Figure 3.10), which 
helped reduce the public debt over the following seven 
years. After 1998, however, the zeal gradually faded 
and no substantial additional discretionary consolida-
37The convergence was assessed in 1998 on figures for 1997.
38From 1990 to 2000, Italy’s privatization proceeds were esti-
mated at about $108 billion—the highest relative to GDP among 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries in both absolute and relative terms (OECD, 
2003b). Over the entire episode, privatization receipts accounted 
for about 10 percentage points of GDP. This means that more 
than half of the peak-to-trough debt reduction can be attributed 
to privatization receipts. It is also worth noting that, according to 
the Maastricht Treaty, privatization proceeds are treated as financ-
ing, and therefore they matter for debt reduction but not for the 
deficit target. In our analysis, however, privatization receipts are 
included in the primary deficit.
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In order to meet the Maastricht criteria, Italy achieved large primary surpluses at the end of 
the 1990s. The debt ratio also started to decline thanks to the reduction in real interest 
rates. Fiscal consolidation efforts, however, waned during the 2000s. 
Figure 3.10.  Italy: Fading Zeal
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tion efforts were undertaken.39 Moreover, because 
some of the fiscal measures were temporary, the pri-
mary surplus started to decline after peaking in 1997. 
As a result the speed of debt reduction was modest 
and reflected momentum more than ongoing effort. 
These developments can be seen in the debt 
decomposition summary in Figure 3.10, panel 3. A 
move into primary surplus during 1993–97 was off-
set by tight monetary policy, but with the easing of 
monetary conditions during 1998–02, debt dropped 
more significantly—at least until the primary sur-
pluses faded away during 2003–07. Also notable is 
that GDP growth made a very modest contribution 
to debt reduction throughout this period. Indeed, 
the economy’s growth rate remained weak, consid-
erably below the advanced economy average (see 
Figure 3.5, panel 1).
Belgium in 1983: ten years of consolidation before 
currency Union
A comparison of the Italian experience with that 
of Belgium is quite instructive, because Belgium 
experienced, eventually, a more successful outcome 
under very similar circumstances. The Belgian story 
starts approximately 10 years earlier with the debt-
to-GDP ratio crossing the 100 percent threshold in 
1983. As in Italy, Belgium’s large primary deficits, 
slow growth, and the central bank’s relatively tight 
anti-inflation stance combined to put the debt-to-
GDP ratio on an unsustainable path. 
From 1982 to 1987 Belgium embarked on a 
serious fiscal consolidation effort that culminated 
with the 1987 “Sint-Anna” or “Val Duchesse” deficit 
reduction plan. This plan consisted mainly of struc-
tural reforms that delivered permanent spending 
cuts of 2.8 percent of GDP. The plan, coupled with 
previous fiscal consolidation efforts (again, mainly 
structural and spending based), led to substantial 
primary surpluses and even a temporary reduction 
in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Over the 10-year period 
from 1981 to 1991, Belgium improved its primary 
39During the period 2003–05 the European Union Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact was watered down, in part because of core 
European countries’ poor growth performance. In any case, Italy 
undertook some additional consolidation from 2004 to 2007, 
after the 2003 recession.
balance by 11 percentage points—the largest con-
solidation over any 10-year period among advanced 
economies since World War II.40
The policies pursued focused on trimming the 
share of public employment, reducing an exces-
sively generous system of welfare payments, cutting 
family allowances and unemployment insurance 
benefits, and increasing the retirement age. In the 
business sector, there was little scope for privatiza-
tion compared with other countries such as Italy, 
but corporate tax expenditures and subsidies—
among the highest in the OECD—were reduced 
substantially.41 These priorities were a reaction to 
policies pursued between the mid-1970s and early 
1980s that markedly increased subsidies to business, 
public sector employment, and transfer payments 
to households. Finally, in the early 1990s, under the 
“global plan,” pension expenditures and health care 
costs were curbed further. 42 However, during the 
past 30 years there was no relevant structural reform 
to improve the flexibility and efficiency of the labor 
market, which has left Belgium plagued with low 
labor participation and high short- and long-term 
unemployment for most of the high-debt episode 
and beyond. The main achievement with respect to 
the labor market was the wage moderation process, 
which since the mid-1980s has linked wage increases 
to those in Belgium’s major trading partners (Ger-
many, France, Netherlands).43 
40For a list of the largest primary balance improvements in 
advanced economies and emerging markets, see Abbas and others 
(2010).
41It was estimated that “total aid to business—subsidies, capital 
transfers, loans and government equity investment has averaged 
5.5 percent of GNP (gross national product) a year since the early 
1970s, attaining 8.9 per cent in 1982” (OECD, 1986, p. 25). For 
comparison, in Italy business subsidies were equal to only about 3 
percent of business sector value added during 1980–87 (OECD, 
1994, p. 54). 
42On November 17, 1993, a comprehensive plan for employ-
ment, competitiveness, and the social security system was 
approved by the Belgian government. OECD (2003a) reports that 
“a new method of calculating pensions will be introduced (the 
base period for calculating pensions will be longer, and pensions 
for men and women will be harmonized)”; other constraints and 
cost-cutting measures are mentioned for health care costs. The age 
limit for early retirement was raised from 55 to 58. 
43Also, like Italy, Belgium was listed among OECD countries 
as having the most market-unfriendly product market regula-
tion, mainly because of barriers to entrepreneurship (see OECD, 
2003a). 
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Belgium’s fiscal effort was hampered by monetary 
conditions at the time and by a slowdown in global 
activity in the early 1990s.44 Although the wage 
moderation process helped break the wage-price 
spiral, which contributed to endemic inflation, it 
still took some time and a period of high interest 
rates (aimed at maintaining the peg to the European 
Currency Unit) for monetary policy to succeed 
in delivering low and stable inflation. Hence, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio started to rise again in 1990 and 
peaked at 134 percent in 1993, a recession year. 
Even during the recession, however, the Belgian gov-
ernment was able to run a primary surplus—high-
lighting how beneficial the structural measures taken 
in the 1980s were for public finances.
A second multiyear convergence plan was enacted 
in the early 1990s to meet the Maastricht criteria 
by reducing the budget deficit to less than 3 percent 
by 1997.45 This plan included a mix of additional 
spending cuts and tax increases—but it was fun-
damentally built on the foundation established by 
the successful 1980s consolidation. Moreover, the 
fiscal framework was strengthened: first, in 1989 the 
High Council of Finance was vested with a renewed 
advisory role for budgetary policy; second, in 1994, 
the National Accounting Institute was established to 
provide macroeconomic forecasts for use in bud-
get preparation. Both actions were fundamental to 
increasing government accountability for budgetary 
policy.46
On the monetary front, the successful fiscal con-
solidation of the 1980s gave markets confidence that 
the convergence plan would likewise be successful. 
As a result, in 1993 short-term bond rates were on a  
steep downward path, and long-term bond rates soon  
followed.47 Inflation, which had been reduced in the 
44The real growth rate deteriorated from more than 3 percent 
in 1990 to –0.7 percent in 1993, in line with other advanced 
economies.
45The fiscal consolidation of the 1990s included privatiza-
tion and sales of assets (such as the central bank gold reserve). 
The impact of these temporary measures, however, was minor in 
Belgium compared with Italy.
46See European Commission (2012).
47The decomposition in Figure 3.11, panel 3, shows that the 
more benign monetary conditions, evidenced by falling interest 
rates during the episode, contributed significantly to the reduction 
in debt levels.
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Belgium achieved large primary surpluses in the late 1980s and maintained them for about 
15 years. The debt ratio also fell considerably in the 1990s thanks to a reduction in real 
interest rates and fairly strong growth. 
Figure 3.11.  Belgium: A Marathon Not a Sprint
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late 1980s, oscillated around 2 percent.48 One con-
sequence was that, in contrast to the first effort, this 
convergence plan led to a sustained drop in debt.
In sum, Belgium’s public finances were already 
on a sounder footing than Italy’s by the end of the 
1980s. The permanent structural measures taken in 
the 1980s projected beneficial effects into the future. 
As a result Belgium required a milder fiscal adjust-
ment to meet the Maastricht criteria than Italy, and 
the changes in the fiscal framework adopted in the 
1990s helped prevent slippages and the onset of 
fiscal consolidation fatigue. At the same time, given 
the credibility attached to the 1992 convergence 
plan, Belgium benefited from a much needed reduc-
tion in real interest payments earlier than Italy. It is 
hard to say whether this is what contributed to its 
relatively better growth performance, but between 
1993 and 2007 Belgium reduced its debt-to-GDP 
ratio by 50 percentage points—substantially more 
than Italy.
canada in 1995: success from failure
As in Belgium, there were two phases to Canada’s 
fiscal consolidation: an initial unsuccessful phase in 
the second half of the 1980s and a later successful 
consolidation starting in 1995. We discuss them 
both here because the earlier consolidation effort 
provides a valuable comparison with the ultimately 
successful consolidation in the mid-1990s. 
In the early 1980s, a combination of high primary 
deficits and tight monetary policy put the Canadian 
general government debt on an unstable path—from 
1981 to 1986 the debt increased by about 25 per-
centage points (Figure 3.12, panel 1). This prospect 
induced the newly elected government of Brian Mul-
roney to embark on a multiyear fiscal consolidation 
plan that, beginning in 1985, aimed at stabilizing 
the debt-to-GDP ratio at 65 percent by 1990–91. 
The actual implementation of the 1985 plan 
implied a fiscal consolidation that was split roughly 
evenly between tax hikes and spending cuts (see 
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori, 2011) and was able 
to achieve a temporary balanced primary budget in 
48As for various other European countries, 1994, the year after 
the ERM collapse, was an exception. 
1989. The overall debt performance was less success-
ful. In fact, given the high real and nominal interest 
payments followed by the sharp 1990–91 recession, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio kept rising and peaked at 
102 percent in 1995. The recession left a large scar 
on fiscal revenue,49 while government spending 
kept increasing in real terms until 1993, mainly as a 
result of automatic stabilizers. 
Various reasons have been advanced for the failure 
of the 1985 consolidation.50 One explanation is that 
the adjustment in expenditures relied mainly on 
poorly specified across-the-board cuts and efficiency 
gains that did not impose fundamental changes in 
the way government expenses were determined and 
so did not persist. Moreover, some of the measures 
were also temporary. For example, the plan imposed 
a temporary surtax on higher-income individuals 
and large corporations and garnered some savings 
from privatization. Thus, while the primary balance 
did improve during the 10 years from 1985 to 1995, 
the improvement amounted to just under 6 percent-
age points of GDP because it was interrupted by the 
recession of the early 1990s. The consolidation effort 
did, however, introduce a number of permanent 
measures that helped future Canadian governments, 
including a change from full to partial indexation of 
tax brackets. Another factor, which becomes clearer 
on examination of the 1995 consolidation, is that 
both the monetary and external environments were 
hostile to debt reduction. Monetary policy was 
particularly tight because the Bank of Canada was 
attempting to reduce inflation with high real interest 
rates during this time (Figure 3.12, panel 2), and the 
recession, which coincided with a global slowdown, 
undermined growth and government finances (more 
below).
In 1995, after having crossed the 100 percent 
debt-to-GDP threshold and with substantial public 
support, the Canadian government launched another 
ambitious fiscal consolidation plan.51 Given the 
49Revenue recovered slowly, possibly due to the performance 
of the housing market: housing prices dropped by 7 percent from 
their peak in 1990 and did not recover quickly, while stock prices 
started to increase only in 1995.
50See, for example, Sancak, Liu, and Nakata (2011) for a more 
detailed discussion of the Canadian experience.
51Convincing the public of the importance of reducing public 
debt was an important element in the government’s approach to 
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already high level of taxation and disappointment 
with the earlier consolidation, this plan was mainly 
spending based and tackled some fundamental 
structural issues behind the fiscal imbalances. In par-
ticular, the plan implemented structural reforms to 
the unemployment insurance system, the system of 
transfers to provinces, and the pension system.52 The 
reduction in transfers to the provinces imposed addi-
tional fiscal discipline at the subnational level, with 
the effect of improving provincial finances as well. 
Moreover, the consolidation was supported by the 
fact that in the mid-1990s, most Canadian provinces 
legislated some form of fiscal regulation that explic-
itly imposed specific limits on fiscal indicators such 
as budgetary balances, spending, and taxation.53 This 
helped boost the persistence of the fiscal effort. As 
a result, the primary balance moved to a consistent 
strong surplus, and debt fell by 35 percentage points 
over the subsequent 10 years.
The success of the fiscal consolidation effort of the 
1990s was clearly amplified by the benign external 
and domestic environment. Domestically, after the 
Bank of Canada adopted an inflation-targeting 
framework in 1991, the country was enjoying the 
benefits of relatively low interest rates in an environ-
ment of low and stable inflation, while the exchange 
rate depreciated slowly but steadily over the period.54 
As a consequence, real rates dropped substantially 
along with the premium associated with the risk 
of resurgent inflation. The debt-service burden fell 
from almost 10 percent of GDP in 1995 to about 
7 percent in 2000. Moreover, the United States, 
Canada’s foremost trading partner, experienced an 
extraordinary boom in the late 1990s. This, coupled 
with a strong decrease in the real effective exchange 
rate, helped spur the Canadian export sector: the 
contribution of exports to GDP growth averaged 
more than 3 percentage points between 1993 and 
2000. Despite the propitious monetary and exter-
the issue. Furthermore, unfavorable comparisons of Canada with 
Mexico by the Wall Street Journal in the wake of the peso crisis 
and Moody’s credit watch on Canada prior to the 1995 budget 
underscored the importance for the public of dealing with debt. 
52See Sancak, Liu, and Nakata (2011) for further details.
53See Millar (1997).
54The depreciation of the Canadian dollar was supported by the 
relatively stronger performance of the U.S. economy at the time 
and by declines in commodity prices during the 1990s.
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Canada went through two distinct consolidation phases in the 1980s and 1990s, the latter 
leading to larger primary surpluses and declining debt. The 1990s debt reduction was also 
supported by strong growth.
Figure 3.12.  Canada: Fiscal Consolidation after 1985
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nal environment, GDP growth remained below the 
advanced economy average (see Figure 3.5, panel 1).
Figure 3.12, panel 3, shows the decomposition 
of the debt dynamics over these years. Given the 
relevance of the 1985 consolidation, two bars are 
added to cover this period, although the average is 
still for the 15 years following 1995. Strong growth, 
a large primary surplus, and falling real interest rates 
contribute strongly to debt reduction after 1995. 
Finally, the effect of the Great Recession is visible in 
the last bar—weak growth and countercyclical fiscal 
stimulus added to the debt during this period.
Overall, this episode highlights how fiscal, 
monetary, and external factors all contribute to 
the outcome. The shift in the composition of fiscal 
efforts toward structural reforms and a rule-based 
fiscal framework at the subnational level contributed 
to the success of consolidation in 1995. But the 
influence of both monetary and external conditions 
is also evident. In the 1985 plan, both monetary and 
external conditions hampered contraction, whereas 
in 1995 these influences were supportive. Further-
more, even in a sound monetary and fiscal setting, 
the effects of the Great Recession show that external 
events can still compromise domestic debt reduction.
analysis
This section draws together the experiences of 
the countries covered in the case studies by compar-
ing the policy objectives pursued, the instruments 
used (such as policy rates, exchange rates, primary 
surpluses, and institutional frameworks), and the 
outcomes achieved. To facilitate this comparison, 
Figure 3.13 shows debt decompositions for the six 
cases. This comparison yields a number of lessons on 
how to best deal with high levels of public debt.
The first key lesson is that a supportive monetary 
environment is a necessary condition for successful 
fiscal consolidation. This is evident from the cases of 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan 
(Figure 3.13, panel 1). In the United Kingdom, 
despite substantial fiscal efforts that achieved and 
sustained large primary surpluses, public debt ratios 
were not reduced. The reason is the simultaneous 
pursuit of a return to the gold standard at the prewar 
parity, which required a tight monetary policy stance 
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Despite large fiscal surpluses, the United Kingdom experienced sharply higher debt due to 
very high real interest rates caused by deflation. The United States successfully reduced 
debt through a combination of negative real interest rates and growth. Japan’s increase in 
debt resulted mostly from its large fiscal deficits. The second phase of debt reduction for 
Belgium, Canada, and Italy was supported by larger fiscal surpluses and lower real interest 
rates.
Figure 3.13. Decomposition of Debt Dynamics in Case Study 
Countries
(Percent of GDP)
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and exceptionally high real interest rates, which offset 
the contribution of fiscal surpluses to debt reduction. 
At the same time, domestic prices did not fall enough 
to produce a real exchange rate depreciation due to 
the concomitant appreciation of the pound to prewar 
parity. Furthermore, this combination of tight fiscal 
and monetary policies delivered negative growth, 
exacerbating the debt problem. 
Given that both fiscal and monetary policies were 
tight in the United Kingdom, it is conceivable that 
either or both were to blame for the poor outcomes. 
However, the cases of Japan, which had tight monetary 
conditions and loose fiscal conditions, and the United 
States, which had loose monetary and tight fiscal con-
ditions, allow us to attribute the outcomes more clearly 
to the monetary stance, as explained below.
In Japan, monetary policy was constrained by 
the zero lower bound after the bursting of the stock 
market and real estate bubbles in the early 1990s. 
In addition, the monetary transmission mechanism 
was impaired by financial sector problems. With low 
growth and deflation, the Japanese authorities were 
in a difficult position with respect to fiscal con-
solidation. Attempts to tighten fiscal policies were 
either quickly abandoned after economic conditions 
deteriorated or not seriously pursued. If Japan had 
persisted with tight fiscal policy, it seems likely that 
it would have experienced even stronger deflation 
and lower growth, just as in the United Kingdom. 
Still, despite an expansionary fiscal policy stance, 
growth remained anemic and public debt ratios kept 
increasing.
In the United States after World War II, vivid 
memories of the Great Depression led people to 
fear deflation more than inflation. The high level 
of war debt and the associated potentially high 
interest burden were also a source of concern. The 
authorities adopted a policy mix that resulted in 
an exceptionally supportive monetary environment 
combined with tight fiscal policy. Specifically, they 
adopted various policy measures (often referred to 
as “financial repression”) that aimed at keeping the 
nominal rates on government bonds low, while con-
trolling inflation with a tight fiscal stance and credit 
controls. This policy mix resulted in two substantial 
bursts of inflation, which led to large negative real 
rates and a sharp reduction in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. The supportive monetary stance was also 
instrumental in lowering private borrowing rates, 
thus providing stimulus to the economy. Based on 
growth and fiscal performance, this policy mix was 
undoubtedly successful—although inflation volatility 
remained relatively high. Thus, we conclude that a 
supportive monetary policy stance is a key ingredient 
in successful debt reduction.
What is less clear, however, is whether this 
approach could be applied in today’s economic and 
financial environment. The set of controls and regu-
lations needed for financial repression to be effective 
would lead to a much less internationally integrated 
financial system than we have today. Furthermore, 
an unexpected burst of inflation—which accounted 
for much of the debt reduction in the United States 
episode—could jeopardize the institutional frame-
work built by central banks over the past 30 years 
for controlling inflation.55
Leaving aside the possibility of large inflation 
surprises and financial repression, the most realistic 
policy options for today appear to be those followed 
by Belgium, Canada, and Italy. All three countries 
implemented large fiscal adjustment in an environ-
ment where the goal of reaching or maintaining 
low inflation was considered necessary for economic 
stability. Their degrees of success in reducing public 
debt, however, varied.56 This variation leads us to 
three additional conclusions and reinforces our first 
conclusion about the importance of monetary policy 
in successful debt reduction. 
First, even in an environment where inflation is 
low, a supportive monetary environment with low 
real rates is important to facilitate a reduction in 
public debt. The monetary environment was tight 
in the 1980s (and in Italy until the mid-1990s) 
because of disinflationary efforts by central banks. 
As a result, debt continued to increase in all three 
countries. Figure 3.13, panel 2, shows that high real 
55It is also worth noting that the period of financial repression 
ended with the collapse of the Bretton Woods international mon-
etary system because of the loss of U.S. competitiveness vis-à-vis 
its trading partners, which opened the doors to the great inflation 
of the 1970s. 
56This can be seen from Figure 3.13, panel 2, where we present 
the debt decompositions for each country across the two main 
phases (that is, a tight or supportive monetary policy stance) that 
we have identified in the previous case studies.
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interest rates contributed to the rise in debt levels in 
the initial years of each episode, despite tight fiscal 
policies. It was only when real rates fell—after dis-
inflation was achieved and credible monetary policy 
frameworks were established—that all countries were 
able to reduce their debt.
Second, debt reduction is larger when fiscal 
measures are permanent or structural and buttressed 
by a fiscal framework that supports the measures 
implemented. Italian fiscal adjustment efforts led to 
a considerable improvement in the fiscal balance. 
However, especially before 1992, they were biased 
toward temporary measures that failed to put public 
debt on a steadily decreasing path—in part because 
of the lack of a fiscal framework to lock in the fiscal 
gains achieved.57 In fact, faced with very high levels 
of taxation, fiscal efforts waned after Italy entered the 
EMU. Similarly, Canada in the 1980s complemented 
tax hikes with spending cuts, but the reduction in 
spending was achieved with across-the-board cuts that 
proved to be short lived. In contrast, in the 1990s, 
Canada’s fiscal plans were much more successful in 
persistently reducing public debt. This is because they 
were based on well-targeted and structural measures, 
including pension and entitlement reforms in a 
context of tight fiscal rules at the subnational level. 
Similarly, Belgium’s ability to achieve large and per-
sistent primary surpluses can largely be explained by 
structural spending cuts, which involved reductions 
in public employment and reforms to the excessively 
generous welfare system in the context of a fiscal 
framework that enhanced accountability. 
Third, the relatively successful experiences of 
Belgium and Canada in the 1990s were facilitated by 
a boost from strong external demand (Figure 3.14).58 
While external demand is influenced by various factors, 
currency depreciation helped in both cases (Canada in 
the first half of the 1990s, Belgium in the second half 
of the 1990s). The Italian economy benefited from the 
sharp devaluation after the 1992 ERM crisis, but, in 
part because of its relatively more closed economy, the 
57As a matter of fact, Italy passed important entitlement 
reforms in the mid-1990s, but their major benefits accumulated 
only very gradually over time. 
58The average ratio of exports to GDP between 1992 and 
2007 in Belgium, Canada, and Italy was 0.65, 0.34, and 0.23, 
respectively.
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The debt reductions in the 1990s for Belgium and Canada were achieved in the context of 
strong export performance.
Figure 3.14.  Contribution to GDP from Exports
(Percent of GDP)
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export contribution to output growth was smaller and 
relatively short lived. Hence, although precise attribu-
tion is difficult here, a supportive external environ-
ment clearly contributes to the relatively better growth 
performance and relatively better debt reduction in 
Canada and Belgium compared with Italy. 
Fourth, it takes time to turn around primary 
deficits. Emblematic is the case of Belgium, which, 
despite achieving the largest peacetime improvement 
in the primary balance since World War II between 
1981 and 1991, still took 10 years to move from a 
deficit of about 7 percent to a surplus of 4 percent. 
The effect of this transition on the level of debt is 
visible in Figure 3.13, panel 2: the average contri-
bution of the primary balance to debt reduction 
between 1982 and 1992 was actually very small. The 
observation that it takes time to turn around primary 
balances is confirmed by looking at the full sample of 
countries. Among advanced economies since 1980, 
improvements of greater than 10 percentage points 
over a 10-year period are exceedingly rare. Canada’s 
best improvement was 6.7 percentage points between 
1990 and 2000, and Italy achieved a 10.2 percentage 
point improvement between 1987 and 1997—both 
among the best since 1980 among advanced econo-
mies. In short, sustained improvements of more than 
1 percentage point a year are rare, and this means 
that, when starting from a primary deficit, debt 
reduction takes a particularly long time. 
 Summing up, historical experience suggests 
that countries dealing with high debt burdens are 
unlikely to experience strong improvements in their 
debt ratios while real rates are high and monetary 
conditions remain tight. Assuming that sufficiently 
supportive monetary conditions can be achieved, 
fiscal policy focused on permanent or structural 
reforms appears to provide larger and more endur-
ing debt reductions than do policies based on more 
temporary measures.
conclusion
For countries currently struggling with high public 
debt burdens, the historical record offers both instruc-
tive lessons and cautionary tales. The first lesson is 
that fiscal consolidation efforts need to be comple-
mented by measures that support growth: structural 
issues need to be addressed and monetary condi-
tions need to be as supportive as possible. In Japan, 
for example, weaknesses in the banking system and 
corporate sector limited monetary policy efficacy and 
led to weak growth, which prevented fiscal consolida-
tion. As a result, debt continued climbing until these 
issues were addressed. In Italy, Belgium, and Canada, 
debt did not fall until monetary conditions were sup-
portive. Here, reforms to wage-setting mechanisms 
that broke the wage-price spiral were an important 
contributor to the establishment of the supportive 
monetary environment. Furthermore, monetary eas-
ing also fostered exchange rate depreciation, which 
supported external demand and growth.
The case of the United Kingdom reinforces this 
message but also offers a cautionary lesson for coun-
tries attempting internal devaluation. The combina-
tion of tight monetary and tight fiscal policy, aimed 
at significantly reducing the price level and return-
ing to the prewar parity, had disastrous outcomes. 
Unemployment was high, growth was low, and—
most relevant—debt continued to grow. Although 
the price level reduction the United Kingdom was 
attempting to achieve is larger than anything likely 
to happen as a result of internal devaluation today, 
similar dynamics are evident. A reduction in the 
price level, a necessary part of internal devaluation, 
comes at a high cost, and determining whether the 
cost outweighs the benefit to competitiveness from 
internal devaluation requires further work.
The case of the United States, although support-
ing the general finding about the contribution of 
monetary policy, points to more outside-the-box 
possibilities. U.S. monetary policy was very support-
ive in the immediate postwar years as a result of lim-
its on nominal interest rates and bursts of inflation. 
This particular combination quickly reduced the 
debt ratio while growth remained robust. Whether 
financial repression could assist in reducing debt 
burdens in today’s environment, however, is much 
harder to gauge. Given that the major problem for 
the United States in those years was controlling 
excess demand and inflation—which is not a prob-
lem faced by the countries struggling with public 
debt today—it seems likely that financial repression 
as practiced by the United States after World War 
II would not be effective today for countries already 
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benefiting from historically low sovereign interest 
rates. Moreover, the inflationary consequences of 
financial repression could endanger the institutional 
frameworks established over the past 30 years to 
control inflation. Whether policies inspired by this 
experience could help remains an open question.
The implications vary for countries dealing with 
high debt levels today. For some, such as the United 
States, where financial sector weakness has largely 
been addressed and monetary policy is as supportive 
as possible, it would seem that conditions are in 
place for fiscal consolidation. In others, such as the 
European periphery, where financial sectors remain 
weak and fundamental issues relating to monetary 
union remain to be addressed, progress may be lim-
ited until these issues are resolved.
A second lesson is that consolidation plans 
should emphasize persistent, structural reforms over 
temporary or short-lived measures. Belgium and 
Canada were ultimately much more successful than 
Italy in reducing debt, and a key difference between 
these cases is the relative weight placed on structural 
improvements versus temporary efforts. Moreover, 
both Belgium and Canada put in place fiscal frame-
works in the 1990s that preserved the improvement 
in the fiscal balance and mitigated consolidation 
fatigue.
A third lesson is that fiscal repair and debt reduc-
tion take time—with the exception of postwar 
episodes, primary deficits have not been quickly 
reversed. A corollary is that this increases the vulner-
ability to significant setbacks when shocks hit. The 
sharp increases in public debt since the Great Reces-
sion—including in the relatively successful cases of 
Belgium and Canada—exemplify such vulnerability. 
Furthermore, the external environment has been an 
important contributor to outcomes in the past. The 
implications for today are sobering—widespread 
fiscal consolidation efforts, deleveraging pressures 
from the private sector, adverse demographic trends, 
and the aftermath of the financial crisis are unlikely 
to provide the supportive external environment that 
played an important role in a number of previous 
episodes of debt reduction. Expectations about what 
can be achieved need to be set realistically.
Based on these lessons, we suggest a road map for 
successful resolution of the current public debt over-
hangs. First, support for growth is essential to cope 
with the contractionary effects of fiscal consolidation. 
Policies must emphasize the resolution of underlying 
structural problems within the economy, and mon-
etary policy must be as supportive as possible. Such 
policy support is particularly important at this point 
because all major economies must address public debt 
overhangs, which means they cannot rely on favorable 
external conditions. Second, because debt reduction 
takes time, fiscal consolidation should focus on endur-
ing structural change. In this respect, fiscal institu-
tions can help. Third, while realism is needed when it 
comes to expectations about future debt trajectories 
and setting debt targets in a relatively weaker global 
growth environment, the case of Italy in the 1990s 
suggests that debt reduction is still possible even with-
out strong growth. 
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4chapter
Many emerging market and developing economies have 
done well over the past decade and through the global 
fi nancial crisis. Will this last? Th is chapter documents the 
marked improvement in these economies’ resilience over 
the past 20 years. Th ese economies did so well during the 
past decade that for the fi rst time, emerging market and 
developing economies spent more time in expansion and 
had smaller downturns than advanced economies. Th eir 
improved performance is explained by both good policies 
and a lower incidence of external and domestic shocks: 
better policies account for about three-fi fths of their 
improved performance, and less-frequent shocks account 
for the rest. However, should the external environment 
worsen, these economies will likely end up “recoupling” 
with advanced economies. Homegrown shocks could also 
pull down growth. Th ese economies will need to rebuild 
their buff ers to ensure that they are able to respond to 
potential shocks on the horizon.
During 2003–07 growth in emerging market 
and developing economies accelerated (Figure 4.1, 
panel 1), even as growth in advanced economies 
remained weak. Th is stimulated a vigorous debate on 
whether emerging market and developing economies 
had decoupled from the advanced economies.1 Th at 
debate was silenced temporarily by the global crisis 
that emanated from the United States and Europe—
in fact, more than half of emerging market and 
developing economies experienced negative growth 
in 2009 (Figure 4.1, panel 2). But they quickly 
bounced back, and during 2010–11 many of them 
grew at or above precrisis rates. As a result, they now 
account for virtually all of global growth (Figure 4.1, 
panel 3).
Th e question on policymakers’ minds now is 
whether this strong performance will last. Beyond 
Th e authors of this chapter are Abdul Abiad (team leader), 
John Bluedorn, Jaime Guajardo, and Petia Topalova, with support 
from Angela Espiritu and Katherine Pan.
1For a summary of this debate, see Kose (2008) and, in the 
World Economic Outlook, Chapter 4 of the April 2007 report and 
Chapter 1 of the April 2008 report.
reSILIeNce IN eMerGING MarKet aND DeVeLOpING ecONOMIeS: 
WILL It LaSt?
AEs EMDEs World growth
Sources: World Economic Outlook database; World Bank World Development Indicators 
database; Penn World Tables 7.0; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Economy groups are defined in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. AE = advanced economy; 
EMDE = emerging market and developing economy.
Growth in emerging market and developing economies accelerated in the mid-2000s, 
leading to talk of their decoupling from advanced economies. Emerging market and 
developing economies were not spared during the global downturn; most experienced 
negative growth in 2009. But many have recovered and are growing at or above precrisis 
rates, despite continued weakness in advanced economies. As a result, they now account for 
almost all global growth.
Figure 4.1.  The Strong Performance of Emerging Market and 
Developing Economies
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the de facto evidence of their resilience over the 
past decade and through the largest global shock in 
the past half-century, optimists can point to their 
improved policy frameworks and the ample policy 
space—room to maneuver without undermining 
sustainability—these improvements have created. 
These economies have also become more diversi-
fied along many dimensions—in their economic 
structure, trading patterns, and the composition of 
their capital flows. On the other hand, recent growth 
in some emerging market and developing economies 
has been supported by capital inflows, strong credit 
growth, and for those that export commodities, by 
the continued strength of commodity prices. These 
factors are prone to reversal, which suggests that 
these economies’ prospects might not be that robust 
(Frankel, 2012). Some of the policy space they built 
over the past decade was used during the global cri-
sis and has not yet been fully rebuilt. And there are 
now signs that growth in some of these economies is 
slowing.
This chapter studies the resilience of these 
economies, defined as their ability to sustain longer 
and stronger expansions and to experience shorter 
and shallower downturns and more rapid recov-
eries.2 Previous studies have attempted to directly 
explain the growth of emerging market and develop-
ing economies and have had only modest success, 
in part because the behavior of output in these 
economies is much more complex and diverse than 
in advanced economies (see, for example, Easterly, 
2001, and Figure 4.2). Easterly and others (1993) 
found very low persistence in their growth rates 
across decades, which is hard to reconcile with the 
high persistence of “fundamentals”—such as invest-
ment rates, education levels, trade, financial develop-
ment, and institutional quality—that typically enter 
growth regressions. Pritchett (2000) characterized 
2This is consistent with the general definition of resilience, 
which encompasses the same two aspects. The Oxford English 
Dictionary, for example, defines resilience as “the quality or fact 
of being able to recover quickly or easily from, or resist being 
affected by, a misfortune, shock, or illness.” Increased resilience 
would result in longer and stronger expansions, but the latter 
could also result from fewer shocks—a possibility we explore in 
this chapter. Shorter and shallower downturns and more rapid 
recoveries are fully consistent with the aforementioned definition 
of resilience, since downturns are the result of negative shocks.
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Figure 4.2.  Diverse Paths of Output
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their output paths as being composed of “moun-
tains, plateaus, cliffs, and plains” and documented 
large and abrupt changes in growth performance 
at the country level. Some emerging market and 
developing economies grow at reasonable rates for 
many years and then, without any obvious change 
in fundamentals, stagnate for decades, whereas 
others experience long periods of stagnation inter-
rupted periodically by bursts of fast growth. Severe 
economic crises are not uncommon and tend to 
happen more often in these economies. These crises 
have large output costs because they often represent 
declines in the trend rather than fluctuations around 
a trend (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; Cerra and 
Saxena, 2008). As a result, expansions and recoveries 
in these economies have lasted anywhere from a few 
years to several decades.
Analyzing the length of expansions and the 
speed of recoveries could be an intermediate step in 
investigating the processes underlying growth—shifts 
in long-term growth or in the volatility of growth 
will show up in changing duration of expansions 
and speed of recoveries. Another reason for studying 
their duration is to help policymakers identify the 
factors that tend to halt or prolong expansions and 
hasten recoveries.3
This chapter helps shed light on the past, present, 
and prospective resilience of emerging market and 
developing economies by addressing the following 
questions:
 • How has the resilience of these economies 
changed over time? Have expansions become 
longer and stronger, and have downturns and 
recoveries become shallower and shorter?
 • What factors, both external and domestic, are 
associated with the duration of expansions and 
the speed of recoveries in these economies? 
 • If performance has improved over time, to what 
extent has it been due to less frequent or less 
3In analyzing the length of expansions and speed of recoveries, 
we contribute to a growing literature that tries to shed light on 
growth transitions. Examples include Hausmann, Pritchett, and 
Rodrik (2005), who investigate growth accelerations; Berg, Ostry, 
and Zettelmeyer (2012) and Virmani (2012), who study periods 
of sustained growth; and Rodrik (1999); Becker and Mauro 
(2006); and Hausmann, Rodriguez, and Wagner (2006), who 
focus on growth collapses.
severe shocks, to improved policymaking, and to 
structural changes such as shifts in these econo-
mies’ trade and financial linkages?
The chapter examines the evolution of output per 
capita in more than 100 emerging market and devel-
oping economies over the past 60 years.4 It identifies 
periods of expansion, downturn, and recovery in 
their output paths. Using a variety of tools, includ-
ing event studies, statistical associations, and dura-
tion analysis, it analyzes how these durations have 
changed over time and how they relate to various 
shocks, policies, and structural characteristics. These 
are the chapter’s main findings:
 • The resilience of emerging market and develop-
ing economies has increased markedly during the 
past two decades. They are spending more time 
in expansion, and downturns and recoveries have 
become shallower and shorter. The performance 
of the past decade was particularly good, with 
emerging Europe being a notable exception. In 
fact, the past decade was the first time that emerg-
ing market and developing economies spent more 
time in expansion, and had smaller downturns, 
than advanced economies.
 • Various shocks, both external and domestic, are 
associated with the end of expansions in these 
economies. Among external shocks, sudden stops 
in capital flows, advanced economy recessions, 
spikes in global uncertainty, and terms-of-trade 
busts all increase the likelihood that an expansion 
will end. Among domestic shocks, credit booms 
double and banking crises triple the probability 
that an expansion will shift into a downturn by 
the following year. 
 • Good policies are associated with increased resil-
ience. Specifically, greater policy space (charac-
terized by low inflation and favorable fiscal and 
external positions) and improved policy frame-
works (countercyclical policy, inflation targeting, 
and flexible exchange rate regimes) are associated 
with longer expansions and faster recoveries.
 • It is more difficult to tease out the effects on 
resilience of these economies’ structural character-
istics—such as trade patterns, financial openness 
and the composition of capital flows, and income 
4Appendix 4.1 outlines the data sources for the analysis.
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distribution. Few of these characteristics are 
robustly associated with the duration of expan-
sions and the speed of recoveries. 
 • Improvements in policymaking and the buildup 
of policy space in many of these economies 
account for the bulk of the increased resilience 
since 1990. Some shocks, such as spikes in 
global uncertainty, have become more frequent 
in the past decade, but other shocks have 
become less frequent, such as banking crises and 
credit booms. Overall, the fact that there have 
been fewer shocks accounts for about two-fifths 
of the improved performance in emerging mar-
ket and developing economies. Greater policy 
space and better policy frameworks account for 
the remaining three-fifths of the improvement in 
their performance.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. 
The first section documents how resilience has 
evolved for various country groupings and regions 
over time and relates these changes to deeper shifts 
in steady-state growth rates and the variability of 
growth. The second section relates the duration of 
expansions and the speed of recoveries to external 
and domestic shocks, to policy space and policy 
frameworks, and to structural characteristics of 
these economies. It uses standard tools of duration 
analysis, including both bivariate and multivariate 
models, to examine these correlates in a compre-
hensive and integrated manner. It then evaluates 
whether the nature of these associations has changed 
over time. The final section synthesizes the chapter 
with an examination of how these economies’ poli-
cies and structure, as well as the shocks that buffet 
them, have changed over time. It then quantifies 
their relative contributions to the rise in resilience, 
and concludes with a few words on the prospective 
resilience of these economies.
how has resilience Varied across countries 
and over time?
We begin by establishing some stylized facts about 
the depth and duration of downturns, recoveries, 
and expansions for various country groups and how 
these have changed over the past six decades. For the 
purposes of this chapter the economies of the world 
are split into three groups.5 Following Pritchett 
(2000), we define advanced economies primarily 
by membership in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development prior to 1990, with 
the exception of Turkey.6 All other economies are 
classified as emerging market and developing econo-
mies, which we further subdivide into two groups: 
low-income countries, which are defined as the 51 
economies currently eligible for concessional IMF 
loans, and the remaining 69 economies, which we 
classify as emerging markets. Appendix 4.1 lists the 
countries included in the analysis according to their 
classifications. 
The primary variable of interest is the evolution of 
real output per capita. We focus on this variable for 
consistency with most of the literature on develop-
ment, because it is the relevant measure of output 
for welfare analysis, and since it accounts for differ-
ences in population growth rates across countries. 
Most of the chapter’s findings continue to hold if 
one uses real output instead (see Appendix 4.4).
To identify expansions, downturns, and recoveries 
in output per capita, we use the statistical algo-
rithm of Harding and Pagan (2002), which detects 
turning points in the log level of a time series. The 
algorithm searches for local maximums (peaks) and 
minimums (troughs) that meet specified conditions 
for the length of cycles and phases. Because we are 
using annual data and some downturns and expan-
sions can be as short as one year, the only condition 
imposed is on the minimum length of the cycle 
(a contiguous expansion and downturn), which is 
specified to be five years.7 Expansions are defined as 
5Throughout, we restrict our analysis to economies that have 
had an average population of at least 1 million inhabitants over 
the sample period.
6This implies that some economies currently classified as 
advanced by the World Economic Outlook are classified as emerg-
ing markets in this chapter. We do this because over the past 
60 years they were more like emerging markets than advanced 
economies and because their experience—especially their ability 
to grow sufficiently to attain advanced economy status—provides 
valuable lessons. 
7This is not too restrictive a constraint. In advanced economies, 
cycles have averaged 8½ years (see Chapter 3 of the April 2002 
World Economic Outlook). As noted, expansions and downturns in 
emerging market and developing economies can often be much 
more protracted. The imposition of a five-year minimum cycle 
length serves mainly to filter out high-frequency fluctuations in 
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the period from the year after a trough to the year 
of the peak, inclusive, and downturns are defined as 
the period from the year after a peak to the year of 
the trough, inclusive. Recoveries are defined as the 
period from the year after a trough to the year when 
output per capita reaches or exceeds the previous 
peak’s level. When output is well behaved, as is the 
case for most advanced economies, recoveries are 
a subset of expansions. For emerging market and 
developing economies, however, an expansion fol-
lowing a deep downturn may not reach the previ-
ous peak’s output per capita until several cycles are 
completed, in which case a recovery can span several 
cycles. Application of the Harding-Pagan methodol-
ogy identifies 117 expansions and 105 downturns 
in advanced economies and 576 expansions and 
496 downturns in emerging market and developing 
economies.8 
How has resilience changed over time? Figures 
4.3 and 4.4 plot the dynamics of output per capita 
during the 10 years following a peak, with peaks 
grouped by the decades during which they occurred. 
We begin by looking at output dynamics following 
peaks in the 1950s and 1960s—the dark blue lines 
in the figures. These were golden decades for the 
advanced economies and good decades for emerg-
ing market and developing economies—the median 
downturn for the latter during these decades was 
shallow, less than 3 percent, and it took four years 
for median output per capita to regain or surpass its 
previous peak (Figure 4.3, panel 2). 
Emerging market and developing economies took 
a sharp turn for the worse in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Figure 4.3, panels 2 to 4, red lines). The median 
downturn was much deeper and more protracted—
even 10 years later median output per capita failed 
to recover its losses relative to the previous peak. 
There were substantial variations across regions, 
however (see Figure 4.4). Emerging and developing 
Asia was relatively resilient in these decades, with 
the median downturn and recovery lasting only four 
years. This was in sharp contrast to Latin America, 
emerging market and developing economies’ output, which is 
typically much more volatile than output in advanced economies. 
8The number of expansions and downturns are not equal due 
to the presence of incomplete cycles at the start and end of the 
time series.
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Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Economy groups are defined in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. AE = advanced economy; 
EM = emerging market economy; EMDE = emerging  market and developing economy; LIC 
= low-income country. Peaks in output per capita are identified using the Harding-Pagan 
algorithm (Harding and Pagan, 2002). Output per capita at the peak (t ) is normalized to 100, 
and the median output per capita is plotted in years (t + 1) through (t + 10) for each group.
The 1950s and 1960s were good decades for emerging market economies—less so for 
low-income countries. But the 1970s and 1980s were cruel to both—median output per 
capita remained below predownturn levels 10 years after the peak. The 1990s saw 
shallower downturns and faster recoveries in emerging market economies, while the 
improvement in low-income countries was most evident during 2000–06. Both groups did 
comparatively well during the Great Recession.
Figure 4.3.  Dynamics of Output per Capita following Peaks
(Median output per capita; peak = 100; years on x-axis)
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where many economies went through wrenching 
debt crises in the 1980s, and to sub-Saharan Africa 
and the Middle East and North Africa. In all three 
of the latter regions, median output per capita 
10 years later remained below (in some cases well 
below) the previous peak. 
Things began improving for emerging market and 
developing economies in the 1990s (Figure 4.3, light 
blue lines). Median output per capita followed a 
path closer to that observed in the 1950s and 1960s, 
although again with some variation across regions 
(see Figure 4.4). The 1990s were not a great decade 
for emerging and developing Asia: many economies 
experienced sharp downturns during the 1997–98 
Asian financial crisis. By contrast, many countries 
in emerging Europe grew rapidly following their 
transition-related declines in output. 
But the strong performance of emerging market 
and developing economies in the early 2000s and 
throughout the Great Recession was unprecedented 
(Figure 4.3, yellow and black lines).9 The decline in 
median output per capita during downturns between 
2000 and 2006 was smaller than in previous decades, 
and it only took two years to recover—this was 
true for both the emerging market and low-income 
country subgroups. Even through the Great Reces-
sion—arguably the largest external shock in the past 
half-century—both these subgroups performed well, 
with median output per capita recovering to its pre-
crisis peak by the third year. The strong performance 
in the aftermath of the global crisis is evident in most 
regions, with the exception of emerging Europe, 
where median output per capita has yet to recover to 
its precrisis level (Figure 4.4, black lines). Employ-
ment in many emerging market and developing 
economies has also performed well: unemployment 
fell below precrisis levels by 2011 (see Box 4.1 for an 
analysis of the relationship between employment and 
growth in these economies).
9The improved performance of these economies is not driven 
by a subset of well-performing countries. If emerging market and 
developing economies are split into commodity exporters—which 
have benefited greatly in recent years from high commodity 
prices—and non–commodity exporters, the same pattern of 
improvement is evident in both groups. Similarly, isolating the 
largest emerging markets from the rest does not alter the picture 
materially. These splits are reported in Figure 4.15 in Appendix 
4.4.
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
Peak t + 3 t + 6 t + 10
1. Emerging and
    Developing Asia
2. Latin America
3. SSA 4. MENA
1950–69 1970–89 1990–99
2000–06 Great Recession
80
90
100
110
120
130
140 5. CIS and Emerging
    Europe
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
Peak t + 3 t + 6 t + 10
Peak t + 3 t + 6 t + 10Peak t + 3 t + 6 t + 10
Peak t + 3 t + 6 t + 10
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Economy groups are defined in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. CIS = Commonwealth of 
Independent States; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa. Peaks 
in output per capita are identified using the Harding-Pagan algorithm (Harding and Pagan, 
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There were differences in performance across emerging market and developing 
economy regions over the past decades. The 1970s and 1980s were difficult for most 
regions (especially sub-Saharan Africa), but emerging and developing Asia fared better. 
The 1990s were tough for emerging and developing Asia, but the performance of other 
regions improved. All regions did better in the 2000s, except emerging Europe during 
the Great Recession.
Figure 4.4.  Emerging Market and Developing Economy Regions: 
Dynamics of Output per Capita following Peaks
(Median output per capita; peak = 100; years on x-axis)
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These economies did so well in the past decade 
that for the first time, they spent more time in 
expansion and had smaller downturns than advanced 
economies (Figure 4.5, panel 1). In the 1970s and 
1980s, emerging market and developing economies 
spent more than a third of their time in downturns. 
In the 2000s, however, they spent more than 80 
percent of their time in expansion. In contrast, the 
advanced economies have spent less time in expan-
sion over the decades, and in the 2000s they were in 
downturns more than a fifth of the time. Although 
emerging market and developing economies have 
been spending more time in expansion, the median 
growth rate during expansions has not shown a clear 
trend over the past decades—median growth during 
recent expansions is not much different than during 
the expansions of the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 4.5, 
panel 2). But their downturns have become much 
less severe and are now shallower than downturns in 
the advanced economies (Figure 4.5, panel 3). 
Why has resilience changed? taking a Look at 
Steady-State Growth and Variability
Longer expansions and shorter downturns are, in 
the end, simply manifestations of deeper changes. 
One possible underlying change is that steady-state 
or trend growth of emerging market and develop-
ing economies has been increasing—a higher rate 
of trend growth would mean that shocks that 
would have previously caused a downturn now 
cause only a slowdown. A second possibility is 
that the variability of growth has lessened, so that 
the longer expansions and faster recoveries are the 
result of fewer large, negative fluctuations.10 Or 
both changes could be at work. 
10A third possibility is that the propagation mechanism has 
changed—that is, the effect of shocks has become more (or less) 
persistent over time. But such a change would have ambiguous 
effects on resilience as defined in this chapter. Greater persistence 
would mean longer-lasting effects for positive shocks, which 
would prolong expansion, but it would also mean more pro-
tracted effects for negative shocks, which would result in slower 
recoveries. As it turns out, the estimated autoregressive coefficient 
(from an AR(1) growth model) for emerging market and develop-
ing economies has not changed significantly over the past 40 
years. See Appendix 4.2.
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Note: Economy groups are defined in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. AE = advanced economy; 
EM = emerging market economy; EMDE = emerging market and developing economy; 
LIC = low-income country. Peaks and troughs in output per capita are identified using the 
Harding-Pagan algorithm (Harding and Pagan, 2002).
Emerging market and low-income economies have spent more time in expansion during 
the past two decades relative to the 1970s and 1980s. The 2000s was the first decade 
during which both groups spent more time than advanced economies in expansion. Median 
growth in output per capita during expansions has not risen much, but downturns have 
become shallower.
Figure 4.5.  Along Which Dimensions Has Emerging Market and 
Developing Economy Growth Improved?
(Percent)
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Although estimating potential growth is dif-
ficult, including for advanced economies, one way 
to shed light on which of these various possibili-
ties is at work is to follow Blanchard and Simon 
(2001) by modeling output growth as a simple 
autoregressive process—that is, by letting the 
growth rate of output per capita be a function of 
its lagged value and a constant, plus an innova-
tion term. With such a model, we can calculate 
measures of steady-state growth and the variabil-
ity of growth. We estimate such a model for all 
countries over three subperiods—the 1950s and 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and 1990s and 2000s—
and extract the median estimates for steady-state 
growth and the variability of growth for each of 
these periods (see Appendix 4.2).
As Figure 4.6 shows, longer expansions, shal-
lower downturns, and faster recoveries are the 
result of both higher steady-state growth and 
lower variability in growth. For emerging mar-
kets, median steady-state growth fell from 2½ 
percent in the 1950s and 1960s to 1½ percent in 
the 1970s and 1980s; but it more than doubled, 
to 3½ percent, in the 1990s and 2000s. At the 
same time, the standard deviation of growth fell 
to 3¼ percent, from 4¼ percent in the 1970s and 
1980s.11 The same pattern holds true for low-
income countries, for which steady-state growth 
markedly improved since the stagnation of the 
1970s and 1980s and growth variability fell. The 
improvements in emerging market and develop-
ing economies along both dimensions differ from 
what is observed in the advanced economies, 
where the variability of growth has been falling 
over time (a phenomenon often referred to as the 
Great Moderation). On its own, this would be 
expected to improve resilience, but it has been 
offset by lower trend growth—median steady-state 
growth is less than 2 percent, about half of what 
it was in the 1950s and 1960s.
11The changes in steady-state growth and growth variability are 
both statistically significant for the emerging market and develop-
ing economies.
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Note: Economy groups are defined in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. AE = advanced economy; 
EM = emerging market economy; EMDE = emerging market and developing economy; LIC 
= low-income country. Growth in output per capita is modeled as an AR(1) process, and 
the model is estimated for all countries over three subperiods—1950–69, 1970–89, and 
1990–2007. See Appendix 4.2 for further details. The results are nearly identical for 
1990–2011 and 1990–2007.
The longer expansions and shorter recoveries observed in these economies during the past 
two decades are a manifestation of two underlying changes: higher steady-state growth 
and less variability in growth.
Figure 4.6.  Why Have Emerging Market and Developing 
Economies Become More Resilient?
(Percent)
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What Factors are associated with resilience? 
Having established the stylized facts regarding the 
changing duration of expansions and speed of recov-
eries in emerging market and developing economies, 
we now ask which factors are associated with these 
durations.12 Specifically, we explore the following, in 
turn:
 • What kinds of shocks, both external and domes-
tic, tend to derail expansions?
 • Do good policies help lengthen expansions and/or 
hasten recoveries?
 • What structural characteristics help strengthen 
resilience?
What Shocks tend to end expansions?
A large number of shocks could potentially derail 
expansions in emerging market and developing 
economies. We focus on a subset of economic and 
financial disturbances, both domestic and external, 
the risks of which are now heightened in a number 
of countries:13
 • External shocks: We consider increases in global 
uncertainty and world interest rates, recessions in 
advanced economies, sharp declines in an econ-
omy’s terms of trade, and sudden stops in capital 
inflows. Sharp increases in world interest rates, 
which we proxy with the U.S. real interest rate, 
have triggered crises in the past, as have spikes 
in global uncertainty and recessions in advanced 
economies. Similarly, adverse movements in a 
country’s terms of trade or capital flows can be 
destabilizing. 
12It is important to emphasize that it is very difficult to 
establish causality from factors such as policies and structural 
characteristics on the one hand to the duration of expansions and 
recoveries on the other. Many of the variables we explore, includ-
ing measures of policy space such as low inflation or stronger 
fiscal balances, are endogenous to the growth process in general. 
In particular, they could be a function of how long the economy 
has been in expansion.
13For a related analysis of output drops and shocks, see Becker 
and Mauro (2006). Adler and Tovar (2012) look specifically at 
the resilience of emerging markets to global financial shocks. 
Other shocks, such as political turmoil and civil unrest, have 
also been important, particularly in low-income countries; see 
Hausmann, Rodriguez, and Wagner (2006) and Berg, Ostry, and 
Zettelmeyer (2012).
 • Domestic shocks: We consider credit booms and 
banking crises. Although strong credit growth 
tends to be associated with strong output growth, 
excessively high credit tends to generate domes-
tic vulnerabilities such as asset price bubbles or 
consumption and investment booms, and there 
is often a downturn when they burst. Similarly, 
banking crises frequently have very negative mac-
roeconomic consequences.14
The shocks under consideration differ in one 
important dimension. Many external shocks, such 
as a rise in global uncertainty or global interest rates 
or recession in advanced economies, are clearly exog-
enous to emerging market and developing econo-
mies. Therefore, we examine the contemporaneous 
effect of these external shocks on the probability that 
the expansion ends.15 But domestic shocks, such as 
a banking crisis, might be triggered by developments 
in output—for example, financial sector distress may 
be the result of a downturn rather than its cause. To 
gauge whether banking crises tend to derail expan-
sions—while minimizing potential reverse causality 
issues—we examine the likelihood of an expansion 
ending in the period immediately following a bank-
ing crisis. For credit booms, the deleterious effects of 
which may take time to materialize, we examine the 
likelihood of an expansion ending in the subsequent 
period if there has been a credit boom during the 
previous three years. 
The domestic and external shocks under con-
sideration are strongly associated with expansions 
coming to an end. Figure 4.7 compares the prob-
ability of an expansion ending when these shocks 
occur with the probability of an expansion ending 
in the absence of such a shock. Among external 
shocks, spikes in global uncertainty, recessions in 
advanced economies, sudden stops in capital flows, 
14See Chapter 4 of the October 2009 World Economic Outlook.
15The case of sudden stops in capital flows is less clear-cut, 
because a reversal in net capital flows could be driven by changes 
in domestic conditions. The findings reported here for sud-
den stops are not sensitive to whether the contemporaneous or 
lagged values of the sudden stop indicators are used. In addition, 
Appendix 4.4 reports a robustness test intended to minimize 
potential endogeneity, in which we focus on the subset of sudden 
stop episodes referred to in the literature as “systemic sudden 
stops,” which are those that coincide with a sharp rise in global 
uncertainty. The results hold in this case as well. 
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and terms-of-trade busts all significantly increase the 
likelihood that an expansion will end. Sudden stops 
and advanced economy recessions have the most 
pronounced effects; they raise the likelihood that an 
expansion will end by a factor of two. The effect of 
domestic shocks is just as strong if not stronger—
credit booms double the likelihood that an expan-
sion will shift into a downturn by the following year, 
and banking crises triple the likelihood.
how are policies associated with resilience?
We now turn to the role of monetary, fiscal, and 
exchange rate policies. One of the arguments put 
forward in the literature to explain higher resilience 
among emerging market and developing economies 
is these economies’ improved policy frameworks and 
increased policy space (see, for example, Kose and 
Prasad, 2010). For example, many have adopted 
inflation targeting and have reduced inflation since 
the early 1990s (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2009). Simi-
larly, some have graduated from procyclical fiscal 
policy and now have a greater ability to implement 
countercyclical fiscal policy than in the late 1990s 
(Frankel, Végh, and Vuletin, 2011) or have reduced 
their fiscal deficits and public debt.16 Finally, many 
have moved away from hard exchange rate pegs, 
and their more flexible exchange rates act as a shock 
absorber and reduce the vulnerability of the public 
and financial sectors to the sudden and severe cur-
rency depreciations characteristic of currency crises 
(Chang and Velasco, 2004).
We analyze both improved policy frameworks 
and enhanced policy space for fiscal, monetary, and 
exchange rate policies as follows:
 • Monetary policy: We consider whether the central 
bank has adopted inflation targeting. To measure 
policy space, we consider whether the economy 
had an inflation rate above or below 10 percent.17
16Végh and Vuletin (2012) also find that monetary policy in 
many emerging market and developing economies has graduated 
from being procyclical to being more countercyclical.
17Our results are robust to choosing a more stringent threshold 
for low inflation. See Appendix 4.4 for details.
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Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: AE = advanced economy. The bars show the average probability of exiting an 
expansion in the absence or presence of various types of external and domestic shocks. For 
external shocks, which are more likely to be exogenous, the red bars present the 
contemporaneous effect, that is, the probability that the expansion will end and the 
downturn will begin in the same year as the shock. For domestic shocks, for which 
endogeneity is more of a concern, the red bars are the lagged effect, that is, the probability 
that the expansion will end and the downturn will begin in the year after the shock. The 
probability of exit conditional on a shock also depends on the length of the expansion at the 
time the shock occurs; the average probability is used as a summary measure of the 
distribution of conditional probabilities. Statistically significant differences at the 10 percent 
level between the underlying distributions are denoted by starred and bolded labels.
Various shocks, both external and domestic, are associated with expansions coming to an 
end. Among external shocks, sudden stops in capital flows, spikes in global uncertainty, 
recessions in advanced economies, and terms-of-trade busts all significantly increase the 
likelihood that an expansion will end. Among domestic shocks, credit booms double and 
banking crises triple the likelihood that an expansion will shift to a downturn by the following 
year.
Figure 4.7.  Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Effects 
of Various Shocks on the Likelihood that an Expansion Will End
(Percent)
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 • Fiscal policy: We consider whether fiscal policy was 
countercyclical or procyclical.18 We also measure 
policy space—the scope for further increases in 
public debt without undermining sustainabil-
ity (Ostry and others, 2010, p. 4). We use two 
measures: whether the government was running 
a fiscal surplus or deficit, and whether it had a 
low or high ratio of public debt to GDP, with the 
threshold for “high” public debt at 50 percent of 
GDP.19
 • Exchange rate policy: We consider whether the 
economy had a pegged exchange rate or not. For 
policy space, we look at whether the economy had 
a current account surplus or deficit, a high or low 
ratio of external debt to GDP (above or below 40 
percent), and a high or low ratio of international 
reserves to GDP (above or below the sample 
median).20 
To assess the role of policies, we relate the dura-
tion of expansions and the speed of recoveries to the 
various policy measures using nonparametric dura-
tion analysis methods—that is, without imposing 
any structure or model on the data.21 Specifically, 
we use the standard Kaplan-Meier survivor func-
tion estimator to gauge whether policy frameworks 
and the availability of policy space help lengthen 
18The cyclicality of fiscal policy is measured by the correlation 
between the cyclical component of real government expenditure 
and the cyclical component of real GDP (Kaminsky, Reinhart, 
and Végh, 2004) measured over the previous 10 years. A negative 
correlation reflects a countercyclical fiscal policy; a positive cor-
relation reflects a procyclical fiscal policy.
19Mendoza and Ostry (2008) find that fiscal solvency in emerg-
ing markets diminishes beyond a public debt threshold of 50 
percent of GDP, with fiscal solvency measured by the responsive-
ness of the primary balance to changes in the debt level. Due to 
the poor coverage of data on fiscal balances across economies and 
over time, we proxy the fiscal balance by the change in the ratio 
of public debt to GDP adjusted by nominal GDP growth. See 
Appendix 4.1 for details.
20Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003, p. 10) find that 
“default in emerging markets can and does occur at ratios of 
external debt to GDP that would not be considered ‘excessive’ for 
the typical advanced economy.” About one-fifth of defaults they 
study in these countries occurred when external debt was less than 
40 percent of GDP, and one-third occurred when external debt 
was between 40 and 60 percent of GDP.
21Duration analysis goes by many names, including “survival” 
or “event history” analysis. Historically, such methods arose in 
medical research on the determinants of human mortality (the 
origin of the term “survival analysis”). See Appendix 4.3 for 
details.
expansions and hasten recoveries. As with domestic 
shocks, we use lagged values of the policy variables 
to minimize reverse causality, so that policy charac-
teristics in the current year are related to the likeli-
hood that an expansion or recovery will end in the 
next year.
We find that good policy frameworks have helped 
emerging market and developing economies prolong 
their expansions and hasten their recoveries. Figure 
4.8 illustrates how their average duration is associ-
ated with the various measures of policy frameworks 
and policy space.22 With regard to policy frame-
works, inflation targeting and a countercyclical fiscal 
policy significantly increase the length of expansions 
and hasten recoveries.23 In addition, not having 
a pegged exchange rate tends to lengthen expan-
sions, but has no significant effect on the speed of 
recoveries. 
Adequate policy space also appears to provide a 
cushion. Figure 4.8 shows that having a low infla-
tion rate significantly lengthens expansions and 
hastens recoveries. Having a fiscal surplus in the 
previous year leads to significantly longer expansions, 
but there is no significant impact of this variable on 
the speed of recoveries. Economies with low levels of 
public debt tend to recover much faster from down-
turns, but this variable has no significant effect on 
the length of expansions. Finally, a strong external 
position (characterized by current account surpluses, 
low external debt, and high international reserves) 
significantly lengthens expansions and hastens 
recoveries.24 
22The average recovery duration shown in Figure 4.8 may be 
somewhat surprising to those used to the much shorter recover-
ies in advanced economies, but recall from Figure 4.3 that the 
median path of output per capita following peaks in the 1970s 
and 1980s did not recover to the previous peak’s level even 10 
years later.
23This result is in line with de Carvalho Filho (2011), who 
documents that inflation-targeting economies fared better during 
the Great Recession.
24Several studies find that the strength of the countries’ external 
position (low levels of foreign-currency-denominated debt, low 
current account deficits) was an important factor in explaining the 
cross-country incidence of the Great Recession. See, for example, 
Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das (2010) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2010). Didier, Hevia, and Schmukler (2012) document the 
importance of foreign reserves in explaining the speed of recovery 
in the aftermath of the global crisis.
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how are Structural characteristics associated with 
resilience?
In addition to macroeconomic policies, an econo-
my’s structural characteristics shape its performance in 
general and its response to shocks in particular. Various 
hypotheses have been put forward in recent years that 
relate changes in the resilience of emerging market and 
developing economies to shifts in their economic struc-
tures. Although many potential characteristics could 
affect resilience, we focus on the following:
 • Increased trade openness and diversification: There 
has been a significant shift in both the trade 
openness and trading patterns of emerging market 
and developing economies. Trade openness has 
increased substantially over time as trade regimes 
have been liberalized and the costs of transporta-
tion and communication have fallen. Greater trade 
openness helps reduce dependence on domestic 
demand and vulnerability to domestic shocks, but 
it may also make economies more vulnerable to 
slowdowns in external demand. Greater diversifi-
cation across trading partners would help reduce 
these economies’ vulnerability to slowdowns in spe-
cific trading partners. In this regard, the dramatic 
increase in trade among these economies is thought 
to have helped them weather the recent advanced 
economy crisis, although prospectively it may 
increase their vulnerability to a slowdown in large 
emerging markets like China (Box 4.2). 
 • Increased financial openness and changes in the 
composition of capital flows: As with trade, there 
has been a steady move toward greater finan-
cial openness in many regions. Increased capital 
account openness can facilitate risk sharing, but it 
can also leave countries more vulnerable to finan-
cial shocks or sudden stops in capital flows. For 
some emerging market and developing economies, 
susceptibility to the volatility of capital flows has 
been mitigated by a change in their composi-
tion—toward foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which is thought to be more stable.
 • Income equality: Rodrik (1999) posits that when 
social divisions run deep, the effects of external 
shocks are magnified by the distributional con-
flicts they trigger. Adjustment to external shocks 
often has distributional consequences, and in 
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Good policies have contributed to emerging market and developing economies’ resilience. 
Specifically, greater policy space (as measured by low inflation and favorable fiscal and 
external positions) and improved policy frameworks (as measured by countercyclical policy, 
the adoption of inflation targeting, and more flexible exchange rate regimes) are associated 
with longer expansions and faster recoveries.
Figure 4.8.  Emerging Market and Developing Economies: 
Effects of Policies on Expansion Duration and Speed of 
Recovery
(Years)
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economies where “latent social conflict” is high—
as measured by proxies such as income inequality, 
ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, and social 
mistrust—adjustment tends to be inadequate, 
prolonging the negative effects of the shock. More 
recent papers such as Berg and Ostry (2011) find 
that greater income equality enables countries to 
sustain periods of rapid growth.
Although the effects of shocks and policies on 
the duration of expansions are apparent and almost 
always significant, the effects of structural char-
acteristics are less clear-cut (Figure 4.9, panel 1). 
We use the same techniques as in previous sub-
sections to examine their effects on the duration 
of expansions and the speed of recoveries, again 
using lagged values to mitigate reverse causality, so 
that structural characteristics in the current year 
are related to the likelihood that an expansion or 
recovery will end in the following year. Greater 
trade openness and trade liberalization are not 
significantly associated with the duration of expan-
sions. Nor are the extent of trade among emerging 
market and developing economies or greater finan-
cial integration. In contrast, greater FDI flows are 
associated with a small but statistically significant 
increase in the average duration of expansions. The 
strongest structural correlate of expansion duration, 
at least in this bivariate exercise, is income inequal-
ity—countries with below-median income inequal-
ity have expansions that last about five years longer 
than those with above-median income inequality.
The effects of structural factors on the speed of 
recovery are more distinct (Figure 4.9, panel 2). 
Greater trade openness and diversification, lower 
financial integration, higher capital account openness, 
and higher FDI are all significantly associated with 
faster recoveries. But greater income equality does not 
have a significant effect on the speed of recovery. 
putting It all together: Multivariate analysis
To this point, the chapter has examined individual 
variables and their association with the resilience of 
emerging market and developing economies. How-
ever, these determinants rarely change in isolation and 
often move together, and so a proper assessment of 
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It is more difficult to tease out the effects of economies’ structural characteristics—such as 
trade patterns, composition of capital flows, and the degree of financial integration—on 
resilience. Among these characteristics, only FDI flows and low income inequality were 
significantly associated with longer expansion. The effects of structural factors on the speed 
of recovery are more distinct: greater trade openness and diversification, lower financial 
integration, higher capital account openness,  and higher FDI are all significantly associated 
with faster recoveries. Income inequality does not have a significant effect on the speed of 
recovery.
Figure 4.9.  Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Effects 
of Structural Characteristics on Expansion Duration and Speed 
of Recovery
(Years)
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each variable’s influence requires controlling for move-
ments in the other variables. To do this, we undertake 
a multivariate analysis of resilience. We do this using 
the tools of parametric duration analysis, which allow 
the duration of an expansion or the speed of recov-
ery to be modeled as a function of several variables 
simultaneously. This analysis provides a sense of how 
each variable is related to the chances that the episode 
under study will last—that is, whether the variable 
tends to increase or decrease the expected length of an 
episode at a given time. Appendix 4.3 contains details 
on the duration model used here.
The large number of potential correlates and the 
poor data availability for some of these necessitate a 
parsimonious approach to the multivariate analysis. 
As noted, a wide array of factors have been identi-
fied as possible factors in the improved resilience of 
emerging market and developing economies, but 
there is only limited historical experience on which 
to draw to test the simultaneous impact of these 
various factors. For example, the data are extremely 
sparse for our measure of the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy prior to the 1990s. As a result, we focus on a 
selected subset of the variables explored in the previ-
ous section:
 • External shocks: global uncertainty, the U.S. real 
interest rate, indicators of terms-of-trade busts, 
sudden stops in capital inflows, and advanced 
economy recessions;
 • Domestic shocks: indicators of credit booms and 
systemic banking crises;
 • Domestic policies: indicators of single-digit infla-
tion and public debt levels below 50 percent of 
GDP, and a measure of international reserves to 
GDP; and
 • Structural characteristics: trade openness, financial 
openness, and income equality.
Apart from the external shocks, the explanatory 
variables are lagged as in the previous section to 
mitigate potential endogeneity.
What ends expansions?
The first column of Table 4.1 shows how the 
expected duration of an expansion is associated 
with these variables. The estimates are based on an 
accelerated failure time model, which breaks the 
determinants of duration into two components: 
a baseline expected duration, which captures how 
long an episode is likely to last at a particular time, 
independent of other variables, and a “shifter” that 
scales this baseline and is a function of a set of 
explanatory variables. The Weibull shape param-
eter for the model indicates that an expansion 
has a greater chance of ending the longer it lasts 
(the parameter is greater than 1). The effects of 
the explanatory variables on the baseline are given 
by the time ratios, which are the numbers shown 
in the table for each variable. The magnitude of 
these time ratios denotes the factor by which the 
expected duration of the expansion is increased 
relative to the baseline. If the time ratio is greater 
than 1, the variable tends to lengthen the expan-
sion or slow the recovery relative to the baseline; if 
it is less than 1, it tends to shorten the expansion 
or hasten the recovery.
The multivariate duration analysis for expansions 
mostly confirms the bivariate relationships reported 
above. External and domestic shocks tend to reduce 
the length of expansions. For example, a 1 point 
rise in global uncertainty reduces the expected 
duration of an expansion by about 5 percent 
(because the baseline expected duration is multi-
plied by 0.951). A 1 percentage point rise in the 
U.S. real interest rate has a similar effect. Sudden 
stops, advanced economy recessions, credit booms, 
and banking crises reduce the expected dura-
tion of an expansion by about 40 percent. These 
shocks have statistically significant effects, with the 
exception of terms-of-trade busts and the U.S. real 
interest rate.
The policy-related variables tend to increase the 
length of expansions, although the statistical signifi-
cance of these effects varies. Low inflation lengthens 
the expansion by about 47 percent, whereas a 10 
percent of GDP increase in international reserves 
lengthens it by about 9 percent. In the multivariate 
model, a low public debt level does not have a statis-
tically significant effect on expansion duration.
The structural characteristics tend to have little to 
no effect. Only higher income inequality and greater 
financial integration reduce the expected expansion 
duration in a statistically significant manner, but 
even then, the magnitudes are small.
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As seen in the second and third columns of Table 
4.1, there is also some evidence that the effects of 
some variables on the length of expansions have 
changed over time. To investigate whether the 
greater resilience observed after 1989 results from 
changes in the sensitivity of expansions to shocks 
and policies, we estimate a model in which the 
effects are allowed to be different before and after 
1989. 
The sensitivity of expansion duration to shocks 
has not changed over time. Although the effects of 
some external shocks is slightly weaker after 1989, 
only global uncertainty and U.S. real interest rates 
have statistically significant effects that differ across 
these subperiods, and both tend to shorten expan-
sions more after 1989. Domestic shocks also tend to 
have a weaker effect after 1989, but the difference is 
not statistically significant. 
The effects of policy-related variables and struc-
tural characteristics are generally similar across the 
two subperiods, with a couple of notable exceptions. 
Income inequality and financial openness shorten 
expansion only before 1989; after 1989, they have 
no statistically significant effect.
Table 4.1. What Ends Expansions and Recoveries?
Explanatory Variable
Expansions Recoveries
All Years Pre-1990 Post-1989 All Years Pre-1990 Post-1989
Implied S&P 100 Volatility (VXO)1 0.951***
(–4.179)
0.981
(–0.985)
0.943***
(–4.565)
1.054***
(2.846)
1.060**
(2.143)
1.042**
(2.012)
U.S. Ex Ante Real Interest Rate 0.956
(–1.461)
0.993
(–0.158)
0.835***
(–3.479)
1.085
(1.502)
0.960
(–0.397)
1.068
(0.748)
Terms-of-Trade Bust Indicator 0.968
(–0.214)
0.802
(–1.034)
1.134
(0.740)
1.751
(1.582)
1.819
(1.065)
1.726*
(1.944)
Sudden Stop (capital inflows) Indicator 0.590***
(–2.927)
0.497*
(–1.885)
0.841
(–1.254)
0.921
(–0.171)
1.208
(0.168)
0.834
(–0.452)
Advanced Economy Recession Indicator 0.642***
(–4.074)
0.668**
(–2.420)
0.680*
(–1.911)
1.271
(0.922)
1.006
(0.0209)
1.012
(0.0372)
Credit Boom during Past Three Years 0.616***
(–3.913)
0.591***
(–2.621)
0.705***
(–2.610)
1.449
(0.875)
1.200
(0.300)
1.546
(0.867)
Banking Crisis Indicator 0.550***
(–3.376)
0.504***
(–3.302)
0.538***
(–2.830)
Single-Digit Inflation Indicator 1.473***
(3.185)
1.574**
(2.474)
1.276**
(2.102)
0.692
(–1.465)
0.788
(–0.674)
1.132
(0.457)
Low Public Debt to GDP Indicator 1.009
(0.0713)
0.998
(–0.0117)
1.019
(0.132)
0.550***
(–2.648)
0.623
(–1.308)
0.472***
(–2.969)
International Reserves to GDP 1.009***
(2.866)
1.006
(1.289)
1.004
(0.903)
0.993
(–0.927)
1.001
(0.0636)
0.998
(–0.241)
Income Inequality (Gini coefficient) 0.986**
(–2.144)
0.976***
(–2.833)
0.997
(–0.459)
Trade Openness (exports plus imports to 
GDP)
0.999
(–0.451)
1.001
(0.373)
1.000
(–0.170)
0.993**
(–2.327)
0.987**
(–2.324)
1.000
(–0.0371)
Financial Openness (external assets plus 
liabilities to GDP)
0.999***
(–3.121)
0.999***
(–4.840)
1.000
(–0.549)
1.001**
(2.154)
1.004
(1.183)
1.000
(–0.488)
Observations 1,264 832
Number of Episodes 188 144
Number of Exits 126 118
Number of Economies 75 76
Weibull Shape Parameter 1.516 1.408 2.277 0.829 0.857 1.024
Z Statistic of Shape Parameter 6.829 3.258 2.928 –3.792 –1.846 1.713
Log Likelihood –103.0 –88.1 –201.1 –189.1
Model Chi-Squared p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Exponentiated coefficients shown are time ratios, which indicate whether the variable tends to shorten (less than 1) or lengthen (greater than 1) the expected time-in-
episode. Z statistics are given in parentheses underneath the coefficient estimates. A negative z statistic indicates that the associated variable tends to shorten an episode; if 
the z statistic is positive, it tends to lengthen an episode. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
1VXO = Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 100 volatility index.
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What hastens recoveries?
The three right-hand columns of Table 4.1 show 
how the various factors affect the speed of recovery. 
Unfortunately, data limitations require that we drop 
two of the variables—banking crises and income 
inequality.
The multivariate results broadly confirm the 
directional effects from the bivariate analyses, but 
statistical significance is much weaker. Only a few 
statistically significant variables are associated with 
the speed of recoveries. 
In general, recoveries accompanied by the large 
shocks considered in this chapter tend to be slower 
(the time ratio is larger than 1), but only global 
uncertainty is statistically significant. Greater policy 
space helps hasten recoveries, but again with less 
statistical significance than in the bivariate analyses. 
Low inflation, low public debt, and high reserves 
tend to hasten recoveries, but only low public debt 
has a statistically significant effect. Among the struc-
tural characteristics, trade openness significantly has-
tens recoveries and financial openness significantly 
slows them, but both effects are comparatively small.
The fifth and sixth columns of Table 4.1 show the 
estimated effects on the speed of recoveries before 
and after 1989. Among the external shocks, only the 
effect of global uncertainty is consistently significant, 
but it does not appear to have changed over time. 
Terms-of-trade busts slow recoveries, but are statisti-
cally significant only after 1989. Low public debt 
dramatically hastens recoveries after 1989 (roughly 
halving the expected duration), but it had no signifi-
cant effect before 1989. Greater trade openness tends 
to hasten recoveries more before than after 1989. 
The estimated effects of the other policy-related vari-
ables and structural characteristics were not statisti-
cally different between the two subperiods.
Wrapping Up: What has contributed to 
Increased resilience? 
What are the key drivers of the increasing resil-
ience that emerging market and developing econo-
mies have demonstrated in recent years? There are 
a number of potential explanations. One is that the 
shocks that afflicted them in past decades—credit 
boom-bust cycles, sudden stops, and financial crises, 
to name just a few—have become less frequent,  
less severe, or both.25 A second is that although the 
shocks themselves have not changed, their effects 
have decreased over time. But, as shown in the 
previous section, the effects of shocks on the dura-
tion of expansions and the speed of recoveries have 
not lessened since 1989. A third is that emerging 
market and developing economies have built bigger 
cushions—in the form of better policy frameworks 
and enhanced policy space or more diversified 
production or trade patterns—that help them better 
weather shocks. We explore each of these possible 
explanations.
Homegrown shocks seem to have become less 
frequent in recent years (Figure 4.10, panels 1 and 
2). The share of emerging market and developing 
economies that had a banking crisis, for example, 
rose during the 1990s but fell during the 2000s. 
Even with substantial financial spillovers and a 
much weaker economic environment as a result of 
the Great Recession, only four of these economies 
(Latvia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Ukraine) had a sys-
temic banking crisis during 2008–09, and none had 
one in the past two years. Similarly, the incidence 
of credit booms fell between the 1990s and the 
2000s.26 Although the number of credit booms was 
high during 2008–09, it fell back during 2010–11 
as economic and credit conditions worsened and as 
some of these economies tightened macroeconomic 
and credit policies to rein in rapid credit growth. In 
addition, the deviation from trend of real credit per 
capita during recent credit booms has been lower on 
average than during booms in previous decades (see 
Figure 4.10, panel 2, red line). 
Some external shocks have become more frequent, 
others less frequent (Figure 4.10, panels 3 through 
7). Sudden stops and spikes in global uncertainty 
have been more common in the past decade. But 
terms-of-trade busts and advanced economy reces-
25While it may be tempting to attribute fewer or less severe 
shocks to good luck, it should be kept in mind that many of these 
so-called shocks are endogenous to policymaking. For example, 
less frequent credit boom-bust cycles and banking crises can result 
from tighter regulation and supervision.
26Emerging Europe is a notable exception here—the credit 
boom-bust cycle that several emerging European countries have 
gone through is one of the causes of the region’s weaker perfor-
mance in the past decade.
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sions declined in frequency between the 1980s 
and 2000–07. External shocks reemerged with a 
vengeance amid the 2008–09 global crisis but have 
receded in the past two years. The continued volatil-
ity of capital flows and commodity prices and the 
weak activity in advanced economies suggest taking 
a cautious view on the likelihood of such shocks in 
the future—a point discussed further below. 
There has been a broad improvement in policy 
frameworks and policy space over time, and this 
has increased the resilience of emerging market and 
developing economies (Figure 4.11). Inflation has 
fallen in many of these economies: although half of 
them had double-digit inflation in the 1970s and 
1980s, more than 80 percent now have inflation in 
the single digits. This may partly reflect the fact that 
more central banks have adopted inflation target-
ing. Exchange rate regimes have also become more 
flexible—there are fewer hard pegs than in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
The external positions of many of these econo-
mies are much improved. More are running current 
account surpluses, and the median external debt 
level has fallen from close to 60 percent of GDP in 
the 1990s to less than 35 percent of GDP today. 
Most of these economies now have external debt 
levels below 40 percent of GDP, a threshold that 
Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) flag as a 
level beyond which “debt intolerance” increases. 
And increasing reserves have not been limited to the 
high-profile Asian emerging markets—the median 
emerging market and developing economy saw its 
reserves rise from less than 8 percent of GDP on 
average in the 1990s to 18 percent of GDP during 
2010–11. It should be noted, however, that current 
account surpluses come at the cost of potentially 
raising global imbalances, and high reserve holdings 
can entail a substantial opportunity cost.
Fiscal positions and frameworks have also 
improved, although fiscal balances have not fully 
recovered from the effects of the Great Recession. 
Median public debt has fallen from over 65 percent 
of GDP in the 1990s to less than 40 percent of 
GDP in the past two years. The number of coun-
tries implementing countercyclical fiscal policies 
is also on the rise. The share of emerging market 
and developing economies with fiscal surpluses rose 
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Note: Economy groups are defined in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. AE = advanced economy; EMDE 
= emerging market and developing economy; VXO = Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 100 
volatility index. In panels 1, 2, 4, and 5, bars represent the share of EMDEs hit by the shock 
(banking crises, credit booms, terms-of-trade busts, sudden stops in capital flows) in each 
subperiod. In panels 3, 6, and 7, bars represent the share of years with shocks (spikes in global 
uncertainty, spikes in U.S. short-term real interest rate, recessions in AEs) in each subperiod.
There is no clear downward trend in the frequency of shocks to these economies. Although 
domestic shocks (banking crises and credit booms) were less frequent in the 2000–07 period 
compared with the 1980s, the frequency of external shocks has varied. The frequency of global 
uncertainty spikes and sudden stops in capital inflows increased between the 1980s and 
2000–07, while the frequency of terms-of-trade shocks and advanced economy recessions 
declined over the same period. Many of these shocks reemerged in 2008–09 but have become 
less common in the past two years.
Figure 4.10.  Frequency of Various Types of Domestic and 
External Shocks to Emerging Market and Developing 
Economies
(Percent unless noted otherwise)
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Policy frameworks in these economies have improved in the 2000s as more adopted nonpegged exchange rates, inflation targeting, and countercyclical fiscal policy. Policy space 
also improved: more economies enjoyed single-digit inflation, current account and fiscal surpluses, lower external and public debt, and higher international reserves. 
Figure 4.11.  Policy Frameworks and Policy Space in Emerging Market and Developing Economies
(Percent unless noted otherwise)
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steadily from the 1970s to the 1990s. By the early 
2000s more than one-quarter had budget surpluses, 
although that number fell during 2008–09 as many 
of these economies used this fiscal space to support 
their economies.
Structural factors—trade openness, financial 
openness, and income equality—have also mostly 
moved in the correct direction. The slight down-
ward trend in income inequality—the median Gini 
coefficient among emerging market and developing 
economies fell from 42 in the 1990s to less than 40 
in 2008–09—may have helped increase expansion 
duration (Figure 4.12).27 There has also been a trend 
toward increased trade among emerging market and 
developing economies, a greater share of FDI flows, 
and higher trade and financial integration. But the 
small and often statistically insignificant effects of 
these structural characteristics suggest that they are 
likely not a major factor in explaining these econo-
mies’ increased resilience.
the relative contributions of Shocks, policies, and 
Structure to Increased resilience
The multivariate model from the previous sec-
tion (see Table 4.1, column 1) can be used to shed 
light on the relative contributions of these possible 
explanations to resilience. Such an exercise can only 
be indicative, because the results will be sensitive to 
the specific variables that enter the model. Moreover, 
these contributions should not be given a causal 
interpretation, because we do not identify the exog-
enous component of policies (a Herculean task for 
these economies). Nevertheless, this decomposition 
can help provide a feel for the importance of the 
various changes for these economies’ performance.
The model suggests that improved policies account 
for about three-fifths of their increased resilience 
between the 1980s and 2000–07, and fewer shocks 
account for the remaining two-fifths; structural char-
acteristics have made a negligible contribution (Figure 
4.13, panel 1). As noted above and in Figure 4.10, 
the frequency of banking crises and credit booms 
27Country coverage of income inequality data dropped sharply 
in 2010 and 2011, to fewer than 20 countries, so we exclude it 
here and in the figure.
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Emerging market and developing economies’ structural characteristics have improved in 
the 2000s. There has been a significant increase in trade openness and diversification 
across trading partners, with a marked increase in intra-EMDE trade. Financial integration 
has also increased, with a larger share of cross-border flows taking the form of FDI. 
Income inequality has also fallen, and fewer economies have a high Gini coefficient. 
Figure 4.12.  Structural Characteristics of Emerging Market and 
Developing Economies
(Percent unless noted otherwise)
1. Low Income Inequality
5. High Net FDI
(percent of GDP)
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declined between 1980 and 2000–07. This reduc-
tion in frequency and the estimated impact from the 
duration model imply that the decline in domestic 
shocks has improved the expected mean duration of 
expansions by about 5 percent relative to the 1980s. 
Similarly, the decline in terms-of-trade busts and 
advanced economy recessions during 2000–07 relative 
to the 1980s has more than offset the more frequent 
spikes in global uncertainty and sudden stops in 
capital inflows. On the whole, the reduced number 
of external shocks has improved the expected mean 
duration of expansions by about 10 percent relative 
to the 1980s. The largest improvement has been in 
policies, however, as documented in Figure 4.11; the 
changes in the policy variables between the 1980s 
and 2000–07, along with the estimated coefficients, 
suggest that improved policies have increased the 
expected mean duration of expansions by about 20 
percent during the past two decades.28 
The relative contributions of shocks, improved 
policies, and structural characteristics to the increase 
in resilience are similar across geographic regions and 
across commodity and noncommodity exporters. 
Resilience has increased even for heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs), partly thanks to debt relief they 
are receiving under the HIPC Initiative but also as a 
result of the reforms and policy improvements that are 
a precondition for debt relief (see Box 4.3, and Figure 
4.16 in Appendix 4.4).
The past two years (2010–11) were even better 
than 2000–07 with regard to expected mean dura-
tion of expansions (Figure 4.13, panel 2), particu-
larly for external shocks. Despite weak growth in 
many advanced economies, this was not a period of 
advanced economy recession. World interest rates 
were low, which supported global growth and credit 
conditions and fueled capital flows to emerging 
market and developing economies. And global uncer-
tainty remained elevated but was actually at the same 
level on average during 2010–11 as during 2000–07. 
There have also been no banking crises in emerging 
market and developing economies in the past two 
28The contribution of policies could be underestimated if 
the endogenous nature of some of the shocks considered here 
are taken into account: improved policymaking could lengthen 
expansions by reducing the incidence of shocks, such as banking 
crises, credit booms, and sudden stops in capital flows.
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Note: Expected mean durations for expansions and the contributions of variables are 
calculated using the duration model estimates from Table 4.1, column 1, and the average 
values of the explanatory variables for emerging market and developing economies over the 
corresponding period. The advanced economy crisis scenario in panel 2 assumes that the 
external shocks reach the levels experienced by emerging market and developing 
economies during 2008–09.
The expected mean duration of expansion rose steadily from the 1980s to the early 2000s. 
This increase reflected mostly greater policy space, with more economies achieving lower 
inflation and building up their international reserve buffers. But fewer and less intense 
external and domestic shocks also played a part. The expected mean duration of expansions 
dropped precipitously over 2008–09, with the spike in external shocks coming from 
advanced economies during the Great Recession. The lack of external shocks over the past 
two years has helped raise the expected expansion length. However, a sharp rise in 
advanced economy stresses could largely wipe out these expected gains, reducing the 
expected expansion length to the level seen during the Great Recession.
Figure 4.13.  Contribution of Shocks, Policies, and Structure to 
the Length of Expansions in Emerging Market and Developing 
Economies
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years, and policy space has improved. Although fiscal 
balances declined in the aftermath of the Great Reces-
sion, median public debt fell from about 45 percent 
of GDP during 2000–07 to about 35 percent of 
GDP during 2010–11, and more of these economies 
now have low inflation and low public debt. Taken 
together, these factors have increased the estimated 
expected mean duration of expansions. 
conclusion
The results of this chapter confirm that emerging 
market and developing economies are now more 
resilient than in previous decades. This is not a 
recent phenomenon—their performance was already 
noticeably better in the 1990s than during the previ-
ous two decades, even with severe downturns such as 
the Tequila, Asian, and Russian crises. But the recent 
decade has really been exceptional—for the first 
time, emerging market and developing economies 
have performed better than advanced economies as 
measured by time spent in expansion. The chap-
ter’s findings on the explanations for these gains in 
resilience lend support to an optimistic view that 
they are not temporary. These economies are doing 
better now both because the frequency of shocks 
has fallen and because policymaking has improved. 
This improvement is evident not only in emerging 
markets, but also in low-income countries, includ-
ing countries that are benefiting from the HIPC 
Initiative. 
The caveat, of course, is that the relative calm of the 
past two years could well be temporary. As highlighted 
in Chapter 1, there is a significant risk that advanced 
economies could experience another downturn, as 
continuing sovereign and banking tensions in Europe 
and the so-called fiscal cliff in the United States 
threaten to put the brakes on growth. Terms-of-trade 
busts in emerging market and develop ing economies 
could rise if commodity prices drop. Further spikes 
in global uncertainty are possible, and sudden stops 
could emerge once again if greater risk aversion leads 
to capital outflows. Domestic vulnerabilities could also 
emerge—as noted in Chapter 1, strong credit growth 
in some emerging market and developing economies, 
which likely supported domestic demand, may raise 
concerns about financial stability.
Should the external environment worsen again, 
emerging market and developing economies will 
likely end up recoupling with advanced economies, 
much as they did during the Great Recession (see 
Figure 4.13, panel 2, red bar). And even in the 
absence of an external shock, homegrown shocks 
could pull down growth further in some key emerg-
ing economies, as highlighted in Chapter 1. To 
guard against such risks, these economies will need 
to rebuild their buffers to ensure that they have 
adequate policy space. In response to the global 
downturn, policy space was rightly used to support 
activity. These economies will be more resilient to 
new shocks if recent improvements in their policy 
frameworks—including greater exchange rate flex-
ibility and more countercycli cal macroeconomic 
policies—are maintained, while policy buffers are 
being rebuilt.
appendix 4.1. Data Sources
The primary data sources for this chapter are the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) and Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS) databases and the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database. All the data sources used in the analysis 
are listed in Table 4.2. The analytical and regional 
groupings of economies are presented in Table 4.3. 
Data on output per capita at the annual frequency 
are from the WEO and are extended with series 
from the WDI and the Penn World Tables 7.0. 
external Shocks
Global uncertainty is measured by Bloom’s (2009) 
index of volatility spliced with the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange S&P 100 volatility index (VXO). 
Spikes in global uncertainty are periods in which the 
VXO is above its 75th percentile. Advanced economy 
recessions are defined as in Chapter 1 of the October 
2010 issue of the World Economic Outlook, with five 
such recessions during our sample period: 1974–75, 
1980–83, 1991–93, 2001, and 2008–09. The U.S. 
ex ante real interest rate is defined as the interest 
rate on three-month Treasury bills minus projected 
inflation, which is the percent change in the fore-
cast GDP deflator from the Survey of Professional 
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Forecasters. Large increases in the U.S. ex ante real 
interest rates are those in the top quartile.
Data on net private capital flows are from the IMF 
Balance of Payments Statistics (BPS) database. Net 
private capital flows correspond to the sum of net 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (line 4500), net 
portfolio flows (line 4600), net derivative flows (line 
4910), and net other investment flows (line 4700), 
excluding other investment flows to the general 
government and monetary authorities. A sudden stop 
in capital flows occurs when the ratio of net private 
capital flows to GDP falls by at least 5 percentage 
points from the previous year, and when the level of 
net private flows is more than 1 standard deviation 
below its economy-specific mean. The BPS database is 
also used to obtain the net foreign direct investment 
flows as a share of GDP.
The trade-weighted terms of trade are constructed 
using the deflators of exports and imports of goods 
and services and the series of GDP, exports, and 
imports of goods and services in nominal terms—all 
from the WEO and WDI databases. In particular, 
the terms-of-trade series is calculated as the percent 
change in the export price deflator times the share 
of exports in GDP in the previous period minus the 
percent change in the import price deflator times 
the share of imports in GDP in the previous period. 
Terms-of-trade busts are defined as a worsening in the 
terms of trade of at least 3 percent of GDP.
Domestic Shocks
The banking crisis indicator is from Laeven and 
Valencia (2012). Bank credit to the private nonfi-
nancial sector is taken from the IFS database. Breaks 
in these data are identified using the IFS Country 
Notes publications, and data are growth-spliced 
at these points. We follow Mendoza and Terrones 
(2008) and define credit booms as periods in which 
the cyclical component of log real private credit per 
capita is at least 1.65 times its standard deviation 
above its mean.
Table 4.2. Data Sources
Variable Source
Bank Credit to the Private Sector
Banking Crisis Indicators
Bilateral Exports
Capital Account Openness
Consumer Price Inflation
Current Account Balance
De Facto Exchange Rate Regime
Export Deflator
Exports of Goods and Services
External Debt to GDP
Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign Assets
Foreign Liabilities
GDP (nominal local currency)
GDP (U.S. dollars)
GDP per Capita (real)
Gini Coefficient
Global Uncertainty
Government Expenditure
Import Deflator
Imports of Goods and Services
Inflation-Targeting Indicator
Net Private Capital Flows
Public Debt to GDP
Reserves to GDP
Trade Liberalization Index
U.S. Projected Inflation
U.S. 3-Month Treasury Bill Interest Rate
International Financial Statistics Database
Laeven and Valencia (2012)
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Database
Chinn and Ito (2006), updated to 2010
World Economic Outlook Database
World Economic Outlook Database
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008), updated to 2010
World Economic Outlook Database, World Development Indicators Database
World Economic Outlook Database, World Development Indicators Database
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database updated to 2010
IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Database
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database updated to 2010
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database updated to 2010
World Economic Outlook Database, World Development Indicators Database
World Economic Outlook Database, World Development Indicators Database
World Economic Outlook Database, World Development Indicators, Penn World Tables 7.0
Solt (2009), Standardized World Income Inequality Database v. 3.1
Bloom (2009) and Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P100 volatility index (VXO)
World Economic Outlook Database
World Economic Outlook Database, World Development Indicators Database
World Economic Outlook Database, World Development Indicators Database
Roger (2010)
IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Database
Abbas and others (2010)
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database updated to 2010
Wacziarg and Welch (2008)
Survey of Professional Forecasters, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Global Financial Database
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Table 4.3. Economy Groups
Advanced Economies 
(AEs)
Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs)
Emerging Market Economies (EMs) Low-Income Countries (LICs)
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Asia
China
Hong Kong SAR
India
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taiwan Province of China
Thailand
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)
Azerbaijan*
Belarus
Kazakhstan*
Russia*
Ukraine
Europe
Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia 
Poland
Romania
Serbia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Turkey
Latin America
Argentina
Brazil
Chile*
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador*
El Salvador
Guatemala
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Paraguay
Peru*
Trinidad and Tobago*
Uruguay
Venezuela*
Middle East and  
North Africa (MENA)
Algeria*
Egypt
Iran*
Iraq*
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait*
Lebanon
Libya*
Morocco
Oman*
Saudi Arabia*
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates*
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Angola*
Botswana
Namibia
South Africa
Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Cambodia
Lao P.D.R.
Myanmar
Nepal
Papua New Guinea*
Timor-Leste*
Vietnam
Commonwealth of Independent  
States (CIS)
Armenia
Georgia
Kyrgyz Republic
Moldova
Mongolia*
Latin America
Bolivia*
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Mauritania*
Sudan*
Yemen*
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Benin
Burkina Faso*
Burundi*
Cameroon
Central African Republic*
Chad*
Democratic Republic of the Congo*
Republic of Congo*
Côte d’Ivoire
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea*
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi*
Mali*
Mozambique*
Niger
Nigeria*
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone*
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia*
Zimbabwe*
Note: * denotes a primary commodity and/or fuel exporter, as classified in the WEO Statistical Appendix. All economies in the analysis have an average population over the 
sample period of 1 million inhabitants or more. Some economies currently classified as advanced by the WEO are classified as emerging markets in this chapter, because 
over the past 60 years these economies were more like emerging markets than advanced economies and because their experience—especially their ability to grow suf-
ficiently to attain advanced economy status—provides valuable lessons.
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policy Frameworks and policy Space
The dates when countries adopted inflation target-
ing are from Roger (2010), and de facto exchange rate 
regime data are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008). We measure the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy as the correlation between the 
cyclical component of real government expenditure 
from the WEO database and the cyclical component 
of real GDP (similar to Kaminsky, Reinhart, and 
Végh, 2004). A negative correlation corresponds to a 
countercyclical fiscal policy, while a positive correla-
tion corresponds to a procyclical fiscal policy. The 
fiscal balance is calculated as the change in the ratio 
of public debt to GDP, corrected for nominal GDP 
growth. Fiscal surplus is an indicator equal to 1 if 
the fiscal balance is positive. Data on public debt are 
from Abbas and others (2010). The low public debt 
indicator equals 1 if public debt is less than 50 per-
cent of GDP, the level at which Mendoza and Ostry 
(2008) find that fiscal solvency in emerging markets 
diminishes.
The External Wealth of Nations Mark II Data-
base (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) is used to 
construct the ratios of external debt to GDP, reserves 
to GDP, and financial integration, which is defined as 
the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities divided 
by GDP. The low external debt indicator equals 1 if 
external debt is less than 40 percent of GDP, a thresh-
old that Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) flag 
as a level beyond which “debt intolerance” increases. 
The current account balance and consumer price 
inflation are both taken from the WEO database. The 
low-inflation indicator equals 1 if inflation is below 
10 percent.
Structural characteristics
Trade openness is measured as the sum of imports 
and exports of goods and services over GDP. The 
trade liberalization index is from Wacziarg and Welch 
(2008), and capital account openness is from Chinn 
and Ito (2006). Data on bilateral merchandise 
imports and exports are from the Direction of Trade 
Statistics database and are used to construct the share 
of exports to emerging market and developing economies. 
Finally, inequality, as captured in the Gini coefficient 
of household disposable income, is from Solt (2009).
appendix 4.2. characterizing resilience Using 
an autoregressive process on Growth
To assess the potential drivers of resilience, this 
appendix characterizes expansions and recoveries 
for advanced economies and emerging market and 
developing economies using a first-order autore-
gressive—AR(1)—process for growth in real GDP 
per capita, similar to the one used by Blanchard 
and Simon (2001). In particular, it explores 
whether an AR(1) model with time-varying coef-
ficients can reproduce the time spent in expansion, 
median real GDP per capita growth in expansions, 
and the median amplitude of downturns observed 
in the data. For that purpose, the following AR(1) 
process is estimated:
gt = a + bgt–1 + et with et ~ N(0, s2), (4.1)
in which gt is growth in real GDP per capita at 
time t, a is a constant, b is the first-order autore-
gressive coefficient, and et  is a mean-zero shock at 
time t. This equation is estimated for each economy 
over three subperiods: 1950–69, 1970–89, and 
1990–2007. Table 4.4 presents the median estimated 
coefficients, and interquartile ranges, by economy 
group and subperiod.
The results for the advanced economies show 
that steady-state growth and growth variability 
have fallen. In particular, a and s have both 
fallen over time, and b has risen. As a result, 
steady-state growth, given by a/(1 – b), and 
growth variability, given by s/√1 – b2, have 
fallen. These have countervailing effects on expan-
sion duration: lower steady-state growth implies 
shorter expansions, whereas lower growth variabil-
ity implies longer expansions.
The results for emerging market and developing 
economies show that steady-state growth increased 
and growth variability fell in 1990–2007 relative 
to the previous 40 years. In particular, a fell from 
1950–69 to 1970–89, but it rose in 1990–2007, 
while b rose markedly from 1950–69 to 1970–89, 
remaining constant thereafter. The growth shock’s 
standard deviation s rose slightly from 1950–69  
to 1970–89, but declined during 1990–2007  
to levels below that of 1950–69. As a result,  
steady-state growth rose and growth variability  
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fell, resulting in both longer expansions and faster 
recoveries.29 
With these estimations in hand, this appendix 
explores whether the characteristics of expansions and 
recoveries seen in the data for emerging market and 
developing economies can be replicated with simu-
lated data based on the median estimated coefficients 
in Table 4.4 for 1970–89 and 1990–2007. In particu-
lar, we use the median coefficients for the emerging 
market and developing economies in each subperiod 
to run 1,000 simulations of the growth processes for 
50 years each. The Harding-Pagan algorithm is then 
applied to identify peaks and troughs in the level of 
simulated GDP per capita. In addition, each coef-
ficient is changed one at a time to assess its impact on 
resilience. Figure 4.14 presents the results.
The AR(1) model for real GDP growth per capita 
suggests that the improvement in resilience observed 
29The increase in steady-state growth and the fall in growth 
variability from 1970–89 to 1990–2007 are both statistically 
significant.
in emerging market and developing economies dur-
ing the past 20 years has been mostly a result of an 
increase in steady-state growth and to a lesser extent 
of lower output variability. However, as discussed 
below, these results must be viewed with caution 
because a linear AR(1) model cannot replicate some 
of the stylized facts presented in this chapter.
The AR(1) model underestimates the time spent in 
expansion during 1970–89 and overestimates it during 
1990–2007, resulting in a larger rise across periods 
than in the data (Figure 4.14, panel 1). The increase 
in time spent in expansion is mostly due to a rise in a. 
The coefficients b and s have no impact on the change 
in time spent in expansion (Figure 4.14, panel 2).
The AR(1) model overestimates growth during 
expansions during 1970–89 and underestimates 
growth during 1990–2007, resulting in no change 
between subperiods, even though the data indicate 
that there was an increase in the growth rate dur-
ing this period (Figure 4.14, panel 3). In short, the 
rise in growth during expansions due to a higher a 
is fully offset by the fall in growth due to a lower s 
Table 4.4. AR(1) Median Coefficients and Interquartile Range 
a b s s ÷ ((1 – b2)0.5) a ÷ (1 – b)
Advanced Economies 1950–69
Interquartile Range
1970–89
Interquartile Range
1990–2007
Interquartile Range
0.032
(0.025, 0.037)
0.018
(0.015, 0.022)
0.010
(0.009, 0.013)
0.057
(–0.043, 0.107)
0.181
(0.124, 0.274)
0.428
(0.314, 0.531)
0.028
(0.017, 0.033)
0.023
(0.020, 0.025)
0.014
(0.012, 0.016)
0.028
(0.018, 0.034)
0.023
(0.020, 0.025)
0.014
(0.013, 0.019)
0.034
(0.027, 0.040)
0.022
(0.021, 0.026)
0.019
(0.016, 0.023)
Emerging Market and 
Developing Economies
1950–69
Interquartile Range
1970–89
Interquartile Range
1990–2007
Interquartile Range
0.019
(0.009, 0.035)
0.003
(–0.004, 0.014)
0.018
(0.008, 0.030)
–0.069
(–0.262, 0.228)
0.232
(0.076, 0.439)
0.272
(–0.002, 0.505)
0.041
(0.031, 0.061)
0.044
(0.034, 0.063)
0.030
(0.021, 0.046)
0.043
(0.032, 0.065)
0.047
(0.038, 0.069)
0.034
(0.025, 0.051)
0.019
(0.008, 0.035)
0.004
(–0.005, 0.020)
0.027
(0.012, 0.042)
Emerging Market 
Economies
1950–69
Interquartile Range
1970–89
Interquartile Range
1990–2007
Interquartile Range
0.027
(0.015, 0.038)
0.009
(0.001, 0.023)
0.022
(0.012, 0.034)
–0.067
(–0.252, 0.175)
0.232
(0.157, 0.471)
0.275
(0.106, 0.484)
0.040
(0.029, 0.057)
0.042
(0.031, 0.061)
0.030
(0.021, 0.041)
0.041
(0.032, 0.065)
0.043
(0.033, 0.062)
0.032
(0.025, 0.046)
0.025
(0.016, 0.041)
0.015
(0.001, 0.029)
0.034
(0.020, 0.046)
Low-Income Countries 1950–69
Interquartile Range
1970–89
Interquartile Range
1990–2007
Interquartile Range
0.010
(0.004, 0.029)
–0.001
(–0.007, 0.005)
0.012
(0.003, 0.026)
–0.145
(–0.323, 0.242)
0.230
(0.029, 0.314)
0.271
(–0.058, 0.550)
0.043
(0.032, 0.063)
0.048
(0.039, 0.065)
0.033
(0.020, 0.052)
0.045
(0.034, 0.066)
0.051
(0.040, 0.070)
0.037
(0.023, 0.055)
0.014
(0.004, 0.025)
–0.001
(–0.007, 0.006)
0.015
(0.003, 0.033)
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: Economy groups are defined in table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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(Figure 4.14, panel 4). In addition, the AR(1) model 
underestimates the amplitude of downturns during 
both subperiods (Figure 4.14, panel 5). The decline in 
the downturns’ estimated amplitude from 1970–89 to 
1990–2007 is mostly due to an increase in a and to a 
lesser extent to a decline in s (Figure 4.14, panel 6).
appendix 4.3. Duration analysis
As a first step in the analysis of the duration of 
each episode (expansion or recovery) we map the 
data from calendar time into analysis time (denoted 
by t), which counts the time elapsed since the 
start of an episode (t = 0). Duration analysis then 
involves modeling how the evolution of the episode 
(as influenced by various explanatory variables) 
affects the likelihood that the episode will end at a 
point during the analysis time.
Bivariate analysis
Figure 4.7 shows the average probability that an 
episode will end, conditional on whether or not 
a shock has occurred. The mean is taken over the 
sample probabilities that an ongoing episode will 
end at each point in the analysis time. Statistical 
significance is calculated from a test of the difference 
between the set of estimated probabilities in which 
the shock occurs and the set in which it does not. 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the average duration of 
an episode conditional on whether or not the char-
acteristic of interest was present during the episode. 
These average durations are calculated from the 
Kaplan-Meier estimated survival curves conditional on 
the characteristic. Sometimes known as the “product 
limit estimators of the survival curve,” the Kaplan-
Meier curve estimation involves (1) calculating the 
probability that an episode will continue beyond a 
point in the analysis time, given that it has lasted 
until that point; and (2) taking the rolling product 
of these probabilities at each point in analysis time 
(Kaplan and Meier, 1958). The result is a mapping of 
analysis time to the probability of continuation, given 
that an episode has lasted until that point:
 nj – djS‒(t) =  ∏  ———, (4.2) j|tj≤t nj
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Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Peaks and troughs in output per capita are identified using the Harding-Pagan 
algorithm (Harding and Pagan, 2002). The simulated data are constructed using the median 
estimated coefficients from Table 4.4 for each period. These coefficients are plugged into an 
AR(1) equation for GDP growth per capita, and the growth innovations are drawn from a 
normal distribution with mean zero and variance of σ2, to run 1,000 simulations of growth 
processes for 50 years each for each period. The generated series of GDP growth per capita 
are then used to construct indices of GDP per capita in levels.
Simulated data from a calibrated AR(1) model with time-varying coefficients broadly 
replicate the stylized facts of resilience in emerging market and developing economies. 
However, comparing 1970–89 and 1990–2007 shows that the simulated data overestimate 
the increase in the time spent in expansion, and underestimate the median real GDP growth 
during expansions and the amplitude of downturns. Most of the gains in resilience between 
1970–89 and 1990–2007 result from an increase in the constant (α) and to a lesser extent 
from a lower standard deviation of growth innovations (σ).   
Figure 4.14.  Emerging Market and Developing Economies: 
Effects of Changing the Autoregressive Model Coefficients
Effects of Changing Coefficients
(difference from the 1970–89 simulated 
data; percentage points)
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in which j indexes the set of observed episode lengths, 
S‒ represents the estimated survival curve, nj is the 
number of episodes at risk of ending at time tj, given 
that they have lasted until that time, and dj is the 
number of episodes at time tj that actually ended.
From this curve (using the sample with or with-
out the characteristic of interest), we calculate the 
expected duration of the episode. Statistical signifi-
cance is given by a log-rank test of the difference 
between the two estimated survival curves. The 
methods used in the bivariate analysis are funda-
mentally nonparametric, since no specific probabil-
ity distribution is assumed to govern the data.
Multivariate analysis
The duration model used in the multivariate 
analysis is an accelerated-failure-time model, based 
on the Weibull distribution. The model assumes 
that the length of episode j, here denoted tj, can be 
expressed as the product of a Weibull-distributed 
random variable tj and a scaling proportion that 
depends on the weighted sum of a set of explanatory 
variables (denoted by the vector xtj):
tj = exp(xtj'b)tj
 k
= exp ∑ bk xk,tjtj, (4.3) k=1
in which tj has a Weibull distribution with shape 
parameter g. The estimated coefficients bk are the 
weights applied to each of the explanatory variables 
in the scaling proportion. As described in the text, 
we show the exponentiated coefficients in Table 4.1, 
which may be interpreted as time ratios, indicat-
ing how much the baseline expected duration E(tj) 
would be shortened or lengthened by a one-unit 
change in a variable. See Cleves and others (2010) 
for an in-depth description of the approach.
appendix 4.4. robustness and additional 
results
We undertook six robustness checks of our 
baseline model, including (1) accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity in episodes across coun-
tries by random effects (also known as “frailties”  
in the duration analysis literature); (2) an alter-
native definition of the sudden stop indicator, 
in which it is interacted with an indicator for 
spikes in global uncertainty, to capture “systemic” 
sudden stops; (3) a more stringent cutoff for the 
low-inflation indicator, in which we consider 
whether an economy had an inflation rate below 5 
percent; (4) accounting for common decade fixed 
effects; (5) an alternative distributional assump-
tion (the generalized gamma); and (6) using real 
GDP instead of real GDP per capita to define 
periods of expansion. The results of these robust-
ness checks are shown in Table 4.5.  
It is readily apparent that the point estimates for 
the time ratios are typically quite similar across the 
columns (with the baseline specification repeated in 
column 1 for convenience). The statistical signifi-
cance of the estimates is also similar across specifica-
tions, although it tends to be marginally reduced 
when frailties are used to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
We also looked at whether our findings for expan-
sions hold for expansions characterized by rapid 
and sustained growth. To identify these episodes, 
we removed a 4 percent linear growth trend from 
real GDP per capita for each economy and applied 
the Harding-Pagan algorithm to find the turning 
points in the detrended series. We then undertook 
our baseline duration analysis for the growth expan-
sions (periods from trough to peak in the detrended 
series). The results of this analysis are shown in 
column 8 of Table 4.5. The results are broadly 
aligned with the findings for the level expansions 
(column 1)—external and domestic shocks tend to 
shorten growth expansions, whereas policy space 
tends to lengthen them. The statistical significance 
of the estimated results is sometimes reduced, but 
this appears to be largely a function of the much 
smaller sample size, given that the point estimates 
themselves are quite similar to the baseline for level 
expansions. Thus, the variables associated with lon-
ger level expansions are also associated with longer 
growth expansions.
We investigated whether the stylized facts for 
emerging market and developing economies’ 
expansions over the past decades were driven by 
the experience of commodity exporters or by 
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Table 4.5. What Shortens Expansions? Robustness Checks
Explanatory Variable Baseline
Baseline with 
Economy 
Frailties
Alternative 
Sudden Stop
Alternative 
Inflation
Decade 
Dummies
Alternative 
Distribution 
(generalized 
gamma)
Alternative 
Output
Growth 
Expansions
Implied S&P 100 Volatility 
(VXO)1
0.951***
(–4.179)
0.951***
(–3.688)
0.951***
(–4.138)
0.952***
(–3.851)
0.944***
(–4.624)
0.950***
(–4.659)
0.937***
(–4.785)
0.967**
(–2.191)
U.S. Ex Ante Real Interest 
Rate
0.956
(–1.461)
0.956
(–1.170)
0.956
(–1.471)
0.944*
(–1.801)
0.982
(–0.494)
0.939*
(–1.862)
0.917**
(–2.399)
0.986
(–0.328)
Terms-of-Trade Bust Indicator 0.968
(–0.214)
0.968
(–0.200)
0.969
(–0.209)
0.953
(–0.298)
0.982
(–0.116)
0.926
(–0.450)
1.051
(0.231)
0.801
(–0.826)
Sudden Stop (capital inflows) 
Indicator
0.590***
(–2.927)
0.590**
(–2.134)
0.622**
(–2.536)
0.590***
(–2.731)
0.523***
(–2.656)
0.363***
(–4.946)
0.657
(–1.333)
Advanced Economy Recession 
Indicator
0.642***
(–4.074)
0.642**
(–2.512)
0.648***
(–4.016)
0.608***
(–4.449)
0.619***
(–3.967)
0.622***
(–4.091)
0.685***
(–3.065)
0.680***
(–2.590)
Credit Boom during Past 
Three Years
0.616***
(–3.913)
0.616***
(–2.977)
0.620***
(–3.843)
0.617***
(–3.664)
0.626***
(–3.631)
0.601***
(–3.373)
0.596***
(–3.454)
0.497***
(–3.697)
Banking Crisis Indicator 0.550***
(–3.376)
0.550**
(–2.392)
0.550***
(–3.387)
0.524***
(–3.584)
0.567***
(–3.180)
0.480***
(–3.079)
0.516***
(–3.561)
0.451**
(–1.977)
Single-Digit Inflation Indicator 1.473***
(3.185)
1.473***
(2.938)
1.475***
(3.192)
1.444***
(2.954)
1.434***
(2.925)
1.604***
(3.077)
1.145
(0.688)
Low Public Debt to GDP 
Indicator
1.009
(0.0713)
1.009
(0.0651)
1.001
(0.0119)
1.019
(0.149)
0.989
(–0.0811)
1.016
(0.127)
0.740*
(–1.699)
1.276
(0.988)
International Reserves to GDP 1.009***
(2.866)
1.009
(1.584)
1.009***
(2.887)
1.009***
(3.099)
1.009***
(3.037)
1.009***
(2.620)
1.010**
(2.122)
1.012*
(1.893)
Income Inequality (Gini 
coefficient)
0.986**
(–2.144)
0.986**
(–1.988)
0.986**
(–2.154)
0.986**
(–2.094)
0.987**
(–2.035)
0.990
(–1.327)
0.998
(–0.271)
0.990
(–0.847)
Trade Openness (exports plus 
imports to GDP)
0.999
(–0.451)
0.999
(–0.317)
0.999
(–0.495)
1.000
(–0.377)
0.999
(–0.468)
1.000
(0.0951)
0.997*
(–1.888)
1.003
(1.605)
Financial Openness (external 
assets plus liabilities to 
GDP)
0.999***
(–3.121)
0.999*
(–1.766)
0.999***
(–3.094)
0.999***
(–3.037)
0.999***
(–3.577)
0.999**
(–2.417)
1.000
(–0.484)
0.998**
(–2.324)
Global Uncertainty Spike 
and Sudden Stop Joint 
Indicator
0.603***
(–2.828)
Below 5 Percent Inflation 
Indicator
1.330*
(1.729)
Observations
Weibull Shape Parameter
Z Statistic of Shape Parameter
Number of Episodes
Number of Exits
Number of Economies
Log Likelihood
Model Chi-Squared p Value
1,264
1.516
6.829
188
126
75
–103.0
0.000
1,264
1.516
2.653
188
126
75
–103.0
0.000
1,264
1.519
6.817
188
126
75
–103.7
0.000
1,264
1.476
5.968
188
126
75
–105.6
0.000
1,264
1.498
6.411
188
126
75
–101.0
0.000
1,264
188
126
75
–99.2
0.000
1,417
1.401
5.372
163
99
75
–73.5
0.000
452
1.438
3.177
84
63
54
–58.0
0.000
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Exponentiated coefficients shown are time ratios, which indicate whether the variable tends to shorten (less than 1) or lengthen (greater than 1) the expected time-in-episode. Z statistics are given in paren-
theses underneath the coefficient estimates. A negative z statistic indicates that the associated variable tends to shorten an episode; if the z statistic is positive, it tends to lengthen an episode. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
1VXO = Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 100 volatility index.
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the largest economies. Figure 4.15 shows that 
neither of these groups appears to be driving the 
changes in resilience seen from the 1980s to the 
2000s. Commodity exporters and noncommod-
ity exporters follow the same patterns, although 
at a somewhat different pace. The median com-
modity exporter was more adversely impacted in 
the 1980s, whereas the median noncommodity 
exporter tended to have even stronger growth in 
the 2000s after a peak. The largest 30 economies 
also show similar patterns of resilience when 
compared with the other, smaller economies. The 
most marked difference is probably the somewhat 
poorer performance after a peak of smaller econo-
mies during the 1980s.
Finally, we examine whether the relative con-
tributions of shocks, policies, and structural char-
acteristics differ across regions, commodity and 
non–commodity exporters, and for heavily indebted 
poor countries eligible for debt relief under the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative. We use 
the same method for decomposing the change in 
expected duration of expansions as in Figure 4.13. 
As mentioned in the main text, this decomposi-
tion is an accounting exercise, and care should be 
taken that these contributions not be given a causal 
interpretation. 
As shown in Figure 4.16, our finding that 
improved policies account for the bulk of the 
increase in expected duration of expansions from the 
1980s to the 2000s holds across all emerging market 
and developing economy regions and subsamples. 
Less frequent domestic and external shocks also con-
tributed to improved performance. Structural char-
acteristics had a negligible contribution in almost 
all subsamples, with the exception of emerging and 
developing Asia—in that region, financial open-
ness almost doubled between the 1980s and 2000s, 
resulting in a negative contribution to expected 
duration of expansions.
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Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Economy groups are defined in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. EMDE = emerging market 
and developing economy. Peaks in output per capita are identified using the Harding-Pagan 
algorithm (Harding and Pagan, 2002). Output per capita at the peak (t ) is normalized to 100, 
and the median output per capita is plotted in years (t + 1) through (t + 10) for each group.
1Refers to the 30 largest emerging market and developing economies based on their 
average real GDP over the sample period.
Figure 4.15.  Emerging Market and Developing Economy 
Subgroups: Dynamics of Output per Capita following Peaks
(Median output per capita; peak = 100; years on x-axis)
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Note: Economy groups are defined in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4.1. MENA = Middle East and 
North Africa; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa. Peaks in output per capita are identified using the 
Harding-Pagan algorithm (Harding and Pagan, 2002).
Figure 4.16.  Emerging Market and Developing Economy 
Regions: Contributions of Shocks, Policies, and Structure to the 
Length of Expansions
(Contribution to change in expected mean duration of expansions from 
1980s to 2000–07; percent)
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Emerging market and developing economies 
have enjoyed robust growth during the past 
decade and bounced back quickly from the Great 
Recession, in marked contrast to the more tepid 
recovery in advanced economies. These divergent 
growth trajectories were reflected in their labor 
markets. For instance, unemployment—both num-
bers of people unemployed and rates—remained 
substantially higher in 2011 in advanced econo-
mies compared with 2007. In contrast, although 
unemployment in emerging market and developing 
economies did go up during the Great Recession, 
by 2011 it was essentially back to precrisis levels 
(Figure 4.1.1). 
Is the observed correspondence between jobs and 
growth a surprise, or does it represent a systemic 
feature of emerging market and developing econo-
mies? This box shows that the short-term relation-
ship between labor market developments and output 
growth has been fairly strong in many of these econ-
omies for the past 30 years. Hence, although the 
emphasis on structural policies to lower long-term 
unemployment and raise labor force participation 
remains appropriate, cyclical developments deserve 
adequate consideration as well. The short-term 
relationship between jobs and growth suggests that 
macroeconomic policies to maintain aggregate 
demand also likely play an important role in labor 
market outcomes in many of these economies. 
Does One Law Fit All?
The short-term relationship between U.S. output 
and unemployment documented by Okun (1962) 
has since become famous as “Okun’s law.” Ball, 
Leigh, and Loungani (forthcoming) investigate how 
well Okun’s law explains short-term changes in the 
unemployment rate for the United States since 1960 
and for a sample of 20 advanced economies since 
1980. 
Ball and others (forthcoming) conclude that 
Okun’s law is a strong and stable relationship in 
most advanced economies. That is, they confirm 
the view that short-term changes in unemployment 
are driven by changes in output. On average, a 1 
percent deviation of output from potential leads to 
a reduction in cyclical unemployment of about ½ 
percentage point. Deviations from Okun’s law occur, 
but they are usually modest in size and short lived. 
However, although Okun’s law fits the data for 
most countries, the coefficient in the relationship—
the effect of a 1 percent change in output on the 
unemployment rate—varies across countries, rang-
ing from –0.16 in Japan to –0.85 in Spain. 
How well does Okun’s law hold in emerging 
market and developing economies? As in Ball and 
others (forthcoming), we interpret Okun’s law as 
a relationship between the deviation of unemploy-
ment from its natural rate and the deviation of 
output from its potential: 
Box 4.1. Jobs and Growth: can’t have One without the Other?
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Figure 4.1.1.  Diverging Global Labor Market 
Trends, 2007–11
The authors of this box are Davide Furceri and Prakash 
Loungani. Jair Rodriguez and Hites Ahir provided research 
assistance. 
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ut – ut* = a( yt – yt*) + errort, (4.1.1)
in which u is the unemployment rate, y is log 
output, and * indicates a long-term (natural rate or 
potential) level. The assumption behind equation 
(4.1.1) is that shifts in aggregate demand cause 
fluctuations in output, which in turn cause firms 
to hire and fire workers. The error term captures 
factors that shift the unemployment-output rela-
tionship, such as unusual changes in productivity 
or in labor force participation. To measure u*, the 
natural rate of unemployment, and y*, potential 
output, we smooth the series for u and y with the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
We also estimate a version of Okun’s law in first 
differences:
ut – ut–1 = c + a( yt – yt–1) + errort. (4.1.2)
Here, the change in unemployment depends on 
the change in output and a constant. This follows 
from equation (4.1.1) if the natural rate u* is con-
stant and potential output grows at a constant rate 
c/a. For many of these economies, these assumptions 
may not be reasonable because of time variation 
in u* and growth accelerations and slowdowns. 
As noted in the main text of this chapter, output 
in these economies is often characterized not by 
“smooth hills” but by “mountains, cliffs, plateaus, 
and plains.” Nevertheless, both the levels and the 
first-differences specifications show some evidence 
of the robustness of the results to alternate assump-
tions about the long-term levels of output and 
unemployment.1
The usefulness of unemployment rates as an 
indicator of labor market slack in emerging market 
and developing economies is often questioned. 
1We carried out other robustness checks as well. In the 
levels specification—equation (4.1.1)—we tried smoothing 
parameters for the Hodrick-Prescott filter of 100 and 12 
(the latter suggested by Rand and Tarp, 2002, for developing 
economies). The results are quite similar, so only the ones for 
the smoothing parameter of 100 are discussed here. In the 
first-differences specification—equation (4.1.2)—we also tried 
a version including a time trend and the lag of the change 
in unemployment. The results of these specifications were 
very similar to the baseline specification and therefore not 
reported.
One argument is that in low-income countries 
people cannot afford to be unemployed; everyone 
is in some kind of job, either in the rural sec-
tor or in self-employment. Another argument is 
that many of these economies have large informal 
sectors, so that neither the unemployment nor 
the employment statistics have much relevance 
(Agénor and Montiel, 2008; Singh, Jain-Chandra, 
and Mohommad, 2012). 
To address the first of these issues, we also esti-
mate a version of Okun’s law using employment as 
the dependent variable: 
et – et–1 = c + a( yt – yt–1) + errort, (4.1.3)
in which e is log employment. The second issue is 
addressed later when we look at the relationship 
between Okun coefficients and the level of informality.
Okun’s Law in Emerging Market and Developing 
Economies: The Evidence2
We use data on employment, unemployment, 
and real GDP for 80 economies between 1980 and 
2011, but the length of the time series varies across 
countries. We also present results for a subset of 
countries that have at least 30 years of data. 
The results confirm the validity of Okun’s law 
for most countries, though the strength of the 
relationship varies. Figure 4.1.2, panel 1, shows 
the distribution of Okun coefficients using equa-
tion (4.1.2). As shown, the estimates range from 
small positive values to –0.8, with the majority 
of the estimates between –0.2 and –0.4. For the 
group of countries with longer time series, the 
distribution is quite similar. Estimating the speci-
fication in levels (equation 4.1.1 above) yields 
qualitatively similar results; the rank correlation 
between the two sets of Okun coefficients is 0.6. 
Using employment as the dependent variable, the 
estimates range from small negative values to 0.8 
(Figure 4.1.2, panel 2). The rank correlation with 
the estimates using unemployment as the depen-
dent variable is –0.6. 
2This section draws on ongoing work by Ball and others 
(forthcoming).
Box 4.1. (continued)
c h a p t e r 4  r e S i l i e n c e i n e m e r g i n g ma r k e t a n d d e v e lo p i n g e co n o m i e S: w i l l i t  l a S t? 
 International Monetary Fund | october 2012 161
To summarize, regardless of the choice of the 
three specifications discussed above, there is a 
significant short-term relationship between output 
fluctuations and developments in the labor market. 
Table 4.1.1 compares the average value of the 
Okun coefficient and the employment responsive-
ness in advanced economies with that in emerging 
market and developing economies. It is evident 
that on average the short-term relationship between 
labor market outcomes and output is weaker in 
emerging market and developing economies than in 
advanced economies.
Accounting for Cross-Country Differences3
We also carry out an investigation of some of the 
factors that account for the cross-country variation 
in Okun coefficients. As discussed, many emerging 
market and developing economies are characterized 
by large informal sectors. Intuitively, countries with 
larger informal sectors should have a smaller Okun 
coefficient—that is, unemployment should respond 
less to a given change in output (see Figure 4.1.3, 
panel 1). Ball and others (forthcoming) document 
a positive relationship for advanced economies 
between the estimated Okun coefficient and the 
average level of unemployment: in countries in 
which unemployment is higher on average, it also 
fluctuates more in response to output movements. 
Although the reason for this association is not 
apparent, we find that a similar correlation holds for 
emerging market and developing economies as well 
(Figure 4.1.3, panel 2). 
Some recent studies have probed the responsive-
ness of employment to output (Crivelli, Furceri, and 
Toujas-Bernaté, forthcoming; Ahmed, Guillaume, 
and Furceri, 2012). These studies suggest that the 
responsiveness could depend on features such as 
labor and product market flexibility. For instance, 
in discussing hiring and firing regulations in Middle 
Eastern and North African countries, Ahmed, 
Guillaume, and Furceri (2012) argue that such 
regulations can discourage “firms from expanding 
employment in response to favorable changes in 
the economic climate.” That is, greater employment 
protection can dampen hiring and firing as output 
fluctuates, reducing the employment responsiveness. 
3The data on informality used in this box are from 
Schneider (2004) and Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 
(2010). The indicators of labor and product market flex-
ibility are described in Crivelli, Furceri, and Toujas-Bernaté 
(forthcoming). 
Box 4.1. (continued)
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Table 4.1.1. Short-Term Relationship between Labor Market Outcomes and Growth, by Country Group
 
Okun Coefficients  
(equation 4.1.1)
Okun Coefficients  
(equation 4.1.2)
Employment Response 
(equation 4.1.3)
Advanced Economies –0.39 –0.33 0.49
Emerging Markets and 
Developing Economies –0.17 –0.29 0.20
Source: imF staff calculations.
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Box 4.1. (continued)
Figure 4.1.3, panels 3 and 4, suggests that greater 
labor and product market flexibility may indeed be 
correlated with higher employment responsiveness. 
Table 4.1.2 reports weighted-least-squares (WLS) 
estimates of these determinants of Okun coefficients 
and employment responsiveness.4 The results presented 
4Because our dependent variables are based on estimates, 
the dependent variable is measured with different degrees of 
precision across countries; hence, we use a WLS estimator. 
Specifically, the WLS estimator assumes that the errors et are 
distributed as ei ~ N(0, s2 ÷ si), in which si is the estimated 
standard deviation of the residual of the Okun coefficients 
(or employment responsiveness) for each country i, and s2 is 
in the first two columns confirm that Okun coef-
ficients do depend on the size of the informal sector 
and the average unemployment rate, as suggested by 
Figure 4.1.3, panels 1 and 2. The other four regressions 
in the table examine the determinants of employment 
responsiveness. Informality influences the responsive-
ness, but the average unemployment rate does not have 
a significant impact. Greater labor and product market 
flexibility each individually raise employment respon-
siveness. However, when the two are entered in the 
regression together, only the effects of product market 
flexibility are statistically significant.5 
Policy Implications
The structural challenges facing labor markets 
in emerging market and developing economies 
deservedly receive a lot of attention. In many of 
these economies, unemployment rates, particularly 
youth unemployment rates, remain alarmingly high. 
Other economies face the challenge of raising labor 
force participation, particularly among women. The 
results of this box lend support to a focus on poli-
cies to address these structural challenges: the cycli-
cal relationship between jobs and growth is weaker, 
on average, in emerging market and developing 
economies than in advanced economies. 
At the same time, the finding of a significant rela-
tionship in many countries suggests that cyclical con-
siderations should not be ignored. Aggregate demand 
policies that support output growth in the short 
term can also help labor markets recover. The results 
also point to an interaction of cyclical and structural 
considerations. The strength of the short-term relation-
ship between jobs and growth depends on structural 
features of the economy such as informality and the 
degree of product market flexibility. The evidence 
suggests that as informality is reduced and product 
markets become more flexible, the short-term relation-
ship between labor market outcomes and growth will 
become stronger. 
an unknown parameter that is estimated in the second-stage 
regression.
5We do not find evidence of a significant relationship 
between labor and product market flexibility and the Okun 
coefficients, which is similar to the findings of Ball and others 
(forthcoming) for advanced economies.
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Figure 4.1.3.  Okun’s Law: Employment and 
Output in Emerging Market and Developing 
Economies
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Box 4.1. (continued)
Table 4.1.2. Determinants of Okun Coefficients and Employment Responsiveness
Okun Coefficients
Employment Responsiveness
Levels 
Specification
Changes 
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Informality 0.0027***
(0.0009)
0.0044**
(0.0021)
–0.0034**
(0.0014)
–0.0058***
(0.0014)
–0.0034***
(0.0013)
–0.0044***
(0.0014)
Average Unemployment Rate –0.0094***
(0.0030)
–0.0131***
(0.0047)
0.0027
(0.0049)
–0.0003
(0.0048)
0.0057
(0.0046)
0.0031
(0.0047)
Labor Market Flexibility 0.0390**
(0.018)
0.0083
(0.43)
Product Market Flexibility 0.0727***
(0.0222)
0.0747***
(0.0250)
R2 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.28 0.30 0.38
N 67 67 67 56 58 55
Source: imF staff calculations.
Note: the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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This box explores the potential impact of an 
investment slowdown in China on growth in 
other emerging market and developing economies. 
China’s growth model has become increasingly 
dependent on investment during the past decade. 
Investment contributed about one-half of China’s 
GDP growth in the first decade of the 2000s, with 
particularly large contributions toward the end of 
the decade (Figure 4.2.1, panel 1). In part, this 
reflects the steep increase in infrastructure invest-
ment during the 2008–10 stimulus response to the 
Great Recession. But it appears that other forces 
are increasingly contributing to investment growth, 
including the ongoing urbanization process, the 
more recent emphasis on social housing construc-
tion, and capacity building in high-end manufac-
turing and services. 
Associated with these changes are important 
shifts in China’s import basket. As more manufac-
turing takes place onshore, the share of machinery 
imports has been gradually declining, whereas min-
eral and metal imports have grown steadily (Figure 
4.2.1, panel 2). 
These developments have had a noticeable 
impact on global trade flows over the past decade 
as trading partners sent an increasing fraction of 
their exports to China (Figure 4.2.2, panel 1). The 
importance of exports to China, when assessed 
relative to trading partner GDP, shows even sharper 
increases for several economies. This ratio has, on 
average, quadrupled during 2001–11 (Figure 4.2.2, 
panel 2). 
The trends suggest that China’s rapidly expand-
ing investment may have had a large positive 
impact on its trading partners’ growth. But with 
investment already close to 50 percent of output 
and China’s continued reliance on investment to 
drive growth, it is unclear whether the new capacity 
will be profitable. An abrupt and disorderly end to 
the investment boom, albeit a tail risk, could have 
adverse effects on China’s trading partners. 
To get a sense of the potential magnitude of this 
dynamic, the spillover from investment activity 
in China on its trading partners is measured by 
the product of an economy’s exports to China 
(as a share of GDP) and China’s fixed investment 
growth.1 
1More specifically, the spillover is defined as
China spilloverj,t =  exCHNj,t × China fixed  
investment growtht, (4.2.1)
in which
 Exports to ChinaexCHNj = ———————
j
,
 GDP
and China fixed investment growtht is the annual percent 
change of real gross fixed capital formation from the national 
accounts.
Box 4.2. How Would an Investment Slowdown in China Affect Other Emerging Market and 
Developing Economies?
The main authors of this box are Ashvin Ahuja and Malhar 
Nabar. The box draws on Ahuja and Nabar (forthcoming).
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Figure 4.2.1.  Composition of China’s Growth 
and Imports
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 This spillover measure varies across countries 
based on their export exposure to China and over 
time based on fluctuations in China’s fixed invest-
ment growth. By construction, it measures only the 
influence of Chinese activity on other economies 
through the direct trade channel; indirect exposure 
through vertically integrated intermediate econo-
mies or through lower commodity prices is not 
captured. 
The effect of the spillover on China’s trading 
partners’ growth is estimated by regressing emerg-
ing market and developing economies’ growth 
rates on this spillover measure and a number of 
other controls, including these economies’ lagged 
growth, terms of trade, and output volatility. The 
sample covers the period of China’s membership 
in the World Trade Organization (2002–11) and 
includes the set of emerging market and develop-
ing economies classified under the MSCI AC 
World Index and key commodity producers. The 
regression is also estimated using different mea-
sures of fixed investment growth in China: overall, 
manufacturing, and nontradables (calculated by 
applying shares in fixed asset investment data, avail-
able beginning in 2003). This breakdown allows 
for a comparison of spillovers from a slowdown 
in manufacturing investment with a deceleration 
concentrated in nontradables.2 
In line with China’s widening footprint on 
global imports, the effect of China’s investment 
on its trading partners’ growth has increased over 
time. The most heavily exposed emerging market 
economies are those within the Asian regional 
supply chain, such as Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan 
Province of China. The results suggest that GDP 
growth in Taiwan Province of China decreases by 
slightly over nine-tenths percentage point for every 
1 percentage point deceleration in investment 
growth in China (Figure 4.2.3, panel 1). 
Among commodity exporters, the impact is 
largest on mineral ore exporters with relatively less 
diversified economic structures and higher concen-
trations of exports to China. In response to a 1 per-
centage point slowdown in investment growth in 
China, the estimated effect on Chile’s growth is a 
decrease of close to two-fifths of a percentage point. 
By contrast, larger commodity exporters with more 
diversified economies, such as Brazil and Indonesia, 
experience smaller declines in growth (Figure 4.2.3, 
panel 2).3 
2The nontradables sector is defined to include utili-
ties, construction, transportation and storage, information 
technology, wholesale and retail trade, catering, banking 
and insurance, real estate, leasing and commercial services, 
education, health care, sports and entertainment, and public 
administration.
3Related to this analysis, a factor-augmented vector 
autoregression model relating G20 macroeconomic, financial, 
trade, and global commodity price variables finds that a 
1 percent decline in China’s fixed asset investment from 
baseline would, on average, lead to drops of 0.8, 1.0, 1.6, 
1.8, 1.8, and 2.2 percent for prices of iron ore, aluminum, 
copper, lead, nickel, and zinc, respectively, within one year 
Box 4.2. (continued)
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after the shock. For further details, see Ahuja and Nabar 
(forthcoming). 
A decomposition of investment into manufactur-
ing and nontradables shows that spillover effects 
from China’s manufacturing investment reflect the 
influence of global demand. Once global demand is 
included as an additional control in the regression, 
the spillover from manufacturing fixed investment 
in China no longer has a statistically significant 
impact on its trading partners’ growth (whereas 
global demand does). By contrast, nontradables 
investment in China has a significant spillover 
impact on its trading partners’ growth above and 
beyond the effects of global demand. 
The analysis also shows that direct spillover 
effects from consumption growth on trading part-
ners’ growth have been negligible in recent years. 
China’s share in global consumer goods imports has 
increased at a slower pace than its share in global 
consumption over the past 15 years. China cur-
rently plays a small role as an importer of consumer 
goods, accounting for only 2 percent of global 
consumer goods imports.4 The low import intensity 
of final consumption in China suggests that if a 
transition to consumption-based growth takes place 
in response to the structural reforms envisaged in 
the 12th Five-Year Plan, the direct benefits to con-
sumer goods exporters are likely to be small. Nev-
ertheless, China’s trading partners may still benefit 
from indirect access to Chinese consumers by 
selling intermediate goods, parts, and components 
to Chinese firms that then assemble and customize 
final products for the local market.
4See IMF (2012) for more details.
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Figure 4.2.3.  Impact of an Investment 
Slowdown in China
Box 4.2. (continued)
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Kenya and Tanzania are among the group of 
emerging market and developing economies that 
showed marked resilience during the Great Reces-
sion. Both outpaced earlier advanced economy 
growth, experienced only a modest growth 
slowdown during 2008–09, and have charted a 
subsequent rapid and robust recovery (Figure 4.3.1, 
panel 1).1 
A decade of improved macroeconomic stability 
has helped underpin this resilience. In Tanzania, 
reforms since the late 1990s liberalized foreign 
exchange and financial markets and foreign trade, 
and diminished the role of parastatals. Inflation fell 
from 20 to 30 percent in the 1990s to 5 percent 
in the mid-2000s, fiscal revenues increased from 
10 to 15 percent of GDP, and gross reserve cover 
broadly doubled. With the help of the IMF’s 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country/Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative, the debt burden was also halved in 
relation to GDP. In Kenya, reforms started earlier, 
with a major program to liberalize price controls, 
import licensing, and exchange restrictions, as well 
as steps to privatize parastatals and reduce civil 
service numbers. As a result of prudent fiscal policy, 
Kenya’s public debt fell from 54 percent of GDP in 
2001 to 38 percent in 2008.
Macroeconomic stability and market-friendly 
policies helped provide a durable growth impetus. 
As in much of Africa, growth in Kenya and Tan-
zania has been driven by strong domestic markets, 
led by a growing middle class. For both countries, 
an improved investment outlook contributed to 
a sustained expansion in private sector construc-
tion spending. At the same time, the adoption of 
new technologies has contributed to rapid growth 
in communications and finance. This engine of 
growth helped shield both economies from the 
global downturn, with spending on construction, 
communications, and finance continuing to grow 
The main authors of this box are Nick Gigineishvili, 
Dimitre Milkov, Armando Morales, and Peter Allum.
1In Kenya, growth trends were distorted by domestic 
factors, with a slowdown in 2008 on account of postelec-
tion violence and drought conditions during 2008–09 that 
undercut agricultural production. Given the latter, panel 1 
of Figure 4.3.1 focuses on growth in Kenya’s nonagricultural 
economy.
Box 4.3. Resilient Growth in Low-Income Countries: Kenya and Tanzania
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Figure 4.3.1.  The Resilience of Kenya and 
Tanzania
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at a 9 to 10 percent real rate throughout the Great 
Recession.
Strengthened macroeconomic buffers also provided 
space for a countercyclical policy response to the 
global downturn. With modest fiscal deficits and sus-
tainable levels of public debt, both countries allowed 
government spending to rise between 2006/07 and 
2008/09—by 4½ percentage points of GDP in 
Tanzania and by 2 percentage points in Kenya.2 This 
fiscal stimulus helped offset growth spillovers from a 
less favorable external environment. Monetary policy 
was also supportive. Tanzania halved its short-term 
interest rates between 2007 and 2009. And in Kenya, 
a recent IMF study shows that supportive monetary 
conditions were successful in offsetting most of the 
contractionary impact of the Great Recession, which 
would otherwise have resulted in output falling well 
below its potential (Figure 4.3.1, panel 2).3 Under 
floating exchange rate regimes, both currencies appre-
ciated in real terms against the dollar through 2009, 
though this did not offset the overall impact of fiscal 
and monetary easing. Both countries saw quick, albeit 
temporary, deterioration in their overall balance of 
payments in 2008, but weathered it readily using their 
healthy gross reserve buffer (of about four months of 
imports) and by resorting to new IMF financing. 
Diversification of production and export activ-
ity may also have helped their resilience. At the 
product level, Kenya has increased its exports of 
intermediate nonmanufactured goods while diversi-
fying its tourism market. In Tanzania, a significant 
decline in traditional agricultural exports was offset 
by growth in exports of minerals and manufactured 
goods. At the market level, Kenya’s trade with other 
emerging market and developing economies has 
2For fiscal years starting July 1.
3Andrle and others (forthcoming).
remained broadly stable at slightly more than half 
of total exports; in Tanzania, sales to these econo-
mies doubled to represent two-thirds of exports, 
helping the country decouple from the advanced 
economy growth cycle (Figure 4.3.1, panel 3). 
Both countries are projected to sustain a robust 
pace of growth through 2012. The rate of expan-
sion is likely to remain somewhat below the peak 
rates seen during 2006–07 given steps to gradually 
reverse the 2008–09 fiscal stimulus and because of the 
monetary tightening adopted since mid-2011 to bring 
down food-price-related inflation. Credit growth has 
decelerated in both countries but remains sufficient to 
support steady growth. More generally, unlike in some 
other emerging market and developing economies, 
growth has been supported by direct investment and 
capital repatriation, which are less likely to experience 
sudden stops, and the financial sector remains robust, 
with low levels of nonperforming loans.
The resilience of Kenya and Tanzania could 
be tested, however, in the event of an intensi-
fied downturn in the global economy. Sustained 
growth in exports has supported their external 
performance so far, but a new global downturn, 
including emerging market and developing econo-
mies, would bring new balance of payments pres-
sures. Both countries also have more constrained 
policy space than at the start of the Great Reces-
sion, with higher fiscal deficits and debt levels, 
higher inflation, and somewhat lower gross reserve 
cover. Accordingly, both countries are rebuilding 
macroeconomic buffers under programs supported 
by the IMF: Kenya’s economic program has been 
supported by a three-year Extended Credit Facility 
since 2011, and Tanzania recently accessed an 
18-month precautionary Standby Credit Facil-
ity to complement its preexisting Policy Support 
Instrument arrangement.
Box 4.3. (continued)
c h a p t e r 4  r e S i l i e n c e i n e m e r g i n g ma r k e t a n d d e v e lo p i n g e co n o m i e S: w i l l i t  l a S t? 
 International Monetary Fund | october 2012 169
references
Abbas, S. Ali, Nazim Belhocine, Asmaa ElGanainy, and Mark 
Horton, 2010, “A Historical Public Debt Database,” IMF 
Working Paper No. 10/245 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund).
Adler, Gustavo, and Camilo Tovar, 2012, “Riding Global 
Financial Waves: The Economic Impact of Global 
Financial Shocks on Emerging Market Economies,” IMF 
Working Paper No. 12/188 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund).
Agénor, Pierre-Richard, and Peter J. Montiel, 2008, Develop-
ment Macroeconomics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 3rd ed.).  
Aguiar, Mark, and Gita Gopinath, 2007, “Emerging Market 
Business Cycles: The Cycle Is the Trend,” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, Vol. 115, No. 1, pp. 69–102.
Ahmed, Masood, Dominique Guillaume, and Davide Furceri, 
2012, “Youth Unemployment in the MENA Region: 
Determinants and Challenges,” World Economic Forum, 
Addressing the 100 Million Youth Challenge—Perspectives on 
Youth Employment in the Arab World in 2012 (unpublished; 
Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Ahuja, Ashvin, and Malhar Shyam Nabar, forthcoming, 
“Investment-Led Growth in China: Global Spillovers,” 
IMF Working Paper (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund).
Andrle, Michal, Andrew Berg, Rogelio Morales, Rafael 
Portillo, and Jan Vlcek, forthcoming, “Forecasting and 
Policy Analysis Systems in Low-Income Countries: Food 
and Nonfood Inflation in Kenya,” IMF Working Paper 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Ball, Laurence, Davide Furceri, Daniel Leigh, and Prakash 
Loungani, forthcoming, “Okun’s Law Outside the OECD: 
Does One Law Fit All?” IMF Working Paper (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund).
Ball, Laurence, Daniel Leigh, and Prakash Loungani, forth-
coming, “Okun’s Law: Fit at 50?” IMF Working Paper 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Becker, Torbjörn, and Paolo Mauro, 2006, “Output Drops 
and the Shocks That Matter,” IMF Working Paper No. 
06/172 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Berg, Andrew, and Jonathan Ostry, 2011, “Inequality and 
Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” IMF 
Staff Discussion Note No. 11/08 (Washington: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund).
Berg, Andrew, Jonathan Ostry, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 
2012, “What Makes Growth Sustained,” Journal of Devel-
opment Economics, Vol. 98, No. 2, pp. 149–66.
Blanchard, Olivier, and John Simon, 2001, “The Long and 
Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,” Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 135–74.
Blanchard, Olivier, Hamid Faruqee, and Mitali Das, 2010, 
“The Initial Impact of the Crisis on Emerging Market 
Countries,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring), 
pp. 263–323.
Bloom, Nicholas, 2009, “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 623–85.
Cerra, Valerie, and Sweta Saxena, 2008, “Growth Dynamics: 
The Myth of Economic Recovery,” American Economic 
Review, Vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 439–57.
Chang, Roberto, and Andrés Velasco, 2004, “Monetary Policy 
and the Currency Denomination of Debt: A Tale of Two 
Equilibria,” NBER Working Paper No. 10827 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Chinn, Menzie, and Hiro Ito, 2006, “What Matters for 
Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and 
Interactions,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 81, 
No. 1, pp. 163–92.
Cleves, Mario, William Gould, Roberto G. Gutierrez, and 
Yulia V. Marchenko, 2010, An Introduction to Survival 
Analysis Using Stata (College Station, Texas: Stata Press, 
3rd ed.).
Corbo, Vittorio, Óscar Landerretche, and Klaus Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2000, “Does Inflation Targeting Make a Differ-
ence?” presented at the Central Bank of Chile Conference 
10 Years of Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, 
Challenges.
Crivelli, Ernesto, Davide Furceri, and Joël Toujas-Bernaté, 
forthcoming, “Can Policies Affect Employment Intensity 
of Growth? A Cross-Country Analysis,” IMF Working 
Paper (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
de Carvalho Filho, Irineu, 2011, “28 Months Later: How 
Inflation Targeters Outperformed Their Peers in the Great 
Recession,” The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 11, 
No. 1, Article 22.
Didier, Tatiana, Constantino Hevia, and Sergio L. Schmukler, 
2012, “How Resilient Were Emerging Economies to the 
Global Crisis,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 5637 (Washington).
Easterly, William, 2001, “The Lost Decades: Develop-
ing Countries’ Stagnation in Spite of Policy Reform, 
1980–1998,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 6, No. 2, 
pp. 135–57.
______, Michael Kremer, Lant Pritchett, and Lawrence 
Summers, 1993, “Good Policy or Good Luck? Country 
Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 459–83.
wo r l d e co n o m i c o u t lo o k : co p i n g w i t h h i g h d e bt a n d S lu g g i S h g r ow t h
170 International Monetary Fund | october 2012
Engel, James, David Haugh, and Adrian Pagan, 2005, “Some 
Methods for Assessing the Need for Non-Linear Models in 
Business Cycle Analysis,” International Journal of Forecast-
ing, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 651–62.
Frankel, Jeffrey, 2012, “Will Emerging Markets Fall in 2012?” 
Business & Management Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 119–20.
______, Carlos Végh, and Guillermo Vuletin, 2011, “On 
Graduation from Fiscal Procyclicality,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 17619 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research).
Harding, Don, and Adrian Pagan, 2002, “Dissecting the 
Cycle: A Methodological Investigation,” Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 365–81.
Hausmann, Ricardo, Lant Pritchett, and Dani Rodrik, 2005, 
“Growth Accelerations,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 
10, No. 4, pp. 303–29.
Hausmann, Ricardo, Francisco Rodriguez, and Rodrigo 
Wagner, 2006, “Growth Collapses,” Kennedy School of 
Government Working Paper No. RWP06–046 (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University).
Ilzetzki, Ethan, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 
2008, “Exchange Rate Arrangements Entering the 21st 
Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?” (unpublished; Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University).
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2012, Consolidated 
Spillover Report (Washington).
Kaminsky, Graciela, Carmen Reinhart, and Carlos Végh, 
2004, “When it Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows 
and Macroeconomic Policies,” NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual, ed. by Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, pp. 
11–79 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of 
Economic Research). 
Kaplan, E. L., and Paul Meier, 1958, “Nonparametric 
Estimation from Incomplete Observations,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, Vol. 53, No. 282,  
pp. 457–81.
Kose, M. Ayhan, 2008, “Seven Questions about Decoupling,” 
IMF Research Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 1–5.   
_______, and Eswar Prasad, 2010, Emerging Markets: 
Resilience and Growth Amid Global Turmoil (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press).
Laeven, Luc, and Fabián Valencia, 2012, “Systemic Banking 
Crises Database: An Update,” IMF Working Paper No. 
12/163 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2007, “The 
External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended 
Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004,” 
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 
223–50.
______, 2010, “The Cross-Country Incidence of the Global 
Crisis,” IMF Working Paper No. 10/171 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund).
Loungani, Prakash, M. Ayhan Kose, and Marco Terrones, 
2012, “Divergence of Fortunes in Recoveries” VoxEU, 
April 24. www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7907.  
Mendoza, Enrique, and Jonathan Ostry, 2008, “International 
Evidence on Fiscal Solvency: Is Fiscal Policy ‘Responsible’?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 1081–93.
Mendoza, Enrique, and Marco Terrones, 2008, “An Anatomy 
of Credit Booms: Evidence From Macro Aggregates and 
Micro Data,” IMF Working Paper No. 08/226 (Washing-
ton: International Monetary Fund).
Okun, Arthur M., 1962, “Potential GNP: Its Measurement and 
Significance,” American Statistical Association, proceedings 
of the Business and Economics Statistics Section (Alexan-
dria, Virginia: American Statistical Association). Available at 
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p01b/p0190.pdf.
Ostry, Jonathan D., Atish R. Ghosh, Jun I. Kim, and Mahvash 
S. Qureshi, 2010, “Fiscal Space,” IMF Staff Position Note 
No. 10/11 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Pagan, Adrian, 1997, “Policy, Theory, and the Cycle,” Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 19–33.
Pritchett, Lant, 2000, “Understanding Patterns of Economic 
Growth: Searching for Hills Among Plateaus, Mountains, 
and Plains,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 
pp. 221–50.
Rand, John, and Finn Tarp, 2002, “Business Cycles in Devel-
oping Countries: Are They Different?” World Development, 
Vol. 30, No. 12, pp. 2071–88.
Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004, “The Mod-
ern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinter-
pretation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 1, 
pp. 1–48.
———, and Miguel Savastano, 2003, “Debt Intolerance,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 
1–74.
Rodrik, Dani, 1999, “Where Did All the Growth Go? 
External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses,” 
Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 385–412.
Roger, Scott, 2010, “Inflation Targeting Turns 20,” Finance 
and Development, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 46–49.
Rose, Andrew K., and Mark M. Spiegel, 2011, “Cross-Coun-
try Causes and Consequences of the Crisis: An Update,” 
European Economic Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 309–24.
Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus, 2009, “Inflation Targeting Twenty 
Years on: Where, When, Why, With What Effects, What 
Lies Ahead?” Economics Institute Working Paper No. 360 
(Santiago: Pontifical Catholic University of Chile).
c h a p t e r 4  r e S i l i e n c e i n e m e r g i n g ma r k e t a n d d e v e lo p i n g e co n o m i e S: w i l l i t  l a S t? 
 International Monetary Fund | october 2012 171
Schneider, Friedrich, 2004, “The Size of the Shadow Econo-
mies of 145 Countries All Over the World: First Results 
over the Period 1999 to 2003,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 
1431 (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor).
______, Andreas Buehn, and Claudio E. Montenegro, 2010, 
“New Estimates for the Shadow Economies All Over the 
World,” International Economic Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4,  
pp. 443–61.
Singh, Anoop, Sonali Jain-Chandra, and Adil Mohommad, 
2012, “Inclusive Growth, Institutions, and the Under-
ground Economy,” IMF Working Paper No. 12/47 (Wash-
ington: International Monetary Fund).
Solt, Frederick, 2009, “Standardizing the World Income 
Inequality Database,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 
2, pp. 231–42. 
Végh, Carlos, and Guillermo Vuletin, 2012, “Overcoming 
the Fear of Free Falling: Monetary Policy Graduation in 
Emerging Markets,” NBER Working Paper No. 18175 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
Virmani, Arvind, 2012, “Accelerating and Sustaining Growth: 
Economic and Political Lessons,” IMF Working Paper No. 
12/185 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Wacziarg, Romain, and Karen Horn Welch, 2008, “Trade 
Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence,” World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 187–231.

 International Monetary Fund | October 2012 173
Executive Directors noted that the global economic recovery remains fragile and risks to the global financial system have increased. Growth has slowed recently 
both in advanced and in emerging market and 
developing economies, and the outlook remains 
subdued, largely because policies in major advanced 
economies have failed to instill lasting confidence. 
Directors emphasized that clear and credible poli‑
cies in advanced economies, with improved policy 
coordination and communication, are of paramount 
importance to address immediate downside risks. 
In this regard, ongoing efforts at fiscal consolida‑
tion and structural reform, as well as recent policy 
initiatives in key advanced economies, should help 
improve financial stability, lower public debt over 
the medium term, spur growth, and contribute to 
strengthen market confidence. 
Directors agreed that downside risks to the 
outlook remain considerable. Principal sources of 
near‑term risk are the protracted crisis in the euro 
area and the “fiscal cliff” and impending “debt 
ceiling” in the United States. Geopolitical risks that 
could lead to a disruption of oil supply also remain 
a concern. Over the medium term, the elevated, 
though gradually declining, public debt in advanced 
economies could dampen investor confidence and 
destabilize global bond markets. Furthermore, 
stress in key regions could have large spillover 
effects given cross‑border macro‑financial and trade 
linkages.
Directors concurred that resolving the euro area 
crisis remains the most important policy priority. 
They welcomed the recent decisions by the Euro‑
pean Central Bank to increase liquidity support 
and safeguard an appropriate monetary policy 
transmission, particularly through the Outright 
Monetary Transactions program. They urged timely 
and accelerated implementation of these and 
other measures to strengthen the currency union 
and reduce financial fragmentation. In particular, 
Directors supported the establishment of a banking 
union with a unified financial stability framework, 
as well as further fiscal integration, recapitalization 
or restructuring of viable banks, and resolution of 
nonviable banks. It is also imperative to make the 
euro area firewall sufficiently flexible to help break 
the adverse feedback loop between sovereigns and 
banks.
Directors observed that most countries have 
made progress in reducing fiscal deficits, improv‑
ing fiscal policy frameworks, and strengthening 
fiscal governance. Nevertheless, they noted that 
debt levels remain high and underscored the need 
for sustained medium‑term fiscal consolidation to 
achieve debt sustainability. The United States and 
Japan, in particular, urgently need to adopt credible 
medium‑term fiscal adjustment plans to reduce 
their debt to sustainable levels. Fiscal tightening 
should be executed in a manner that makes public 
finances growth friendly and efficient. Most Direc‑
tors considered that in countries with fiscal space, 
near‑term fiscal adjustment plans should be imple‑
mented flexibly, and automatic stabilizers should 
be allowed to operate fully, as economic conditions 
warrant. A few Directors, however, stressed the need 
to preserve the credibility of fiscal policy frame‑
works by strictly adhering to fiscal targets. 
Directors reiterated that fiscal consolidation 
should be combined with accommodative monetary 
policies, while respecting the mandate of respective 
central banks, and with structural reforms to main‑
tain growth and limit the negative social impact of 
deficit reduction. Most Directors supported further 
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easing of monetary policy to sustain growth, includ‑
ing through unconventional measures if necessary. 
In that regard, they underscored the importance 
of the recent announcements by the European 
Central Bank and the Federal Reserve. A number of 
Directors noted, however, that prolonged monetary 
easing could introduce economic and financial 
distortions, discourage fiscal consolidation, and spur 
destabilizing capital flows to other regions, while its 
effectiveness may be limited.
Directors called for faster progress with structural 
reform. The priorities are to strengthen the finan‑
cial regulatory framework, improve bank balance 
sheets and financial health more generally, and 
reduce household debt. Many countries also need to 
improve their external competitiveness, which will 
require reforms to enhance labor and product mar‑
ket flexibility and efficiency. Social safety nets and 
reforms to reduce long‑term unemployment should 
be strengthened in parallel with fiscal adjustment.
Directors welcomed the steady improvement in 
the economic performance of emerging market and 
developing economies, which reflected both good 
policies and fewer shocks. However, the recent 
slowdown of growth calls for determined action 
to mitigate internal and external vulnerabilities, 
including the use of macroprudential policies as 
needed. Those countries with stable and low infla‑
tion could pause or reverse the monetary policy 
tightening of the past year to sustain growth. Those 
with relatively strong fiscal and external posi‑
tions could also use their fiscal space prudently for 
this purpose. Others would have to continue to 
rebuild policy space needed to tackle shocks, with 
due regard for social and development needs in 
low‑income countries. 
Directors agreed that global imbalances and 
associated risks have diminished, mainly because of 
weaker demand in external‑deficit advanced econo‑
mies. Lasting resolution of these imbalances is in the 
self‑interest of both deficit and surplus economies. 
For surplus economies, this will require structural 
reforms to boost investment and consumption, more 
market‑determined exchange rates, and discontinua‑
tion of large‑scale official reserve accumulation where 
appropriate. A few Directors nevertheless emphasized 
the importance of maintaining adequate reserve buf‑
fers against external shocks. Deficit economies will 
require stronger fiscal positions, higher saving rates, 
and lower consumption demand.
StatiStical appendix
 International Monetary Fund | October 2012 175
The Statistical Appendix presents historical data as well as projections. It comprises five sections: Assumptions, What’s New, Data and Conventions, Classification of 
Countries, and Statistical Tables.
The assumptions underlying the estimates and 
projections for 2012–13 and the medium-term 
scenario for 2014–17 are summarized in the first 
section. The second section presents a brief descrip-
tion of the changes to the database and statistical 
tables since the April 2012 issue of the World Eco-
nomic Outlook. The third section provides a general 
description of the data and the conventions used for 
calculating country group composites. The classifica-
tion of countries in the various groups presented in 
the World Economic Outlook is summarized in the 
fourth section. 
The last, and main, section comprises the statisti-
cal tables. (Statistical Appendix A is included here; 
Statistical Appendix B is available online.) Data 
in these tables have been compiled on the basis of 
information available through mid-September 2012. 
The figures for 2012 and beyond are shown with 
the same degree of precision as the historical figures 
solely for convenience; because they are projections, 
the same degree of accuracy is not to be inferred.
assumptions
Real effective exchange rates for the advanced 
economies are assumed to remain constant at their 
average levels during the period July 30–August 27, 
2012. For 2012 and 2013, these assumptions imply 
average U.S. dollar/SDR conversion rates of 1.523 
and 1.512, U.S. dollar/euro conversion rates of 1.266 
and 1.239, and yen/U.S. dollar conversion rates of 
79.3 and 79.3, respectively.
It is assumed that the price of oil will average 
$106.18 a barrel in 2012 and $105.10 a barrel in 
2013.
Established policies of national authorities are 
assumed to be maintained. The more specific policy 
assumptions underlying the projections for selected 
economies are described in Box A1.
With regard to interest rates, it is assumed that the 
London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on six-
month U.S. dollar deposits will average 0.7 percent 
in 2012 and 0.6 percent in 2013, that three-month 
euro deposits will average 0.6 percent in 2012 and 
0.2 percent in 2013, and that six-month yen deposits 
will average 0.4 percent in 2012 and 0.3 percent in 
2013.
With respect to introduction of the euro, on 
December 31, 1998, the Council of the European 
Union decided that, effective January 1, 1999, the 
irrevocably fixed conversion rates between the euro 
and currencies of the member countries adopting the 
euro are as follows:
See Box 5.4 of the October 1998 World Economic 
Outlook for details on how the conversion rates were 
established.
1 euro = 13.7603 Austrian schillings
 =  40.3399  Belgian francs
 = 0.585274  Cyprus pound1
 = 1.95583 Deutsche mark
 = 15.6466 Estonian krooni2
 = 5.94573 Finnish markkaa
 = 6.55957 French francs
 = 340.750 Greek drachma3
 = 0.787564 Irish pound
 = 1,936.27 Italian lire
 =  40.3399 Luxembourg francs
 = 0.42930 Maltese lira1
 = 2.20371 Netherlands guilders
 = 200.482 Portuguese escudos
 = 30.1260 Slovak koruna4
 = 239.640 Slovenian tolars5
 = 166.386 Spanish pesetas
1Established on January 1, 2008.
2Established on January 1, 2011.
3Established on January 1, 2001.
4Established on January 1, 2009.
5Established on January 1, 2007.
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What’s New
•	 For	Cyprus,	data	reflect	a	passive	scenario	based	on	
implementation	of	approved	policies	only.	It	is	also	
assumed	that	the	government	will	be	able	to	roll	over	
its	debt	and	finance	its	deficit	at	a	reasonable	cost	
over	the	medium	term	and	that	banks	will	achieve	
adequate	capitalization	without	government	assistance.
•	 Data	for	South	Sudan	are	now	included	in	the	sub-
Saharan	Africa	aggregates	and	classified	under	those	
for	a	country	with	fuel	as	the	main	source	of	export	
earnings.	Sudan,	which	remains	in	the	Middle	East	
and	North	Africa	region,	is	now	classified	as	a	country	
with	nonfuel	primary	products	as	the	main	source	of	
export	earnings.	
•	 Data	for	San	Marino	are	now	included	in	the	
advanced	economy	classification.
•	 As	in	the	April	2012	World Economic Outlook,	
data	for	Syria	are	excluded	for	2011	and	later	due	
to	the	uncertain	political	situation.
•	 Starting	with	the	October	2012 World Economic 
Outlook, the	label	for	the	Emerging	and	Develop-
ing	Economies	group	is	Emerging	Market	and	
Developing	Economies.	The	member	countries	
remain	unchanged	with	the	exception	of	South	
Sudan	as	a	new	member	of	the	group.
Data and Conventions
Data	and	projections	for	186	economies	form	the	
statistical	basis	of	the	World Economic Outlook	(the	
WEO	database).	The	data	are	maintained	jointly	by	
the	IMF’s	Research	Department	and	regional	depart-
ments,	with	the	latter	regularly	updating	country	
projections	based	on	consistent	global	assumptions.
Although	national	statistical	agencies	are	the	
ultimate	providers	of	historical	data	and	definitions,	
international	organizations	are	also	involved	in	statisti-
cal	issues,	with	the	objective	of	harmonizing	meth-
odologies	for	the	compilation	of	national	statistics,	
including	analytical	frameworks,	concepts,	definitions,	
classifications,	and	valuation	procedures	used	in	the	
production	of	economic	statistics.	The	WEO	database	
reflects	information	from	both	national	source	agen-
cies	and	international	organizations.	
Most	countries’	macroeconomic	data	presented	in	the	
World Economic Outlook	conform	broadly	to	the	1993	
version	of	the	System of National Accounts (SNA).	The	
IMF’s	sector	statistical	standards—the	Balance of Pay-
ments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth 
Edition (BPM6),	the	Monetary and Financial Statistics 
Manual (MFSM	2000),	and	the	Government Finance 
Statistics Manual 2001 (GFSM	2001)—have	been	or	
are	being	aligned	with	the	2008	SNA.1	These	standards	
reflect	the	IMF’s	special	interest	in	countries’	external	
positions,	financial	sector	stability,	and	public	sector	fiscal	
positions.	The	process	of	adapting	country	data	to	the	
new	standards	begins	in	earnest	when	the	manuals	are	
released.	However,	full	concordance	with	the	manuals	is	
ultimately	dependent	on	the	provision	by	national	statis-
tical	compilers	of	revised	country	data;	hence,	the	World 
Economic Outlook	estimates	are	only	partially	adapted	
to	these	manuals.	Nonetheless,	for	many	countries	the	
impact	of	conversion	to	the	updated	standards	will	be	
small	on	major	balances	and	aggregates.	Many	other	
countries	have	partially	adopted	the	latest	standards	and	
will	continue	implementation	over	a	period	of	years.
Consistent	with	the	recommendations	of	the	
1993 SNA,	several	countries	have	phased	out	their	
traditional	fixed-base-year	method	of	calculating	
real	macroeconomic	variable	levels	and	growth	by	
switching	to	a	chain-weighted	method	of	comput-
ing	aggregate	growth.	The	chain-weighted	method	
frequently	updates	the	weights	of	price	and	volume	
indicators.	It	allows	countries	to	measure	GDP	
growth	more	accurately	by	reducing	or	eliminating	
the	downward	biases	in	volume	series	built	on	index	
numbers	that	average	volume	components	using	
weights	from	a	year	in	the	moderately	distant	past.	
Composite	data	for	country	groups	in	the	World 
Economic Outlook	are	either	sums	or	weighted	aver-
ages	of	data	for	individual	countries.	Unless	noted	
otherwise,	multiyear	averages	of	growth	rates	are	
expressed	as	compound	annual	rates	of	change.2	
Arithmetically	weighted	averages	are	used	for	all	data	
1Many	other	countries	are	implementing	the	2008	SNA	and	will	
release	national	accounts	data	based	on	the	new	standard	in	2014.	
A	few	countries	use	versions	of	the	SNA	older	than	1993.	A	similar	
adoption	pattern	is	expected	for	BPM6.	While	the	conceptual	
standards	use	the	BPM6,	the	WEO	is	still	using	the	BPM5	presen-
tation	until	such	a	time	when	a	representative	number	of	countries	
have	moved	their	BOP	accounts	into	the	BPM6	framework.
2Averages	for	real	GDP	and	its	components,	employment,	per	
capita	GDP,	inflation,	factor	productivity,	trade,	and	commod-
ity	prices,	are	calculated	based	on	the	compound	annual	rate	of	
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for the emerging market and developing economies 
group except inflation and money growth, for which 
geometric averages are used. The following conven-
tions apply.
•	 Country	group	composites	for	exchange	rates,	
interest rates, and growth rates of monetary aggre-
gates are weighted by GDP converted to U.S. 
dollars at market exchange rates (averaged over the 
preceding three years) as a share of group GDP.
•	 Composites	for	other	data	relating	to	the	domes-
tic economy, whether growth rates or ratios, are 
weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) as a share of total world or group 
GDP.3
•	 Composites	for	data	relating	to	the	domestic	
economy for the euro area (17 member countries 
throughout the entire period unless noted other-
wise) are aggregates of national source data using 
GDP weights. Annual data are not adjusted for 
calendar-day effects. For data prior to 1999, data 
aggregations apply 1995 European currency unit 
exchange rates.
•	 Composites	for	fiscal	data	are	sums	of	individual	
country data after conversion to U.S. dollars at 
the average market exchange rates in the years 
indicated.
•	 Composite	unemployment	rates	and	employment	
growth are weighted by labor force as a share of 
group labor force.
•	 Composites	relating	to	external	sector	statistics	are	
sums of individual country data after conversion 
to U.S. dollars at the average market exchange 
rates in the years indicated for balance of pay-
ments data and at end-of-year market exchange 
rates for debt denominated in currencies other 
than U.S. dollars. 
•	 Composites	of	changes	in	foreign	trade	vol-
umes and prices, however, are arithmetic aver-
change, except for the unemployment rate, which is based on the 
simple arithmetic average.
3See Box A2 of the April 2004 World Economic Outlook for a 
summary of the revised PPP-based weights and Annex IV of the 
May 1993 World Economic Outlook. See also Anne-Marie Gulde 
and Marianne Schulze-Ghattas, “Purchasing Power Parity Based 
Weights for the World Economic Outlook,” in Staff Studies for the 
World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund, Decem-
ber 1993), pp. 106–23.
ages of percent changes for individual countries 
weighted by the U.S. dollar value of exports or 
imports as a share of total world or group exports 
or imports (in the preceding year).
•	 Unless	noted	otherwise,	group	composites	are	
computed if 90 percent or more of the share of 
group weights is represented.
classification of countries
Summary of the country classification
The country classification in the World Economic 
Outlook divides the world into two major groups: 
advanced economies and emerging market and 
developing economies.4 This classification is not 
based on strict criteria, economic or otherwise, and 
it has evolved over time. The objective is to facili-
tate analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful 
method of organizing data. Table A provides an 
overview of the country classification, showing the 
number of countries in each group by region and 
summarizing some key indicators of their relative 
size (GDP valued by PPP, total exports of goods and 
services, and population). 
Some countries remain outside the country 
classification and therefore are not included in the 
analysis. Anguilla, Cuba, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, and Montserrat are examples 
of countries that are not IMF members, and their 
economies therefore are not monitored by the 
IMF. The Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palau, and Somalia are omitted from the 
emerging market and developing economies group 
composites because of data limitations.
General Features and composition of Groups 
in the World Economic Outlook classification
advanced economies
The 35 advanced economies are listed in Table 
B. The seven largest in terms of GDP—the United 
4As used here, the terms “country” and “economy” do not 
always refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by 
international law and practice. Some territorial entities included 
here are not states, although their statistical data are maintained 
on a separate and independent basis.
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States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada—constitute the subgroup 
of major advanced economies often referred to as the 
Group of Seven (G7). The members of the euro area 
and the newly industrialized Asian economies are also 
distinguished as subgroups. Composite data shown 
in the tables for the euro area cover the current 
members for all years, even though the membership 
has increased over time.
Table C lists the member countries of the 
European Union, not all of which are classified as 
advanced economies in the World Economic Outlook.
emerging Market and developing economies
The group of emerging market and developing 
economies (151) includes all those that are not clas-
sified as advanced economies.
The regional breakdowns of emerging market and 
developing economies are central and eastern Europe 
(CEE), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
developing Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Emerging market and developing economies are 
also classified according to analytical criteria. The 
analytical criteria reflect the composition of export 
earnings and other income from abroad; a distinction 
between net creditor and net debtor economies; and, 
for the net debtors, financial criteria based on external 
financing sources and experience with external debt 
servicing. The detailed composition of emerging 
market and developing economies in the regional and 
analytical groups is shown in Tables D and E. 
The analytical criterion by source of export earn-
ings distinguishes between categories: fuel (Standard 
International Trade Classification—SITC 3) and 
nonfuel and then focuses on nonfuel primary products 
(SITCs 0, 1, 2, 4, and 68). Economies are catego-
rized into one of these groups when their main 
source of export earnings exceeds 50 percent of total 
exports on average between 2006 and 2010.
The financial criteria focus on net creditor econo-
mies, net debtor economies, and heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs). Economies are categorized as net 
debtors when their current account balance accu-
mulations from 1972 (or earliest data available) to 
2010 are negative. Net debtor economies are further 
differentiated on the basis of two additional financial 
criteria: official external financing and experience with 
debt servicing.5 Net debtors are placed in the official 
external financing category when 66 percent or more 
of their total debt, on average between 2006 and 
2010, was financed by official creditors.
The HIPC group comprises the countries that are 
or have been considered by the IMF and the World 
Bank for participation in their debt initiative known as 
the HIPC Initiative, which aims to reduce the external 
debt burdens of all the eligible HIPCs to a “sustain-
able” level in a reasonably short period of time.6 Many 
of these countries have already benefited from debt 
relief and have graduated from the initiative.
5 During 2006–10, 40 economies incurred external payments 
arrears or entered into official or commercial bank debt-reschedul-
ing agreements. This group is referred to as economies with arrears 
and/or rescheduling during 2006–10.
6See David Andrews, Anthony R. Boote, Syed S. Rizavi, and 
Sukwinder Singh, Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries: The 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative, IMF Pamphlet Series No. 51 (Wash-
ington: International Monetary Fund, November 1999).
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Table A. Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in Aggregate GDP, Exports 
of Goods and Services, and Population, 20111
(Percent of total for group or world)
GDP
Exports of Goods 
and Services Population
Number of
Economies
Advanced
Economies World
Advanced
Economies World
Advanced
Economies World
Advanced Economies 35 100.0 51.1 100.0 62.3 100.0 15.0
United States 37.4 19.1 15.2 9.4 30.4 4.5
Euro Area 17 27.9 14.3 41.8 26.0 32.2 4.8
Germany 7.7 3.9 13.1 8.2 8.0 1.2
France 5.5 2.8 6.0 3.7 6.2 0.9
Italy 4.6 2.3 4.5 2.8 5.9 0.9
Spain 3.5 1.8 3.3 2.0 4.5 0.7
Japan 11.0 5.6 6.7 4.2 12.5 1.9
United Kingdom 5.7 2.9 5.7 3.5 6.1 0.9
Canada 3.5 1.8 3.9 2.4 3.4 0.5
Other Advanced Economies 14 14.6 7.4 26.8 16.7 15.5 2.3
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 7 75.3 38.5 55.1 34.3 72.4 10.8
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 4 7.7 3.9 15.2 9.4 8.3 1.2
Emerging  
Market and 
Developing 
Economies World
Emerging 
Market and 
Developing 
Economies World
Emerging 
Market and 
Developing 
Economies World
Emerging Market and Developing 
Economies 151 100.0 48.9 100.0 37.7 100.0 85.0
Regional Groups
Central and Eastern Europe 14 7.2 3.5 9.1 3.4 3.1 2.6
Commonwealth of Independent States2 13 8.8 4.3 10.7 4.0 4.9 4.2
Russia 6.2 3.0 6.9 2.6 2.4 2.1
Developing Asia 27 51.1 25.0 42.6 16.1 61.3 52.1
China 29.3 14.3 24.8 9.4 23.1 19.6
India 11.4 5.6 5.3 2.0 20.7 17.6
Excluding China and India 25 10.4 5.1 12.4 4.7 17.5 14.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 32 17.8 8.7 14.6 5.5 9.9 8.4
Brazil 5.9 2.9 3.5 1.3 3.3 2.8
Mexico 4.3 2.1 4.3 1.6 1.9 1.7
Middle East and North Africa 20 10.0 4.9 17.5 6.6 6.7 5.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 45 5.1 2.5 5.6 2.1 14.2 12.1
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 43 2.6 1.3 3.1 1.2 10.6 9.0
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel 27 17.6 8.6 28.6 10.8 11.1 9.4
Nonfuel 124 82.4 40.3 71.4 26.9 88.9 75.6
Of Which, Primary Products 23 2.7 1.3 2.8 1.1 5.8 4.9
By External Financing Source3
Net Debtor Economies 121 48.1 23.5 39.0 14.7 60.5 51.4
Of Which, Official Financing 29 2.2 1.1 1.5 0.6 8.6 7.3
Net Debtor Economies by Debt-
Servicing Experience3
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2006–10 40 4.9 2.4 4.2 1.6 9.4 8.0
Other Net Debtor Economies 81 43.2 21.2 34.8 13.1 51.1 43.4
Other Groups
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 38 2.4 1.2 1.9 0.7 10.7 9.1
1The GDP shares are based on the purchasing-power-parity valuation of economies’ GDP. The number of economies comprising each group reflects those for which data 
are included in the group aggregates.
2Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in 
economic structure.
3South Sudan in omitted from the external financing group composites for lack of a fully developed database.
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Table B. Advanced Economies by Subgroup
Major Currency Areas
United States
Euro Area
Japan
Euro Area
Austria Germany Netherlands
Belgium Greece Portugal
Cyprus Ireland Slovak Republic
Estonia Italy Slovenia
Finland Luxembourg Spain
France Malta
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies
Hong Kong SAR1 Singapore
Korea Taiwan Province of China
Major Advanced Economies
Canada Italy United States
France Japan
Germany United Kingdom
Other Advanced Economies
Australia Israel Singapore
Czech Republic Korea Sweden
Denmark New Zealand Switzerland
Hong Kong SAR1 Norway Taiwan Province of China
Iceland San Marino  
1On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the People’s Republic of China and became a Special Administrative 
Region of China.
Table C. European Union
Austria Germany Netherlands
Belgium Greece Poland
Bulgaria Hungary Portugal
Cyprus Ireland Romania
Czech Republic Italy Slovak Republic
Denmark Latvia Slovenia
Estonia Lithuania Spain
Finland Luxembourg Sweden
France Malta United Kingdom
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Table D. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source of Export Earnings
Fuel Nonfuel Primary Products
Commonwealth of Independent States1
Azerbaijan Mongolia
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Developing Asia
Brunei Darussalam Papua New Guinea
Timor-Leste Solomon Islands
Latin America and the Caribbean
Ecuador Bolivia
Trinidad and Tobago Chile
Venezuela Guyana
Peru
Suriname
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria Mauritania
Bahrain Sudan
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
Republic of Yemen
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola Burkina Faso
Chad Burundi
Republic of Congo Central African Republic
Equatorial Guinea Democratic Republic of the Congo
Gabon Guinea
Nigeria Guinea-Bissau
South Sudan Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Zambia
Zimbabwe
1Mongolia, which is not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, is included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure.
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Net External Position Heavily 
Indebted Poor 
Countries2
Net  
Creditor
Net  
Debtor1
Central and Eastern 
Europe
Albania *
Bosnia and Herzegovina *
Bulgaria *
Croatia *
Hungary *
Kosovo *
Latvia *
Lithuania *
FYR Macedonia *
Montenegro *
Poland *
Romania *
Serbia *
Turkey *
Commonwealth of 
Independent States3
Armenia *
Azerbaijan *
Belarus *
Georgia *
Kazakhstan *
Kyrgyz Republic •
Moldova *
Mongolia •
Russia *
Tajikistan •
Turkmenistan *
Ukraine *
Uzbekistan *
Developing Asia
Afghanistan • •
Bangladesh •
Bhutan *
Brunei Darussalam *
Cambodia *
China *
Fiji *
India *
Indonesia *
Kiribati •
Net External Position Heavily 
Indebted Poor 
Countries2
Net  
Creditor
Net  
Debtor1
Lao P.D.R. *
Malaysia *
Maldives *
Myanmar *
Nepal *
Pakistan *
Papua New Guinea *
Philippines *
Samoa *
Solomon Islands *
Sri Lanka *
Thailand *
Timor-Leste *
Tonga *
Tuvalu •
Vanuatu *
Vietnam *
Latin America and the 
Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda *
Argentina *
The Bahamas *
Barbados *
Belize *
Bolivia * •
Brazil *
Chile *
Colombia *
Costa Rica *
Dominica *
Dominican Republic *
Ecuador •
El Salvador *
Grenada *
Guatemala *
Guyana • •
Haiti • •
Honduras * •
Jamaica •
Mexico *
Nicaragua * •
Panama *
Table E. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region, Net External Position, and Status as 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
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Net External Position Heavily 
Indebted Poor 
Countries2
Net  
Creditor
Net  
Debtor1
Paraguay *
Peru *
St. Kitts and Nevis *
St. Lucia *
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines •
Suriname •
Trinidad and Tobago *
Uruguay *
Venezuela *
Middle East and North 
Africa
Algeria *
Bahrain *
Djibouti *
Egypt *
Iran *
Iraq *
Jordan *
Kuwait *
Lebanon *
Libya *
Mauritania * •
Morocco *
Oman *
Qatar *
Saudi Arabia *
Sudan * *
Syria •
Tunisia *
United Arab Emirates *
Yemen *
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola *
Benin * •
Botswana *
Burkina Faso • •
Burundi • •
Cameroon * •
Cape Verde *
Net External Position Heavily 
Indebted Poor 
Countries2
Net  
Creditor
Net  
Debtor1
Central African Republic • •
Chad * *
Comoros • *
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo • •
Republic of Congo • •
Côte d’Ivoire * *
Equatorial Guinea *
Eritrea • *
Ethiopia • •
Gabon *
The Gambia * •
Ghana • •
Guinea * *
Guinea-Bissau • •
Kenya *
Lesotho *
Liberia * •
Madagascar * •
Malawi • •
Mali • •
Mauritius *
Mozambique * •
Namibia *
Niger * •
Nigeria *
Rwanda • •
São Tomé and Príncipe • •
Senegal * •
Seychelles *
Sierra Leone * •
South Africa *
South Sudan 4 . . .
Swaziland *
Tanzania * •
Togo • •
Uganda * •
Zambia * •
Zimbabwe *
Table E. (concluded)
1Dot instead of star indicates that the net debtor’s main external finance source is official financing.
2Dot instead of star indicates that the country has reached the completion point.
3Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in 
economic structure.
4South Sudan is omitted from the external financing group composites for lack of a fully developed database.
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Fiscal Policy Assumptions
The short-term fiscal policy assumptions used in 
the World Economic Outlook (WEO) are based on 
officially announced budgets, adjusted for differences 
between the national authorities and the IMF staff 
regarding macroeconomic assumptions and projected 
fiscal outturns. The medium-term fiscal projections 
incorporate policy measures that are judged likely 
to be implemented. In cases where the IMF staff 
has insufficient information to assess the authorities’ 
budget intentions and prospects for policy 
implementation, an unchanged structural primary 
balance is assumed unless indicated otherwise. 
Specific assumptions used in some of the advanced 
economies follow. (See also Tables B5 to B9 in the 
online section of the Statistical Appendix for data 
on fiscal net lending/borrowing and structural 
balances.1)
Argentina: The 2012 forecasts are based on the 
2011 outturn and IMF staff assumptions. For the 
outer years, the assumed improvement in fiscal 
balance is predicated on an assumed growth of 
revenues in the context of a pickup in economic 
recovery combined with a decline in the growth of 
expenditures.
Australia: Fiscal projections are based on IMF 
staff projections and the 2012–13 budget and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
1 The output gap is actual minus potential output, as a 
percent of potential output. Structural balances are expressed 
as a percent of potential output. The structural balance is 
the actual net lending/borrowing minus the effects of cycli-
cal output from potential output, corrected for one-time 
and other factors, such as asset and commodity prices and 
output composition effects. Changes in the structural balance 
consequently include effects of temporary fiscal measures, the 
impact of fluctuations in interest rates and debt-service costs, 
and other noncyclical fluctuations in net lending/borrowing. 
The computations of structural balances are based on IMF 
staff estimates of potential GDP and revenue and expenditure 
elasticities. (See the October 1993 World Economic Outlook, 
Annex I.) Net debt is defined as gross debt minus financial 
assets of the general government, which include assets held by 
the social security insurance system. Estimates of the output 
gap and of the structural balance are subject to significant 
margins of uncertainty.
Austria: Projections take the 2013–16 federal 
financial framework as well as associated further 
implementation needs and risks into account.
Belgium: IMF staff projections for 2012 and 
beyond are based on unchanged policies, as some 
reform measures remain under discussion.
Brazil: For 2012, the projection is based on the 
budget, subsequent updates to plans announced 
by the authorities and the fiscal outturn up to July 
2012. In this and outer years, the IMF staff assumes 
adherence to the announced primary surplus target 
and further increases in public investment in line 
with the authorities’ intentions.
Canada: Projections use the baseline forecasts 
in the Economic Action Plan 2012, Jobs, Growth, 
and Long-Term Prosperity, March 29, 2012 (the 
fiscal year 2012/13 budget). The IMF staff makes 
some adjustments to this forecast for differences in 
macroeconomic projections. The IMF staff forecast 
also incorporates the most recent data releases from 
Statistics Canada’s Canadian System of National 
Economic Accounts, including federal, provincial, 
and territorial budgetary outturns through the end 
of the second quarter of 2012.
China: For 2012, the government is assumed 
to slow the pace of fiscal consolidation; the fiscal 
impulse is assumed to be neutral.
Denmark: Projections for 2012–13 are aligned 
with the latest official budget estimates and the 
underlying economic projections, adjusted where 
appropriate for the IMF staff’s macroeconomic 
assumptions. For 2014–17, the projections incor-
porate key features of the medium-term fiscal plan 
as embodied in the authorities’ 2011 Convergence 
Program submitted to the European Union.
France: Estimates for the general government 
in 2011 reflect the actual outturn. Projections for 
2012 and beyond reflect the authorities’ 2011–14 
multiyear budget, adjusted for fiscal packages and 
differences in assumptions on macro and financial 
variables and revenue projections.
Germany: The estimates for 2011 are prelimi-
nary estimates from the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany. The IMF staff’s projections for 2012 and 
beyond reflect the authorities’ adopted core federal 
government budget plan adjusted for the differences 
Box a1. economic policy assumptions Underlying the projections for Selected economies
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in the IMF staff’s macroeconomic framework and 
staff assumptions about fiscal developments in state 
and local governments, the social insurance system, 
and special funds. The projections also incorporate 
the authorities’ plans for a 2013–14 tax reduction. 
The estimate of gross debt includes portfolios of 
impaired assets and noncore business transferred 
to institutions that are winding up as well as other 
financial sector and EU support operations.
Greece: Macroeconomic, monetary, and fiscal 
projections for 2012 and the medium term are 
consistent with the policies discussed between the 
IMF staff and the authorities in the context of the 
Extended Fund Facility. 
Hong Kong SAR: Projections are based on the 
authorities’ medium-term fiscal projections.
Hungary: Fiscal projections include IMF staff pro-
jections of the macroeconomic framework and of the 
impact of recent legislative measures as well as fiscal 
policy plans announced at the end of July 2012.
India: Historical data are based on budgetary execu-
tion data. Projections are based on available informa-
tion on the authorities’ fiscal plans, with adjustments 
for IMF staff assumptions. Subnational data are 
incorporated with a lag of up to two years; general 
government data are thus finalized well after central 
government data. IMF and Indian presentations differ, 
particularly regarding divestment and license auction 
proceeds, net versus gross recording of revenues in cer-
tain minor categories, and some public sector lending.
Indonesia: The 2011 central government deficit was 
lower than expected (1.1 percent of GDP), reflecting 
underspending, particularly on public investment. 
The central government 2012 deficit is estimated at 
2.0 percent of GDP, lower than the revised budget 
estimate of 2.2 percent of GDP. It is assumed that 
subsidized fuel prices will not be adjusted in 2012. 
The low projected budget deficit also reflects ongoing 
budget execution problems. Fiscal projections for 
2013–17 are built around key policy reforms needed 
to support economic growth—namely, enhanc-
ing budget implementation to ensure fiscal policy 
effectiveness, reducing energy subsidies through 
gradual administrative price increases, and continu-
ous revenue mobilization efforts to increase space for 
infrastructure development.
Ireland: Fiscal projections are based on the 2012 
budget and the Medium-Term Fiscal Statement 
(published in November 2011), which commits to a 
€12.4 billion consolidation over 2012–15. The fiscal 
projections are adjusted for differences between the 
macroeconomic projections of the IMF staff and 
those of the Irish authorities.
Italy: Fiscal projections incorporate the impact of 
the government’s announced fiscal adjustment pack-
age, as outlined in its April 2012 Documento di 
Economia e Finanza, modified based on the recent 
announcement of the government’s spending review. 
The estimates for the 2011 outturn are preliminary. 
The IMF staff projections are based on the authori-
ties’ estimates of the policy scenario and are adjusted 
mainly for differences in macroeconomic assump-
tions. After 2015, a zero overall fiscal balance in 
cyclically adjusted terms is projected, in line with 
the authorities’ fiscal rule.
Japan: The projections include fiscal measures 
already announced by the government, including 
consumption tax increases and earthquake recon-
struction spending. The medium-term projections 
assume that expenditure and revenue of the general 
government are adjusted in line with current under-
lying demographic and economic trends.
Korea: Fiscal projections assume that fiscal policies 
will be implemented in 2012 as announced by the 
government. Projections of expenditure for 2012 are 
in line with the budget. Revenue projections reflect 
the IMF staff’s macroeconomic assumptions, adjusted 
for discretionary revenue-raising measures already 
announced by the government. The medium-term 
projections assume that the government will continue 
with its consolidation plans and balance the budget 
(excluding social security funds) by 2013, consistent 
with the government’s medium-term goal.
Mexico: Fiscal projections for 2012 are broadly 
in line with the approved budget; projections for 
2013 onward assume compliance with the balanced 
budget rule.
Netherlands: Fiscal projections for the period 
2012–17 are based on the authorities’ Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis budget projections, 
after adjusting for differences in macroeconomic 
assumptions.
Box a1. (continued)
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New Zealand: Fiscal projections are based on the 
authorities’ 2012 budget and IMF staff estimates. 
The New Zealand fiscal accounts switched to New 
Zealand International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards in Budget 2007/08. Backdated data have been 
released back to 1997.
Portugal: Projections reflect the authorities’ 
commitments under the EU- and IMF-supported 
program for 2012–13 and IMF staff projections 
thereafter.
Russia: Projections for 2012–14 are based on the 
non-oil deficit in percent of GDP implied by the 
2012–14 medium-term budget, the 2012 supple-
mental budget, and the IMF staff’s revenue projec-
tions. The IMF staff assumes an unchanged non-oil 
federal government balance in percent of GDP 
during 2015–17.
Saudi Arabia: The authorities base their budget 
on a conservative assumption for oil prices with 
adjustments to expenditure allocations considered in 
the event that revenues exceed budgeted amounts. 
IMF staff projections of oil revenues are based 
on WEO baseline oil prices. On the expenditure 
side, wages are assumed to rise at a natural rate of 
increase in the medium term with adjustments for 
recently announced changes in the wage structure. 
In 2013 and 2016, 13th-month pay is awarded 
based on the lunar calendar. Capital spending is in 
line with the priorities established in the authorities’ 
Ninth Development Plan, and recently announced 
capital spending on housing is assumed to start in 
2012 and continue over the medium term.
Singapore: For fiscal year 2012/13, projections are 
based on budget numbers. For the remainder of the 
projection period, the IMF staff assumes unchanged 
policies.
South Africa: Fiscal projections are based on the 
authorities’ 2012 budget and policy intentions 
stated in the Budget Review, published February 22, 
2012.
Spain: For 2012 and beyond, fiscal projections 
are based on the measures specified in the Stabil-
ity Program Update 2012–15, the revised fiscal 
recommendations by the European Council and 
the subsequent July fiscal package, and the bian-
nual budget plan for 2013–14 announced in August 
2012. While the Eurogroup’s commitment of up to 
€100 billion (9.4 percent of GDP) includes an addi-
tional safety margin, IMF staff, to be prudent and 
pending further details on implementation, assumed 
disbursement of this full amount for its 2012 debt 
projections. Under the unchanged policies scenario, 
no additional structural improvement is assumed 
for the outer years, after the fiscal deficit reaches 3 
percent of GDP.
Sweden: Fiscal projections for 2012 are broadly in 
line with the authorities’ projections. The impact of 
cyclical developments on the fiscal accounts is calcu-
lated using the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development’s latest semi-elasticity.
Switzerland: Projections for 2011–17 are based on 
IMF staff calculations, which incorporate mea-
sures to restore balance in the federal accounts and 
strengthen social security finances.
Turkey: Fiscal projections assume that current 
expenditures will be in line with the authorities’ 
2012–14 Medium-Term Program but that capital 
expenditures will be exceeded given projects initi-
ated in 2011.
United Kingdom: Fiscal projections are based on 
the authorities’ 2012 budget announced in March 
2012 and the Economic and Fiscal Outlook by the 
Office for Budget Responsibility published along 
with the budget. These projections incorporate 
the announced medium-term consolidation plans 
from 2012 onward. The authorities’ projections are 
adjusted for differences between the IMF staff’s fore-
casts of macroeconomic and financial variables (such 
as GDP growth) and the forecasts of these variables 
assumed in the authorities’ fiscal projections. IMF 
staff projections also exclude the temporary effects 
of financial sector interventions and the effect on 
public sector net investment in 2012–13 of transfer-
ring assets from the Royal Mail Pension Plan to the 
public sector.
United States: Fiscal projections are based on the 
March 2012 Congressional Budget Office baseline, 
adjusted for the IMF staff’s policy and macro-
economic assumptions. The key near-term policy 
assumptions include an extension of all the Bush 
Box A1. (continued)
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tax cuts and emergency unemployment benefits 
into 2013 and replacement of automatic spending 
cuts (“sequestration”) with back-loaded consolida-
tion measures. Over the medium term, the IMF 
staff assumes that Congress will continue to make 
regular adjustments to the Alternative Minimum 
Tax parameters and Medicare payments (“Doc Fix”) 
and will extend certain traditional programs (such 
as the research and development tax credit). It is 
assumed that the Bush tax cuts for the middle class 
will be extended permanently, but those for high-
income taxpayers will be allowed to expire in 2014 
(one year later than planned by the administration). 
The fiscal projections are adjusted to reflect the IMF 
staff’s forecasts of key macroeconomic and financial 
variables and different accounting treatment of the 
financial sector support and are converted to the 
general government basis.
Monetary Policy Assumptions
Monetary policy assumptions are based on the 
established policy framework in each country. In  
most cases, this implies a nonaccommodative 
stance over the business cycle: official interest rates 
will increase when economic indicators suggest 
that inflation will rise above its acceptable rate or 
range; they will decrease when indicators sug-
gest that prospective inflation will not exceed the 
acceptable rate or range, that prospective output 
growth is below its potential rate, and that the 
margin of slack in the economy is significant. On 
this basis, the LIBOR on six-month U.S. dol-
lar deposits is assumed to average 0.7 percent 
in 2012 and 0.6 percent in 2013 (see Table 1.1). 
The rate on three-month euro deposits is assumed 
to average 0.6 percent in 2012 and 0.2 percent in 
2013. The interest rate on six-month Japanese yen 
deposits is assumed to average 0.4 percent in 2012 
and 0.3 percent in 2013.
Australia: Monetary policy assumptions are in line 
with market expectations.
Brazil: Monetary policy assumptions are based on 
current policy and are consistent with the gradual 
convergence of inflation toward the middle of the 
target range by the end of 2012.
Canada: Monetary policy assumptions are in line 
with market expectations.
China: Monetary tightening built into the 
baseline is consistent with authorities’ forecast of 14 
percent year-over-year growth for M2 in 2012.
Denmark: The monetary policy is to maintain the 
peg to the euro.
Euro area: Monetary policy assumptions for euro 
area member countries are in line with market 
expectations.
Hong Kong SAR: The IMF staff assumes that the 
Currency Board system remains intact and projects 
broad money growth based on the past relationship 
with nominal GDP.
India: The policy (interest) rate assumption is 
based on the average of market forecasts.
Indonesia: Bank Indonesia is expected to use a 
combination of macroprudential measures and 
policy rate increases.
Japan: The current monetary policy conditions are 
maintained for the projection period, and no further 
tightening or loosening is assumed.
Korea: Monetary policy assumptions incorporate 
resumption of rate normalization over the course of 
2013.
Mexico: Monetary assumptions are consistent with 
attaining the inflation target.
Russia: Monetary projections assume unchanged 
policies, as indicated in recent statements by the 
Central Bank of Russia. Specifically, policy rates are 
assumed to remain at the current levels, with limited 
interventions in the foreign exchange markets.
Saudi Arabia: Monetary policy projections are 
based on the continuation of the exchange rate peg 
to the U.S. dollar.
Singapore: Broad money is projected to grow in 
line with the projected growth in nominal GDP.
South Africa: Monetary projections are consistent 
with South Africa’s 3 to 6 percent inflation target 
range.
Sweden: Monetary projections are in line with 
Riksbank projections.
Switzerland: Monetary policy variables reflect 
historical data from the national authorities and the 
market.
Box A1. (continued)
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Turkey: Broad money and the long-term bond 
yield are based on IMF staff projections. The 
short-term deposit rate is projected to evolve with a 
constant spread against the interest rate of a similar 
U.S. instrument.
United Kingdom: On monetary policy, the projec-
tions assume no changes to the policy rate or the 
level of asset purchases through 2014.
United States: Given the outlook for sluggish growth  
and inflation, the IMF staff expects the federal funds  
target to remain near zero until late 2014. This 
assumption is consistent with the Federal Open Mar- 
ket Committee’s statement following its January meet-
ing (and reaffirmed in subsequent meetings) that eco-
nomic conditions are likely to warrant an exceptionally 
low federal funds rate at least through late 2014.
Box A1. (concluded) 
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 Table A1. Summary of World Output 1 
(Annual percent change) 
Average Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
World 3.4 4.9 4.6 5.3 5.4 2.8 –0.6 5.1 3.8 3.3 3.6 4.6 
 Advanced Economies 2.8 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.8 0.1 –3.5 3.0 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.6 
United States 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.7 1.9 –0.3 –3.1 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.1 3.3 
Euro Area  2.2 2.2 1.7 3.2 3.0 0.4 –4.4 2.0 1.4 –0.4 0.2 1.7 
Japan 0.9 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 –1.0 –5.5 4.5 –0.8 2.2 1.2 1.1 
Other Advanced Economies 2 3.8 4.1 3.6 3.9 4.2 0.9 –2.1 4.5 2.5 1.5 2.4 3.2 
 Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.4 7.5 7.3 8.2 8.7 6.1 2.7 7.4 6.2 5.3 5.6 6.2 
 Regional Groups     
Central and Eastern Europe 3.4 7.3 5.9 6.4 5.4 3.2 –3.6 4.6 5.3 2.0 2.6 3.8 
Commonwealth of Independent States 3 0.6 8.2 6.7 8.8 9.0 5.4 –6.4 4.8 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 
Developing Asia 7.0 8.5 9.5 10.3 11.4 7.9 7.0 9.5 7.8 6.7 7.2 7.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 6.0 4.7 5.7 5.8 4.2 –1.5 6.2 4.5 3.2 3.9 4.0 
Middle East and North Africa 4.0 6.2 5.3 6.3 5.7 4.5 2.6 5.0 3.3 5.3 3.6 4.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 7.1 6.2 6.4 7.1 5.6 2.8 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.7 5.8 
Memorandum     
European Union 2.6 2.6 2.3 3.6 3.4 0.6 –4.2 2.1 1.6 –0.2 0.5 2.1 
Analytical Groups     
 By Source of Export Earnings     
Fuel 2.4 8.1 6.7 7.7 7.4 5.0 –1.5 4.7 4.5 5.3 4.2 4.2 
Nonfuel 5.0 7.4 7.4 8.4 9.1 6.4 3.7 8.0 6.5 5.3 5.9 6.6 
Of Which, Primary Products 4.6 5.7 6.1 6.8 7.3 5.9 2.1 6.7 5.6 4.6 5.3 5.7 
 By External Financing Source     
Net Debtor Economies 3.6 6.5 6.0 6.8 6.9 4.8 0.8 6.7 5.1 3.6 4.4 5.2 
Of Which, Official Financing 3.4 6.4 6.4 6.0 5.9 6.3 5.2 5.5 7.2 5.7 6.1 6.2 
 Net Debtor Economies by Debt-Servicing Experience             
 Economies with Arrears and/or Rescheduling during 2006–10 2.9 7.2 7.5 7.8 7.6 5.8 2.0 6.7 6.1 3.3 4.3 4.9 
 Memorandum     
Median Growth Rate 
Advanced Economies 3.3 4.1 3.1 3.9 3.8 0.8 –3.7 2.4 1.8 0.9 1.3 2.3 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.1 5.4 5.4 5.7 6.3 5.1 1.9 4.5 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.5 
 Output per Capita     
Advanced Economies 2.1 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.0 –0.7 –4.1 2.4 1.0 0.7 0.9 2.0 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 3.1 6.4 6.0 7.1 7.5 4.9 1.5 6.3 5.2 4.3 4.6 5.2 
 World Growth Rate Based on Market Exchange 2.9 3.9 3.4 4.0 4.0 1.5 –2.2 4.1 2.8 2.6 2.9 3.9 
 Value of World Output (billions of                  U.S. dollars)             
At Market Exchange Rates 31,429  42,178  45,616  49,375  55,718  61,222  57,846  63,180  69,899  71,277  74,149  92,722 
At Purchasing Power Parities 39,240  52,741  56,853  61,705  66,835  70,140  70,154  74,684  78,970  82,762  86,836  110,405 
 
1 Real GDP. 
2 In this table, Other Advanced Economies means advanced economies excluding the United States, Euro Area countries, and Japan. 
3 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic 
structure. 
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 Table A2. Advanced Economies: Real GDP and Total Domestic Demand 1 
(Annual percent change) 
Fourth Quarter 2 
Average Projections Projections  
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 2011:Q4 2012:Q4 2013:Q4 
Real GDP 
 Advanced Economies 2.8 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.8 0.1 –3.5 3.0 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.6 1.3 1.1 2.1 
United States 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.7 1.9 –0.3 –3.1 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.1 3.3 2.0 1.7 2.5 
Euro Area 2.2 2.2 1.7 3.2 3.0 0.4 –4.4 2.0 1.4 –0.4 0.2 1.7 0.7 –0.5 0.8 
Germany 1.5 0.7 0.8 3.9 3.4 0.8 –5.1 4.0 3.1 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.9 0.9 1.4 
France 2.2 2.5 1.8 2.5 2.3 –0.1 –3.1 1.7 1.7 0.1 0.4 1.9 1.2 0.0 0.8 
Italy 1.7 1.7 0.9 2.2 1.7 –1.2 –5.5 1.8 0.4 –2.3 –0.7 1.4 –0.5 –2.3 0.0 
 Spain 3.6 3.3 3.6 4.1 3.5 0.9 –3.7 –0.3 0.4 –1.5 –1.3 1.7 0.0 –2.3 0.2 
Netherlands 2.9 2.2 2.0 3.4 3.9 1.8 –3.7 1.6 1.1 –0.5 0.4 1.9 –0.4 0.1 0.9 
Belgium 2.3 3.3 1.8 2.7 2.9 1.0 –2.8 2.4 1.8 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.9 0.1 0.6 
Austria 2.4 2.6 2.4 3.7 3.7 1.4 –3.8 2.1 2.7 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.6 2.2 
Greece 3.5 4.4 2.3 5.5 3.0 –0.2 –3.3 –3.5 –6.9 –6.0 –4.0 3.5 –7.5 –3.6 –2.9 
 Portugal 2.7 1.6 0.8 1.4 2.4 0.0 –2.9 1.4 –1.7 –3.0 –1.0 1.8 –3.0 –2.7 0.5 
Finland 3.8 4.1 2.9 4.4 5.3 0.3 –8.5 3.3 2.7 0.2 1.3 1.9 0.8 –0.1 2.4 
Ireland 6.9 4.4 5.9 5.4 5.4 –2.1 –5.5 –0.8 1.4 0.4 1.4 2.9 2.9 0.4 1.0 
Slovak Republic 4.4 5.1 6.7 8.3 10.5 5.8 –4.9 4.2 3.3 2.6 2.8 3.6 3.3 2.0 3.7 
Slovenia 4.1 4.4 4.0 5.8 7.0 3.4 –7.8 1.2 0.6 –2.2 –0.4 2.3 –2.3 –3.0 3.6 
 Luxembourg 4.4 4.4 5.4 5.0 6.6 0.8 –5.3 2.7 1.6 0.2 0.7 2.5 1.1 0.3 0.9 
Estonia 5.7 6.3 8.9 10.1 7.5 –3.7 –14.3 2.3 7.6 2.4 3.5 3.9 5.1 2.0 4.1 
Cyprus 4.3 4.2 3.9 4.1 5.1 3.6 –1.9 1.1 0.5 –2.3 –1.0 2.0 –0.8 –2.8 –0.4 
Malta . . . –0.5 3.7 3.1 4.4 4.1 –2.6 2.5 2.1 1.2 2.0 2.3 0.1 3.9 0.8 
 Japan 0.9 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 –1.0 –5.5 4.5 –0.8 2.2 1.2 1.1 –0.6 1.6 2.1 
United Kingdom 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.6 3.6 –1.0 –4.0 1.8 0.8 –0.4 1.1 2.7 0.6 0.0 1.2 
Canada 3.5 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.2 0.7 –2.8 3.2 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.2 1.7 2.2 
Korea  5.7 4.6 4.0 5.2 5.1 2.3 0.3 6.3 3.6 2.7 3.6 4.0 3.4 3.1 3.5 
Australia 3.8 4.1 3.1 2.7 4.7 2.5 1.4 2.5 2.1 3.3 3.0 3.2 2.6 2.3 4.4 
 Taiwan Province of China 4.7 6.2 4.7 5.4 6.0 0.7 –1.8 10.7 4.0 1.3 3.9 5.0 2.0 3.4 3.7 
Sweden 3.2 3.7 3.2 4.5 3.4 –0.8 –5.0 5.9 4.0 1.2 2.2 2.4 1.2 0.8 4.7 
Hong Kong SAR 2.7 8.5 7.1 7.0 6.4 2.3 –2.6 7.1 5.0 1.8 3.5 4.4 3.0 3.3 2.9 
Switzerland 1.3 2.4 2.7 3.8 3.8 2.2 –1.9 3.0 1.9 0.8 1.4 1.9 0.9 0.6 2.3 
Singapore 5.4 9.2 7.4 8.8 8.9 1.7 –1.0 14.8 4.9 2.1 2.9 3.9 3.6 2.9 4.0 
 Czech Republic . . . 4.7 6.8 7.0 5.7 3.1 –4.7 2.7 1.7 –1.0 0.8 3.4 0.6 –1.0 1.8 
Norway 3.2 4.0 2.6 2.4 2.7 0.0 –1.6 0.6 1.5 3.1 2.3 2.0 1.8 0.7 5.2 
Israel 4.3 4.8 4.9 5.6 5.5 4.0 0.8 5.7 4.6 2.9 3.2 3.7 3.6 2.6 4.4 
Denmark 2.4 2.3 2.4 3.4 1.6 –0.8 –5.8 1.3 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.8 0.1 1.6 0.9 
New Zealand 3.6 4.3 3.1 2.3 2.9 –0.2 –2.4 1.8 1.3 2.2 3.1 2.3 1.9 2.9 2.4 
 Iceland 3.4 7.8 7.2 4.7 6.0 1.3 –6.8 –4.0 3.1 2.9 2.6 3.0 2.7 3.2 2.2 
San Marino . . . 4.6 2.4 3.8 3.5 –3.4 –12.8 –5.2 –2.6 –2.6 0.5 1.3 . . . . . . . . . 
 Memorandum      
Major Advanced Economies 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.6 2.3 –0.4 –3.8 2.8 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.5 1.3 1.1 2.0 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 5.1 5.9 4.8 5.8 5.9 1.8 –0.7 8.5 4.0 2.1 3.6 4.3 3.0 3.2 3.5 
 Real Total Domestic Demand      
 Advanced Economies 2.9 3.2 2.6 2.8 2.4 –0.4 –3.8 2.9 1.3 1.1 1.3 2.6 0.9 1.1 1.6 
United States 3.8 3.9 3.2 2.6 1.2 –1.5 –4.0 2.8 1.7 2.1 2.0 3.5 1.9 1.6 2.5 
Euro Area  . . . 1.9 1.8 3.1 2.8 0.3 –3.8 1.3 0.5 –1.7 –0.3 1.4 –0.5 –1.3 0.3 
Germany 1.1 0.0 –0.2 2.7 1.9 1.2 –2.5 2.6 2.6 0.1 0.9 1.2 2.2 0.1 1.3 
France 2.2 2.8 2.5 2.4 3.2 0.3 –2.6 1.6 1.7 –0.2 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.7 0.8 
Italy 1.9 1.4 0.9 2.1 1.4 –1.2 –4.4 2.1 –0.9 –4.6 –0.9 1.2 –3.4 –3.5 –0.1 
Spain 3.9 4.8 5.0 5.2 4.1 –0.5 –6.2 –0.6 –1.9 –4.0 –3.3 1.4 –3.1 –4.6 –1.3 
Japan 0.9 1.5 1.0 0.9 1.1 –1.3 –4.0 2.8 0.1 2.8 1.1 1.0 0.6 1.8 1.8 
United Kingdom 3.7 3.5 2.3 2.2 3.5 –1.8 –5.0 2.3 –0.5 0.3 0.6 2.1 –0.6 0.9 0.4 
Canada 3.2 3.9 4.6 4.2 3.8 2.7 –2.9 5.2 3.2 1.9 2.4 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.3 
Other Advanced Economies 3 3.7 4.6 3.4 4.0 4.9 1.5 –2.9 5.6 2.7 2.5 2.8 3.4 1.8 3.7 2.3 
 Memorandum      
Major Advanced Economies 2.8 2.9 2.3 2.3 1.7 –0.9 –3.8 2.7 1.3 1.3 1.4 2.5 1.1 1.1 1.8 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 4.1 4.8 2.9 4.2 4.5 1.4 –3.0 7.4 2.3 2.3 3.1 4.2 0.7 4.5 1.5 
1 In this and other tables, when countries are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size. 
2 From the fourth quarter of the preceding year. 
3 In this table, Other Advanced Economies means advanced economies excluding the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and Euro 
Area countries. 
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 Table A3. Advanced Economies: Components of Real GDP 
(Annual percent change) 
Averages Projections 
1994–2003 2004–13 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Private Consumer Expenditure 
 Advanced Economies 3.0 1.5 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.4 0.0 –1.2 2.0 1.4 1.1 1.4 
United States 3.8 1.8 3.3 3.4 2.9 2.3 –0.6 –1.9 1.8 2.5 1.9 2.2 
Euro Area  . . . 0.6 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.7 0.4 –1.0 1.0 0.1 –1.1 –0.3 
Germany 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.2 1.5 –0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 1.7 0.7 1.0 
France 2.2 1.1 1.7 2.5 2.2 2.4 0.2 0.3 1.5 0.3 –0.2 0.2 
Italy 1.7 –0.1 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.1 –0.8 –1.6 1.2 0.2 –3.3 –1.2 
Spain 3.3 0.6 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.5 –0.6 –3.8 0.7 –1.0 –2.2 –2.4 
Japan 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.1 0.9 –0.9 –0.7 2.6 0.1 2.5 1.0 
United Kingdom 4.1 0.6 3.2 2.5 1.5 2.7 –1.6 –3.1 1.3 –1.0 –0.2 0.9 
Canada 3.2 2.8 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.6 3.0 0.4 3.3 2.4 1.7 2.0 
Other Advanced Economies 1 4.0 2.9 3.6 3.5 3.7 4.6 1.3 0.2 3.7 2.7 2.4 2.8 
 Memorandum      
Major Advanced Economies 2.8 1.3 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.9 –0.4 –1.3 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.4 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 4.8 3.0 3.0 3.9 4.0 4.8 1.0 0.3 4.7 3.4 2.4 3.2 
 Public Consumption      
 Advanced Economies 2.1 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.1 3.3 1.3 –0.5 0.0 –1.0 
United States 1.9 0.5 1.4 0.6 1.0 1.3 2.2 4.3 0.9 –2.3 –1.6 –2.4 
Euro Area  . . . 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.6 0.8 –0.2 –0.2 –0.6 
Germany 1.4 1.3 –0.6 0.3 0.9 1.4 3.2 3.0 1.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 
France 1.1 1.4 2.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.3 2.5 1.8 0.2 1.4 0.8 
Italy 0.9 0.2 2.5 1.9 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.8 –0.6 –0.9 –1.6 –2.0 
Spain 3.3 2.2 6.2 5.5 4.6 5.6 5.9 3.7 1.5 –0.5 –4.1 –5.4 
Japan 3.0 1.1 1.5 0.8 0.0 1.1 –0.1 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.8 –0.6 
United Kingdom 2.2 1.2 3.4 2.0 1.5 0.6 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.1 2.3 –1.1 
Canada 1.4 2.1 2.0 1.4 3.0 2.7 4.4 3.6 2.4 0.8 –0.2 0.7 
Other Advanced Economies 1 2.9 2.4 1.8 2.0 2.9 3.1 2.6 3.4 2.6 1.7 2.5 1.8 
 Memorandum      
Major Advanced Economies 1.9 0.8 1.6 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.8 3.2 1.2 –0.8 –0.3 –1.3 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 3.6 3.1 2.4 2.4 3.7 3.9 3.2 4.6 3.1 1.9 3.5 2.7 
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation      
 Advanced Economies 3.6 0.8 4.4 4.1 4.1 2.4 –2.9 –12.6 1.6 2.2 2.4 3.3 
United States 5.3 0.6 6.3 5.3 2.5 –1.4 –5.1 –15.3 –0.3 3.4 6.2 6.2 
Euro Area  . . . –0.1 2.2 3.2 5.7 4.7 –1.1 –12.8 –0.1 1.4 –3.1 0.2 
Germany 0.4 1.5 –0.2 0.8 8.2 4.7 1.3 –11.6 5.9 6.2 –0.7 1.5 
France 2.9 1.3 3.3 4.4 4.0 6.3 0.4 –10.6 1.3 3.6 0.7 0.4 
Italy 3.0 –1.5 2.0 1.3 3.4 1.8 –3.7 –11.7 2.1 –1.9 –7.8 1.0 
Spain 6.0 –2.7 5.1 7.1 7.1 4.5 –4.7 –18.0 –6.2 –5.3 –8.9 –4.1 
Japan –1.0 –0.7 0.4 0.8 1.5 0.3 –4.1 –10.6 0.1 0.8 3.5 1.2 
United Kingdom 4.6 0.6 5.0 2.4 6.3 8.2 –4.6 –13.7 3.5 –1.4 0.4 1.6 
Canada 5.0 4.0 7.7 9.3 7.0 3.6 2.0 –13.2 10.0 6.6 4.1 4.6 
Other Advanced Economies 1 4.1 3.3 6.3 5.0 5.6 6.6 –0.4 –6.2 7.5 2.5 2.9 3.7 
 Memorandum      
Major Advanced Economies 3.4 0.6 4.2 3.8 3.6 1.2 –3.5 –13.4 1.4 2.8 3.3 3.9 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 3.5 2.4 6.2 2.2 3.8 4.4 –3.1 –4.3 11.3 –0.5 1.6 3.4 
S tat i S t i c a l a p p e n d i x
 International Monetary Fund | October 2012 193
 
 
      
 Table A3. Advanced Economies: Components of Real GDP (concluded) 
(Annual percent change) 
Averages Projections 
1994–2003 2004–13 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Final Domestic Demand 
 Advanced Economies 2.9 1.3 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.3 –0.2 –2.7 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.3 
United States 3.8 1.4 3.5 3.3 2.5 1.4 –1.0 –3.3 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.0 
Euro Area  . . . 0.6 1.7 2.0 2.9 2.4 0.5 –2.8 0.7 0.3 –1.3 –0.3 
Germany 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.3 2.6 1.1 1.3 –1.6 2.0 2.4 0.5 1.0 
France 2.0 1.2 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.9 0.5 –1.4 1.5 0.9 0.4 0.4 
Italy 1.8 –0.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.2 –1.2 –3.2 1.0 –0.4 –3.8 –1.0 
Spain 3.9 0.1 4.8 5.2 5.0 4.1 –0.7 –6.2 –0.8 –1.8 –4.0 –3.4 
Japan 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.8 –1.6 –2.3 2.1 0.6 2.6 0.7 
United Kingdom 3.7 0.7 3.5 2.4 2.2 3.1 –1.4 –4.0 1.4 –0.8 0.5 0.5 
Canada 3.1 2.9 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.0 3.0 –2.1 4.5 3.0 1.8 2.3 
Other Advanced Economies 1 3.7 2.9 3.9 3.5 3.9 4.8 1.2 –0.9 4.3 2.5 2.5 2.9 
 Memorandum     
Major Advanced Economies 2.7 1.1 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.6 –0.6 –2.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 4.2 2.9 3.7 3.2 3.9 4.6 0.4 –0.2 5.8 2.2 2.4 3.2 
 Stock Building 2     
 Advanced Economies 0.0 0.0 0.4 –0.1 0.1 0.1 –0.2 –1.1 1.0 0.0 –0.1 0.1 
United States 0.0 0.0 0.4 –0.1 0.1 –0.2 –0.5 –0.8 1.5 –0.2 0.2 0.0 
Euro Area  . . . 0.0 0.2 –0.2 0.2 0.4 –0.2 –1.0 0.6 0.2 –0.4 0.0 
Germany 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.4 0.1 0.8 –0.1 –0.7 0.6 0.2 –0.4 –0.1 
France 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.2 –0.3 –1.3 0.1 0.8 –0.6 0.1 
Italy 0.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.4 0.5 0.2 0.0 –1.1 1.1 –0.5 –0.3 0.0 
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.3 –0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.5 –0.3 –0.1 0.3 0.2 –1.5 0.7 –0.4 0.0 0.4 
United Kingdom 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0.1 0.4 –0.4 –1.0 0.9 0.3 –0.2 0.1 
Canada 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 –0.2 –0.1 –0.2 –0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Other Advanced Economies 1 0.0 0.0 0.6 –0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 –1.9 1.1 0.2 –0.1 –0.1 
 Memorandum     
Major Advanced Economies 0.0 0.0 0.3 –0.1 0.1 0.1 –0.3 –1.0 1.1 –0.1 0.0 0.1 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies –0.1 0.0 0.8 –0.2 0.3 –0.1 0.8 –2.5 1.4 0.1 0.0 –0.1 
 Foreign Balance 2     
 Advanced Economies –0.1 0.2 –0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 
United States –0.5 0.1 –0.7 –0.3 –0.1 0.6 1.2 1.1 –0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Euro Area  . . . 0.3 0.4 –0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 –0.7 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.4 
Germany 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.5 0.0 –2.9 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.0 
France 0.0 –0.3 –0.3 –0.7 0.0 –0.9 –0.3 –0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 –0.1 
Italy –0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 –1.2 –0.4 1.4 2.2 0.2 
Spain –0.3 0.6 –1.6 –1.7 –1.5 –0.9 1.5 2.9 0.2 2.4 2.4 1.9 
Japan 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.2 –2.0 1.9 –0.8 –0.4 0.1 
United Kingdom –0.4 0.2 –0.8 0.3 0.2 –0.2 0.9 1.1 –0.6 1.2 –0.8 0.4 
Canada 0.3 –1.1 –0.8 –1.6 –1.4 –1.5 –2.1 0.2 –2.1 –0.8 0.0 –0.5 
Other Advanced Economies 1 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.3 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.4 
 Memorandum     
Major Advanced Economies –0.2 0.1 –0.2 –0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 0.6 1.5 1.3 2.1 1.9 2.0 0.7 1.9 1.9 2.1 0.1 1.0 
 
1 In this table, Other Advanced Economies means advanced economies excluding the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and 
Euro Area countries. 
2 Changes expressed as percent of GDP in the preceding period. 
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 Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP 1 
(Annual percent change) 
Average  Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Central and Eastern Europe 2 3.4 7.3 5.9 6.4 5.4 3.2 –3.6 4.6 5.3 2.0 2.6 3.8 
Albania 6.3 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.9 7.5 3.3 3.5 3.0 0.5 1.7 2.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . 6.3 3.9 6.0 6.1 5.6 –2.9 0.7 1.3 0.0 1.0 4.0 
Bulgaria 0.6 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.2 –5.5 0.4 1.7 1.0 1.5 4.5 
Croatia 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.9 5.1 2.1 –6.9 –1.4 0.0 –1.1 1.0 2.5 
Hungary 3.2 4.8 4.0 3.9 0.1 0.9 –6.8 1.3 1.7 –1.0 0.8 1.8 
 Kosovo . . . 2.6 3.8 3.4 6.3 6.9 2.9 3.9 5.0 3.8 4.1 4.6 
Latvia 4.8 8.9 10.1 11.2 9.6 –3.3 –17.7 –0.3 5.5 4.5 3.5 4.0 
Lithuania . . . 7.4 7.8 7.8 9.8 2.9 –14.8 1.4 5.9 2.7 3.0 3.6 
FYR Macedonia 1.1 4.6 4.4 5.0 6.1 5.0 –0.9 2.9 3.1 1.0 2.0 4.0 
Montenegro . . . 4.4 4.2 8.6 10.7 6.9 –5.7 2.5 2.4 0.2 1.5 2.2 
 Poland 4.5 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.1 1.6 3.9 4.3 2.4 2.1 3.6 
Romania 2.1 8.5 4.2 7.9 6.3 7.3 –6.6 –1.6 2.5 0.9 2.5 3.5 
Serbia . . . 9.3 5.4 3.6 5.4 3.8 –3.5 1.0 1.6 –0.5 2.0 2.0 
Turkey 2.7 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 –4.8 9.2 8.5 3.0 3.5 4.4 
 Commonwealth of Independent States 2,3 0.6 8.2 6.7 8.8 9.0 5.4 –6.4 4.8 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 
Russia 0.7 7.2 6.4 8.2 8.5 5.2 –7.8 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.8 3.8 
Excluding Russia 0.3 10.8 7.6 10.5 10.0 5.6 –3.1 6.0 6.2 4.7 4.8 4.9 
 Armenia 7.5 10.5 14.1 13.2 13.7 6.9 –14.1 2.1 4.6 3.9 4.0 4.0 
Azerbaijan 2.2 10.2 26.4 34.5 25.0 10.8 9.3 5.0 0.1 3.9 2.7 3.1 
Belarus 2.3 11.4 9.4 10.0 8.6 10.2 0.2 7.7 5.3 4.3 3.4 4.1 
Georgia . . . 5.9 9.6 9.4 12.3 2.3 –3.8 6.3 7.0 6.5 5.5 5.5 
Kazakhstan 2.1 9.6 9.7 10.7 8.9 3.2 1.2 7.3 7.5 5.5 5.7 6.3 
 Kyrgyz Republic 1.1 7.0 –0.2 3.1 8.5 7.6 2.9 –0.5 5.7 1.0 8.5 5.0 
Moldova –3.1 7.4 7.5 4.8 3.0 7.8 –6.0 7.1 6.4 3.0 5.0 5.3 
Mongolia 3.7 10.6 7.3 8.6 10.2 8.9 –1.3 6.4 17.5 12.7 15.7 9.7 
Tajikistan 0.5 10.6 6.7 7.0 7.8 7.9 3.9 6.5 7.4 6.8 6.0 6.0 
Turkmenistan 4.3 14.7 13.0 11.0 11.1 14.7 6.1 9.2 14.7 8.0 7.7 8.0 
 Ukraine –2.3 12.1 2.7 7.3 7.9 2.3 –14.8 4.1 5.2 3.0 3.5 3.5 
Uzbekistan 2.5 7.4 7.0 7.5 9.5 9.0 8.1 8.5 8.3 7.4 6.5 5.5 
 Developing Asia 7.0 8.5 9.5 10.3 11.4 7.9 7.0 9.5 7.8 6.7 7.2 7.7 
Afghanistan . . . 1.1 11.2 5.6 13.7 3.6 21.0 8.4 5.8 5.2 6.5 4.2 
Bangladesh 5.1 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.0 5.9 6.4 6.5 6.1 6.1 7.3 
Bhutan 6.8 5.9 7.1 6.8 17.9 4.7 6.7 11.8 5.3 9.9 13.5 10.7 
Brunei Darussalam 2.4 0.5 0.4 4.4 0.2 –1.9 –1.8 2.6 2.2 2.7 1.5 3.6 
Cambodia 7.4 10.3 13.3 10.8 10.2 6.7 0.1 6.1 7.1 6.5 6.7 7.7 
 China 9.4 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.2 7.8 8.2 8.5 
Fiji 2.7 5.5 2.5 1.9 –0.9 1.4 –1.3 –0.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 
India 6.0 7.6 9.0 9.5 10.0 6.9 5.9 10.1 6.8 4.9 6.0 6.9 
Indonesia 3.1 5.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.0 6.3 6.9 
Kiribati 3.9 0.2 0.3 1.2 0.5 –2.4 –2.3 1.4 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.0 
 Lao P.D.R. 6.1 7.0 6.8 8.6 7.8 7.8 7.5 8.1 8.0 8.3 8.0 7.8 
Malaysia 5.4 6.8 5.0 5.6 6.3 4.8 –1.5 7.2 5.1 4.4 4.7 5.0 
Maldives 8.1 10.4 –8.7 19.6 10.6 12.2 –4.7 5.7 5.8 1.5 2.5 3.4 
Myanmar . . . 13.6 13.6 13.1 12.0 3.6 5.1 5.3 5.5 6.2 6.3 6.5 
Nepal 4.5 4.7 3.5 3.4 3.4 6.1 4.5 4.8 3.9 4.6 3.6 4.0 
 Pakistan 3.9 7.5 9.0 5.8 6.8 3.7 1.7 3.1 3.0 3.7 3.3 3.5 
Papua New Guinea 1.2 0.6 3.9 2.3 7.2 6.6 6.1 7.6 8.9 7.7 4.0 4.9 
Philippines 3.8 6.7 4.8 5.2 6.6 4.2 1.1 7.6 3.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 
Samoa 4.4 4.2 7.0 2.1 1.8 4.3 –5.1 0.4 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.5 
Solomon Islands –0.1 8.1 12.9 4.0 6.4 7.1 –4.7 7.8 10.7 7.4 4.0 4.0 
 Sri Lanka 4.4 5.4 6.2 7.7 6.8 6.0 3.5 7.8 8.3 6.7 6.7 6.5 
Thailand 3.4 6.3 4.6 5.1 5.1 2.6 –2.3 7.8 0.1 5.6 6.0 5.0 
Timor-Leste . . . 4.4 6.5 –3.2 11.7 14.6 12.8 9.5 10.6 10.0 10.0 9.0 
Tonga 2.1 2.2 0.7 –4.5 –2.4 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.8 
Tuvalu . . . –1.4 –3.8 2.6 5.5 7.6 –1.7 –2.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.0 
 Vanuatu 2.0 4.5 5.2 7.4 6.5 6.2 3.5 1.5 2.5 2.6 4.3 4.0 
Vietnam 7.4 7.8 8.4 8.2 8.5 6.3 5.3 6.8 5.9 5.1 5.9 7.5 
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 Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP 1 (continued) 
(Annual percent change) 
Average  Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 6.0 4.7 5.7 5.8 4.2 –1.5 6.2 4.5 3.2 3.9 4.0 
Antigua and Barbuda 2.9 3.2 7.6 12.8 7.1 1.5 –10.7 –8.5 –5.5 1.0 1.5 3.5 
Argentina 4 0.8 8.9 9.2 8.5 8.7 6.8 0.9 9.2 8.9 2.6 3.1 4.0 
The Bahamas 4.2 0.9 3.4 2.5 1.4 –2.3 –4.9 0.2 1.6 2.5 2.7 2.5 
Barbados 1.9 1.4 4.0 5.7 1.7 0.3 –4.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.0 2.5 
Belize 5.0 4.6 3.0 4.7 1.3 3.5 0.0 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.5 
 Bolivia 3.4 2.7 6.8 2.8 5.3 6.1 3.4 4.1 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Brazil 2.5 5.7 3.2 4.0 6.1 5.2 –0.3 7.5 2.7 1.5 4.0 4.1 
Chile 4.6 6.8 6.3 5.8 5.2 3.1 –0.9 6.1 5.9 5.0 4.4 4.6 
Colombia 2.3 5.3 4.7 6.7 6.9 3.5 1.7 4.0 5.9 4.3 4.4 4.5 
Costa Rica 4.4 4.3 5.9 8.8 7.9 2.7 –1.0 4.7 4.2 4.8 4.3 4.5 
 Dominica 2.0 3.3 –0.5 4.5 6.0 7.9 –1.3 1.2 1.0 0.4 1.3 2.0 
Dominican Republic 4.9 1.3 9.3 10.7 8.5 5.3 3.5 7.8 4.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 
Ecuador 2.4 8.8 5.7 4.8 2.0 7.2 0.4 3.6 7.8 4.0 4.1 3.4 
El Salvador 3.4 1.9 3.6 3.9 3.8 1.3 –3.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.0 3.0 
Grenada 5.2 0.1 12.5 –4.4 6.3 1.7 –5.7 –1.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 2.5 
 Guatemala 3.4 3.2 3.3 5.4 6.3 3.3 0.5 2.9 3.9 3.1 3.2 3.5 
Guyana 3.0 1.6 –1.9 5.1 7.0 2.0 3.3 4.4 5.4 3.7 5.5 3.3 
Haiti 0.9 –3.5 1.8 2.2 3.3 0.8 2.9 –5.4 5.6 4.5 6.5 5.3 
Honduras 2.9 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.2 4.1 –2.1 2.8 3.6 3.8 3.6 4.0 
Jamaica 0.9 1.3 0.9 2.9 1.4 –0.8 –3.5 –1.5 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.5 
 Mexico 2.6 4.0 3.2 5.1 3.2 1.2 –6.0 5.6 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.3 
Nicaragua 4.2 5.3 4.3 4.2 3.6 2.8 –1.5 4.5 4.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 
Panama 3.9 7.5 7.2 8.5 12.1 10.1 3.9 7.6 10.6 8.5 7.5 6.0 
Paraguay 1.7 4.1 2.1 4.8 5.4 6.4 –4.0 13.1 4.3 –1.5 11.0 4.7 
Peru 4.3 5.0 6.8 7.7 8.9 9.8 0.9 8.8 6.9 6.0 5.8 6.0 
 St. Kitts and Nevis 3.6 3.8 9.2 3.5 5.0 4.0 –5.6 –2.7 –2.0 0.0 1.8 4.2 
St. Lucia 1.4 8.4 –1.9 9.3 1.5 5.3 0.1 0.4 1.3 0.7 1.3 2.3 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3.5 4.6 3.0 6.0 3.1 –0.6 –2.3 –1.8 0.0 1.2 1.5 3.0 
Suriname 2.6 7.3 4.9 5.8 5.1 4.1 3.0 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.5 5.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 7.2 7.9 6.2 13.2 4.8 2.7 –3.3 0.0 –1.5 0.7 2.2 3.0 
 Uruguay 0.7 4.6 6.8 4.1 6.5 7.2 2.4 8.9 5.7 3.5 4.0 4.0 
Venezuela –0.9 18.3 10.3 9.9 8.8 5.3 –3.2 –1.5 4.2 5.7 3.3 2.5 
 Middle East and North Africa 4.0 6.2 5.3 6.3 5.7 4.5 2.6 5.0 3.3 5.3 3.6 4.5 
Algeria 3.2 5.2 5.1 2.0 3.0 2.4 2.4 3.3 2.4 2.6 3.4 4.0 
Bahrain 4.2 5.6 7.9 6.7 8.4 6.3 3.2 4.7 2.1 2.0 2.8 2.8 
Djibouti 0.2 3.0 3.2 4.8 5.1 5.8 5.0 3.5 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.8 
Egypt 4.8 4.1 4.5 6.8 7.1 7.2 4.7 5.1 1.8 2.0 3.0 6.5 
Iran 4.2 6.1 4.7 6.2 6.4 0.6 3.9 5.9 2.0 –0.9 0.8 2.0 
 Iraq . . . . . . –0.7 6.2 1.5 9.5 2.9 3.0 8.9 10.2 14.7 9.4 
Jordan 4.2 8.6 8.1 8.1 8.2 7.2 5.5 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.5 4.5 
Kuwait 3.9 10.8 10.1 8.1 6.5 4.2 –7.8 2.5 8.2 6.3 1.9 3.9 
Lebanon 3.6 7.5 1.0 0.6 7.5 9.3 8.5 7.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 4.0 
Libya  0.4 4.5 11.9 6.5 6.4 2.4 –1.4 3.7 –59.7 121.9 16.7 3.9 
 Mauritania 2.9 5.2 5.4 11.4 1.0 3.5 –1.2 5.1 4.0 5.3 6.9 5.5 
Morocco 3.9 4.8 3.0 7.8 2.7 5.6 4.9 3.7 4.9 2.9 5.5 5.9 
Oman 3.2 3.4 4.0 5.5 6.7 13.1 3.9 5.0 5.4 5.0 3.9 3.7 
Qatar 8.1 17.7 7.5 26.2 18.0 17.7 12.0 16.7 14.1 6.3 4.9 7.3 
Saudi Arabia 2.2 5.3 5.6 3.2 2.0 4.2 0.1 5.1 7.1 6.0 4.2 4.2 
 Sudan 5 14.3 6.5 3.7 11.9 12.2 2.3 4.6 2.2 –4.5 –11.2 0.0 5.0 
Syria 6 2.5 6.9 6.2 5.0 5.7 4.5 5.9 3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tunisia 4.5 6.0 4.0 5.7 6.3 4.5 3.1 3.1 –1.8 2.7 3.3 6.0 
United Arab Emirates 6.1 10.1 8.6 8.8 6.5 5.3 –4.8 1.3 5.2 4.0 2.6 3.6 
Yemen 5.0 4.0 5.6 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.9 7.7 –10.5 –1.9 4.1 4.8 
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 Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP 1 (concluded) 
(Annual percent change) 
Average Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 7.1 6.2 6.4 7.1 5.6 2.8 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.7 5.8 
Angola 6.7 11.2 20.6 20.7 22.6 13.8 2.4 3.4 3.9 6.8 5.5 5.3 
Benin 4.7 3.1 2.9 3.8 4.6 5.0 2.7 2.6 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.5 
Botswana 6.6 6.0 1.6 5.1 4.8 3.0 –4.7 7.0 5.1 3.8 4.1 4.7 
Burkina Faso 5.9 4.5 8.7 6.3 4.1 5.8 3.0 7.9 4.2 7.0 7.0 6.8 
Burundi –1.1 3.8 4.4 5.4 4.8 5.0 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.2 4.5 5.9 
 Cameroon 7 3.7 3.7 2.3 3.2 3.4 2.6 2.0 2.9 4.2 4.7 5.0 5.5 
Cape Verde 7.2 4.3 6.5 10.1 8.6 6.2 3.7 5.2 5.0 4.3 4.4 5.0 
Central African Republic 0.9 1.0 2.4 3.8 3.7 2.0 1.7 3.0 3.3 4.1 4.2 5.7 
Chad 5.2 33.6 7.9 0.2 0.2 1.7 –1.2 13.0 1.8 7.3 2.4 2.8 
Comoros 1.5 –0.2 4.2 1.2 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.5 3.5 4.0 
 Democratic Republic of the Congo –1.6 6.6 7.8 5.6 6.3 6.2 2.8 7.2 6.9 7.1 8.2 7.9 
Republic of Congo 1.9 3.5 7.8 6.2 –1.6 5.6 7.5 8.8 3.4 4.9 5.3 5.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 1.7 1.6 1.9 0.7 1.6 2.3 3.7 2.4 –4.7 8.1 7.0 7.8 
Equatorial Guinea 37.0 38.0 9.7 1.3 21.4 10.7 4.6 –0.5 7.8 5.7 6.1 3.7 
Eritrea 3.6 1.5 2.6 –1.0 1.4 –9.8 3.9 2.2 8.7 7.5 3.4 –3.2 
 Ethiopia 4.0 11.7 12.6 11.5 11.8 11.2 10.0 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.5 
Gabon 1.4 1.4 3.0 1.2 5.6 2.3 –1.4 6.6 6.6 6.1 2.0 2.3 
The Gambia 3.9 7.0 –0.3 0.8 4.0 6.5 6.7 5.5 3.3 –1.6 9.7 5.6 
Ghana 4.6 5.3 6.0 6.1 6.5 8.4 4.0 8.0 14.4 8.2 7.8 7.3 
Guinea 4.0 2.3 3.0 2.5 1.8 4.9 –0.3 1.9 3.9 4.8 5.0 14.3 
 Guinea-Bissau 0.2 2.8 4.3 2.1 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.5 5.3 –2.8 5.7 4.5 
Kenya 2.5 4.6 6.0 6.3 7.0 1.5 2.7 5.8 4.4 5.1 5.6 5.9 
Lesotho 3.6 2.8 2.9 4.1 4.8 4.8 3.8 5.2 4.9 4.3 4.7 3.9 
Liberia . . . 4.1 5.9 9.0 13.2 6.2 5.3 6.1 8.2 9.0 7.9 5.7 
Madagascar 2.2 5.3 4.6 5.0 6.2 7.1 –4.1 0.4 1.8 1.9 2.6 5.0 
 Malawi 2.6 5.5 2.6 2.1 9.5 8.3 9.0 6.5 4.3 4.3 5.7 6.7 
Mali 4.9 2.3 6.1 5.3 4.3 5.0 4.5 5.8 2.7 –4.5 3.0 5.8 
Mauritius 4.2 5.5 1.5 4.5 5.9 5.5 3.0 4.2 4.1 3.4 3.7 4.6 
Mozambique 8.3 7.9 8.4 8.7 7.3 6.8 6.3 7.1 7.3 7.5 8.4 7.8 
Namibia 3.6 12.3 2.5 7.1 5.4 3.4 –0.4 6.6 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 
 Niger 3.3 –0.8 8.4 5.8 3.1 9.6 –0.9 8.0 2.3 14.5 6.6 5.5 
Nigeria 5.5 10.6 5.4 6.2 7.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 7.4 7.1 6.7 6.7 
Rwanda 3.5 7.4 9.4 9.2 5.5 11.2 4.1 7.2 8.6 7.7 7.5 7.0 
São Tomé and Príncipe 2.4 4.5 1.6 12.6 2.0 9.1 4.0 4.5 4.9 4.5 5.5 10.9 
Senegal 3.8 5.9 5.6 2.4 5.0 3.7 2.1 4.1 2.6 3.7 4.3 5.6 
 Seychelles 2.1 –2.9 8.0 8.9 9.9 –1.0 0.5 6.7 5.1 3.0 3.5 3.8 
Sierra Leone –1.1 6.5 4.4 4.4 8.0 5.4 3.2 5.3 6.0 21.3 7.5 5.0 
South Africa 3.0 4.6 5.3 5.6 5.5 3.6 –1.5 2.9 3.1 2.6 3.0 4.1 
South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 –55.0 69.6 6.1 
Swaziland 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.9 2.8 3.1 1.2 2.0 0.3 –2.9 –1.0 0.2 
 Tanzania 4.5 7.8 7.4 6.7 7.1 7.4 6.0 7.0 6.4 6.5 6.8 7.0 
Togo 3.3 2.1 1.2 4.1 2.3 2.4 3.5 4.0 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.8 
Uganda 7.1 6.6 8.6 9.5 8.6 7.7 7.0 6.1 5.1 4.2 5.7 7.0 
Zambia 1.0 5.4 5.3 6.2 6.2 5.7 6.4 7.6 6.6 6.5 8.2 7.7 
Zimbabwe 8 . . . –6.0 –5.5 –3.5 –3.8 –18.3 6.3 9.6 9.4 5.0 6.0 4.0 
 
1 For many countries, figures for recent years are IMF staff estimates. Data for some countries are for fiscal years. 
2 Data for some countries refer to real net material product (NMP) or are estimates based on NMP. For many countries, figures for recent years are IMF staff estimates. The 
figures should be interpreted only as indicative of broad orders of magnitude because reliable, comparable data are not generally available. In particular, the growth of output 
of new private enterprises of the informal economy is not fully reflected in the recent figures.  
3 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic 
structure. 
4 Figures are based on Argentina’s official GDP data. The IMF has called on Argentina to adopt remedial measures to address the quality of these data. The IMF 
staff is also using alternative measures of GDP growth for macroeconomic surveillance, including data produced by private analysts, which have shown significantly 
lower real GDP growth than the official data since 2008. 
5 Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan. 
6 Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward due to the uncertain political situation. 
7 The percent changes in 2002 are calculated over a period of 18 months, reflecting a change in the fiscal year cycle (from July–June to January–December). 
8 The Zimbabwe dollar ceased circulating in early 2009. Data are based on IMF staff estimates of price and exchange rate developments in U.S. dollars. IMF staff estimates of 
U.S. dollar values may differ from authorities’ estimates. Real GDP is in constant 2009 prices. 
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 Table A5. Summary of Inflation 
(Percent) 
Average Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
GDP Deflators 
 Advanced Economies 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.9 
United States 1.9 2.8 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.2 0.9 1.3 2.1 1.6 1.3 2.1 
Euro Area  2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.4 2.0 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 
Japan –0.8 –1.4 –1.3 –1.1 –0.9 –1.3 –0.5 –2.2 –2.1 –0.8 –1.0 0.7 
Other Advanced Economies 1 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.5 3.0 0.8 2.4 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.2 
 Consumer Prices     
 Advanced Economies 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.4 0.1 1.5 2.7 1.9 1.6 1.9 
United States 2.4 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.8 –0.3 1.6 3.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 
Euro Area 2 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.7 2.3 1.6 1.7 
Japan 0.0 0.0 –0.3 0.2 0.1 1.4 –1.3 –0.7 –0.3 0.0 –0.2 1.0 
Other Advanced Economies 1 2.3 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.8 1.4 2.4 3.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 
 Emerging Market and Developing Economies 19.8 5.9 5.8 5.6 6.5 9.3 5.1 6.1 7.2 6.1 5.8 4.6 
 Regional Groups     
Central and Eastern Europe 37.7 6.6 5.9 5.9 6.0 8.1 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.6 4.4 3.6 
Commonwealth of Independent States 3 62.9 10.4 12.1 9.4 9.7 15.6 11.2 7.2 10.1 6.8 7.7 6.8 
Developing Asia 6.1 4.1 3.7 4.2 5.4 7.4 3.0 5.7 6.5 5.0 4.9 3.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 25.6 6.6 6.3 5.3 5.4 7.9 6.0 6.0 6.6 6.0 5.9 5.4 
Middle East and North Africa 8.0 6.6 6.5 7.7 10.2 13.5 6.6 6.9 9.7 10.4 9.1 6.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.2 7.4 9.0 7.0 7.0 12.6 9.4 7.5 9.7 9.1 7.1 5.6 
 Memorandum     
European Union 4.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 3.6 0.9 2.0 3.1 2.5 1.8 1.9 
 Analytical Groups     
 By Source of Export Earnings     
Fuel 32.9 9.8 10.0 9.1 10.2 15.0 9.3 8.1 10.2 9.1 9.0 7.6 
Nonfuel 16.6 5.0 4.8 4.7 5.6 7.9 4.2 5.6 6.6 5.5 5.1 4.0 
Of Which, Primary Products 19.9 4.4 5.5 5.4 5.6 9.7 5.7 4.7 6.9 7.0 5.5 4.2 
 By External Financing Source     
Net Debtor Economies 22.0 5.6 5.9 5.9 6.2 9.1 7.3 7.2 7.6 7.3 6.7 4.9 
Of Which, Official Financing 19.8 6.2 8.2 7.7 8.1 15.2 6.7 7.0 11.2 9.3 7.3 5.6 
 Net Debtor Economies by Debt-Servicing Experience             
 Economies with Arrears and/or Rescheduling during 2006–10 18.7 7.9 8.1 8.9 8.3 11.5 6.6 7.9 11.8 11.9 9.3 7.3 
 Memorandum     
Median Inflation Rate 
Advanced Economies 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 3.9 0.6 2.0 3.1 2.4 2.0 2.0 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 6.7 4.4 5.6 6.1 6.3 10.3 4.1 4.3 5.8 5.1 5.0 4.0 
 
1 In this table, Other Advanced Economies means advanced economies excluding the United States, Euro Area countries, and Japan. 
2 Based on Eurostat's harmonized index of consumer prices. 
3 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic 
structure.  
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 Table A6. Advanced Economies: Consumer Prices 
(Annual percent change) 
End of Period 1 
Average  Projections Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 2011 2012 2013 
Advanced Economies 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.4 0.1 1.5 2.7 1.9 1.6 1.9 2.5 1.7 1.7 
United States 2.4 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.8 –0.3 1.6 3.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 3.1 1.6 1.8 
Euro Area 2 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.7 2.3 1.6 1.7 2.7 2.1 1.7 
Germany 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.8 0.2 1.2 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.2 1.9 
France 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5 2.8 0.1 1.5 2.1 1.9 1.0 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.0 
Italy 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.0 3.5 0.8 1.6 2.9 3.0 1.8 1.4 3.7 1.5 2.9 
 Spain 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.6 2.8 4.1 –0.2 2.0 3.1 2.4 2.4 1.4 2.4 3.3 1.4 
Netherlands 2.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 2.2 1.0 0.9 2.5 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.8 
Belgium 1.7 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.8 4.5 0.0 2.3 3.5 2.8 1.9 1.2 3.2 2.6 1.5 
Austria 1.6 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.2 3.2 0.4 1.7 3.6 2.3 1.9 1.9 3.4 1.9 1.9 
Greece 5.4 2.9 3.5 3.2 2.9 4.2 1.2 4.7 3.3 0.9 –1.1 0.6 2.2 0.4 –0.7 
 Portugal 3.2 2.5 2.1 3.0 2.4 2.7 –0.9 1.4 3.6 2.8 0.7 1.5 3.5 2.3 0.2 
Finland 1.6 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.6 3.9 1.6 1.7 3.3 2.9 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.6 2.3 
Ireland 3.1 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.1 –1.7 –1.6 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.0 
Slovak Republic 8.3 7.5 2.8 4.3 1.9 3.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 3.6 2.3 2.3 4.7 2.5 2.6 
Slovenia 9.6 3.6 2.5 2.5 3.6 5.7 0.9 1.8 1.8 2.2 1.5 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.4 
 Luxembourg 1.9 3.2 3.8 3.0 2.7 4.1 0.0 2.8 3.7 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.4 1.8 2.3 
Estonia 12.9 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.6 10.4 –0.1 2.9 5.1 4.4 3.2 2.8 4.1 5.0 3.2 
Cyprus 3.0 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 4.4 0.2 2.6 3.5 3.1 2.2 2.0 4.2 2.7 2.2 
Malta 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.6 0.7 4.7 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.5 2.2 2.2 1.5 3.5 2.6 
 Japan 0.0 0.0 –0.3 0.2 0.1 1.4 –1.3 –0.7 –0.3 0.0 –0.2 1.0 –0.3 –0.2 0.3 
United Kingdom 2 1.7 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.1 3.3 4.5 2.7 1.9 1.9 4.7 2.2 1.7 
Canada 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.4 0.3 1.8 2.9 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.7 1.7 2.0 
Korea 4.1 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.7 2.8 2.9 4.0 2.2 2.7 3.0 4.2 2.2 3.0 
Australia 2.6 2.3 2.7 3.5 2.3 4.4 1.8 2.8 3.4 2.0 2.6 2.4 3.1 3.3 1.0 
 Taiwan Province of China 1.4 1.6 2.3 0.6 1.8 3.5 –0.9 1.0 1.4 2.5 2.0 2.0 –3.4 2.5 2.0 
Sweden 1.3 0.4 0.5 1.4 2.2 3.4 –0.5 1.2 3.0 1.4 2.0 2.0 0.4 0.9 2.0 
Hong Kong SAR 1.7 –0.4 0.9 2.0 2.0 4.3 0.6 2.3 5.3 3.8 3.0 3.0 5.7 3.8 3.0 
Switzerland 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.4 –0.5 0.7 0.2 –0.5 0.5 1.0 –0.7 –0.5 0.5 
Singapore 1.0 1.7 0.5 1.0 2.1 6.6 0.6 2.8 5.2 4.5 4.3 2.5 5.5 3.8 4.9 
 Czech Republic . . . 2.8 1.8 2.5 2.9 6.3 1.0 1.5 1.9 3.4 2.1 2.0 2.4 3.1 2.2 
Norway 2.2 0.5 1.5 2.3 0.7 3.8 2.2 2.4 1.3 1.0 2.2 2.5 0.2 1.7 1.8 
Israel 6.1 –0.4 1.3 2.1 0.5 4.6 3.3 2.7 3.4 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 
Denmark 2.1 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.7 3.4 1.3 2.3 2.8 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.1 
New Zealand 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.4 2.4 4.0 2.1 2.3 4.0 1.9 2.4 2.0 1.8 2.4 2.5 
 Iceland 3.1 3.2 4.0 6.8 5.0 12.4 12.0 5.4 4.0 5.6 4.4 2.5 5.3 5.3 3.7 
San Marino . . . 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.5 4.1 2.4 2.6 2.0 3.0 2.1 1.4 2.0 1.9 1.8 
 Memorandum      
Major Advanced Economies 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.2 –0.1 1.4 2.6 1.8 1.5 1.9 2.6 1.5 1.6 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.6 2.2 4.5 1.3 2.3 3.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.9 
1 December–December changes. Several countries report Q4–Q4 changes. 
2 Based on Eurostat's harmonized index of consumer prices. 
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 Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices 1 
(Annual percent change) 
End of Period 2 
Average Projections Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 2011 2012 2013 
Central and Eastern Europe 3 37.7 6.6 5.9 5.9 6.0 8.1 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.6 4.4 3.6 6.4 4.8 4.0 
Albania 10.3 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.9 3.4 2.2 3.6 3.4 2.0 3.0 3.0 1.7 3.0 3.0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . 0.3 3.6 6.1 1.5 7.4 –0.4 2.1 3.7 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.2 2.1 
Bulgaria 62.5 6.1 6.0 7.4 7.6 12.0 2.5 3.0 3.4 1.9 2.3 3.0 2.0 2.1 2.5 
Croatia 10.4 2.0 3.3 3.2 2.9 6.1 2.4 1.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.7 3.0 
Hungary 14.0 6.8 3.6 3.9 7.9 6.1 4.2 4.9 3.9 5.6 3.5 3.0 4.1 5.4 3.5 
 Kosovo . . . –1.1 –1.4 0.6 4.4 9.4 –2.4 3.5 7.3 0.6 1.2 1.3 3.6 1.0 1.9 
Latvia 9.8 6.2 6.9 6.6 10.1 15.3 3.3 –1.2 4.2 2.4 2.2 2.2 3.9 2.1 2.0 
Lithuania . . . 1.2 2.7 3.8 5.8 11.1 4.2 1.2 4.1 3.2 2.4 2.4 3.5 3.4 2.3 
FYR Macedonia 12.4 –0.4 0.5 3.2 2.3 8.4 –0.8 1.5 3.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.0 2.0 
Montenegro . . . 3.1 3.4 2.1 3.5 9.0 3.6 0.7 3.1 3.4 3.0 3.4 2.8 3.8 2.9 
 Poland 12.8 3.5 2.1 1.0 2.5 4.2 3.5 2.5 4.3 3.9 2.7 2.5 4.6 3.2 2.5 
Romania 53.2 11.9 9.0 6.6 4.8 7.8 5.6 6.1 5.8 2.9 3.2 2.6 3.1 3.6 3.2 
Serbia . . . 10.6 16.2 10.7 6.9 12.4 8.1 6.2 11.1 5.9 7.5 3.7 7.0 8.6 5.0 
Turkey 67.3 8.6 8.2 9.6 8.8 10.4 6.3 8.6 6.5 8.7 6.5 5.0 10.4 6.5 5.7 
 Commonwealth of Independent States 3,4 62.9 10.4 12.1 9.4 9.7 15.6 11.2 7.2 10.1 6.8 7.7 6.8 9.2 7.4 7.4 
Russia 57.5 10.9 12.7 9.7 9.0 14.1 11.7 6.9 8.4 5.1 6.6 6.5 6.1 6.7 6.5 
Excluding Russia 79.1 9.1 10.6 8.8 11.6 19.5 10.1 7.9 14.0 10.8 10.2 7.6 17.0 9.2 9.6 
 Armenia 72.9 7.0 0.6 3.0 4.6 9.0 3.5 7.3 7.7 2.8 4.2 4.0 4.7 2.8 4.0 
Azerbaijan 62.4 6.7 9.7 8.4 16.6 20.8 1.6 5.7 7.9 3.0 6.0 5.0 5.6 6.5 5.5 
Belarus 175.7 18.1 10.3 7.0 8.4 14.8 13.0 7.7 53.2 60.2 30.6 17.4 108.7 27.6 29.8 
Georgia . . . 5.7 8.2 9.2 9.2 10.0 1.7 7.1 8.5 0.2 5.5 6.0 2.0 3.0 6.0 
Kazakhstan 59.9 6.9 7.5 8.6 10.8 17.1 7.3 7.1 8.3 5.0 6.6 6.0 7.4 5.7 6.6 
 Kyrgyz Republic 29.4 4.1 4.3 5.6 10.2 24.5 6.8 7.8 16.6 2.9 9.4 5.9 5.7 8.0 7.5 
Moldova 34.6 12.4 11.9 12.7 12.4 12.7 0.0 7.4 7.6 5.1 5.0 5.0 7.8 5.0 5.0 
Mongolia 24.2 7.9 12.5 4.5 8.2 26.8 6.3 10.2 7.7 14.1 11.7 7.0 9.4 12.9 10.4 
Tajikistan 105.9 7.2 7.3 10.0 13.2 20.4 6.5 6.5 12.4 6.0 8.1 7.0 9.3 6.5 8.0 
Turkmenistan 146.2 5.9 10.7 8.2 6.3 14.5 –2.7 4.4 5.3 4.3 6.0 7.0 5.6 5.0 7.0 
 Ukraine 70.2 9.0 13.5 9.1 12.8 25.2 15.9 9.4 8.0 2.0 7.4 5.0 4.6 6.0 5.9 
Uzbekistan 91.6 6.6 10.0 14.2 12.3 12.7 14.1 9.4 12.8 12.9 10.7 11.0 13.3 11.0 11.0 
 Developing Asia 6.1 4.1 3.7 4.2 5.4 7.4 3.0 5.7 6.5 5.0 4.9 3.8 5.1 5.5 4.8 
Afghanistan . . . 13.2 12.3 5.1 13.0 26.8 –12.2 7.7 11.8 6.6 6.7 5.0 11.3 5.9 5.4 
Bangladesh 5.2 6.1 7.0 6.8 9.1 8.9 5.4 8.1 10.7 8.5 6.7 5.5 10.6 6.9 6.4 
Bhutan 6.1 4.6 5.3 5.0 5.2 8.3 4.4 7.0 8.9 9.4 7.8 6.4 6.5 10.5 6.7 
Brunei Darussalam 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.2 1.0 2.1 1.0 0.4 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 
Cambodia 5.3 3.9 6.3 6.1 7.7 25.0 –0.7 4.0 5.5 3.6 4.4 3.0 4.9 4.6 4.6 
 China 4.9 3.9 1.8 1.5 4.8 5.9 –0.7 3.3 5.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.1 2.8 3.1 
Fiji 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.5 4.8 7.7 3.7 5.5 8.7 4.7 4.5 3.5 7.8 4.5 4.5 
India 7.0 3.9 4.0 6.3 6.4 8.3 10.9 12.0 8.9 10.2 9.6 5.0 6.5 13.0 9.3 
Indonesia 13.7 6.1 10.5 13.1 6.7 9.8 4.8 5.1 5.4 4.4 5.1 4.0 3.8 5.0 5.1 
Kiribati 2.5 –0.9 –0.3 –1.5 4.2 11.0 8.8 –2.8 2.8 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.5 3.0 
 Lao P.D.R. 29.7 10.5 7.2 6.8 4.5 7.6 0.0 6.0 7.6 5.1 6.8 4.2 7.7 5.3 6.2 
Malaysia 2.7 1.4 3.0 3.6 2.0 5.4 0.6 1.7 3.2 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.4 
Maldives 2.1 6.3 2.5 3.5 7.4 12.3 4.0 4.7 14.1 12.3 8.3 3.0 20.8 8.0 8.0 
Myanmar . . . 3.8 10.7 26.3 32.9 22.5 8.2 8.2 4.0 5.8 6.5 5.0 5.0 5.6 5.3 
Nepal 6.5 4.0 4.5 8.0 6.2 6.7 12.6 9.5 9.6 8.3 8.0 6.5 9.7 11.5 7.3 
 Pakistan 7.3 4.0 9.3 8.0 7.8 10.8 17.6 10.1 13.7 11.0 10.4 13.0 13.3 11.3 11.8 
Papua New Guinea 11.5 2.1 1.8 2.4 0.9 10.8 6.9 6.0 8.4 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.9 6.8 6.7 
Philippines 6.3 4.8 6.6 5.5 2.9 8.2 4.2 3.8 4.7 3.5 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.6 4.0 
Samoa 4.0 7.8 7.8 3.5 4.7 6.3 14.6 –0.2 2.9 6.2 2.0 4.0 2.9 5.5 4.0 
Solomon Islands 9.7 6.9 7.5 11.2 7.7 17.3 7.1 0.9 7.4 6.6 3.3 4.3 9.4 4.6 4.5 
 Sri Lanka 9.4 9.0 11.0 10.0 15.8 22.4 3.5 6.2 6.7 7.9 8.0 6.0 4.9 10.1 7.2 
Thailand 3.6 2.8 4.5 4.6 2.2 5.5 –0.8 3.3 3.8 3.2 3.3 2.7 3.5 4.7 1.9 
Timor-Leste . . . 3.2 1.1 3.9 10.3 9.0 0.7 6.8 13.5 12.0 8.0 8.0 17.4 9.0 8.0 
Tonga 5.1 10.8 8.5 6.1 7.4 7.4 3.5 3.9 5.3 4.5 5.3 6.0 5.4 4.5 6.0 
Tuvalu . . . 2.4 3.2 4.2 2.3 10.4 –0.3 –1.9 0.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 . . . . . . . . . 
 Vanuatu 2.5 1.4 1.2 2.0 3.9 4.8 4.3 2.8 0.9 2.0 3.0 3.0 1.2 2.2 3.0 
Vietnam 5.1 7.9 8.4 7.5 8.3 23.1 6.7 9.2 18.7 8.1 6.2 5.0 18.1 4.5 5.6 
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 Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices 1 (continued) 
(Annual percent change) 
End of Period 2 
Average Projections Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 2011 2012 2013 
Latin America and the Caribbean 25.6 6.6 6.3 5.3 5.4 7.9 6.0 6.0 6.6 6.0 5.9 5.4 6.8 5.8 5.9 
Antigua and Barbuda 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.4 5.3 –0.6 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.0 2.4 4.0 3.0 3.1 
Argentina 5 4.2 4.4 9.6 10.9 8.8 8.6 6.3 10.5 9.8 9.9 9.7 9.8 9.5 9.9 9.9 
The Bahamas 1.7 1.2 2.0 1.8 2.5 4.4 2.1 1.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 1.5 2.0 
Barbados 1.8 1.4 6.1 7.3 4.0 8.1 3.7 5.8 9.4 8.2 4.8 4.5 9.5 6.4 4.5 
Belize 1.7 3.1 3.7 4.2 2.3 6.4 –1.1 0.9 1.5 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 1.9 2.5 
 Bolivia 5.5 8.1 5.2 4.1 8.7 10.3 6.5 2.5 9.9 4.8 4.7 4.0 6.9 5.0 4.5 
Brazil 52.7 6.6 6.9 4.2 3.6 5.7 4.9 5.0 6.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 6.5 5.0 5.1 
Chile 5.4 1.1 3.1 3.4 4.4 8.7 1.5 1.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 4.4 2.5 3.0 
Colombia 14.2 5.9 5.0 4.3 5.5 7.0 4.2 2.3 3.4 3.2 2.8 3.0 3.7 2.7 3.0 
Costa Rica 12.9 12.3 13.8 11.5 9.4 13.4 7.8 5.7 4.9 4.6 5.0 4.0 4.7 5.0 5.0 
 Dominica 1.2 2.4 1.6 2.6 3.2 6.4 0.0 2.8 1.4 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 3.6 1.5 
Dominican Republic 9.3 51.5 4.2 7.6 6.1 10.6 1.4 6.3 8.5 4.1 4.8 4.0 7.8 4.5 5.0 
Ecuador 33.0 2.7 2.1 3.3 2.3 8.4 5.2 3.6 4.5 5.1 4.3 3.0 5.4 4.6 4.5 
El Salvador 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.0 4.6 7.3 0.4 1.2 3.6 4.0 2.9 2.8 5.1 3.0 2.8 
Grenada 1.6 2.3 3.5 4.3 3.9 8.0 –0.3 3.4 3.0 3.2 2.2 2.0 3.5 2.4 2.2 
 Guatemala 8.0 7.6 9.1 6.6 6.8 11.4 1.9 3.9 6.2 3.9 4.1 4.0 6.2 4.1 4.0 
Guyana 6.7 4.7 6.9 6.7 12.2 8.1 3.0 3.7 5.0 3.0 5.6 4.0 3.3 4.6 6.0 
Haiti 19.0 28.3 16.8 14.2 9.0 14.4 3.4 4.1 7.4 6.7 5.9 3.4 10.4 6.0 5.0 
Honduras 15.4 8.1 8.8 5.6 6.9 11.4 5.5 4.7 6.8 5.8 6.7 5.9 5.6 6.5 6.5 
Jamaica 13.4 13.5 15.1 8.5 9.3 22.0 9.6 12.6 7.5 7.3 8.2 6.4 6.0 7.2 8.0 
 Mexico 15.0 4.7 4.0 3.6 4.0 5.1 5.3 4.2 3.4 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.8 4.0 3.3 
Nicaragua 8.2 8.5 9.6 9.7 9.3 16.8 11.6 3.0 7.4 8.2 8.3 6.9 8.0 8.0 7.5 
Panama 1.0 0.5 2.9 2.5 4.2 8.8 2.4 3.5 5.9 6.0 5.5 4.0 6.3 6.2 5.5 
Paraguay 10.9 4.3 6.8 9.6 8.1 10.2 2.6 4.7 6.6 5.0 5.0 4.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 
Peru 7.2 3.7 1.6 2.0 1.8 5.8 2.9 1.5 3.4 3.7 2.5 2.0 4.7 3.0 2.0 
 St. Kitts and Nevis 3.1 2.2 3.4 8.5 4.5 5.3 2.1 0.6 7.1 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 1.9 2.5 
St. Lucia 2.6 1.5 3.9 3.6 2.8 5.5 –0.2 3.3 2.8 3.2 2.8 3.0 4.8 2.2 2.9 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.3 2.9 3.4 3.0 7.0 10.1 0.4 0.8 3.2 2.6 1.7 2.5 4.7 0.8 2.6 
Suriname 62.0 9.1 9.6 11.1 6.6 15.0 0.0 6.9 17.7 6.2 5.5 4.0 15.3 5.7 5.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 4.2 3.7 6.9 8.3 7.9 12.0 7.0 10.5 5.1 10.0 6.5 4.0 5.3 9.0 4.0 
 Uruguay 18.6 9.2 4.7 6.4 8.1 7.9 7.1 6.7 8.1 7.9 7.6 6.0 8.6 8.0 7.3 
Venezuela 39.1 21.7 16.0 13.7 18.7 30.4 27.1 28.2 26.1 23.2 28.8 27.3 27.6 22.0 29.2 
 Middle East and North Africa 8.0 6.6 6.5 7.7 10.2 13.5 6.6 6.9 9.7 10.4 9.1 6.6 10.1 9.2 8.9 
Algeria 9.4 3.6 1.6 2.3 3.6 4.9 5.7 3.9 4.5 8.4 5.0 4.0 5.2 6.3 5.0 
Bahrain 0.9 2.2 2.6 2.0 3.3 3.5 2.8 2.0 –0.4 0.6 2.0 2.0 0.2 3.0 2.0 
Djibouti 2.5 3.1 3.1 3.5 5.0 12.0 1.7 4.0 5.1 4.7 2.4 2.4 7.6 2.4 1.3 
Egypt 5.1 8.1 8.8 4.2 11.0 11.7 16.2 11.7 11.1 8.6 10.7 6.5 11.8 7.3 12.3 
Iran 21.4 15.3 10.4 11.9 18.4 25.4 10.8 12.4 21.5 25.2 21.8 15.5 21.8 22.0 20.3 
 Iraq . . . . . . 37.0 53.2 30.8 2.7 –2.2 2.4 5.6 6.0 5.5 4.0 6.0 6.0 5.5 
Jordan 2.5 3.4 3.5 6.3 4.7 13.9 –0.7 5.0 4.4 4.5 3.9 3.0 3.3 4.4 4.2 
Kuwait 1.7 1.3 4.1 3.1 5.5 10.6 4.0 4.0 4.7 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.7 4.3 4.1 
Lebanon 4.1 1.7 –0.7 5.6 4.1 10.8 1.2 4.5 5.0 6.5 5.7 2.0 3.1 10.1 2.0 
Libya  0.7 1.3 2.7 1.5 6.2 10.4 2.4 2.5 15.9 10.0 0.9 4.0 26.6 –1.7 3.1 
 Mauritania 4.9 10.4 12.1 6.2 7.3 7.5 2.1 6.3 5.7 5.9 6.1 5.1 5.5 6.0 6.3 
Morocco 2.5 1.5 1.0 3.3 2.0 3.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 2.2 2.5 2.6 0.9 2.5 2.5 
Oman –0.3 0.7 1.9 3.4 5.9 12.6 3.5 3.3 4.0 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.3 4.7 3.0 
Qatar 2.5 6.8 8.8 11.8 13.8 15.0 –4.9 –2.4 1.9 2.0 3.0 4.0 1.9 2.0 3.0 
Saudi Arabia 0.4 0.4 0.6 2.3 4.1 9.9 5.1 5.4 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.0 5.3 4.7 4.0 
 Sudan 6 36.4 8.4 8.5 7.2 8.0 14.3 11.3 13.0 18.3 28.6 17.0 6.8 18.9 28.6 17.0 
Syria 7 3.2 4.4 7.2 10.4 4.7 15.2 2.8 4.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tunisia 3.5 3.6 2.0 4.1 3.4 4.9 3.5 4.4 3.5 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 5.0 4.0 
United Arab Emirates 3.0 5.0 6.2 9.3 11.1 12.3 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.6 2.1 0.8 1.1 1.7 
Yemen 22.6 12.5 9.9 10.8 7.9 19.0 3.7 11.2 19.5 15.0 12.7 7.1 23.2 14.0 11.5 
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 Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices 1 (concluded) 
(Annual percent change) 
End of Period 2 
Average Projections Projections 
1994–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 2011 2012 2013 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.2 7.4 9.0 7.0 7.0 12.6 9.4 7.5 9.7 9.1 7.1 5.6 10.6 8.2 6.8 
Angola 413.6 43.6 23.0 13.3 12.2 12.5 13.7 14.5 13.5 10.8 8.6 7.4 11.4 9.6 7.5 
Benin 7.5 0.9 5.4 3.8 1.3 7.4 0.9 2.1 2.7 6.9 3.3 2.8 1.8 7.2 3.3 
Botswana 8.7 7.0 8.6 11.6 7.1 12.6 8.1 6.9 8.5 7.5 6.2 5.4 9.2 6.4 6.0 
Burkina Faso 5.2 –0.4 6.4 2.4 –0.2 10.7 2.6 –0.6 2.7 3.0 2.0 2.0 5.1 3.0 2.0 
Burundi 14.6 11.8 1.2 9.1 14.4 26.0 4.6 4.1 14.9 14.7 8.4 5.5 14.9 14.7 8.4 
 Cameroon 8 6.1 0.3 2.0 4.9 1.1 5.3 3.0 1.3 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.0 
Cape Verde 3.9 –1.9 0.4 4.8 4.4 6.8 1.0 2.1 4.5 2.1 2.0 2.0 3.6 2.3 2.3 
Central African Republic 5.6 –2.2 2.9 6.7 0.9 9.3 3.5 1.5 1.2 6.8 1.6 1.8 4.3 2.9 2.3 
Chad 7.3 –4.8 3.7 7.7 –7.4 8.3 10.1 –2.1 1.9 5.5 3.0 3.0 10.8 5.5 3.0 
Comoros 5.0 4.5 3.0 3.4 4.5 4.8 4.8 3.9 6.8 5.6 3.1 3.4 7.0 4.3 2.0 
 Democratic Republic of the Congo  382.7 4.0 21.4 13.2 16.7 18.0 46.2 23.5 15.5 10.4 9.5 7.2 15.4 9.9 9.0 
Republic of Congo 7.7 3.7 2.5 4.7 2.6 6.0 4.3 5.0 1.8 5.1 4.5 2.7 1.8 5.3 4.1 
Côte d'Ivoire 6.3 1.5 3.9 2.5 1.9 6.3 1.0 1.4 4.9 2.0 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.5 2.5 
Equatorial Guinea 9.3 4.2 5.6 4.5 2.8 4.7 8.3 6.1 6.3 5.4 7.0 6.9 6.5 7.0 7.0 
Eritrea 13.0 25.1 12.5 15.1 9.3 19.9 33.0 12.7 13.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 
 Ethiopia 3.2 3.2 11.7 13.6 17.2 44.4 8.5 8.1 33.1 22.9 10.2 9.0 35.9 16.6 9.0 
Gabon 5.0 0.4 1.2 –1.4 5.0 5.3 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.6 
The Gambia 4.7 14.3 5.0 2.1 5.4 4.5 4.6 5.0 4.8 4.7 5.5 5.0 4.4 5.0 6.0 
Ghana 27.8 12.6 15.1 10.2 10.7 16.5 19.3 10.7 8.7 9.8 10.9 7.5 8.6 11.5 9.5 
Guinea 5.0 17.5 31.4 34.7 22.9 18.4 4.7 15.5 21.4 14.7 10.3 5.9 19.0 12.0 8.7 
 Guinea-Bissau 13.6 0.8 3.2 0.7 4.6 10.4 –1.6 1.1 5.0 5.0 2.5 2.0 3.3 3.3 1.7 
Kenya 8.9 11.8 9.9 6.0 4.3 15.1 10.6 4.1 14.0 10.0 5.8 5.0 18.6 7.0 7.0 
Lesotho 8.4 5.0 3.4 6.1 8.0 10.7 7.4 3.6 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.2 7.7 4.3 5.5 
Liberia . . . 3.6 6.9 7.2 13.7 17.5 7.4 7.3 8.5 6.6 5.4 5.0 11.4 4.9 4.7 
Madagascar 15.0 14.0 18.4 10.8 10.4 9.2 9.0 9.3 10.0 6.5 7.0 5.0 7.5 7.7 7.0 
 Malawi 30.1 11.5 15.4 13.9 8.0 8.7 8.4 7.4 7.6 17.7 16.2 5.6 9.8 22.6 11.8 
Mali 5.0 –3.1 6.4 1.5 1.5 9.1 2.2 1.3 3.1 7.2 6.2 3.5 5.3 6.4 7.6 
Mauritius 6.0 4.7 4.9 8.7 8.6 9.7 2.5 2.9 6.5 4.5 5.2 4.4 4.9 4.8 5.1 
Mozambique 20.6 12.6 6.4 13.2 8.2 10.3 3.3 12.7 10.4 3.0 8.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 8.2 
Namibia 8.9 4.1 2.3 5.1 6.7 10.4 8.8 4.5 5.8 6.7 5.9 4.5 7.2 6.2 5.7 
 Niger 6.0 0.4 7.8 0.1 0.1 10.5 1.1 0.9 2.9 4.5 2.0 2.0 1.4 4.5 2.0 
Nigeria 22.0 15.0 17.9 8.2 5.4 11.6 12.5 13.7 10.8 11.4 9.5 7.0 10.3 11.0 9.5 
Rwanda 13.0 12.0 9.1 8.8 9.1 15.4 10.3 2.3 5.7 7.0 6.1 5.0 8.3 6.3 5.9 
São Tomé and Príncipe 27.6 13.3 17.2 23.1 18.6 32.0 17.0 13.3 14.3 10.5 6.2 3.0 11.9 8.3 6.0 
Senegal 4.9 0.5 1.7 2.1 5.9 5.8 –1.7 1.2 3.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.2 2.1 
 Seychelles 2.5 3.9 0.6 –1.9 5.3 37.0 31.7 –2.4 2.6 7.5 4.5 3.1 5.5 7.0 3.1 
Sierra Leone 15.5 14.2 12.0 9.5 11.6 14.8 9.2 17.8 18.5 13.7 7.0 5.4 16.9 11.0 7.5 
South Africa 7.2 1.4 3.4 4.7 7.1 11.5 7.1 4.3 5.0 5.6 5.2 4.7 6.1 5.3 5.3 
South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.3 54.8 22.2 5.0 65.6 60.4 –5.9 
Swaziland 8.6 3.4 4.9 5.2 8.1 12.7 7.4 4.5 6.1 7.8 6.9 5.2 7.8 3.1 14.3 
 Tanzania 13.4 4.1 4.4 7.3 7.0 10.3 12.1 7.2 12.7 15.6 9.8 6.3 19.8 11.1 9.6 
Togo 6.5 0.4 6.8 2.2 0.9 8.7 1.9 3.2 3.6 2.5 4.2 4.3 1.5 1.0 12.0 
Uganda 4.8 3.7 8.6 7.2 6.1 12.0 13.1 4.0 18.7 14.6 6.1 5.0 27.0 7.1 5.0 
Zambia 29.5 18.0 18.3 9.0 10.7 12.4 13.4 8.5 8.7 6.4 6.2 5.0 7.2 6.7 6.1 
Zimbabwe 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 3.0 3.5 5.0 5.7 4.6 4.9 6.5 4.3 
1 In accordance with standard practice in the World Economic Outlook, movements in consumer prices are indicated as annual averages rather than as 
December–December changes during the year, as is the practice in some countries. For many countries, figures for recent years are IMF staff estimates. Data for some 
countries are for fiscal years. 
2 December–December changes. Several countries report Q4–Q4 changes. 
3 For many countries, inflation for the earlier years is measured on the basis of a retail price index. Consumer price index (CPI) inflation data with broader and more 
up-to-date coverage are typically used for more recent years. 
4 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in 
economic structure.  
5 Figures are based on Argentina’s official consumer price index (CPI-GBA) data. The IMF has called on Argentina to adopt remedial measures to address the quality of 
these data. The IMF staff is also using alternative measures of inflation for macroeconomic surveillance, including data produced by provincial statistical offices and private 
analysts, which have shown considerably higher inflation figures than the official data since 2007. 
6 Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan. 
7 Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward due to the uncertain political situation. 
8 The percent changes in 2002 are calculated over a period of 18 months, reflecting a change in the fiscal year cycle (from July–June to January–December). 
9 The Zimbabwe dollar ceased circulating in early 2009. Data are based on IMF staff estimates of price and exchange rate developments in U.S. dollars. IMF staff estimates 
of U.S. dollar values may differ from authorities' estimates.  
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 Table A8. Major Advanced Economies: General Government Fiscal Balances and Debt 1 
(Percent of GDP unless noted otherwise) 
Average Projections 
1996–2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Major Advanced Economies 
Net Lending/Borrowing . . . –2.3 –2.1 –4.5 –10.1 –9.0 –7.8 –7.2 –6.1 –3.3 
Output Gap 2 0.7 1.3 1.6 –0.3 –5.1 –3.5 –3.3 –3.2 –3.1 –0.3 
Structural Balance 2 . . . –2.9 –2.9 –4.2 –6.6 –7.0 –6.3 –5.6 –4.6 –3.1 
 United States     
Net Lending/Borrowing . . . –2.0 –2.7 –6.7 –13.3 –11.2 –10.1 –8.7 –7.3 –4.4 
Output Gap 2 1.6 1.8 1.4 –0.9 –5.6 –4.5 –4.4 –4.1 –4.0 –0.2 
Structural Balance 2 . . . –2.7 –3.3 –5.5 –8.4 –8.7 –7.9 –6.8 –5.5 –4.2 
Net Debt 43.4 48.6 48.2 53.8 65.8 73.2 80.3 83.8 87.7 89.4 
Gross Debt 62.7 66.6 67.2 76.1 89.7 98.6 102.9 107.2 111.7 114.0 
 Euro Area     
Net Lending/Borrowing –2.4 –1.3 –0.7 –2.1 –6.4 –6.2 –4.1 –3.3 –2.6 –0.8 
Output Gap 2 0.0 1.4 2.7 1.7 –3.5 –2.3 –1.4 –2.4 –2.7 –0.4 
Structural Balance 2 –2.6 –2.4 –2.3 –2.9 –4.4 –4.2 –3.4 –2.1 –1.0 –0.5 
Net Debt 55.3 54.3 52.0 54.1 62.4 65.5 68.0 73.4 74.8 71.9 
Gross Debt 70.6 68.6 66.4 70.2 80.0 85.4 88.0 93.6 94.9 89.5 
 Germany 3     
Net Lending/Borrowing –2.6 –1.6 0.2 –0.1 –3.2 –4.1 –0.8 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 
Output Gap 2 –0.6 1.0 2.7 2.3 –3.7 –1.2 0.6 0.2 –0.2 0.0 
Structural Balance 2,4 –2.5 –2.3 –1.1 –0.9 –1.2 –2.3 –0.9 –0.5 –0.3 0.0 
Net Debt 45.2 53.0 50.5 50.2 57.0 56.2 55.3 58.4 57.5 56.2 
Gross Debt 61.9 67.9 65.4 66.9 74.7 82.4 80.6 83.0 81.5 73.7 
 France     
Net Lending/Borrowing –2.9 –2.4 –2.8 –3.3 –7.6 –7.1 –5.2 –4.7 –3.5 0.0 
Output Gap 2 0.0 0.0 0.7 –0.6 –4.6 –3.8 –2.7 –3.0 –3.3 –0.6 
Structural Balance 2,4 –2.8 –2.2 –3.0 –3.0 –4.7 –4.6 –3.5 –2.8 –1.4 0.4 
Net Debt 53.9 59.6 59.6 62.3 72.0 76.1 78.8 83.7 85.9 80.2 
Gross Debt 60.4 64.1 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3 86.0 90.0 92.1 86.5 
 Italy     
Net Lending/Borrowing –3.4 –3.4 –1.6 –2.7 –5.4 –4.5 –3.8 –2.7 –1.8 –0.7 
Output Gap 2 0.6 2.0 2.8 1.0 –4.5 –2.9 –2.3 –4.2 –4.9 –1.4 
Structural Balance 2,5 –4.4 –4.1 –3.3 –3.5 –3.6 –3.3 –3.4 –0.6 0.6 0.0 
Net Debt 94.8 89.3 86.9 88.8 97.2 99.1 99.6 103.1 103.9 98.7 
Gross Debt 110.0 106.1 103.1 105.7 116.0 118.6 120.1 126.3 127.8 120.6 
 Japan     
Net Lending/Borrowing –6.4 –3.7 –2.1 –4.1 –10.4 –9.4 –9.8 –10.0 –9.1 –5.8 
Output Gap 2 –0.9 –0.5 0.5 –1.3 –7.0 –3.0 –4.0 –2.2 –1.5 0.0 
Structural Balance 2 –6.2 –3.5 –2.2 –3.5 –7.4 –7.9 –8.3 –9.1 –8.6 –5.8 
Net Debt 60.3 81.0 80.5 95.3 106.2 112.8 126.4 135.4 144.7 158.7 
Gross Debt 6 144.9 186.0 183.0 191.8 210.2 215.3 229.6 236.6 245.0 250.3 
 United Kingdom     
Net Lending/Borrowing –1.4 –2.7 –2.8 –5.1 –10.4 –9.9 –8.5 –8.2 –7.3 –1.7 
Output Gap 2 1.1 2.6 3.6 1.7 –2.1 –1.8 –2.6 –4.2 –4.4 –1.4 
Structural Balance 2 –2.0 –4.7 –5.2 –7.2 –9.7 –8.5 –6.6 –5.4 –4.0 –0.5 
Net Debt 37.2 37.8 38.0 45.8 60.6 71.0 76.6 83.7 88.2 88.7 
Gross Debt 42.3 43.0 43.7 52.2 68.0 75.0 81.8 88.7 93.3 93.7 
 Canada     
Net Lending/Borrowing 0.5 1.6 1.4 –0.4 –4.9 –5.6 –4.4 –3.8 –3.0 –0.7 
Output Gap 2 0.5 1.7 1.7 0.2 –4.0 –2.4 –1.7 –1.7 –1.6 0.0 
Structural Balance 2 0.3 0.8 0.5 –0.6 –2.5 –4.1 –3.4 –2.9 –2.1 –0.7 
Net Debt 48.9 26.3 22.9 22.4 28.3 30.4 33.1 35.8 37.5 36.3 
Gross Debt 85.1 70.3 66.5 71.3 83.3 85.1 85.4 87.5 87.8 78.1 
 
Note: The methodology and specific assumptions for each country are discussed in Box A1. The country group composites for fiscal data are calculated as the sum of the 
U.S. dollar values for the relevant individual countries.  
1 Debt data refer to the end of the year. Debt data are not always comparable across countries. 
2 Percent of potential GDP. 
3 Beginning in 1995, the debt and debt-services obligations of the Treuhandanstalt (and of various other agencies) were taken over by the general government. This debt 
is equivalent to 8 percent of GDP, and the associated debt service to 0.5 to 1 percent of GDP. 
4 Excludes sizable one-time receipts from the sale of assets, including licenses. 
5 Excludes one-time measures based on the authorities’ data and, in the absence of the latter, receipts from the sale of assets. 
6 Includes equity shares. 
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 Table A9. Summary of World Trade Volumes and Prices 
(Annual percent change) 
Averages Projections 
1994–2003 2004–13 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Trade in Goods and Services 
 World Trade 1     
Volume 6.9 5.2 10.7 7.7 9.2 7.8 3.0 –10.4 12.6 5.8 3.2 4.5 
Price Deflator 
In U.S. Dollars 0.2 4.1 9.6 5.3 5.3 7.7 11.3 –10.8 5.6 11.2 –1.9 –0.5 
In SDRs 0.2 3.3 3.7 5.6 5.8 3.5 7.8 –8.5 6.8 7.5 1.7 0.2 
 Volume of Trade     
Exports 
Advanced Economies 6.2 4.3 9.4 6.3 8.7 6.7 2.2 –11.3 12.0 5.3 2.2 3.6 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.4 7.0 13.4 11.3 11.0 9.9 3.9 –7.6 13.7 6.5 4.0 5.7 
 Imports     
Advanced Economies 7.0 3.7 9.3 6.4 7.7 5.3 1.0 –11.9 11.4 4.4 1.7 3.3 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 7.2 9.1 16.1 12.1 12.3 14.9 8.6 –8.3 14.9 8.8 7.0 6.6 
 Terms of Trade     
Advanced Economies 0.2 –0.5 –0.4 –1.5 –1.1 0.4 –1.8 2.4 –0.9 –1.6 –0.8 0.1 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 0.7 1.8 3.5 5.5 3.4 1.7 3.3 –4.8 2.3 3.5 0.5 –0.4 
 Trade in Goods      
 World Trade 1     
Volume 7.1 5.2 10.6 7.7 9.1 7.2 2.5 –11.5 14.1 6.3 3.4 4.6 
Price Deflator 
In U.S. Dollars 0.2 4.3 9.5 5.8 5.9 7.9 12.1 –12.0 6.6 12.6 –2.1 –0.7 
In SDRs 0.2 3.5 3.5 6.0 6.4 3.8 8.6 –9.8 7.8 8.8 1.5 0.0 
 World Trade Prices in U.S. Dollars 2     
Manufactures 0.0 2.3 4.8 2.8 2.5 5.6 6.2 –6.6 2.7 6.5 –0.5 –0.3 
Oil 5.6 13.8 30.7 41.3 20.5 10.7 36.4 –36.3 27.9 31.6 2.1 –1.0 
Nonfuel Primary Commodities –0.3 7.4 15.2 6.1 23.2 14.1 7.5 –15.7 26.3 17.8 –9.5 –2.9 
Food –0.8 6.9 14.0 –0.9 10.5 15.2 23.4 –14.7 11.5 19.7 –1.1 –2.0 
Beverages 1.2 6.3 –0.9 18.1 8.4 13.8 23.3 1.6 14.1 16.6 –20.1 –4.4 
Agricultural Raw Materials –1.0 3.2 4.1 0.5 8.8 5.0 –0.8 –17.0 33.2 22.7 –12.9 –2.1 
Metal 1.4 11.7 34.6 22.4 56.2 17.4 –7.8 –19.2 48.2 13.5 –16.5 –4.5 
 World Trade Prices in SDRs 2     
Manufactures 0.0 1.5 –0.9 3.0 2.9 1.5 2.8 –4.3 3.8 3.0 3.2 0.5 
Oil 5.5 12.9 23.6 41.6 21.0 6.4 32.1 –34.8 29.3 27.2 5.8 –0.3 
Nonfuel Primary Commodities –0.4 6.6 9.0 6.3 23.8 9.6 4.1 –13.6 27.7 13.8 –6.2 –2.2 
Food –0.9 6.1 7.8 –0.7 11.0 10.7 19.5 –12.6 12.7 15.7 2.6 –1.3 
Beverages 1.2 5.5 –6.3 18.3 8.8 9.4 19.4 4.1 15.4 12.7 –17.2 –3.7 
Agricultural Raw Materials –1.1 2.4 –1.6 0.8 9.3 0.9 –3.9 –14.9 34.7 18.6 –9.7 –1.4 
Metal 1.4 10.8 27.3 22.7 56.9 12.8 –10.7 –17.2 49.8 9.7 –13.4 –3.8 
 World Trade Prices in Euros 2     
Manufactures 0.3 1.4 –4.7 2.6 1.7 –3.2 –1.1 –1.3 7.8 1.6 9.4 1.9 
Oil 6.0 12.8 18.9 41.0 19.5 1.4 27.1 –32.7 34.3 25.5 12.2 1.2 
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 0.0 6.4 4.8 5.9 22.3 4.5 0.1 –10.9 32.6 12.3 –0.5 –0.8 
Food –0.5 6.0 3.7 –1.1 9.6 5.6 14.9 –9.8 17.0 14.1 8.7 0.2 
Beverages 1.6 5.3 –9.9 17.8 7.5 4.2 14.8 7.3 19.8 11.2 –12.2 –2.3 
Agricultural Raw Materials –0.7 2.3 –5.3 0.3 8.0 –3.8 –7.6 –12.3 39.9 17.0 –4.3 0.1 
Metal 1.8 10.7 22.4 22.2 55.0 7.5 –14.1 –14.6 55.5 8.3 –8.2 –2.4 
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 Table A9. Summary of World Trade Volumes and Prices (concluded) 
(Annual percent change) 
 Averages Projections 
1994–2003 2004–13 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Trade in Goods 
 Volume of Trade     
Exports 
Advanced Economies 6.4 4.1 9.0 5.8 8.6 5.8 1.7 –13.2 14.1 5.7 2.4 3.5 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.6 6.7 12.4 11.2 10.5 9.0 3.8 –8.0 14.0 6.6 4.0 5.6 
Fuel Exporters 3.8 3.4 10.5 6.7 3.9 4.3 3.1 –6.8 4.4 3.6 2.8 2.7 
Nonfuel Exporters 10.4 8.0 13.1 12.8 13.3 11.1 4.0 –8.6 17.7 7.7 4.6 6.9 
 Imports     
Advanced Economies 7.2 3.8 9.6 6.7 7.9 4.9 0.4 –12.9 13.4 4.9 1.7 3.7 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 7.3 9.0 16.4 11.9 11.6 14.4 8.1 –9.5 15.6 9.8 7.4 6.9 
Fuel Exporters 4.7 10.0 16.3 15.4 12.5 23.4 14.6 –12.4 8.0 9.9 9.6 6.3 
Nonfuel Exporters 8.0 8.8 16.5 11.2 11.5 12.5 6.6 –8.8 17.5 9.8 6.9 7.1 
 Price Deflators in SDRs     
Exports 
Advanced Economies –0.2 2.2 2.1 3.5 4.3 3.7 5.3 –7.0 4.7 6.5 –0.4 –0.1 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 2.0 6.7 8.6 13.8 11.4 5.4 14.4 –14.0 13.8 13.3 4.0 –0.1 
Fuel Exporters 5.0 11.0 15.7 31.3 19.0 7.8 25.5 –26.4 23.4 23.9 4.2 –1.1 
Nonfuel Exporters 0.9 5.0 6.1 7.3 8.1 4.3 9.7 –8.0 10.0 9.1 3.9 0.4 
 Imports     
Advanced Economies –0.3 2.7 2.8 5.1 5.6 3.0 7.7 –10.4 5.8 8.4 0.6 –0.2 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 1.2 4.7 4.3 6.9 7.6 3.7 11.0 –9.0 10.9 8.6 3.5 0.7 
Fuel Exporters 0.5 4.4 3.1 7.8 8.4 4.3 8.9 –5.1 7.7 6.3 2.8 0.2 
Nonfuel Exporters 1.4 4.7 4.6 6.7 7.4 3.5 11.5 –10.0 11.7 9.1 3.6 0.8 
 Terms of Trade     
Advanced Economies 0.1 –0.5 –0.7 –1.5 –1.3 0.7 –2.2 3.8 –1.1 –1.8 –1.0 0.2 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 0.8 2.0 4.1 6.5 3.5 1.6 3.0 –5.5 2.6 4.3 0.5 –0.8 
 Regional Groups     
Central and Eastern Europe 0.6 –0.1 1.1 –0.1 –4.0 1.6 –2.8 2.4 –2.0 –1.3 4.9 0.0 
Commonwealth of Independent States 3 2.7 5.4 11.9 14.8 8.7 2.4 14.5 –19.0 12.8 11.9 1.6 –0.5 
Developing Asia –1.3 –0.6 0.7 –0.6 –0.1 0.6 –3.2 4.7 –6.0 –1.8 0.6 –0.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.1 2.8 6.0 5.2 6.7 1.8 3.5 –7.9 10.7 7.8 –3.1 –0.8 
Middle East and North Africa 4.2 5.7 9.1 22.8 7.5 2.2 12.7 –18.9 12.6 15.0 1.5 –1.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa . . . 3.5 4.4 10.0 7.3 4.8 9.1 –13.0 10.1 9.4 –2.8 –1.8 
 Analytical Groups     
By Source of Export Earnings 
Fuel Exporters 4.4 6.4 12.3 21.8 9.7 3.4 15.2 –22.4 14.6 16.6 1.3 –1.3 
Nonfuel Exporters –0.4 0.2 1.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 –1.6 2.2 –1.5 0.0 0.3 –0.4 
 Memorandum     
World Exports in Billions of U.S. Dollars 
Goods and Services 7,227 17,926 11,401 12,951 14,924 17,376 19,870 15,888 18,899 22,231 22,419 23,303 
Goods 5,830 14,490 9,148 10,433 12,069 13,984 16,053 12,499 15,207 18,177 18,329 18,999 
Average Oil Price 4 5.6 13.8 30.7 41.3 20.5 10.7 36.4 –36.3 27.9 31.6 2.1 –1.0 
In U.S. Dollars a Barrel 21.03 77.96 37.76 53.35 64.27 71.13 97.04 61.78 79.03 104.01 106.18 105.10 
Export Unit Value of Manufactures 5 0.0 2.3 4.8 2.8 2.5 5.6 6.2 –6.6 2.7 6.5 –0.5 –0.3 
 
1 Average of annual percent change for world exports and imports. 
2 As represented, respectively, by the export unit value index for manufactures of the advanced economies and accounting for 83 percent of the advanced economies' trade 
(export of goods) weights; the average of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices; and the average of world market prices for nonfuel primary 
commodities weighted by their 2002–04 shares in world commodity exports. 
3 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic 
structure. 
4 Percent change of average of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices.  
5 Percent change for manufactures exported by the advanced economies.  
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 Table A10. Summary of Balances on Current Account 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Projections 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Advanced Economies –209.6 –383.8 –426.1 –317.7 –482.1 –71.1 –20.5 –93.3 –165.0 –130.4 –185.1 
United States –628.5 –745.8 –800.6 –710.3 –677.1 –381.9 –442.0 –465.9 –486.5 –499.2 –687.9 
Euro Area 1,2 121.7 51.4 53.7 45.6 –99.8 18.2 48.8 56.6 136.0 151.7 237.4 
Japan 172.1 166.1 170.9 212.1 159.9 146.6 204.0 119.3 95.4 137.8 127.6 
Other Advanced Economies 3 125.1 144.5 149.9 134.9 135.0 146.1 168.6 196.8 90.1 79.3 137.7 
 Memorandum     
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 87.1 83.2 99.0 128.3 86.5 123.8 137.2 138.0 121.0 123.3 136.0 
 Emerging Market and Developing Economies 206.4 416.9 639.5 629.6 673.7 291.8 336.2 481.2 361.8 310.1 258.3 
Regional Groups 
Central and Eastern Europe –55.1 –61.3 –89.0 –136.3 –159.9 –49.5 –81.4 –116.6 –90.6 –94.6 –145.9 
Commonwealth of Independent States 4 63.5 87.6 96.3 71.5 107.7 41.6 71.9 111.8 110.4 82.5 –31.4 
Developing Asia 92.4 141.2 268.3 399.9 405.8 296.9 233.6 188.2 118.6 149.6 466.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean 22.1 35.9 48.7 13.2 –32.2 –21.9 –57.4 –73.7 –97.1 –111.2 –180.7 
Middle East and North Africa 91.7 214.9 286.7 270.4 354.8 52.9 182.5 392.1 361.4 329.5 219.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa –8.2 –1.4 28.5 10.8 –2.5 –28.3 –13.1 –20.6 –41.0 –45.7 –70.4 
 Memorandum     
European Union 66.8 7.9 –27.5 –61.7 –171.6 –0.2 5.7 34.5 82.4 111.0 232.5 
 Analytical Groups     
By Source of Export Earnings 
Fuel 175.5 354.7 482.1 435.8 596.4 148.3 331.4 612.4 577.6 515.1 250.3 
Nonfuel 30.9 62.3 157.4 193.8 77.3 143.4 4.8 –131.1 –215.8 –205.1 8.0 
Of Which, Primary Products –1.2 –3.2 6.5 5.2 –17.0 –8.7 –8.7 –22.6 –35.5 –33.5 –25.9 
 By External Financing Source     
Net Debtor Economies –61.2 –89.6 –119.2 –229.2 –375.8 –190.7 –282.2 –364.8 –399.3 –417.8 –539.7 
Of Which, Official Financing –5.2 –6.0 –3.5 –5.1 –12.3 –9.0 –11.0 –13.0 –18.1 –14.8 –19.2 
 Net Debtor Economies by Debt-Servicing Experience            
 Economies with Arrears and/or Rescheduling        during 2006–10 –3.7 –5.4 –4.1 –14.1 –27.4 –23.5 –33.5 –42.8 –50.5 –48.2 –60.5 
 World 1 –3.2 33.2 213.4 311.9 191.6 220.7 315.7 387.9 196.8 179.6 73.1 
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 Table A10. Summary of Balances on Current Account (concluded) 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Advanced Economies –0.6 –1.1 –1.2 –0.8 –1.1 –0.2 0.0 –0.2 –0.4 –0.3 –0.4 
United States –5.3 –5.9 –6.0 –5.1 –4.7 –2.7 –3.0 –3.1 –3.1 –3.1 –3.5 
Euro Area 1, 2 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 –0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.8 
Japan 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.9 3.3 2.9 3.7 2.0 1.6 2.3 1.9 
Other Advanced Economies 3 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.9 0.9 0.7 1.1 
 Memorandum     
Newly Industrialized Asian economies 6.5 5.5 5.9 7.0 5.0 7.7 7.2 6.6 5.6 5.5 4.6 
 Emerging Market and Developing Economies 2.3 3.8 5.0 4.0 3.5 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.3 1.1 0.6 
 Regional Groups     
Central and Eastern Europe –5.6 –5.2 –6.8 –8.3 –8.3 –3.1 –4.7 –6.1 –5.0 –4.9 –5.8 
Commonwealth of Independent States 4 8.2 8.7 7.4 4.2 4.9 2.5 3.6 4.6 4.2 2.9 –0.8 
Developing Asia 2.6 3.5 5.6 6.6 5.4 3.7 2.4 1.6 0.9 1.1 2.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.0 1.4 1.6 0.4 –0.7 –0.5 –1.2 –1.3 –1.7 –1.9 –2.4 
Middle East and North Africa 8.3 16.0 18.0 14.5 15.3 2.6 7.7 14.2 12.2 10.6 5.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa –1.5 –0.2 4.0 1.3 –0.3 –3.2 –1.2 –1.7 –3.2 –3.3 –3.9 
 Memorandum     
European Union 0.5 0.1 –0.2 –0.4 –0.9 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.2 
 Analytical Groups     
 By Source of Export Earnings     
Fuel 9.7 15.4 16.8 12.4 13.3 4.0 7.7 11.7 10.3 8.6 3.2 
Nonfuel 0.4 0.7 1.6 1.6 0.5 1.0 0.0 –0.6 –1.0 –0.9 0.0 
Of Which, Primary Products –0.4 –1.0 1.7 1.2 –3.4 –1.7 –1.4 –3.3 –4.8 –4.2 –2.4 
 By External Financing Source     
Net Debtor Economies –1.3 –1.5 –1.8 –2.8 –4.0 –2.2 –2.7 –3.1 –3.4 –3.3 –3.2 
Of Which, Official Financing –2.6 –2.6 –1.4 –1.7 –3.4 –2.4 –2.7 –3.3 –4.3 –3.2 –3.0 
 Net Debtor Economies by Debt-Servicing Experience            
 Economies with Arrears and/or Rescheduling        during 2006–10 –0.9 –1.1 –0.7 –2.0 –3.2 –2.9 –3.5 –4.0 –4.4 –4.0 –4.0 
 World 1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 
 Memorandum     
 In Percent of Total World Current Account Transactions 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.1 
In Percent of World GDP 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 
 
1 Reflects errors, omissions, and asymmetries in balance of payments statistics on current account, as well as the exclusion of data for international organizations and a 
limited number of countries. See "Classification of Countries" in the introduction to this Statistical Appendix.  
2 Calculated as the sum of the balances of individual Euro Area countries. 
3 In this table, Other Advanced Economies means advanced economies excluding the United States, Euro Area countries, and Japan. 
4 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in 
economic structure.  
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 Table A11. Advanced Economies: Balance on Current Account 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Advanced Economies –0.6 –1.1 –1.2 –0.8 –1.1 –0.2 0.0 –0.2 –0.4 –0.3 –0.4 
United States –5.3 –5.9 –6.0 –5.1 –4.7 –2.7 –3.0 –3.1 –3.1 –3.1 –3.5 
Euro Area 1 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 –0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.8 
Germany 4.7 5.1 6.3 7.4 6.2 5.9 6.0 5.7 5.4 4.7 4.2 
France 0.5 –0.5 –0.6 –1.0 –1.7 –1.3 –1.6 –1.9 –1.7 –1.7 –0.3 
Italy –0.3 –0.8 –1.5 –1.2 –2.9 –2.1 –3.6 –3.3 –1.5 –1.4 –1.0 
 Spain –5.2 –7.4 –9.0 –10.0 –9.6 –4.8 –4.5 –3.5 –2.0 –0.1 2.2 
Netherlands 7.6 7.4 9.3 6.7 4.3 4.1 7.0 8.5 8.2 8.2 6.5 
Belgium 3.2 2.0 1.9 1.6 –1.6 –1.6 1.4 –1.0 –0.1 0.3 1.4 
Austria 2.2 2.2 2.8 3.5 4.9 2.7 3.0 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.1 
Greece –5.8 –7.6 –11.4 –14.6 –14.9 –11.1 –10.1 –9.8 –5.8 –2.9 0.5 
 Portugal –8.3 –10.3 –10.7 –10.1 –12.6 –10.9 –10.0 –6.4 –2.9 –1.7 0.7 
Finland 6.2 3.4 4.2 4.3 2.6 1.8 1.4 –1.2 –1.6 –1.7 –1.4 
Ireland –0.6 –3.5 –3.5 –5.4 –5.7 –2.3 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.7 3.8 
Slovak Republic –7.8 –8.5 –7.8 –5.3 –6.6 –2.6 –2.5 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 
Slovenia –2.6 –1.7 –2.5 –4.8 –6.2 –0.7 –0.6 0.0 1.1 1.0 0.5 
 Luxembourg 11.9 11.5 10.4 10.1 5.1 6.5 7.7 7.1 7.3 7.1 6.7 
Estonia –11.3 –10.0 –15.3 –15.9 –9.1 3.4 2.9 2.1 0.7 –0.1 –2.6 
Cyprus –5.0 –5.9 –7.0 –11.8 –15.6 –10.7 –9.9 –10.4 –3.5 –2.0 –2.8 
Malta –5.9 –8.7 –9.9 –4.5 –5.0 –7.5 –5.8 –1.3 –1.5 –1.6 –2.1 
 Japan 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.9 3.3 2.9 3.7 2.0 1.6 2.3 1.9 
United Kingdom –2.1 –2.1 –2.9 –2.3 –1.0 –1.3 –2.5 –1.9 –3.3 –2.7 –0.7 
Canada 2.3 1.9 1.4 0.8 0.3 –3.0 –3.1 –2.8 –3.4 –3.7 –3.0 
Korea 4.5 2.2 1.5 2.1 0.3 3.9 2.9 2.4 1.9 1.7 0.7 
Australia –6.1 –5.7 –5.3 –6.2 –4.4 –4.2 –2.9 –2.3 –4.1 –5.5 –5.6 
 Taiwan Province of China 5.8 4.8 7.0 8.9 6.9 11.4 9.3 8.9 6.9 7.3 7.4 
Sweden 6.5 6.7 8.3 9.1 8.7 7.0 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.8 7.5 
Hong Kong SAR 9.5 11.4 12.1 12.3 13.7 8.6 5.5 5.3 4.1 3.8 6.5 
Switzerland 13.0 13.6 14.4 8.6 2.1 10.6 14.3 10.5 10.1 10.0 9.4 
Singapore 17.1 21.4 24.5 25.8 13.9 16.2 24.4 21.9 21.0 20.7 16.3 
 Czech Republic –5.0 –0.9 –2.1 –4.4 –2.1 –2.5 –3.8 –3.0 –2.4 –2.2 –2.0 
Norway 12.6 16.1 16.4 12.5 16.0 10.8 12.4 14.5 15.2 15.6 13.4 
Israel 1.7 3.1 4.8 2.7 0.9 3.8 3.8 0.8 –2.1 –1.3 1.2 
Denmark 3.0 4.3 3.0 1.4 2.9 3.3 5.5 6.7 5.0 4.6 4.7 
New Zealand –5.7 –7.9 –8.3 –8.1 –8.8 –2.6 –3.5 –4.2 –5.4 –5.9 –6.9 
 Iceland –9.8 –16.1 –25.6 –15.7 –28.4 –11.8 –8.5 –6.2 –2.7 –2.1 –2.8 
San Marino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Memorandum    
 Major Advanced Economies –1.3 –1.8 –1.9 –1.2 –1.3 –0.6 –0.8 –1.1 –1.3 –1.2 –1.3 
Euro Area 2 0.8 0.1 –0.1 0.1 –1.6 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 1.1 1.3 1.8 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 6.5 5.5 5.9 7.0 5.0 7.7 7.2 6.6 5.6 5.5 4.6 
 
1 Calculated as the sum of the balances of individual Euro Area countries. 
2 Corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions. 
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 Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Balance on Current Account 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Central and Eastern Europe –5.6 –5.2 –6.8 –8.3 –8.3 –3.1 –4.7 –6.1 –5.0 –4.9 –5.8 
Albania –4.0 –6.1 –5.6 –10.4 –15.1 –14.0 –11.4 –12.3 –11.8 –11.5 –8.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina –16.2 –17.1 –7.9 –10.7 –14.1 –6.3 –5.7 –8.8 –8.0 –7.7 –4.6 
Bulgaria –6.4 –11.6 –17.6 –25.2 –23.0 –8.9 –1.0 0.9 –0.3 –1.5 –4.1 
Croatia –4.1 –5.3 –6.7 –7.3 –9.0 –5.1 –1.1 –1.0 –1.2 –1.3 –2.9 
Hungary –8.4 –7.5 –7.4 –7.3 –7.4 –0.2 1.2 1.4 2.6 2.7 –2.2 
 Kosovo –8.4 –7.4 –6.7 –8.3 –15.3 –15.4 –17.4 –20.3 –18.3 –18.2 –13.8 
Latvia –12.9 –12.6 –22.6 –22.4 –13.2 8.7 3.0 –1.2 –1.6 –2.8 –3.8 
Lithuania –7.6 –7.0 –10.6 –14.5 –13.3 4.7 1.5 –1.5 –1.1 –1.4 –3.3 
FYR Macedonia –8.1 –2.5 –0.4 –7.1 –12.8 –6.8 –2.1 –2.7 –4.0 –6.0 –4.9 
Montenegro –7.2 –16.6 –31.3 –39.5 –50.6 –29.6 –24.6 –19.5 –20.0 –19.8 –15.6 
 Poland –5.2 –2.4 –3.8 –6.2 –6.6 –4.0 –4.7 –4.3 –3.7 –3.8 –3.5 
Romania –8.4 –8.6 –10.4 –13.4 –11.6 –4.2 –4.5 –4.4 –3.7 –3.8 –4.4 
Serbia –12.2 –8.8 –10.2 –16.1 –21.5 –7.1 –7.4 –9.5 –11.5 –12.6 –11.6 
Turkey –3.7 –4.6 –6.1 –5.9 –5.7 –2.2 –6.4 –10.0 –7.5 –7.1 –7.9 
 Commonwealth of Independent States 1 8.2 8.7 7.4 4.2 4.9 2.5 3.6 4.6 4.2 2.9 –0.8 
Russia 10.1 11.1 9.5 5.9 6.2 4.0 4.7 5.3 5.2 3.8 –1.1 
Excluding Russia 2.2 1.3 0.6 –1.3 0.8 –1.9 0.4 2.2 1.3 0.2 0.1 
 Armenia –0.5 –1.0 –1.8 –6.4 –11.8 –15.8 –14.7 –10.9 –9.8 –9.3 –6.4 
Azerbaijan –29.8 1.3 17.6 27.3 35.5 23.0 28.4 26.5 20.4 16.1 6.0 
Belarus –5.3 1.4 –3.9 –6.7 –8.2 –12.6 –15.0 –10.5 –3.6 –5.8 –4.9 
Georgia –6.9 –11.1 –15.1 –19.7 –21.9 –10.6 –10.3 –11.8 –12.6 –11.2 –6.7 
Kazakhstan 0.8 –1.8 –2.5 –8.1 4.7 –3.6 1.6 7.6 6.2 4.5 2.9 
 Kyrgyz Republic 4.9 2.8 –3.1 –6.2 –15.5 –2.5 –6.4 –6.3 –12.8 –6.2 –2.8 
Moldova –1.8 –7.6 –11.3 –15.2 –16.2 –8.6 –7.9 –11.5 –11.4 –10.7 –8.8 
Mongolia 1.2 1.2 6.5 6.3 –12.9 –9.0 –14.9 –31.8 –31.4 –10.1 4.4 
Tajikistan –3.9 –1.7 –2.8 –8.6 –7.6 –5.9 –0.3 0.6 –0.4 –1.5 –1.5 
Turkmenistan 0.6 5.1 15.7 15.5 16.5 –14.7 –10.6 2.0 –1.5 –1.6 5.3 
 Ukraine 10.6 2.9 –1.5 –3.7 –7.1 –1.5 –2.2 –5.5 –5.6 –6.6 –5.5 
Uzbekistan 7.2 7.7 9.1 7.3 8.7 2.2 6.2 5.8 4.7 3.3 1.0 
 Developing Asia 2.6 3.5 5.6 6.6 5.4 3.7 2.4 1.6 0.9 1.1 2.3 
Afghanistan –0.3 3.1 –1.1 5.8 5.1 1.6 3.9 3.3 2.1 0.5 –3.8 
Bangladesh –0.3 0.0 1.2 0.8 1.4 2.8 1.6 0.0 –0.3 –0.3 0.2 
Bhutan –32.6 –4.8 14.8 –2.5 –2.3 –10.6 –22.9 –25.4 –31.4 –28.7 –16.4 
Brunei Darussalam 42.2 47.3 50.1 47.8 48.9 40.2 45.5 48.5 49.1 50.3 61.6 
Cambodia –2.2 –3.8 –0.6 –1.9 –5.7 –4.5 –3.9 –8.1 –9.7 –9.1 –5.4 
 China 3.6 5.9 8.6 10.1 9.1 5.2 4.0 2.8 2.3 2.5 4.3 
Fiji –12.6 –8.6 –17.5 –12.8 –18.1 –7.6 –11.3 –10.1 –9.8 –16.4 –7.7 
India 0.1 –1.3 –1.0 –0.7 –2.5 –2.0 –3.2 –3.4 –3.8 –3.3 –2.3 
Indonesia 0.6 0.1 3.0 2.4 0.0 2.0 0.7 0.2 –2.1 –2.4 –2.9 
Kiribati –25.2 –34.4 –17.6 –19.3 –16.8 –26.6 –15.4 –22.9 –24.0 –20.2 –21.2 
 Lao P.D.R. –17.9 –18.1 –9.9 –15.7 –18.5 –21.0 –18.3 –21.4 –21.9 –24.0 –15.2 
Malaysia 12.1 14.4 16.1 15.4 17.1 15.5 11.1 11.0 7.5 6.9 5.8 
Maldives –11.4 –27.5 –23.2 –28.4 –34.2 –21.0 –17.3 –15.7 –29.1 –29.3 –31.1 
Myanmar 2.4 3.7 7.1 –0.5 –3.3 –2.8 –1.3 –2.6 –4.4 –4.0 –4.0 
Nepal 2.7 2.0 2.1 –0.1 2.7 4.2 –2.4 –1.0 4.4 –0.2 –0.4 
 Pakistan 1.8 –1.4 –3.9 –4.8 –8.5 –5.7 –2.2 0.1 –2.0 –1.7 –3.5 
Papua New Guinea 0.4 13.9 –1.7 4.0 8.4 –16.4 –25.6 –36.4 –28.4 –20.2 8.3 
Philippines 1.8 1.9 4.4 4.8 2.1 5.6 4.5 3.1 3.0 2.6 1.8 
Samoa –8.4 –9.6 –10.2 –15.5 –6.5 –3.1 –7.2 –8.6 –11.4 –12.3 –10.1 
Solomon Islands 16.8 –6.7 –9.1 –15.7 –20.5 –21.4 –30.8 –6.7 –7.8 –10.7 –7.0 
 Sri Lanka –3.1 –2.5 –5.3 –4.3 –9.5 –0.5 –2.2 –7.7 –5.4 –4.7 –3.3 
Thailand 1.7 –4.3 1.1 6.3 0.8 8.3 4.1 3.4 –0.2 0.1 1.0 
Timor-Leste 11.4 32.2 50.0 65.1 66.7 51.7 48.1 57.2 45.4 37.9 28.7 
Tonga 0.4 –5.0 –5.5 –5.5 –8.1 –7.8 –3.9 –4.0 –4.2 –3.1 –3.3 
Tuvalu 5.9 24.7 27.2 14.2 –13.2 27.8 –3.8 –29.2 –8.5 –3.3 4.2 
 Vanuatu –6.2 –8.8 –4.8 –3.4 –8.5 –6.3 –5.1 –6.5 –6.1 –10.2 –9.9 
Vietnam –3.5 –1.1 –0.3 –9.8 –11.9 –6.6 –4.1 0.2 0.3 –0.9 –1.5 
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 Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Balance on Current Account (continued) 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.0 1.4 1.6 0.4 –0.7 –0.5 –1.2 –1.3 –1.7 –1.9 –2.4 
Antigua and Barbuda –13.1 –18.8 –27.8 –30.9 –27.2 –19.3 –13.1 –10.7 –11.4 –12.3 –16.2 
Argentina 2 1.8 2.6 3.4 2.6 1.8 2.5 0.7 –0.1 0.3 –0.1 –1.9 
The Bahamas –2.4 –8.4 –17.7 –11.5 –10.6 –10.5 –10.5 –14.0 –16.0 –16.8 –8.9 
Barbados –7.6 –7.5 –4.8 –2.7 –9.6 –5.6 –8.2 –8.7 –7.9 –7.1 –3.8 
Belize –14.7 –13.6 –2.1 –4.1 –10.6 –5.9 –2.9 –2.6 –2.3 –4.4 –5.9 
 Bolivia 3.7 5.9 11.2 11.3 12.0 4.3 4.9 2.2 1.8 1.1 0.0 
Brazil 1.8 1.6 1.3 0.1 –1.7 –1.5 –2.2 –2.1 –2.6 –2.8 –3.3 
Chile 2.6 1.5 4.6 4.1 –3.2 2.0 1.5 –1.3 –3.2 –3.0 –2.7 
Colombia –0.8 –1.3 –1.9 –2.8 –2.8 –2.1 –3.1 –3.0 –2.9 –2.9 –2.4 
Costa Rica –4.3 –4.9 –4.5 –6.3 –9.3 –2.0 –3.5 –5.3 –5.5 –5.3 –5.5 
 Dominica –16.0 –21.0 –12.9 –20.8 –27.1 –21.0 –16.0 –12.7 –13.3 –13.7 –15.6 
Dominican Republic 4.8 –1.4 –3.6 –5.3 –9.9 –5.0 –8.6 –8.1 –7.5 –7.3 –5.8 
Ecuador –1.5 1.3 4.2 4.3 3.0 0.3 –2.8 –0.3 –0.3 3.0 –2.6 
El Salvador –4.1 –3.6 –4.1 –6.1 –7.1 –1.5 –3.1 –5.4 –5.0 –4.3 –3.0 
Grenada –2.9 –22.1 –26.3 –27.8 –25.7 –23.9 –25.2 –24.6 –22.3 –23.2 –15.4 
 Guatemala –4.9 –4.6 –5.0 –5.2 –4.3 0.0 –1.5 –3.1 –3.5 –3.6 –3.6 
Guyana –6.7 –10.1 –13.1 –11.1 –13.2 –9.1 –9.9 –13.6 –14.0 –17.6 –12.2 
Haiti –1.6 0.7 –1.5 –1.5 –4.4 –3.5 –2.5 –4.6 –4.3 –5.3 –4.0 
Honduras –7.7 –3.0 –3.7 –9.0 –15.4 –3.6 –6.2 –8.7 –9.8 –9.6 –6.8 
Jamaica –6.3 –9.3 –10.2 –16.9 –18.4 –11.1 –8.8 –11.7 –11.7 –11.1 –6.9 
 Mexico –0.7 –0.7 –0.6 –1.1 –1.6 –0.6 –0.4 –1.0 –0.9 –1.1 –1.1 
Nicaragua –14.5 –14.3 –13.4 –17.8 –23.8 –12.2 –14.4 –18.0 –20.5 –18.1 –14.1 
Panama –7.5 –4.9 –3.1 –7.9 –10.9 –0.7 –10.8 –12.8 –12.1 –11.8 –9.5 
Paraguay 1.8 0.2 1.2 1.3 –1.7 0.4 –3.1 –1.0 –1.1 –0.4 –1.3 
Peru 0.1 1.5 3.2 1.4 –4.2 –0.5 –2.5 –1.9 –3.0 –3.0 –2.4 
 St. Kitts and Nevis –16.2 –14.9 –14.1 –16.7 –24.3 –27.3 –22.1 –15.2 –17.1 –16.4 –14.9 
St. Lucia –10.6 –14.3 –30.4 –30.4 –28.9 –11.9 –15.1 –23.1 –24.0 –20.5 –17.9 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines –19.6 –18.0 –19.3 –28.0 –32.9 –29.4 –31.6 –30.2 –27.3 –25.7 –16.6 
Suriname –8.2 –11.7 4.5 8.1 6.6 –0.5 6.4 5.5 –0.1 –2.1 3.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 12.4 22.5 39.6 23.9 30.5 8.3 20.0 7.1 8.1 7.6 6.7 
 Uruguay 0.0 0.2 –2.0 –0.9 –5.7 –1.5 –2.2 –3.1 –3.0 –1.9 –1.9 
Venezuela 13.8 17.7 14.8 8.7 11.9 2.6 4.9 8.6 6.7 5.6 2.7 
 Middle East and North Africa 8.3 16.0 18.0 14.5 15.3 2.6 7.7 14.2 12.2 10.6 5.8 
Algeria 13.0 20.5 24.7 22.8 20.1 0.3 7.5 10.0 6.2 6.1 3.5 
Bahrain 4.2 11.0 13.8 15.7 10.2 2.9 3.6 12.6 9.9 10.5 6.2 
Djibouti –1.3 –3.2 –11.5 –21.4 –24.3 –9.1 –5.8 –12.6 –12.2 –12.5 –8.2 
Egypt 4.3 3.2 1.6 1.7 0.5 –2.3 –2.0 –2.6 –3.4 –3.3 –1.9 
Iran 0.5 7.6 8.5 10.6 6.5 2.6 6.0 12.5 3.4 1.3 –0.4 
 Iraq –43.2 5.7 18.1 11.5 18.8 –13.4 –3.0 8.3 0.3 6.1 9.8 
Jordan 0.1 –5.1 –11.5 –17.2 –9.3 –4.9 –7.1 –12.0 –14.1 –9.9 –4.3 
Kuwait 26.2 37.2 44.6 36.8 40.9 26.7 31.9 44.0 44.1 39.2 29.4 
Lebanon –15.3 –13.4 –5.3 –6.8 –9.2 –9.8 –9.6 –14.0 –16.2 –15.6 –10.8 
Libya  21.1 36.5 50.7 43.8 42.3 14.7 19.8 1.3 21.8 10.3 –0.4 
 Mauritania –34.6 –47.2 –1.3 –17.2 –14.8 –10.7 –8.7 –7.5 –23.6 –13.9 –6.4 
Morocco 1.7 1.8 2.2 –0.1 –5.2 –5.4 –4.3 –8.0 –7.9 –5.4 –3.4 
Oman 4.5 16.8 15.4 5.9 8.3 –1.2 8.6 16.7 14.0 10.0 –5.7 
Qatar 22.4 29.9 25.1 25.4 28.7 10.2 26.7 30.2 29.6 26.8 11.5 
Saudi Arabia 20.7 28.5 27.8 24.3 27.8 5.6 14.6 26.5 26.1 22.7 12.8 
 Sudan 3 –4.9 –10.0 –8.8 –5.9 –2.0 –10.0 –2.1 –0.5 –7.8 –6.6 –4.6 
Syria 4 –3.1 –2.2 1.4 –0.2 –1.3 –3.6 –3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tunisia –2.4 –0.9 –1.8 –2.4 –3.8 –2.8 –4.8 –7.3 –7.9 –7.7 –5.6 
United Arab Emirates 6.1 12.4 16.3 6.9 7.9 3.5 3.2 9.7 9.3 10.1 9.7 
Yemen 1.6 3.8 1.1 –7.0 –4.6 –10.2 –4.4 –3.0 –2.7 –4.0 –6.0 
wo r l d e co n o m i c o u t lo o k : co p i n g w i t h h i g h d e bt a n d S lu g g i S h g r ow t h
210 International Monetary Fund | October 2012
 
 
  
 Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Balance on Current Account (concluded) 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2017 
Sub-Saharan Africa –1.5 –0.2 4.0 1.3 –0.3 –3.2 –1.2 –1.7 –3.2 –3.3 –3.9 
Angola 3.8 18.2 25.6 19.9 10.3 –9.9 9.0 9.6 8.5 6.6 –2.7 
Benin –7.0 –6.3 –5.3 –10.2 –8.1 –8.9 –7.3 –10.0 –9.3 –9.1 –7.7 
Botswana 3.5 15.2 17.2 15.0 6.9 –5.2 –2.0 1.6 3.9 3.4 2.4 
Burkina Faso –11.0 –11.6 –9.5 –8.3 –11.5 –4.7 –2.3 –1.1 –4.2 –3.2 –4.0 
Burundi –6.3 –4.9 –21.5 –5.4 –1.0 1.8 –9.4 –11.4 –11.4 –10.7 –6.3 
 Cameroon –3.4 –3.4 1.6 1.4 –1.2 –3.6 –3.0 –4.1 –4.1 –3.8 –2.7 
Cape Verde –14.3 –3.5 –5.4 –14.7 –15.7 –15.6 –12.5 –12.5 –11.5 –8.9 –7.4 
Central African Republic –1.8 –6.5 –3.0 –6.2 –10.0 –9.2 –10.2 –8.7 –7.6 –6.3 –4.6 
Chad –17.1 1.2 5.9 11.6 9.0 –4.0 –3.5 2.0 –1.9 –2.0 –5.4 
Comoros –4.6 –7.4 –6.0 –5.7 –10.9 –7.8 –7.0 –9.5 –10.4 –9.6 –7.5 
 Democratic Republic of the Congo –3.0 –13.3 –2.7 –1.1 –17.5 –10.5 –8.1 –11.5 –12.5 –14.3 –8.4 
Republic of Congo –5.7 3.7 3.6 –6.5 2.3 –7.4 5.1 0.8 –0.6 –0.4 –11.9 
Côte d'Ivoire  1.6 0.2 2.8 –0.7 1.9 7.0 1.1 6.7 –3.1 –1.6 –4.7 
Equatorial Guinea –21.6 –6.2 7.7 4.0 –2.3 –17.7 –20.5 –6.0 –7.7 –7.7 –8.3 
Eritrea –0.7 0.3 –3.6 –6.1 –5.5 –7.6 –5.6 0.5 2.1 2.0 –3.0 
 Ethiopia –1.4 –6.3 –9.1 –4.5 –5.6 –5.0 –4.0 0.6 –6.1 –7.7 –5.9 
Gabon 11.2 22.9 15.6 17.0 24.2 6.3 9.1 10.6 9.1 4.1 1.9 
The Gambia –4.5 –10.3 –6.9 –8.3 –12.1 –12.3 –15.7 –14.2 –15.9 –14.2 –12.0 
Ghana –4.7 –7.0 –8.2 –8.7 –11.9 –5.4 –8.4 –9.2 –9.1 –7.0 –4.7 
Guinea –2.5 –1.0 –4.6 –11.7 –10.3 –9.9 –12.4 –16.3 –38.8 –39.2 0.2 
 Guinea-Bissau 1.4 –2.1 –5.6 –3.5 –4.9 –6.4 –8.3 –6.4 –3.5 –2.9 –1.6 
Kenya 0.1 –1.5 –2.3 –4.0 –6.6 –5.8 –6.5 –10.6 –8.5 –8.6 –5.6 
Lesotho 8.1 1.4 11.5 8.2 10.0 0.2 –12.1 –17.3 –11.2 –10.6 2.9 
Liberia –16.3 –30.3 –11.2 –22.4 –43.7 –29.2 –33.2 –34.6 –55.8 –71.0 –36.6 
Madagascar –10.6 –11.6 –9.9 –12.7 –20.6 –21.1 –9.7 –6.9 –7.9 –8.0 2.4 
 Malawi –11.2 –11.9 –11.3 1.0 –9.7 –4.8 –1.3 –5.9 –4.1 –1.4 –2.8 
Mali –7.9 –8.5 –4.1 –6.9 –12.2 –7.3 –12.6 –10.2 –5.4 –4.8 –8.6 
Mauritius –1.8 –5.0 –9.1 –5.4 –10.1 –7.4 –8.2 –10.3 –10.5 –9.1 –6.7 
Mozambique –10.7 –11.6 –10.7 –9.7 –11.9 –12.2 –11.7 –12.8 –11.6 –12.4 –8.8 
Namibia 7.0 4.7 13.8 9.1 2.8 –0.3 0.3 –1.7 –3.8 –4.5 0.8 
 Niger –7.3 –8.9 –8.6 –8.2 –13.0 –25.0 –21.1 –25.9 –26.3 –20.7 –11.8 
Nigeria 5.7 8.9 25.3 16.8 14.1 8.3 5.9 3.6 3.5 3.1 0.9 
Rwanda 1.8 1.0 –4.3 –2.2 –4.9 –7.3 –5.9 –7.3 –9.8 –9.9 –5.6 
São Tomé and Príncipe –16.0 –11.0 –25.8 –30.1 –22.0 –25.5 –27.6 –25.4 –22.8 –24.5 14.9 
Senegal –6.9 –8.9 –9.2 –11.6 –14.1 –6.7 –4.4 –6.4 –8.5 –6.9 –6.3 
 Seychelles –9.1 –22.2 –15.8 –15.3 –20.2 –9.8 –20.1 –21.5 –19.8 –19.5 –10.1 
Sierra Leone –4.4 –5.3 –4.3 –4.3 –9.1 –6.5 –19.3 –52.3 –13.1 –9.3 –6.6 
South Africa –3.0 –3.5 –5.3 –7.0 –7.2 –4.0 –2.8 –3.3 –5.5 –5.8 –5.9 
South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 21.6 –12.6 5.8 –4.1 
Swaziland 3.1 –4.1 –7.4 –2.2 –8.2 –14.0 –10.5 –9.1 0.1 –5.4 –4.0 
 Tanzania –2.3 –6.6 –9.6 –11.0 –10.2 –9.8 –9.3 –13.7 –15.4 –13.4 –8.4 
Togo –10.0 –9.9 –8.4 –8.7 –6.8 –6.6 –6.7 –7.2 –8.8 –9.1 –7.2 
Uganda 0.1 –1.3 –3.1 –2.9 –5.7 –9.4 –10.2 –11.4 –11.0 –11.7 –8.7 
Zambia –10.4 –8.5 –0.4 –6.5 –7.2 4.2 7.1 1.2 –1.8 –1.1 1.8 
Zimbabwe 5 –8.0 –10.3 –8.0 –6.7 –21.6 –22.2 –28.8 –36.2 –20.4 –20.0 –18.4 
 
1 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in 
economic structure.  
2 Calculations are based on Argentina’s official GDP data. See footnote to Table A4. 
3 Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan. 
4 Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward due to the uncertain political situation. 
5 The Zimbabwe dollar ceased circulating in early 2009. Data are based on IMF staff estimates of price and exchange rate developments in U.S. dollars. IMF staff estimates 
of U.S. dollar values may differ from authorities’ estimates. 
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 Table A13. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Net Financial Flows 1 
(Billions of U.S. dollars) 
Average Projections 
2001–03 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 
Private Financial Flows, Net 113.0 267.7 316.0 314.7 694.4 264.5 337.1 604.7 503.0 268.3 399.6 
Private Direct Investment, Net 157.1 191.9 293.2 303.7 440.8 484.8 317.0 392.0 462.4 393.8 409.0 
Private Portfolio Flows, Net –11.9 68.8 38.0 –28.5 108.6 –61.9 124.8 240.8 129.7 133.0 150.9 
Other Private Financial Flows, Net –32.2 7.0 –15.2 39.5 145.0 –158.4 –104.7 –28.1 –89.1 –258.6 –160.2 
Official Financial Flows, Net 2 –14.6 –94.5 –88.2 –188.8 –84.3 –104.2 100.6 62.8 –108.3 –51.8 –89.2 
Change in Reserves 3 –182.3 –422.4 –592.8 –756.0 –1,210.2 –723.4 –522.7 –862.9 –765.3 –565.7 –632.3 
 Memorandum     
Current Account 4 93.0 206.4 416.9 639.5 629.6 673.7 291.8 336.2 481.2 361.8 310.1 
 Central and Eastern Europe     
Private Financial Flows, Net 23.5 49.4 102.1 117.4 182.5 153.5 25.6 78.9 88.9 79.6 82.7 
Private Direct Investment, Net 14.4 30.6 37.8 64.1 74.7 67.5 30.7 21.4 35.6 33.1 39.0 
Private Portfolio Flows, Net 2.4 15.6 20.8 0.8 –4.1 –10.4 8.5 26.8 30.8 19.9 22.7 
Other Private Financial Flows, Net 6.8 3.2 43.5 52.5 111.8 96.4 –13.7 30.7 22.5 26.6 21.0 
Official Flows, Net 2 5.5 9.9 3.3 5.2 –6.2 20.5 48.8 35.6 26.9 10.5 4.8 
Change in Reserves 3 –6.9 –12.8 –43.6 –32.3 –36.4 –4.1 –29.0 –36.8 –14.7 –13.0 –1.0 
 Commonwealth of Independent States 5     
Private Financial Flows, Net 6.8 5.6 29.1 51.6 129.7 –97.8 –62.9 –22.8 –64.4 –55.9 –39.5 
Private Direct Investment, Net 5.1 13.2 11.7 21.4 28.3 50.6 16.2 10.3 17.6 7.9 10.4 
Private Portfolio Flows, Net  1.6 4.7 3.9 4.9 19.5 –31.7 –9.3 10.1 –29.0 –5.5 –3.3 
Other Private Financial Flows, Net 0.0 –12.3 13.5 25.4 82.0 –116.8 –69.8 –43.2 –53.0 –58.3 –46.5 
Official Flows, Net 2 –1.3 –10.1 –18.3 –25.4 –5.9 –19.0 42.4 0.4 –16.5 –19.7 –20.6 
Change in Reserves 3 –20.7 –54.9 –77.1 –127.9 –168.0 27.0 –7.9 –53.0 –24.7 –29.3 –19.2 
 Developing Asia     
Private Financial Flows, Net 53.6 161.3 128.4 94.4 205.0 80.4 192.3 407.4 302.6 113.3 182.5 
Private Direct Investment, Net 55.0 68.3 131.9 131.6 175.3 169.6 104.0 223.7 217.9 166.9 162.8 
Private Portfolio Flows, Net –2.9 38.7 16.0 –45.1 68.4 9.7 57.8 101.2 41.6 42.4 52.3 
Other Private Financial Flows, Net 1.5 54.2 –19.5 7.9 –38.7 –98.9 30.5 82.6 43.2 –96.0 –32.6 
Official Flows, Net 2 –9.2 –18.2 –1.7 3.5 6.3 –5.7 24.5 23.1 14.9 7.6 7.7 
Change in Reserves 3 –120.7 –245.8 –281.4 –360.9 –611.2 –492.5 –467.1 –573.9 –452.6 –241.8 –352.5 
 Latin America and the Caribbean     
Private Financial Flows, Net 26.4 7.9 40.3 30.1 85.8 79.5 74.3 126.2 186.4 131.0 125.3 
Private Direct Investment, Net 53.6 50.5 57.4 33.0 91.2 98.7 69.9 76.1 128.2 122.5 121.6 
Private Portfolio Flows, Net –8.7 –15.9 0.8 8.6 32.7 –5.3 33.4 59.4 49.9 16.6 22.2 
Other Private Financial Flows, Net –18.5 –26.8 –17.9 –11.5 –38.2 –13.9 –29.1 –9.2 8.3 –8.1 –18.6 
Official Flows, Net 2 16.7 –2.2 –35.6 –49.4 1.4 –4.7 40.2 48.1 21.2 62.9 55.5 
Change in Reserves 3 –10.3 –24.5 –36.0 –53.2 –134.9 –50.8 –50.4 –104.8 –119.7 –70.0 –54.2 
 Middle East and North Africa     
Private Financial Flows, Net 1.2 32.7 –2.3 13.4 72.3 38.4 90.3 28.2 –16.8 –22.3 13.4 
Private Direct Investment, Net 15.4 17.6 35.9 45.0 48.9 59.4 64.0 37.7 26.7 29.3 33.6 
Private Portfolio Flows, Net –0.3 23.2 –3.5 –3.9 –8.3 3.8 37.4 44.6 45.1 53.6 50.9 
Other Private Financial Flows, Net –14.0 –8.1 –34.7 –27.8 31.6 –24.8 –11.1 –54.0 –88.6 –105.2 –71.1 
Official Flows, Net 2 –26.8 –73.6 –30.5 –88.8 –79.2 –106.7 –68.6 –73.7 –182.6 –143.9 –163.4 
Change in Reserves 3 –23.2 –65.8 –131.4 –152.6 –231.0 –186.1 23.6 –91.5 –131.6 –194.9 –183.9 
 Sub-Saharan Africa     
Private Financial Flows, Net 1.5 10.9 18.4 7.7 19.0 10.6 17.5 –13.2 6.2 22.6 35.2 
Private Direct Investment, Net 13.6 11.7 18.5 8.6 22.3 39.0 32.1 22.9 36.5 34.1 41.6 
Private Portfolio Flows, Net –4.0 2.5 0.0 6.2 0.3 –28.1 –3.1 –1.3 –8.7 6.0 6.2 
Other Private Financial Flows, Net –8.1 –3.3 –0.2 –7.1 –3.6 –0.3 –11.5 –34.8 –21.6 –17.6 –12.5 
Official Flows, Net 2 0.6 –0.4 –5.3 –33.9 –0.8 11.3 13.2 29.4 27.9 30.7 26.8 
Change in Reserves 3 –0.4 –18.6 –23.4 –29.2 –28.6 –17.0 7.9 –2.8 –22.2 –16.7 –21.6 
 Memorandum     
Fuel Exporting Countries 
Private Financial Flows, Net –2.7 26.6 –3.6 25.4 124.0 –142.9 –30.3 –73.5 –142.6 –161.2 –108.1 
 Other Countries     
Private Financial Flows, Net 115.7 241.1 319.6 289.4 570.4 407.4 367.4 678.2 645.7 429.5 507.7 
1 Net financial flows comprise net direct investment, net portfolio investment, other net official and private financial flows, and changes in reserves. 
2 Excludes grants and includes transactions in external assets and liabilities of official agencies. 
3 A minus sign indicates an increase. 
4 The sum of the current account balance, net private financial flows, net official flows, and the change in reserves equals, with the opposite sign, the sum of the capital 
account and errors and omissions.  
5 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons f geography and similarities in 
economic structure.  
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 Table A14. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Private Financial Flows 1 
(Billions of U.S. dollars) 
Average Projections 
2001–03 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 
Private Financial Flows, Net 113.0 267.7 316.0 314.7 694.4 264.5 337.1 604.7 503.0 268.3 399.6 
Assets –100.0 –258.7 –343.6 –616.5 –823.4 –582.3 –287.2 –610.7 –624.2 –680.9 –610.5 
Liabilities 212.6 525.5 652.9 927.9 1,511.8 848.3 623.5 1,213.5 1,126.7 948.9 1,008.4 
 Central and Eastern Europe    
Private Financial Flows, Net 23.5 49.4 102.1 117.4 182.5 153.5 25.6 78.9 88.9 79.6 82.7 
Assets –6.9 –30.0 –17.8 –56.4 –44.5 –29.3 –10.3 –6.9 8.3 3.7 5.2 
Liabilities 30.5 79.4 119.8 173.5 226.1 182.0 36.5 86.0 80.9 76.1 77.8 
 Commonwealth of Independent States 2    
Private Financial Flows, Net 6.8 5.6 29.1 51.6 129.7 –97.8 –62.9 –22.8 –64.4 –55.9 –39.5 
Assets –20.6 –53.1 –80.5 –100.3 –160.8 –265.2 –73.9 –104.0 –170.4 –171.8 –162.8 
Liabilities 27.4 58.5 109.4 152.0 290.4 167.5 11.2 81.1 105.9 115.9 123.3 
 Developing Asia    
Private Financial Flows, Net 53.6 161.3 128.4 94.4 205.0 80.4 192.3 407.4 302.6 113.3 182.5 
Assets –18.9 –54.8 –121.4 –224.6 –254.0 –167.5 –96.3 –253.5 –281.3 –377.9 –311.4 
Liabilities 72.6 215.1 244.3 315.8 453.4 251.3 287.3 659.6 584.3 491.9 493.6 
 Latin America and the Caribbean    
Private Financial Flows, Net 26.4 7.9 40.3 30.1 85.8 79.5 74.3 126.2 186.4 131.0 125.3 
Assets –31.5 –45.3 –50.1 –91.4 –114.5 –74.5 –98.3 –167.1 –113.3 –84.7 –82.2 
Liabilities 57.0 53.0 89.3 121.5 200.4 153.0 172.3 292.3 299.2 214.7 206.5 
 Middle East and North Africa    
Private Financial Flows, Net 1.2 32.7 –2.3 13.4 72.3 38.4 90.3 28.2 –16.8 –22.3 13.4 
Assets –13.4 –64.0 –57.8 –115.7 –215.8 –27.8 6.7 –50.9 –42.5 –22.1 –28.4 
Liabilities 14.5 96.7 55.5 129.1 288.1 66.2 83.6 79.1 25.7 –0.2 41.8 
 Sub-Saharan Africa    
Private Financial Flows, Net 1.5 10.9 18.4 7.7 19.0 10.6 17.5 –13.2 6.2 22.6 35.2 
Assets –8.7 –11.5 –15.9 –28.1 –33.9 –18.0 –15.0 –28.2 –25.0 –28.0 –30.9 
Liabilities 10.5 22.7 34.6 36.0 53.3 28.4 32.7 15.2 30.7 50.5 65.5 
 
1 Private financial flows comprise direct investment, portfolio investment, and other long- and short-term investment flows. 
2 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in 
economic structure.  
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 Table A15. Summary of Sources and Uses of World Savings 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
Averages Average 
1990–97 1998–2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014–17 
World 
Savings 22.1 21.7 24.0 24.3 24.2 21.8 23.1 23.9 24.0 24.6 25.5 
Investment 22.9 21.9 23.2 23.8 23.8 21.7 22.7 23.4 23.9 24.4 25.4 
 Advanced Economies     
Savings 21.7 20.5 20.9 20.8 19.8 17.1 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.7 19.6 
Investment 22.2 21.1 21.6 21.6 21.0 17.7 18.4 18.7 18.8 19.1 20.1 
Net Lending –0.5 –0.6 –0.7 –0.9 –1.2 –0.6 –0.3 –0.4 –0.5 –0.4 –0.4 
Current Transfers –0.4 –0.6 –0.7 –0.8 –0.8 –0.9 –0.9 –0.9 –0.8 –0.8 –0.8 
Factor Income –0.5 0.4 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Resource Balance 0.5 –0.3 –1.0 –0.5 –0.8 0.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 
 United States     
Savings 16.0 16.3 16.4 14.6 13.4 11.1 12.2 12.2 13.1 13.7 15.5 
Investment 18.3 19.8 20.6 19.6 18.1 14.7 15.5 15.5 16.2 16.8 18.8 
Net Lending –2.3 –3.5 –4.2 –5.0 –4.7 –3.6 –3.3 –3.3 –3.1 –3.1 –3.3 
Current Transfers –0.5 –0.6 –0.7 –0.8 –0.9 –0.9 –0.9 –0.9 –0.8 –0.8 –0.7 
Factor Income –0.7 1.0 2.2 0.8 1.0 0.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 
Resource Balance –1.1 –3.9 –5.6 –5.0 –4.9 –2.7 –3.4 –3.7 –3.7 –3.7 –3.8 
 Euro Area     
Savings . . . 21.5 22.4 23.0 21.5 19.0 19.6 20.0 19.9 20.0 20.6 
Investment . . . 21.0 21.9 22.6 22.2 18.8 19.2 19.5 18.7 18.7 19.0 
Net Lending . . . 0.5 0.5 0.4 –0.7 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.6 
Current Transfers 1 –0.6 –0.8 –1.0 –1.1 –1.1 –1.2 –1.3 –1.2 –1.1 –1.1 –1.1 
Factor Income 1 –0.6 –0.4 0.3 –0.2 –0.6 –0.1 0.2 0.1 –0.2 –0.4 –0.5 
Resource Balance 1 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.5 2.8 3.2 
 Germany     
Savings 21.9 20.9 24.4 26.7 25.5 22.4 23.5 23.9 23.4 22.5 22.1 
Investment 22.8 19.6 18.1 19.3 19.3 16.5 17.5 18.3 18.0 17.9 17.8 
Net Lending –0.9 1.2 6.3 7.4 6.2 5.9 6.0 5.7 5.4 4.7 4.3 
Current Transfers –1.6 –1.3 –1.2 –1.3 –1.3 –1.4 –1.5 –1.3 –1.4 –1.4 –1.4 
Factor Income 0.0 –0.2 1.9 1.8 1.3 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.8 
Resource Balance 0.6 2.7 5.6 7.0 6.2 4.9 5.6 5.1 5.4 5.1 4.9 
 France     
Savings 19.1 20.5 20.3 21.0 20.2 17.6 17.7 18.7 18.5 18.4 19.5 
Investment 18.5 19.1 20.9 22.0 21.9 19.0 19.3 20.6 20.2 20.1 20.4 
Net Lending 0.6 1.4 –0.6 –1.0 –1.7 –1.3 –1.6 –1.9 –1.7 –1.7 –0.9 
Current Transfers –0.7 –1.0 –1.2 –1.2 –1.3 –1.8 –1.7 –1.8 –1.4 –1.4 –1.4 
Factor Income –0.3 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Resource Balance 1.6 1.3 –1.0 –1.4 –2.2 –1.3 –1.9 –2.2 –1.8 –1.7 –1.0 
 Italy     
Savings 20.8 20.8 20.3 20.9 18.7 16.8 16.7 16.4 16.9 17.4 18.6 
Investment 20.6 20.7 21.8 22.1 21.6 18.9 20.2 19.6 18.4 18.8 19.7 
Net Lending 0.2 0.1 –1.5 –1.2 –2.9 –2.1 –3.6 –3.3 –1.5 –1.4 –1.1 
Current Transfers –0.5 –0.5 –0.9 –0.9 –1.0 –0.9 –1.1 –1.0 –1.0 –1.0 –1.0 
Factor Income –1.7 –0.6 0.2 –0.1 –1.2 –0.7 –0.5 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 
Resource Balance 2.5 1.2 –0.8 –0.3 –0.7 –0.5 –1.9 –1.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 
 Japan     
Savings 31.7 26.7 26.6 27.8 26.3 22.6 23.5 21.9 21.9 22.9 23.0 
Investment 29.7 23.8 22.7 22.9 23.0 19.7 19.8 19.9 20.3 20.6 20.7 
Net Lending 2.0 2.9 3.9 4.9 3.3 2.9 3.7 2.0 1.6 2.3 2.2 
Current Transfers –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 
Factor Income 0.8 1.6 2.7 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.6 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 
Resource Balance 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.9 0.4 0.5 1.4 –0.7 –1.2 –0.4 –0.4 
 United Kingdom     
Savings 15.8 15.4 14.5 16.0 16.1 12.9 12.5 12.9 11.4 12.1 14.7 
Investment 17.1 17.4 17.4 18.3 17.1 14.1 15.0 14.8 14.7 14.9 16.1 
Net Lending –1.2 –2.0 –2.9 –2.3 –1.0 –1.3 –2.5 –1.9 –3.3 –2.7 –1.4 
Current Transfers –0.7 –0.9 –0.9 –1.0 –1.0 –1.1 –1.4 –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 
Factor Income –0.4 0.9 0.6 1.3 2.2 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Resource Balance –0.1 –2.1 –2.6 –2.7 –2.3 –1.5 –2.1 –1.6 –2.4 –1.8 –0.5 
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 Table A15. Summary of Sources and Uses of World Savings (continued) 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
Averages Average 
1990–97 1998–2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014–17 
Canada 
Savings 16.5 21.7 24.4 24.1 23.6 17.9 19.1 20.0 20.3 20.7 21.4 
Investment 19.0 20.3 23.0 23.2 23.2 20.9 22.2 22.8 23.7 24.4 24.8 
Net Lending –2.5 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.3 –3.0 –3.1 –2.8 –3.4 –3.7 –3.4 
Current Transfers –0.1 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 
Factor Income –3.6 –2.7 –0.9 –0.9 –1.1 –1.0 –1.0 –1.3 –1.2 –1.2 –1.7 
Resource Balance 1.1 4.1 2.4 1.9 1.5 –1.8 –2.0 –1.3 –2.0 –2.4 –1.5 
 Newly Industrialized Asian Economies     
Savings 34.6 32.2 32.5 33.4 32.6 31.2 33.7 32.6 31.5 31.5 30.7 
Investment 32.7 26.5 26.4 26.2 27.6 23.5 26.4 25.9 25.8 26.0 25.9 
Net Lending 1.9 5.7 6.1 7.2 4.9 7.7 7.3 6.6 5.6 5.5 4.8 
Current Transfers –0.1 –0.5 –0.7 –0.7 –0.6 –0.6 –0.8 –0.8 –0.9 –0.9 –0.8 
Factor Income 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Resource Balance 1.2 5.9 6.2 7.2 4.7 7.7 7.2 6.6 5.7 5.5 4.7 
 Emerging Market and Developing Economies     
Savings 23.7 26.3 32.8 33.3 33.7 32.0 32.5 33.7 33.3 33.6 33.6 
Investment 26.2 25.1 27.9 29.2 30.1 30.5 31.0 31.8 32.1 32.6 32.9 
Net Lending –1.9 1.2 4.9 4.1 3.5 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.0 0.6 
Current Transfers 0.6 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 
Factor Income –1.7 –2.0 –1.8 –1.5 –1.5 –1.6 –1.8 –1.8 –1.6 –1.5 –1.1 
Resource Balance –0.8 1.8 5.1 4.0 3.6 1.7 2.1 2.6 1.8 1.5 0.7 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  1.7 4.8 10.5 12.6 6.9 5.0 7.0 6.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 
Change in Reserves 1.1 2.5 5.9 7.7 3.8 2.9 4.0 3.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 
 Regional Groups     
 Central and Eastern Europe     
Savings 20.3 17.3 16.2 17.3 17.5 15.3 15.4 17.1 16.0 16.5 16.7 
Investment 22.0 21.0 23.4 24.7 25.0 18.9 20.5 23.1 21.1 21.5 22.2 
Net Lending –1.6 –3.7 –7.2 –7.4 –7.5 –3.6 –5.2 –6.0 –5.2 –5.0 –5.6 
Current Transfers 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 
Factor Income –1.2 –1.4 –2.7 –1.9 –1.6 –2.9 –2.8 –2.4 –2.6 –2.4 –2.3 
Resource Balance –2.3 –4.5 –6.3 –7.1 –7.5 –2.6 –4.0 –5.3 –4.3 –4.3 –4.7 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  0.9 2.7 6.1 4.8 1.7 1.7 2.7 –0.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 
Change in Reserves 0.4 1.4 2.5 2.2 0.2 1.8 2.1 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.4 
Commonwealth of Independent States 2     
Savings . . . 27.1 30.2 30.7 30.1 21.9 25.7 28.2 27.9 28.3 25.7 
Investment . . . 20.2 23.0 26.7 25.2 19.1 21.9 23.6 23.6 25.3 25.3 
Net Lending . . . 6.9 7.3 4.0 4.8 2.8 3.8 4.6 4.3 3.0 0.3 
Current Transfers . . . 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Factor Income . . . –3.0 –3.3 –2.9 –3.4 –3.6 –3.7 –4.0 –3.3 –3.1 –2.3 
Resource Balance . . . 9.2 10.3 6.8 8.0 5.7 7.1 8.3 7.4 5.8 2.4 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  . . . 9.3 14.9 17.5 10.0 1.5 6.1 6.2 5.5 4.2 3.2 
Change in Reserves . . . 4.0 9.8 9.8 –1.2 0.5 2.7 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.4 
 Developing Asia     
Savings 31.6 34.3 42.6 43.6 43.8 45.2 43.9 43.6 43.0 43.1 43.3 
Investment 33.6 32.0 37.0 36.9 38.3 41.4 41.4 41.9 42.1 42.0 41.5 
Net Lending –2.0 2.4 5.5 6.6 5.4 3.7 2.4 1.6 0.9 1.0 1.8 
Current Transfers 1.0 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.7 
Factor Income –1.7 –1.5 –0.9 –0.5 –0.3 –0.5 –1.0 –0.7 –0.7 –0.5 –0.4 
Resource Balance –1.3 2.1 4.3 4.9 3.7 2.4 1.7 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.5 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  3.2 5.4 11.1 13.4 7.6 6.9 8.7 6.2 4.1 3.9 4.0 
Change in Reserves 1.8 3.8 7.5 10.1 6.6 5.9 6.0 3.9 1.9 2.5 3.1 
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 Table A15. Summary of Sources and Uses of World Savings (continued) 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
Averages Average 
1990–97 1998–2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014–17 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Savings 18.8 19.1 23.3 23.0 22.9 20.0 20.5 21.0 20.5 20.7 20.8 
Investment 21.0 20.5 21.7 22.6 23.8 20.6 21.8 22.6 22.4 22.7 23.2 
Net Lending –2.2 –1.4 1.6 0.4 –0.9 –0.5 –1.3 –1.6 –1.9 –2.0 –2.4 
Current Transfers 0.9 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Factor Income –2.5 –3.0 –3.1 –2.7 –2.7 –2.5 –2.6 –2.8 –2.5 –2.6 –2.5 
Resource Balance –0.5 0.1 2.6 1.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 –0.5 –0.6 –1.1 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  1.3 2.3 3.1 5.7 2.3 4.6 5.3 4.7 2.6 1.8 1.0 
Change in Reserves 0.9 0.5 1.7 3.6 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.4 
 Middle East and North Africa     
Savings 22.4 29.9 41.0 40.9 43.0 31.4 35.4 40.7 38.3 37.5 34.9 
Investment 24.4 23.4 22.9 26.7 27.6 29.0 27.7 26.6 26.1 27.0 27.5 
Net Lending –2.0 6.6 18.3 14.6 15.1 3.0 8.1 14.5 12.8 10.8 7.4 
Current Transfers –2.5 –1.0 –0.4 –0.9 –0.8 –1.5 –1.3 –1.5 –1.5 –1.8 –2.0 
Factor Income 1.1 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.1 –0.3 –0.3 –0.1 0.0 1.2 
Resource Balance –0.6 7.3 18.1 14.6 15.6 3.9 9.4 16.1 14.0 12.4 8.2 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  –0.2 9.2 23.9 28.0 15.8 4.7 9.3 13.1 10.8 10.5 7.7 
Change in Reserves 0.8 3.6 9.6 12.4 8.0 –1.1 3.8 4.8 6.6 5.9 4.2 
 Sub-Saharan Africa     
Savings 15.5 16.8 24.8 23.4 21.9 19.3 20.2 19.2 18.8 18.9 18.9 
Investment 16.8 19.0 20.6 21.9 22.0 22.4 21.4 21.1 22.0 22.2 22.8 
Net Lending –1.4 –2.2 4.1 1.5 0.0 –3.1 –1.2 –1.8 –3.2 –3.2 –3.9 
Current Transfers 1.9 2.3 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3 
Factor Income –3.1 –4.8 –4.0 –5.4 –6.1 –4.5 –4.8 –5.5 –5.3 –5.4 –4.7 
Resource Balance 0.0 0.3 3.5 2.3 1.3 –3.4 –0.1 0.0 –1.5 –1.2 –2.5 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  1.1 2.3 8.3 7.5 3.8 2.5 3.3 2.6 3.1 3.6 3.5 
Change in Reserves 0.9 1.2 4.1 3.4 1.8 –0.9 0.3 1.8 1.3 1.6 1.1 
 Analytical Groups     
 By Source of Export Earnings     
 Fuel Exporters     
Savings 22.9 30.4 39.5 38.5 38.9 28.7 32.2 36.4 35.0 34.4 30.7 
Investment 26.0 22.7 22.7 26.5 25.6 24.7 24.5 24.7 24.7 25.8 25.8 
Net Lending –1.2 7.7 16.8 12.2 13.0 4.3 7.8 11.7 10.5 8.6 4.7 
Current Transfers –3.5 –1.6 –0.4 –0.7 –0.6 –1.0 –1.0 –1.0 –1.1 –1.2 –1.2 
Factor Income –0.2 –1.9 –1.7 –1.6 –2.2 –2.2 –2.5 –2.9 –2.5 –2.3 –1.1 
Resource Balance 2.6 11.2 19.1 14.6 16.1 7.2 11.3 15.7 13.9 12.1 7.3 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  0.3 10.0 21.0 23.5 14.2 3.7 8.0 11.0 9.3 8.3 5.6 
Change in Reserves 0.2 3.7 10.2 10.9 3.7 –1.5 3.0 3.5 4.6 3.7 2.3 
 Nonfuel Exporters     
Savings 23.8 25.4 30.9 31.8 32.1 32.9 32.6 33.0 32.9 33.4 34.3 
Investment 25.9 25.7 29.3 30.0 31.5 31.9 32.6 33.6 34.0 34.3 34.6 
Net Lending –2.1 –0.3 1.6 1.8 0.7 1.0 0.0 –0.7 –1.1 –0.9 –0.4 
Current Transfers 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Factor Income –2.0 –2.0 –1.9 –1.5 –1.3 –1.4 –1.7 –1.5 –1.4 –1.3 –1.1 
Resource Balance –1.5 –0.2 1.1 1.0 –0.2 0.3 –0.2 –0.8 –1.3 –1.3 –0.9 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  1.9 3.7 7.4 9.4 4.6 5.3 6.8 4.7 3.1 2.8 2.9 
Change in Reserves 1.3 2.2 4.6 6.7 3.8 4.0 4.2 2.9 1.4 1.8 2.1 
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 Table A15. Summary of Sources and Uses of World Savings (concluded) 
(Percent of GDP) 
Projections 
Averages Average 
1990–97 1998–2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014–17 
By External Financing Source 
 Net Debtor Economies     
Savings 19.2 19.4 22.4 22.9 21.9 20.8 21.2 21.4 21.0 21.4 22.3 
Investment 21.5 21.4 24.1 25.5 25.7 23.1 24.0 24.5 24.5 24.8 25.7 
Net Lending –2.3 –2.0 –1.8 –2.6 –3.9 –2.3 –2.8 –3.2 –3.5 –3.4 –3.3 
Current Transfers 1.8 2.6 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 
Factor Income –2.0 –2.3 –2.6 –2.3 –2.3 –2.3 –2.4 –2.5 –2.4 –2.4 –2.4 
Resource Balance –2.1 –2.3 –2.2 –3.2 –4.5 –2.9 –3.1 –3.3 –3.7 –3.6 –3.5 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  1.1 2.3 4.2 5.8 1.5 2.9 3.9 2.5 1.5 1.2 1.2 
Change in Reserves 0.9 1.1 2.5 3.9 0.7 1.5 2.0 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 
 Official Financing     
Savings 17.3 19.3 22.9 23.5 21.7 21.7 22.3 22.6 22.1 22.7 22.7 
Investment 19.9 21.6 23.6 23.6 24.0 23.4 24.2 25.1 26.0 26.0 26.3 
Net Lending –2.6 –2.4 –0.7 –0.1 –2.4 –1.6 –1.9 –2.4 –3.9 –3.3 –3.6 
Current Transfers 4.7 7.5 10.6 11.4 11.1 11.0 11.0 11.9 11.8 11.5 10.5 
Factor Income –2.8 –3.0 –2.6 –1.1 –1.6 –1.7 –1.6 –2.1 –2.6 –3.2 –3.6 
Resource Balance –4.6 –7.0 –8.7 –10.3 –11.7 –10.9 –11.2 –12.2 –13.1 –11.7 –10.5 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  1.4 1.6 0.6 3.8 1.6 2.8 2.7 2.8 0.9 1.8 1.4 
Change in Reserves 1.4 1.2 1.0 2.1 0.9 1.9 2.0 1.1 0.1 1.4 1.5 
 Net Debtor Economies by Debt-Servicing Experience            
 Economies with Arrears and/or Rescheduling during 2006–10            
Savings 15.0 17.0 22.7 22.1 21.1 18.9 19.4 19.4 18.9 19.6 19.8 
Investment 18.9 19.0 23.1 24.0 24.7 21.7 23.7 24.6 24.5 24.5 24.5 
Net Lending –3.8 –2.0 –0.4 –1.9 –3.6 –2.9 –4.3 –5.2 –5.6 –4.9 –4.7 
Current Transfers 1.7 3.9 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.4 
Factor Income –3.5 –4.1 –3.0 –2.9 –3.4 –3.2 –3.9 –4.1 –4.0 –3.8 –3.5 
Resource Balance –2.1 –1.9 –3.1 –4.1 –4.9 –4.5 –4.8 –4.9 –5.3 –4.7 –4.6 
 Memorandum     
Acquisition of Foreign Assets  2.8 2.7 3.5 6.0 1.3 1.4 3.0 3.0 0.8 1.0 0.5 
Change in Reserves 0.8 0.7 2.0 3.9 0.6 1.8 1.4 0.2 –0.2 0.5 0.5 
 
Note: The estimates in this table are based on individual countries' national accounts and balance of payments statistics. Country group composites are calculated as the sum 
of the U.S. dollar values for the relevant individual countries. This differs from the calculations in the April 2005 and earlier issues of the World Economic Outlook, where the 
composites were weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parities as a share of total world GDP. For many countries, the estimates of national savings are built up from 
national accounts data on gross domestic investment and from balance-of-payments-based data on net foreign investment. The latter, which is equivalent to the current 
account balance, comprises three components: current transfers, net factor income, and the resource balance. The mixing of data sources, which is dictated by availability, 
implies that the estimates for national savings that are derived incorporate the statistical discrepancies. Furthermore, errors, omissions, and asymmetries in balance of 
payments statistics affect the estimates for net lending; at the global level, net lending, which in theory would be zero, equals the world current account discrepancy. Despite 
these statistical shortcomings, flow of funds estimates, such as those presented in these tables, provide a useful framework for analyzing development in savings and 
investment, both over time and across regions and countries. 
1 Calculated from the data of individual Euro Area countries. 
2 Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic 
structure.  
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 Table A16. Summary of World Medium-Term Baseline Scenario 
                                                      Projections 
Averages Averages 
                                1994–2001 2002–09 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010–13 2014–17 
                                     Annual Percent Change  
 World Real GDP 3.5 3.6 5.1 3.8 3.3 3.6 4.0 4.4 
Advanced Economies 3.1 1.5 3.0 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.5 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.2 6.4 7.4 6.2 5.3 5.6 6.1 6.1 
 Memorandum   
Potential Output 
Major Advanced Economies 2.5 1.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.7 
 World Trade, Volume 1 7.4 4.5 12.6 5.8 3.2 4.5 6.5 6.1 
Imports 
Advanced Economies 7.8 2.9 11.4 4.4 1.7 3.3 5.1 5.1 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 6.9 8.8 14.9 8.8 7.0 6.6 9.3 7.8 
Exports 
Advanced Economies 7.0 3.4 12.0 5.3 2.2 3.6 5.7 5.2 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.3 7.2 13.7 6.5 4.0 5.7 7.4 7.5 
Terms of Trade 
Advanced Economies 0.0 0.0 –0.9 –1.6 –0.8 0.1 –0.8 –0.1 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 0.7 1.7 2.3 3.5 0.5 –0.4 1.4 –0.6 
 World Prices in U.S. Dollars   
Manufactures –0.8 2.7 2.7 6.5 –0.5 –0.3 2.1 0.3 
Oil 4.7 12.4 27.9 31.6 2.1 –1.0 14.2 –4.1 
Nonfuel Primary Commodities –1.4 6.7 26.3 17.8 –9.5 –2.9 6.9 –2.5 
 Consumer Prices   
Advanced Economies 2.1 2.0 1.5 2.7 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.9 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 23.3 6.5 6.1 7.2 6.1 5.8 6.3 4.9 
 Interest Rates    Percent     
Real Six-Month LIBOR 2 3.7 0.5 –0.8 –1.6 –1.0 –0.8 –1.1 0.4 
World Real Long-Term Interest Rate 3 3.5 1.9 1.6 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.8 2.1 
 Balances on Current Account   Percent of GDP     
Advanced Economies –0.2 –0.8 0.0 –0.2 –0.4 –0.3 –0.2 –0.3 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies –0.6 2.9 1.5 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.5 0.7 
 Total External Debt   
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 37.0 30.2 25.4 24.0 24.4 24.1 24.5 23.1 
 Debt Service   
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.8 9.9 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.6 8.3 8.5 
 
1 Data refer to trade in goods and services. 
2 London interbank offered rate on U.S. dollar deposits minus percent change in U.S. GDP deflator. 
3 GDP-weighted average of 10-year (or nearest maturity) government bond rates for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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